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Abstract
	 The thesis  is  composed of  two sections.    The first  provides a  critical 
overview of the published work assembled in the second. This body of work is 
composed  of  journal  articles,  monographs,  papers  published  in  educated 
collections  and  research  reports.   Though  these  papers  address  a  range  of 
different subjects from street robbery, the culture of gun users to the study of 
urban street gangs, what unifies these papers is that they collectively help make 
sense of the violent street world occupied by young men, overwhelmingly from 
deprived  backgrounds,  who  use  weapons,  collectively  and  individually,   in 
street confrontations.   In the critical analysis the term violent street world is 
defined  and  the  body  of  published  work  which  examines  it  is  then 
contextualised; first, by a consideration of the external political and social forces 
that  led  to  its  production;  second,  by  reference  to  the  internal  academic 
traditions in which and at times against which these papers were produced. 
Rather than approach the study of the street world by reference to the actors 
who inhabit it, the crimes they do or the weapons they use, the thesis makes a 
case for making the street world itself the object and focus of enquiry.  The street 
world is then studied thematically in four chapters.  The themes selected are: 
street crime in a historical context, the aetiology of street violence, the structure 
and  organisation  of  the  street  world  and  the  distinction  between  street 
representations and street realities.  The analysis concludes with reflections on 
the key contributions the work assembled has made to our understanding of 
violent street worlds and their social analysis.  The work is original in so far as it 
contests many current myths that have been proposed to explain street violence 
while producing more compelling explanations for it.  These help explicate why 
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the violence occurs,  how and why it  is  changing,  who is  involved and why 
people engage in it. 
Key words: Gang, street culture, guns, knives, weapons
Word count:   112,328 words  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Section 1. Critical Analysis
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Introduction
This document introduces the published work submitted in support of 
this  thesis.   These  papers,  derived  variously  from  journal  articles,  research 
reports,  chapters  in  edited  collections  and  sole  authored  monographs,  were 
written over the last two decades.   At face value they cover a diverse array of 
subjects  from street  robbery,  urban street  gangs  to  the  culture  of  gun users. 
What unifies this body of work is that they collectively help make sense of what 
I will term the violent street world inhabited largely but not exclusively by young 
men; primarily those who derive from poor and deprived backgrounds; who 
confront and perpetrate violence in street settings.  The environments where the 
violence is predominantly performed are the areas these young men inhabit and 
frequent; typically areas subject to multiple types of deprivation and poverty.  In 
the case of the UK where the research for this thesis was principally conducted, 
this  violence  finds  its  most  visceral  expression  in  the  inner  city  areas  of  its 
metropolitan cities. 
The critical narrative has two sections.  In the first (Chapter 2)  I situate 
the published work within a consideration of the external (political and public) 
context  that  led  to  its  production  and  the  internal  (academic)  traditions,  in 
which and, at times, against which, these papers were produced.  
In relation to the external context I describe how my research broadened 
out from a consideration of street robbery and the study of urban street gangs, 
to focus more broadly on the street world itself studied as a complex whole. 
Underpinning this shift in focus was not only the recognition the street world 
needed to be studied as a totality, it was shaped by my conviction that most 
approaches  to  the  study  of  violence  in  street  settings  was  not  only  unduly 
reductive but often mobilised descriptive labels which, on inspection, were little 
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better  than  unhelpful,  inaccurate  reifications.    Instead  of  studying  street 
violence and street actors by reference to a particular street actor (such as the 
gang); or by focusing upon a particular category of offences (street robbery or 
knife  crime,  for  example)  I  argue  for  a  wider  and more  inclusive  approach 
which prioritises the street world as the object of enquiry.   
I  then  contextualise  the  work  assembled  here  by  reference  to  the 
academic tradition of British Critical Criminology. This was a tradition which, in 
its late 20th century incarnation, had largely neglected the study of street actors 
such as muggers and gangsters in favour of studying youth subcultures and 
which, when it  did attend to the  study of street actors (such as ‘muggers’), 
tended to study them either by considering the visceral social response these 
provoked on the part of control agencies (moral panic theory), or by considering 
how deviants were constructed as such (social constructionism).  While critical 
criminology in its 21st century ‘Left Realist’ incarnation, had discovered street 
violence  and  seemed  inclined  to  study  it,  when  academics  reached  for 
explanations, those supplied were often dubious and highly reductive.  This is 
particularly  evident  in  many  current  attempts  to  reduce  and  explain  away 
contemporary street violence by reference to urban street gangs (Pitts 2008).
In  the  second  section  I  explore  the  nature  of  violent  street  worlds 
thematically.  The themes I have chosen reflect my research preoccupations - 
which also raises the possibility that the street world I want to make sense of 
can be  approached in  other  ways.   I  acknowledge this.   The themes I  have 
chosen, however, throw light on some of the key features of the street world. 
My four themes are: street crime in a historical context; the aetiology of violence; 
the structure and organisation of the street world; and the distinction between 
what I call street representations and street realities.  
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In Chapter 3, I introduce three papers that have a historical inflection.   I 
begin with The Janus face of  the robber in popular culture which examines how 
street robbers can be constructed as both a folk hero and folk devil (Hallsworth, 
2017).   I  then  introduce  a  paper  that  mobilises  an  auto-ethnographic 
methodology,  The fists and the fury: My life in a sea of gangs,  in which I document 
the  UK’s  recent  history  of  urban  street  gangs  by  reference  to  my  own 
experiences of having my head ‘kicked-in’ by various iterations of them from 
the 1960s to the 1980s (Hallsworth, 2014).  I conclude with a paper, Continuities 
and discontinuities in street violence,  which explores the changing face of street 
violence in the post war period whilst also reflecting on its causes (Hallsworth,
2014).
In  chapter  4  I  introduce  three  papers  which  explore  the  aetiology  of 
violence in street settings.  The production of motivated offenders (Hallsworth: 2005) 
examines the factors that would propel a population of young, disadvantaged, 
Black males  to  embrace street  robbery.   The second paper That’s  life  innit:  A 
British  perspective  on  guns,  crime  and  social  order  (Hallsworth  and Silverstone, 
2005) describes respectively the culture of professional criminals who use guns 
in pursuit of criminal enterprise and contrasts this with a more disorganised 
lifeworld populated by volatile young men ‘on road’ who use guns in a less 
instrumental and more reckless way.    The chapter concludes with Violence and 
street  culture  which  explores  why  violence  explodes  in  street  settings  by 
reference to the study of ‘street imperatives.’   That is, the ends to which social 
action in street settings is primarily directed (Hallsworth, 2014).   
In  chapter  5  I  present  two  papers  directed  at  making  sense  of  street 
organisation and structure.  In Confronting London’s Violent Street Worlds I outline 
a  typology  of  urban  street  collectives   which  have  some  stake  in  violence. 
(Hallsworth  and  Duffy,  2010).  In  Arborealism  and  rhizomatics:  A  treatise 
!9
(Hallsworth, 2014) I contest the idea that informal organisations such as urban 
street gangs can be studied as if  they are formal organisations, and mobilise 
instead Deleuze’s concept of the rhizome to develop an alternative ‘nomadic’ 
theory of street organisation.  
In chapter 6 I introduce three papers which take on and contest what I 
term the UK Gangland thesis.  A thesis which, in summary, holds that urban 
street gangs are a new and developing threat and which seeks to explain most 
manifestations  of  violence  as  ‘gang  related’.    In  Gangland  Britain:  Realities, 
fantasies and industry (Hallsworth, 2011) I contest the idea that gangs represent 
the new face of youth crime as argued by Pitts (Pitts, 2008).  In the  second paper 
‘Deciphering  gang  talk’,  I  use  Wiggenstein’s  theory  of  language  games  to 
understand the rules of composition that govern how ‘gang talk’  as a discourse 
is produced.  The chapter concludes with ‘Tilting at Windmills: In pursuit of gang 
truths in a British City’ which summarises what happened when I tried to find 
empirical  support  for  the sensational  claims that  have been made about  the 
gang situation in the UK in research conducted in an area considered ‘gang 
afflicted’. 
The concluding chapter summarises the key contributions the body of 
work  assembled  here  have  made  to  our  knowledge  and  understanding  of 
violent street worlds and their social analysis.  The work, I contend, is original 
in so far at it both contests many myths that have been propounded to explain 
street  violence;  whilst  producing more compelling explanations for it.    In a 
country  where  weaponised street  violence  continue to  see  more  young men 
from deprived areas killed pointlessly at each other’s hands, the papers in this 
thesis help explain why the violence occurs, how and why it is changing, who is 
involved and why people engage in it.   
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Context
As Jock Young observes, criminology, like any other discipline, has both 
an internal and external face (Young, 1990).  On one hand its development is 
shaped by the external political, economic and cultural contexts that shape its 
preoccupations.   This includes the wider politics of law and order, the changing 
face of crime and the social response to it.   The internal history defines how 
academic players orientate themselves to the external context and in relation to 
each other.  In this chapter I will address the external context specifically as it 
impacted upon the production of the work assembled here.  It explores how I 
moved from an analysis of street robbery and urban street gangs through to a 
more  generic  examination  of  violent  street  worlds.   I  examine  the  internal 
context by looking at what British Critical Criminology (the area in which this 
work is situated) had to say about the forms of violence that concern me here. 
As a precursor to this discussion I will begin by defining more clearly what I 
mean by the expression violent street world, the focus of the published work.
Defining Violent Street Worlds
By  the  term  ‘violent  street  world’,  I  refer  to  a  subterranean  world 
typically (but not exclusively) populated by volatile men, predominantly (but 
not exclusively) young men. These are men who typically live out the round of 
their  life  in  urban  settings  characterised  by  high  levels  of  deprivation  and 
poverty.  Many live precarious, makeshift lives, in which violence and threat of 
violence  features  disproportionately;  where  the  violence  in  question  is 
predominantly played out and performed in the public theatre of the street. The 
violence in question may be considered normalised to the extent it constitutes a 
taken  for  granted,  inescapable  feature  of  their  lives,  where  the  violence  in 
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question takes a  number of  different  forms,  individual  but  also collective in 
nature.  It  includes  street  robbery,  interpersonal  violence,  territorial  violence, 
gang related violence and, not least, violence connected to the street retail of 
illicit drugs.
Violent street worlds of this type can be found with variation in most 
urban and industrial settings. They have existed in England, the society where 
most of the research presented here was conducted, in the premodern medieval 
city and became entrenched in the poorer areas of the developing industrial city 
(see Hallsworth,  2005,  for  a  short  history).   They typically constitute,  in one 
sense, a perennial taken for granted feature of everyday life in most working 
class, urban, inner city areas.  That said, they assume a far more violent and 
deadly form in areas in which conditions of precariousness and marginalisation, 
what  Wacquant  terms  ‘advanced  marginality’  is  most  heavily  pronounced 
(Wacquant,  2009).    Late  modern societies  under  conditions of  neoliberalism 
provide particularly conducive environments in which the expressive violence 
of the street world finds its most lethal expression.  The empirical symptoms of 
this very human tragedy in the case of the UK can be found expressed in high 
levels  of  interpersonal  violence  (much  of  it  weaponised),  that  have  seen 
hundreds of young men killed or seriously wounded at each other’s hands.
As John Pitts notes, the violence characteristic of these street worlds is 
thus  ‘symmetrical’  (Pitts,  2008).   Disadvantaged young men prey  upon and 
victimise each other.  The violence is thus also ‘implosive’, inwardly directed. 
Periodically, however, the violence can be dramatically externalised, no more so 
than in ‘days of rage’, during events of mass public dis-order typically labelled 
as ‘riots’ (Standing, 2011).
The violence of the street world often goes unnoticed and unreported.  At 
times,  however,  the violent  events  and the violent  lives at  the centre of  this 
!12
world  can  explode  into  public  consciousness.   This  often  occurs  following 
particularly tragic events, often involving innocent bystanders; and often on the 
wave of a deviance amplification spiral that propels the violence up the public 
and political issue attention cycle.  At times, it is a form of crime that brings the 
violence of the street world to public attention.  This was certainly so in 2001 in 
the  U.K.  when street  robbery surged in  a  society  that  suddenly found itself 
victim to a new generation of violently inclined ‘muggers’.  At other times, it is 
less  the  form  of  violence  that  commands  attention  but  the  groups  that  are 
allegedly responsible for perpetrating it.  This has certainly been the case in the 
U.K. post 2002 when urban street based violence began to be blamed on urban 
street gangs. Today the focus appears to have shifted to the weapons they use.  
Though  the  young  men  who  occupy  the  street  world  adopt  a  fairly 
common style,  one predominantly informed by the legacy of American hip hop 
culture, it would be a mistake to try and make sense of the culture of the street 
through an analysis of its style and aesthetics alone.  It would be even more 
mistaken to consider the street world as governed by a common or coherent 
subculture at least as subcultures were defined by the Birmingham School of 
Cultural Studies who saw in youth subcultures, creative and adaptive responses 
to key problems posed in their parent culture (Hall et al, 1976).  As will become 
clear  in  the analysis  of  street  actors  presented here,  the  street  world has  no 
underlying,  integrated  culture.   Even  though  its  participants  are  often 
marginalised and excluded from mainstream society, they are, for the most part, 
wholly incorporated into the culture of ornamental, compulsory consumption 
around which late modern societies are organised.   The street world as such has 
no coherent subculture.   As Bourgeois notes, it’s culture is best grasped as ‘a 
conflictual  web  of  beliefs,  symbols,  modes  of  interaction  of  values  and 
ideologies’ (Bourgeois, 2003) 
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 The External Context
My  initial  contact  with  the  street  world  began  when  I  first  took  post  as  a 
sociology lecturer in London Guildhall University.  The university was located 
in London’s East End, notorious for its gangsters, poverty and crime.  In 1998 I 
was  commissioned to  produce  a  crime audit  for  Tower  Hamlets  Crime and 
Community Safety Board.  I applied an inclusive framework to my brief and 
profiled police crime and disposal data.  I  also interviewed practitioners and 
young people from different ethnic groups in the area. I also profiled – to the 
horror of the police – their stop and search data. In my final report (resisted 
bitterly by the police who tried to suppress it) I highlighted a number of issues. 
These  included  ethnic  disproportionality  in  stop  and  search,  intra-ethnic 
violence and street robbery.   I also drew attention to urban street gangs in the 
area.  No one at this time was talking about urban street gangs.
This research prompted the Head of Government Office for London to 
make  money  available  to  Lambeth  Community  Safety  Partnership  on  the 
condition that they commission me to conduct research into escalating levels of 
street crime in the borough.  Though national crime rates were plateauing out 
by 1998, after rising sharply in the post war era, street crime (meaning street 
robbery) was bucking the trend and had risen dramatically (Hallsworth, 2005). 
I  was asked to explain this rise in an area of the UK where escalating street 
robbery was most dramatically evident, Lambeth, a multiply deprived area in 
London.  Using a heavily modified form of routine activity theory I examined 
the forces that worked to propel a population of young, predominantly Black 
males to become street  robbers;  I  explored why a predominantly White  and 
more affluent demographic became their victims and considered these factors in 
relation to deficits in the control effort.  This research formed the evidential basis 
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for my book Street Crime published in 2005, chapters from which are profiled 
here (Hallsworth, 2005). 
In  2002 I was invited by the Head of the Serious Crime Directorate at 
Scotland Yard to become the first academic adviser to the Metropolitan Police on 
urban  street  gangs.   This  meant  advising  their  strategic  working  group, 
Operation Cruise.  When I was appointed public fears about Street Crime were 
beginning to fade.  The issue attention cycle had shifted and the gang quickly 
came to replace the mugger as folk devil incarnate, a role it has continued to 
perform to this day (see Hallsworth, 2014).  
This point is worth noting because prior to 2005 urban street gangs were 
not  an  object  of  public,  let  alone  academic  interest.    Criminologists  didn’t 
consider them worthy of investigation;  there were no gang specialists  in the 
country offering bespoke gang intervention initiatives; the gang issue was not 
considered serious enough to warrant punitive legislation to suppress them; nor 
did the media feel concerned enough to sensationalise them.   This all changed 
and  very  quickly  to  the  extent  that  by  2003-7  Britain  was  experiencing 
something approximating a full  blown moral panic about urban street gangs 
(Hallsworth, 2013).   
The  urban  street  gang  first  came  to  prominence  following  a  spate  of 
highly publicised murders that were defined as  ‘gang related’.  The first and 
most notorious was the fatal stabbing of a 12 year old boy, Damilola Taylor in 
Peckham in 2000 in what was widely reported as a gang land killing .  The idea 1
that gangs were on the rise would subsequently be confirmed when two sisters, 
Charlene Ellis and Letisha Shakespeare were murdered in drive by shootings in 
 Ironically, though Damilola’s death was used to buttress the Gangland UK thesis, he was in 1
point of fact killed by two brothers.  It was not a gangland murder.
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Birmingham in 2003.   A continual procession of violent deaths in cities like 
London, Liverpool, Manchester and Birmingham, often involving young Black 
males, also identified as ‘gang related’ began to confirm to many a stark truth, 
namely that the urban street gang was no longer an American problem alone 
but a British one.
The Metropolitan Police’s position on urban street gangs (then at least) 
was  admirable;  they  had  no  idea  what  gangs  were  (there  was  no  agreed 
definition), no idea how many of them there might be and no real sense of the 
risks they posed.  They wanted an evidential base from which to derive policy 
and I was commissioned to provide the answers.  I initiated a literature review, 
and went on to develop with my colleague Tara Young a definition of the urban 
street  gang produced as  part  of  a  wider  typology of  street  based collectives 
(Hallsworth  and  Young,  2004).   A  further  development  of  this  typology, 
produced for London Councils is profiled in chapter 4.
In 2008 John Pitts produced his work on ‘reluctant gangsters’, based on 
research in Walthamstow in London, subsequently expanded into a book where 
he identified gangs as the ‘new face of youth crime’ (Pitts, 2007, 2008).  His work 
chimed with a perception, increasingly common in the mass media and among 
policy makers, that gangs were new and posed a serious threat.  In this guise, as 
folk  devil  incarnate,  the  gang  began  to  be  blamed  for  just  about  every 
manifestation  of  urban  violence:   They  were,  allegedly,  responsible  for  the 
control  of  the  drugs  trade,  most  weapon  related  fatalities,  an  outbreak  of 
dangerous dogs and the force responsible for orchestrating the English riots of 
2011 .     According  to  various  reports,  the  gang  had  taken  control  of  the 2
playgrounds  of  British  Schools  and was  making  inroads  in  the  penal  estate 
 This perspective was universally held by the mass media and the political establishment.  For a 2
critique see the opening chapter of The Gang and Beyond (Hallsworth, 2014). 
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(Ofsted, 2005).  Gang members were apparently getting younger and girl gangs 
were apparently on the rise (Bracchi, 2008).  Indeed, the gang posed such an 
immanent existential threat to the wellbeing of British Society that government 
minister  Ian  Duncan  Smith  felt  able  to  blame  it  in  2011  for  ‘Breaking 
Britain’ (Wintour, 2011).  
While not doubting that gangs existed, I was by no means convinced by 
the evidence being assembled to support the thesis that gangs represented the 
‘new face of youth crime’.  I responded with a paper published in Crime Media 
and Culture  with Tara Young,  entitled Gang Talk  and Gang Talkers:  A critique 
(Hallsworth  and  Young,  2008);  and  subsequently  Gangland  Britain:  Realities, 
fantasy  and  industry  (Hallsworth:  2011)  which is  collated here.   My concerns 
eventually provoked me to write The gang and beyond: Interpreting violent street 
worlds  (Hallsworth, 2014).  In these papers I sought to show that groups that 
had all the hallmark of gangs constituted a perennial feature of life in working 
class areas throughout the twentieth century and beyond.  They were not, in 
other words new.  Nor did I accept that the gang was responsible for the many 
violent  excesses  blamed on  it.   Youth  crime  in  its  various  incarnations  had 
causes that were typically not gang related.
Two days after the English riots of 2011 ceased, I was called in to Scotland 
Yard  by  the  ACPO  (Association  of  Chief  Police  Officers)  lead  on  organised 
crime.   He had a question he wanted me to answer: Were the riots caused by 
gangs?  I told him unequivocally no.  This, he told me, was also the position of 
the police but not that of the Government who were determined to  blame gangs 
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for the riots and make gang control their preferred policy response to them .  He 3
wanted me to meet the ACPO lead on urban street gangs.  We subsequently met 
in what was then a very austere and depopulated Home Office.  He was on his 
way to brief the Home Secretary.  He told me I came highly commended but 
was seen as ‘controversial’.  He was interested in my take on the gang situation.  
We also discussed what would eventually translate into a research project 
conducted in Birmingham, initiated to explore the gang situation there, while 
also seeking to ascertain how far the sensational claims being made about gangs 
corresponded  with  street  realities.   Rather  than  initiate  research  into  gangs 
where the available knowledge base was slight, I sought to study ‘gang truths’ 
by examining areas where urban street gangs in the city were understood by the 
police to be a major problem and where the police would (at least I thought) 
have amassed considerable evidence about their  excesses.   The research was 
conducted in 2013 in Birmingham.  I published the findings of this research in a 
paper  entitled  Tilting  at  windmills:  In  pursuit  of  gang  truths  in  a  British  City 
(Hallsworth and Dixon: 2016).  I profile this work in chapter 6. 
In summary, the body of work presented here was predominantly driven 
by the research I was commissioned to do by a range of commissioning bodies. 
The projects commissioned, while different, are nevertheless unified in so far as 
they have a common focus. They concern violence predominantly perpetrated 
in public space; where males from overwhelmingly deprived backgrounds are 
the perpetrators.  The ‘mugger’, the gang member, the knife and gun user, they 
 This was exactly what the government then went onto do – even though compelling evidence 3
began to surface very quickly that gangs were not the orchestrating force responsible for the 
worst outbreak of urban disorder that the UK had witnessed in the post war era (Hallsworth 
2013). 
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all herald from the same population.  They are all a part of the violent street 
world this thesis aspires to make sense of. 
The internal context
The work assembled here sits within British critical criminology.   This 
comprises by no means a homogenous field of enquiry and like other academic 
areas  is  prone  to  bouts  of  tribalism and,  not  least,  internecine  war  between 
opposing  factions  within  it  and  between  it  and  the  more  conventional, 
administrative  wing  of  criminology.    Indeed,  as  I  began  to  undertake  the 
research profiled here a virulent rift had opened up within critical criminology 
following the rise of Left Realism and its critique of what Jock Young termed 
‘left idealism’ (Young, 1979). His critique centred on what he claimed was the 
failure of Critical Criminologists to take working class crime seriously with the 
consequence that the task of explaining it had been ceded, by default, to the 
underclass theorists of the right such as Charles Murray (Murray, 1990).  In the 
short profile I will now undertake, which summarises what critical criminology 
had to say about violent street worlds,  as we shall see, Jock’s critique has some 
salience.  Indeed, it would not be amiss to suggest that Critical Criminology’s 
interest  in  phenomena  such  as  street  robbers  and  gang  members  didn’t 
command  much  interest  at  all,  at  least  in  the  closing  two  decades  of  the 
twentieth century.  It pays to reflect on why this is the case.  
Though gang research is now one of the fastest developing fields of study 
in contemporary British criminology, it could be noted that this interest is very 
recent and only occurred following the wider social discovery of the gang in the 
twenty first century (see above).   After early and pioneering work by David 
Downes in the 1960s (Downes, 1966) who sought to apply American subcultural 
theory to his study of delinquent groups in London’s East End, interest in urban 
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street  gangs  never  took  off  in  a  UK  criminological  tradition  that  became 
increasingly fascinated with youth subculture and,  not  unrelated to this,  the 
often violent and disproportionate social response subcultures provoked on the 
part of the agencies of social control.  
Downes’ research did not discover urban street gangs so much as ‘street 
corner societies’.   What this finding demonstrated was that if  gangs were an 
issue  they  remained  an  American  problem  not  an  English  one.    Though 
Downes  acknowledged  that  his  street  corner  societies  could  be  violent,  the 
violence in which they engaged he understood less as symptoms of pathological 
delinquency associated with group dynamics but as a form of violent leisure 
engaged in by young working class men escaping,   at  least  temporarily,  the 
mundane disciplines of the factory and the school yard.  Though a couple of 
studies over the twentieth century did draw attention to the fact  that  gangs 
might just  be a British issue as well  (see,  for  example,  research on gangs in 
Glasgow  (Patrick,  1973),  such  studies  were  conducted  in  the  margins  of  a 
criminological tradition whose centre of gravity lay elsewhere.   
When group based delinquency was studied in the late 20th century it 
was not through a gang lens that the groups in question were studied.  In two 
notable ethnographic studies, Paul Willis’s, ‘Learning to labour’ (Willis, 1977) and 
Ken Pryce, Endless pressure  (Pryce, 1979), group offending is described but in 
each  case  the  authors  refrain  from  evoking  the  term  ‘gang’.   The  authors 
describe violent lives; and each explore the violence their male research subjects 
engaged in  as  an adaptive  strategy to  the  contradictions  and struggles  they 
confront  in  a  class  and ethnically  divided capitalist  society.   Paul  Willis,  for 
example, documents how his white working class subjects come to embrace a 
hard masculine and racist identity as an adaptive response  to a middle class 
school system established to fail them.  Ken Pryse’s study of young Black men 
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in Bristol explored a hustling culture embraced by young men living precarious 
lives, unprepared to do what they considered ‘shit work’ for the white man. 
None  of  the  authors  here  believe  that  their  subjects  are  part  of  some quasi 
organised criminal entity such as a gang.  Each eschew such a criminalising 
gaze in favour of exploring the cultural dynamics of the groups in question.  
This cultural turn in many ways came to define the evolving centre of 
gravity in a British criminological tradition that, specifically with the rise of the 
Birmingham School of Cultural Studies, lost interest in American gang research 
and began to focus upon the range of flamboyant subcultures that emerged in 
Britain in the late twentieth century.  These were not studied as criminological 
entities but as highly creative and adaptive subcultures and, not least, ‘cultures 
of resistance’ (see Hall et al, 1977).  It was not their criminality that attracted 
attention  but  their  style,  anti-establishment  credentials  and  counter-cultural 
politics.   It would not be until the opening decade of the 21st century that the 
gang began to reappear as an object of analysis and gang research subsequently 
began to expand in British Criminology. I will return to this point below.
If  British  criminology exhibited little  interest  in  urban street  gangs  in 
many respects  the  same can be  said  of  its  approach to  another  pronounced 
aspect of street life in urban areas and that is street robbery.   As the failure to 
address such violence is moot to this thesis it bears to consider why.
The first reason that may be cited to explain the hesitation on the part of 
critical criminologists to engage with street robbery can be attributed to the fact 
that it did not constitute an offence that it could portray at all sympathetically. 
It was and remains an offence disproportionately perpetrated by poor people 
and,  by  and  large,  the  population  of  victims  are  also  poor.   Unlike  the 
subcultures that emerged in post-war Britain - examined by the Birmingham 
school  as  exemplifying  resistance  to  a  deeply  inequitable  ethnic  and  class-
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divided society, it is difficult to categorise street crime in quite the same way. For 
a tradition whose political standpoint was forged through an attempt to resist 
the criminalising tendencies of the state, the modern street robber would not 
provide  much  that  would  sanction  any  meaningful  politics  of  recognition. 
Indeed,  for  a  tradition  that  had  traditionally  sought  to  ‘humanise  the 
deviant’(Cohen, 1981) the street robber did not constitute a deviant many found 
worthy of humanising.
The  reluctance  to  study  street  robbery,  I  would  argue,  was  also 
compounded by another factor.   At stake here is the contentious issue of race, 
and, in particular, the way the political right have seized upon what they claim 
amounts  to  Black  over-representation  in  acts  like  street  robbery.  A  trope 
implicitly stated in the work of underclass theorists of the political right such as 
Charles  Murray  (Murray:  1990).  Though  critical  criminologists  have  never 
denied  that  minority  ethnic  groups  have  been  involved  in  crime,  many 
remained convinced that the coverage given to their involvement remains vastly 
disproportionate to the threat allegedly identified. Indeed, far from engaging in 
an objective reporting of  ‘facts’,  what really underlies  such reporting,  Gilroy 
argued,  was  a  thinly  veiled  racist  agenda  set  upon  proving  that  the  Black 
population is inherently criminogenic and poses by its presence an existential 
threat to the white population and the British way of life (Gilroy, 1987). 
As critical  criminology emerged to resist  the racialising agenda of  the 
state it was, from the beginning, unprepared to endorse a research agenda that 
would appear to concede legitimacy to what Gilroy called ‘the myth of Black 
criminality’  (Gilroy,  1987).   To  study  Black  involvement  in  crime  would 
inevitably reproduce the dangerous reification  ‘Black crime’, while marking out 
the Black population as a suspect community for yet more coercive regulation 
and control. 
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For critical  criminologists  who had the temerity  to  suggest  that  Black 
male involvement in crime was a serious issue that required study – as John Lea 
and Jock Young did in their Left Realist text ‘What is to be done about Law and 
order’  (Lea  and  Young:  1984),  their  fate  was  to  be  accused  by  Gilroy  of 
‘capitulating to the weight  of  white  racism’.  To study street  crime and even 
worse to take the money of the state to study it, was considered tantamount to 
becoming complicit  in the ideological agenda of an authoritarian state.   In a 
paper published by Hilliard et al in 2004, directed at the constituency of those 
who might be tempted, criminologists were starkly warned to avoid ‘feeding’ at 
what the authors starkly termed ‘the state’s trough’ (Hillyard, Sim, Tombs and 
Whyte, 2004).  
In the face of this critique, most critical criminologists in the UK simply 
left  the study of  Black involvement  in  acts  like  street  crime off  the research 
agenda in the closing decades of the twentieth century; studying instead the 
way in which Black involvement in crime was discursively constructed as a 
problem;  and  by  paying  attention  to  the  disproportionate  social  response  it 
provoked (see, for example, Bowling and Philips: 2002).
When critical criminologists did enquire into street robbery, it could be 
observed  the  focus  of  analysis  was  less  on  the  act  itself  but  on  the  social 
response  robbery  has  provoked.   This  approach  is  particularly  apparent  in 
‘Policing the Crisis, Mugging, the State, Law and Order’ written in 1978 by Hall, 
Critcher, Jefferson, Clarke and Roberts (Hall et al 1978).  The text was composed 
against a back drop of growing concerns in the UK during the 1970s over what 
was being reported as a sharp increase in street robbery, perpetrated by what 
the media identified as a population of young Black male ‘muggers’.  The book 
profiles what the authors, following Cohen, term ‘the moral panic; that arose 
around ‘mugging’’ and they explain this by reference to what they identify as 
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the ‘organic crisis of the capitalist state,’ during this period.  Though the text 
concludes with some reflections on street  robbers,  it  could be noted that  no 
street robbers are actually spoken to.  
Rising street crime in the early twentieth first century, and closely allied 
to this, rising weapon use, certainly provoked renewed academic interest (mine 
included (Hallsworth 2005)); it was, however, the subsequent discovery of the 
urban street gang that began to ignite growing academic interest in the violent 
excessive violence of the street world.  From a tradition that had largely ignored 
gang members, criminologists  began to study them in earnest.  
Nick Tilly produced one the first studies into gangland Britain in a report 
that  focussed  specifically  on  the  situation  in  Manchester  which  was  then 
witnessing  a  spike  in  gun  related  fatalities  considered  ‘gang  related’  (Tilly, 
2004) , The Youth Justice Board commissioned a report on urban street gangs in 
which I was involved (Young et al, 2007); while Pitts began his study on gangs 
in Waltham Forest (Pitts, 2007).   The ESRC commissioned research by Medina 
and Aldridge in street gangs in a large English metropolitan city (Aldridge, J. 
and J. Medina-Ariza, 2005); while the Metropolitan Police commissioned me to 
develop a working definition of the gang as part of a wider study on street 
collectives (Hallsworth and Young 2006).  Just as the UK was in the process of 
discovering urban street gangs, so to were criminologists from across Europe. 
To help Europeans make sense of them a group of professional gang experts 
from the  USA established the  Eurogang Network to  study the  phenomenon 
(Decker and Weerman, 2005). Gang research began to burgeon.
If the gang constituted the general object of analysis, it was nevertheless 
comprehended in very different ways.   In the UK two opposing poles in the 
debate began to open up between those who considered the gang a new and 
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developing threat.   A position staked out by authors such as Pitts and more 
recently Harding (Pitts, 2008; Harding, 2016) and those, myself included, who 
were  more  sceptical  about  the  threats  gangs  allegedly  posed  as  well  as  the 
novelty of the phenomenon.  The Eurogang researchers, meanwhile, pursuing a 
largely numbers driven, positivistic research agenda, sought to establish that 
gangs were indeed a potent and present threat to European societies otherwise 
in denial of the gangs within them. 
The  papers  I  present  in  this  thesis  were  written  against  a  back  drop 
framed by this changing intellectual tradition and its legacy.   Against a critical 
criminological  tradition that  had largely lost  sight  of  street  based violence,  I 
have consciously sought to reinstate its analysis into critical criminology’s frame 
of  reference.    To  this  extent  the  work  profiled  here  adopts  a  left  realist 
orientation.  I consider the street world to be self-destructive and treat it as such. 
My research has always been initiated with the aim of trying to understand such 
violence  and  helping  develop  an  evidence  base  from  which  just  policy 
responses can be derived.   At the same time, my research has also been directed 
at  contesting  what  I  consider  to  be  flawed  interpretations  of  the  street.   In 
particular, recent attempts to subsume the study of street violence into the study 
of urban street gangs.  The papers assembled here reflect these preoccupations. 
They attempt to make sense of violent street worlds while also contesting what, 
I argue, are deeply flawed and reductive attempts to make sense of them.
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Historical Perspectives 
In this  chapter  I  will  discuss three papers  that  approach the study of 
violent  street  worlds,  and  the  actors  who  inhabit  them,  within  a  historical 
framework  of  analysis.   The  first  paper  examines  the  representation  of  the 
outlaw in popular culture.  It examines what I term its Janus face by considering 
how  street  robbers  can  find  themselves  positioned  paradoxically  within  the 
same culture as both folk devils and folk heroes.  The second paper adopts an 
auto-ethnographic  methodology  and  applies  this  method  to  contest  the 
conjecture that gangs today constitute the ‘new face of youth crime’ as argued 
by Pitts  (Pitts,  2008)  By using my own biography as  an evidential  resource, 
specifically my experience of having my head ‘kicked in’ by groups that have all 
the hallmarks of urban street gangs in our immediate past, I not only seek to 
show how fecund a research method auto-ethnography can be in the context of 
a discipline that has never meaningfully adopted it, I categorically refute Pitt’s 
claims.    The  final  paper  explores  continuities  and  discontinuities  in  youth 
violence in the post-World War 2 period leading us through to the present.  In 
the paper I outline what I term the Fordist approach to stabilising young men 
with violent inclinations in the post Second World War era; and consider what 
happens under contemporary conditions of neo-liberalism, when this approach 
begins to fail.  
The robber, I argue, is an ambiguous figure who appears in most societies 
under a variety of different names.  Though a predatory figure whose living is 
made by the violent seizure of people’s goods in public spaces, this is a figure 
which  nevertheless  can  find  itself  propelled  to  folk  hero  status.     A fact 
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exemplified in the founding national myths of societies such as England, the 
United Stated and Australia, all of whom have venerated robbers.  Think here, 
for  example about the myths and legends that  surround Robin Hood,  Jessie 
James and Ned Kelly.  Given that street robbery is an offence predominantly 
perpetrated by poor people against other poor people (Hallsworth, 2005); where 
the criminal harvest is typically low, it might appear counterfactual to imagine 
the robber as a folk devil posing an existential threat to society and its values. 
Yet robbers can be positioned as such.  A representation brilliantly explored by 
Hall et al in their seminal text ‘Policing the Crisis’ which examines the moral 
panic that surfaced around ‘Black muggers’ in the 1970s (Hall et al, 1978).  
In the paper I explore these starkly opposing representations and seek to 
locate  them  within  a  historical  frame  of  reference.  The  paper  begins  by 
exploring the factors that allow robbers to be constructed as folk heroes.  I trace 
this history through from early myths of Robin Hood in the 15th century to the 
heroic representation of the outlaw highwaymen of the eighteenth century.  In 
so doing I trace why this figure could become socially acceptable.   In a deeply 
inequitable society governed by an oppressive ruling class the robber/outlaw 
possessed many heroic traits that would permit a certain vicarious identification 
on the part of the public.  Not least, was their ability to heroically outwit the 
forces  of  the ruling regime,  and who,  when caught,  would die  with dignity 
when executed.  Drawing on Hobsbawn  (Hobsbawn, 1959) I also acknowledge 
the  quasi  political  role  these  figures  posed  to  a  public  which,  prior  to  the 
industrial revolution, had no political representation.  
The paper then examines how an intersection of distinctly modern social 
forces unleashed in the industrial 19th century worked to reconstruct the figure 
of the robber as a folk devil. The paper draws attention to the dehumanising 
role played by scientific criminology with its fascination for atavistic monsters, 
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the advent of the prison, the concomitant withdrawal of punishment as a public 
spectacle,  and  the  advent  of  the  mass  media.   From a  figure  that  could  be 
identified with, these distinctly modern forces worked in tandem to position the 
outlaw/robber, as a faceless public enemy.  
The paper concludes with a reflection on whether it is possible today to 
imagine the outlaw as anything other than a ‘suitable enemy’ to evoke Christie’s 
terminology (Christie, 2001).  My conclusion is that in the context of societies 
where the pubic fear of crime is high, the robber will invariably continue to be 
constructed as a folk devil.  That said, many of the heroic traits associated with 
the highwayman of the past still carry popular currency.   Many members of the 
public remain fascinated by men of daring, who, owned by nobody, traverse a 
liminal interzone situated between the licit and the illicit.  Lawless men who live 
by their wits in a violent world where life is cheap and where the possibility of 
death remains high.  These ‘outlaw’ traits continue to fascinate.  They lie at the 
heart of the appeal that rappers such as Tupac possess.  It is a mythic reality 
played out in series such as Breaking Bad.   Ironically, the self-same traits that 
define the heroic outlaw also reappear in the word of contemporary policemen 
paid to suppress them. A trait evident in films such as Dirty Harry in the 1970s 
and True Detective today.
The second paper adopts an auto-ethnographical approach to the study 
of  our  recent  history  and  is  taken  from  my  book  ‘The  Gang  and  beyond: 
Interpreting violent street worlds’.  In it I draw upon my own experience of (quite 
literally) having my head ‘kicked in’ by groups of violently inclined young men 
over a twenty year period in order to contest John Pitt’s conjecture that urban 
street gangs today constitute what he calls the  ‘new face of youth crime’ (Pitts, 
2008). 
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The paper begins with my life as a young boy growing up in Bristol in 
the 1960s  and 1970s  and concludes as  I  enter  adulthood in Peterborough in 
England in the 1980s.   Though the paper is  written in a jocular manner my 
ambitions in writing it are serious.  In it I document, from painful experience, a 
truth directed at the constituency of ‘gang talkers’ who seriously believe that the 
urban street gang is something new the like of which we have not seen before. 
My point, to demonstrate that whatever definition of gang they may elect to 
embrace,  such  groups  have  always  existed  in  working  class  areas  and 
throughout our recent history.  The names by which these groups are known 
certainly  changes;  nevertheless  violently  inclined  groups  which  have  all  the 
hallmarks of urban street gangs constitute a perennial, taken for granted, feature 
of working class life in urban settings. The gang, in other words, is not a new or 
novel entity, it has always been around.  
In the paper I  reinforce this  point my describing my experiences as a 
young  man  navigating  a  treacherous  world  populated  by  a  cacophony  of 
violently  inclined groups  with  names  like  Grebo’s,  Skinheads,  Hells  Angels, 
Squaddies  and  Boot-boys.   All  of  them  were  violent  and  violence  and  a 
proclivity to engage in it were what these groups were essentially about.  
In writing this paper my other aim was to introduce auto-ethnography as 
a methodology into Criminology, a discipline which has pretty much ignored it. 
My aim in writing the chapter was to demonstrate that auto-ethnography is 
potentially a viable and fruitful method and one with potentially productive 
applications.  What  is  unique  about  auto-ethnography  is  the  idea  that  a 
researcher’s  own  biography  and  history  can  be  used  as  a  self-reflective 
evidential  field  from  which  wider  research  claims  can  be  generated.   This 
reverses wholesale the usual methodological approach applied in social science 
(and criminology) which involves researchers generating an evidence base by 
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studying the lives of others.  In auto-ethnography the researcher studies and 
interrogates  their  own  history,  biography  and  experience  and  use  this  to 
formulate research propositions.  They themselves, in this process, become the 
research subject (Ronai, 1992; Chang: 2008; Ellis, 2010).   
While  the  approach  has  certainly  proved  popular  it  has  also  been 
criticised for  its  subjectivism,  lacking academic  rigour and navel  gazing (see 
Madison, 2006).  I sought to deploy it because these criticisms appeared to me 
less  grounds  to  refute  the  method  as  a  whole  but  as  tendencies  which 
researchers who deploy auto-ethnography need to acknowledge and avoid – a 
point  well  acknowledged  by  Chang  in  his  reflections  on  applying  auto-
ethnography in practice (Chang, 2008).  
Though I would, by no means, overstate the importance of the method, 
or ever suggest that it should replace existing methods directed at studying the 
lives  of  others,  I  would  argue  it  constitutes  an  approach  that  has  its  uses. 
Crime, after all, also impacts on criminologists.   Our experience is something 
we  ought  to  reflect  on,  perhaps  more  so  than  we  do.    In  my  case,  my 
experiences  as  a  young man provided me with  the  insights  I  required as  a 
criminologist  to  contest  the  claim that  gangs  have  become ‘the  new face  of 
youth crime’ (Pitts, 2008).   The groups I describe weren’t entities I had to go out 
and study, I had compelling experience of what they were capable of having 
lived my life growing up with them as I vividly describe in the paper. 
In deploying an auto-ethnographic approach, my aim is also  to try and 
accomplish one of the key aims of Cultural Criminology and that is to provide 
something of the sensual feel of what deviance is all about.  In the chapter I try 
and attend to this by providing thick descriptions about what it is actually like 
to be caught by a group of boot-boys in turf  they claim as theirs.   Or what 
happens when you meet a group of drunken skinheads.   In this sense, the auto-
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ethnographic  method,  provides  precisely  what  the  numbers  driven  research 
typically  conducted  on  groups  such  as  urban  street  gangs  by  more 
administrative  criminology,  invariably  lacks,  and that  is  any feel  for  human 
reality as this is lived and experienced.  Auto-ethnography,  in this sense, does 
pose  an  alternative  and  stark  challenge  to  the  desiccated,  de-naturalised 
‘voodoo  statistics’,  to  use  Jock  Young’s  term,  of  mainstream  criminological 
positivism (Young ,2004).  It brings, in other words, the deviant to life.   
The final paper I present in this section Continuities and discontinuities in 
street  violence.   explores the phenomena of  street  violence and documents its 
changing history from the post war period to the present.  This is very much a 
sociological  history  and  one  directed  at  understanding  continuities  and 
discontinuities in the violence of the street world under consideration here.  I 
stress the word ‘continuities’ because the violence typically found in the violent 
street worlds I examine in post war Britain, displays far stronger continuities 
than discontinuities over time.  
Looking for continuities as opposed to looking for stark discontinuities in 
street violence is not, I accept, as exciting as reaching for the conclusion that 
things have changed alarmingly and always for the worst (the gang as ‘the new 
face of youth crime’,  for example) but,  as I  establish,  this is  the truth of the 
matter.  Young people, particularly young men, always congregate together and 
for the simple and obvious  fact that they are social beings.  It is also as social 
beings  that  they break rules,  edge-work and as  Goffman neatly  puts  it,  put 
themselves ‘where the action is’  (Goffman,  1982).   As commentators such as 
Downes and Willis observed long ago,  the violence in which they engage is 
typically no more than an extension of leisure – albeit of a lethal and painful 
variety (Downes, 1966; Willis, 1977).  In a Katzian sense they ‘walk the ways of 
the bad ass’ because deviance is fun, seductive and  ‘cool’ (Katz, 1988).  Such 
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violence is also reinforced culturally in a world where being ‘hard’ and being 
able to handle yourself are traits deeply engrained in working class, masculine 
culture.   Such  traits  also  find  reinforcement  and  encouragement  in  wider 
dominant  evocations  of  heterosexual  masculinity;  no  more  powerfully 
expressed than in the figure of the violently inclined male hero reproduced in 
various movies: Rambo, The Man with no Name, John Wick, and so on.  
The  violence in the five decades following the end of the Second World 
War was nevertheless constrained and delimited by cultural codes and young 
men, by and large,  grew out of  street  violence as they navigated an orderly 
transition from childhood to adulthood.  As this model of male stabilisation, 
developed  and  embedded  in  the  era  of  Fordism  (organised,  welfare  state 
capitalism)  became  the  predominant  means  mobilised  to  ensure  the  social 
production  of  stable,  pacified,  male  workers,  the  transitional  process  from 
childhood to adulthood embodied in the Fordist model needs some elaboration.  
In short, the transition read something like this:  First, the family, the site 
of primary socialisation; then the school for secondary socialisation and some 
education.  Then the factory for paid work and ideally – and not too much later 
- possession of a wife whose subordination to her mate was assured by the male 
worker  being  repositioned  as  ‘bread  winner’  for  his  nuclear  family.     The 
orderly  transition  side  lay  in  the  successful  navigation  of  this  process  from 
inception through to its conclusion.  Sure enough, along the way, young men 
would ‘wild out’ in opposition to the constraints of the school and the factory 
but  eventually  the  ‘mould’  society  (to  use  Deleuze’s  construct  of  the 
Foucauldian disciplinary order (Deleuze,  1992) and, not least,  the patriarchal 
dividend  delivered  to  the  paid  Fordist  worker,  would  work  its  disciplinary 
magic and produce a relatively pacified, domesticated citizen.  Yes, he might hit 
his wife and kids around a bit but, all told, the expressive public violence of his 
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youth would be significantly curtailed.  The model, it could be noted, worked 
for  most,  but  this  was  by  no  means  assured  for  those  areas  subject  to 
concentrated disadvantage (those areas of its inner cities and estates into which 
the welfare state had only ever made minor inroads).  However even these area 
of blight, it was hoped, would eventually disappear as the welfare state evolved 
and full employment for all, at least in principle, became the norm.
The  paper  concludes  by  examining  discontinuities.   It  locates  these 
within an analysis of the wider shift from the welfare to the post welfare, neo-
liberal society that is the UK today.  While not suggesting that the basic features 
of  the  Fordist  model  of  youth  transition  have  been  dismantled  wholesale,  I 
begin  with  the  proposition  that  a  number  of  young  men  today  are  not 
completing an  orderly transition from childhood to adulthood but a fractured 
transition.  That is, a transition that not only fails to produce an orderly stable 
and pacified adult,  but one which leaves the subject suspended or subject to 
street socialisation and it violent codes.  
This process is particularly the case  for the young men studied in this 
thesis, the majority of whom live in areas subject to precarious living and near 
permanent  recession.   Precisely  the  population  that  have  come  to  public 
attention  recently  through  their  implosive,  self-destructive  violence.   My 
argument is this: Rather than drift into street life and through the process of 
maturation (the orderly Fordist transition), ‘drift out’; by default, a number of 
young  men  become  differentially  associated  in  street  culture  and  its 
imperatives.  Confronting an economic market that delivers low wage, episodic 
work and caught within what has mutated to become a harsh workfare regime 
characterised by welfare retrenchment and punitive sanctions (see Bond and 
Hallsworth, 2017), a number of young men do not transition from education 
into the stable world of paid work, not least because stable work is no longer on 
!33
offer to this population of young men;  members of what Guy Standing terms 
the ‘new precariat’ (Standing, 2011).   The street and its violent codes meanwhile 
await them.   The next chapter examines more closely the lifeworld of those who 
experience fractured transitions and the violent adaptations that result. 
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The aetiology of street violence
This chapter introduces three papers each of which is directed at helping 
make sense of the violence perpetrated in a street context.  It also considers the 
constellation of forces that leads young men to become participants in it.  The 
first  paper  explores  the  motivations  that  lead  young  men  to  become  street 
robbers.   The second paper examines gun related violence by describing the 
street culture of those who use them. The final paper examines why violence 
occurs in street contexts and it explores this by attending to ‘street imperatives’; 
that  is  the  ends  to  which  social  action  in  a  street  context  is  predominantly 
directed. 
The  first  paper  ‘The  production  of  motivated  offenders’  derives  from  a 
research project funded by Government Office for London in 2000, the aim of 
which was to help explain why street robbery was burgeoning in Lambeth, a 
multiply  deprived  area  of  London,  during  a  period  when crime rates  more 
generally were beginning to decline after surging in the post-World War Two 
period.  
In the paper I explain why a constituency populated predominantly by 
young Black males, most of whom lived in and adjacent to Lambeth in London, 
came  to  engage  in  robbery.  The  project  was  initiated  against  what  can  be 
considered  an  unprecedented  leap  in  Street  Crime  offences  across  the  U.K. 
during the period 1999-2003.  What made Lambeth interesting as a case study 
was the fact that this borough was producing far higher levels of street crime 
than any other area.  Indeed at the time the research commenced, it produced 
18% of all street crime offences in London (Hallsworth, 2005).
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My remit was to explain why street robbery had escalated.  Why were 
young Black men overrepresented in the population of offenders; why was the 
population of  victims predominantly  white  and why was this  happening in 
Lambeth?   Having studied the available police data; having interviewed over 
20  street  robbers;  and  having  studied  Lambeth’s  socio-economic  profile  and 
history; I applied a heavily modified form of Routine Activity Theory (RAT) to 
help address  these  questions (for  an overview see  Cohen and Felson:  1979). 
According to RAT crime occurs when a motivated offender comes into contact 
with a  suitable  victim in a  context  where suitable  guardians cannot  prevent 
them from offending.   Reconstructed into  the  methodology I  applied in  the 
Lambeth  case,  I  sought  explanations  to  the  following three  questions:  What 
constellation of forces led some Black men to engage in street robbery; what 
dispositions made others ‘suitable victims’; and why had the forces of the law 
failed to prevent motivated offenders from offending.  Whereas RAT is usually 
associated with  theories  of  rational  choice  and studied predominantly  using 
quantitative  research  methods,  I  elected  to  innovate  and  adopt  a  different 
approach.   I  stripped  the  rational  choice  elements  out  of  the  approach  and 
adopted a far more critically informed, qualitative approach to the questions I 
sought to address.
My overall conjecture was that street crime rose in Lambeth because of a 
series of interlocking factors.  Despite attempts to regenerate Lambeth in the 
wake of the Brixton riots, not least, by developing Brixton’s night time economy, 
the plight  of  its  poorest  constituency,  overwhelmingly populated by its  Afro 
Caribbean community, had not improved but had stagnated.  Coupled with a 
legacy  of  racism,  unemployment  among its  young men was  high  and their 
precarious situation was coupled by an absence of work opportunities. Though 
economically and materially marginalised, nevertheless these young men, as the 
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chapter  presented here shows,  were wholly incorporated in to  the rituals  of 
ornamental consumption.  They were products of a capitalist society in which 
the production of a successful identity was determined quite literally by their 
ability  to  consume,  purchase  and  display  key  branded  commodities.    If 
materially disadvantaged, this population was nevertheless, as such, culturally 
included.   Street  Crime  offered  some  an  opportunity  to  mitigate  the 
consequences of material exclusion and poverty whilst also gratifying deeply 
internalised desires  to  construct  a  viable  identity  as  capable  consumers  in  a 
society  where  what  you  wore  and  how  you  wore  it  now  constituted  the 
talisman of a successful being.
Though  regeneration  initiatives  had  not  worked  to  raise  the  social-
economic profile of this demographic, it had worked to make areas like Brixton 
very attractive to a largely white and more affluent demographic that enjoyed 
visiting an area with a ‘cool’ cache and the proliferating bars and restaurants 
that  populated  its  rapidly  gentrifying  centre.   This  population  constituted 
suitable  victims  for  a  number  of  reasons.   They  were  now  carrying  mobile 
phones  which  constituted  the  object  of  choice  for  motivated  street  robbers. 
Given that the producers of them had (at that time the research was undertaken) 
taken no steps to immobilise them when they were stolen, they could easily be 
sold  on  and  Lambeth  possessed  a  well-developed  industry  of  fences  / 
middlemen who did so. This population was relatively easy to target and by 
visiting  areas  like  Brixton  they  came  directly  into  contact  with  motivated 
offenders from the local estates.  
Street  robbery  became their  crime of  choice  because  they didn’t  have 
access to or the skills required to perpetrate more lucrative crime.  By default 
they used the resources they did have available: a proclivity for violence and the 
will to mobilise it, in order to separate victims from their possessions. At the 
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same time other crime alternatives that might once have been attractive to this 
population such as shop theft or car theft were becoming less popular due to 
successful  crime  reduction  initiatives  such  as  situational  crime  prevention. 
When street crime began to surge the police were hopelessly ill-prepared  and 
did not  have in  place  any successful  street  crime reduction strategy.   Given 
racial tensions in areas like Lambeth were fraught, the police in the borough 
were also unable to use the more robust tactics that other forces were utilising. 
Though CCTV was being used, the quality of the data they provided was of 
limited value due to poor analogue, video quality.  Robbers were aware of this.
In many respects my research findings do overlap with the study of street 
robbery provided by Pryce, undertaken, as we saw, in the 1970s (Pryce, 1979). 
However the findings also depart considerably in others.  Refracted through a 
Marxist  lens,  the population of  street  robbers  I  studied in Lambeth,  like the 
street robbers studied by Pryce in the 1970s, could certainly be considered to 
belong to the lowest sector of the working class, the social residuum.  This is a 
population living precarious lives in a capitalist society which provided little by 
way of life chances that would enable them to transcend their marginal status in 
the labour market.  Their engagement in street crime, however, could not easily 
be explained as an adaptive political strategy, defined by a refusal to do ‘shit 
work’ for the white man, as argued by Pryce (Pryce, 1979.  What came across in 
my research was just how powerfully the identities and desires of the young 
men I studied were forged by their exposure to the compulsory logic of hyper 
consumption.  Politics, or even an awareness of it, did not meaningfully feature 
in  the  depoliticised  existence  of  this  demographic.   These  were,  as  Bauman 
argued, ‘flawed consumers’ of late modernity; pressured to consume but unable 
to consume through legitimate channels.
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The second paper entitled That’s Life Innit: A British approach to guns, crime 
and social order, was co-authored with Dan Silverstone.  The factors that led to its 
production  bear  noting.   Both  of  us  had  been  invited  to  an  international 
colloquium on gun related violence in Toronto. Both of us were talking about 
weaponised violence in a street context and both of us sought to make sense of 
it by reference to the term ‘on road’.  This was an expression we had separately 
come  across  in  our  respective  analysis  of  what  others  were  terming  ‘gang 
culture’.  ‘On road’ is a street term, one deployed by street actors to designate 
the way of life of the street, adopted by some as a destination of choice, but for 
others a space to which their precarious existence drove them.  
The  paper  was  written  against  a  back  drop  of  growing  public  and 
political concern about the number of young men who were being killed by 
other young men using guns.  As this chapter is being written, similar concerns 
are still evident.  The paper seeks to contribute to our understanding of such 
violence by describing the conditions of life ‘on road’.
The paper adopts a cultural criminological perspective, one that attends 
closely to the lifeworld of gun users.  It explores two interrelated worlds; first, 
the world of professional criminals who use firearms as part of their business, 
where that business is crime.  This world is populated by those who mobilise 
considerable  criminal  capital.   This  is  a  world  populated  by  men  who 
understand the weapons they use, are trained in their use but who use them 
rarely and only in pursuit of business objectives.  This world is populated by 
professional criminals; men who occupy the centre of the criminal underworld.
We then contrast this world with what we term in the paper the street 
periphery,  a  world  populated  by  young  men  whose  life  unfolds  ‘on  road’. 
These young men inhabit a far more volatile and unpredictable terrain.  They 
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have  access  to  weapons,  including  guns,  but  are  not  skilled  in  their  use. 
Whereas professional criminals use weapons rarely and in pursuit of business 
objectives,  ‘on  road’  weapons  are  deployed  for  both  personal  and  business 
motives.  A gun may be carried for defensive purposes but in the face of an 
honour slight (someone looking at someone else the ‘wrong’ way, for example) 
it  may  be  deployed  offensively.   Often  violence  is  less  pre-planned  but 
situationally determined.  Most deaths, we argue, especially those of an Afro 
Caribbean heritage, can be traced back to the street retail of illegal drugs such as 
crack cocaine.  A section of the drug market in which this population is over-
represented; that part of the economy where violence is most likely to explode. 
The paper concludes by seeking to contextualise the implosive violence of the 
street with wider transitions in the capitalist economy.  Drawing on the work of 
Mezaros  (Mezaros,  2001),  specifically,  his  concept  of  destructive  self-
reproduction,  we  argue  that  just  as  capitalism  destructively  self-reproduces 
itself  from above; think here,  for example,  of the destruction wrought to the 
world economy in the wake of a financial crisis unleashed by finance capital; so 
the self-same forces help provoke a parallel adaptive response among the new 
precariat, what we term destructive reproduction from below.   This, in short is 
our description of what life ‘on road’ is all about.   A world populated by young 
angry men who live an outlaw existence.  Young men who carry a legacy of 
deeply internalised anger but have nowhere to sublimate it except against each 
other.
The final  paper  introduced in this  chapter  again returns to  the vexed 
question of why violence enters the lifeworld of those who inhabit the street 
world to the extent it  becomes a taken for granted,  normalised part  of  their 
everyday reality.  Rather than seek to account for it by trying to find a single 
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cause,  for  example,  by  examining  the  rise  of  a  new  gang  menace,  my 
explanation focuses instead on identifying the ends to which social action in 
street  culture  is  predominantly  directed,  then  considering  why  violence 
inevitably enters into the repertoire of social action by and through which these 
ends are socially realised by street actors.
There are, I argue, three ends or goals that people who dwell on the street 
aspire to gain through their participation in street culture. These are respectively 
pleasure, respect and money.  These I term street imperatives.  Some may pursue 
one or  another  and sometimes all  three  together.   Sometimes accomplishing 
success in one will also translate into success in another.  Fighting, for example, 
may on one hand be fun and thus pleasurable but at the same time it can also be 
deployed to build reputation and gain street capital.  
These imperatives are by no means deviant,  they are also pursued by 
most people in late modern, capitalist societies such as the UK.  What makes 
street life so lethal for its participants however, is that violence invariably enters 
into  the  repertoire  of  social  action  street  actors  draw  upon  to  realise  these 
imperatives.  Generating pleasure in a street context often means searching out 
excitement, it means edge working, it means ‘being where the action is’ to evoke 
Goffman’s expression. (Goffman, 1982) It might entail trespassing into territory 
claimed by others, and violence invariably enter, I argue,  into the way pleasure 
is often generated. 
Middle class males establish a respectable identity by holding down high 
status jobs, or jobs that generate significant income.  They can generate respect 
through the power they marshal in undertaking such positions.   They control 
the resources of the world, they tell others what do, subordinates follow their 
instructions.  Though street actors also search for and desire respect, the same 
options rarely present themselves in street life.  Here respect has to be generated 
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and to generate respect street actors also have to demonstrate that they are, as it 
were, ‘real men’.  And it is not enough to simply make the claim that you are, 
because in a street context, claims will be tested.  Violence, I show, invariably 
enters into the business of respect building.  Finally, in the informal criminal 
economy of  the street,  an economy, that  is,  unregulated by the force of  law, 
violence invariably becomes the de facto regulating force within it.   Making 
money in a street context is once again connected to violence. 
Violence then enters invariably into the way street life proceeds.   It arises 
not  because  street  actors  pursue  deviant  goals  or  have  different  sets  of 
aspirations to those who belong to mainstream society.   Their goals,  to have 
pleasure,  be respected and to make money are no different to those of most 
other people.  It is how these goals are realised in a street context, this is what 
makes the street world so lethal.  
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Street Organisation and Structure
Understanding the nature of formal organisations such as bureaucracies 
and corporations has traditionally fallen within the remit of the sociology of 
organisations.  This tradition, in turn, can be traced back to the preoccupations 
of sociology’s grand forefathers who, like Marx and particularly Weber, were 
interested  in  making sense  of  the  distinguishing  features  and organisational 
structure  of  the  rational  bureaucracies  that  were  remaking  the  modern 
industrial order in their image.  They were particularly interested in studying 
the distinctive features of the new modern order and in so doing distinguishing 
distinctly modern social formations with those typical of the premodern.  
Weber’s  study  of  bureaucracy  constituted  the  classic  defining  text 
articulating what was specific about modern organisations (Weber, 2009).  His 
ideal type in many ways remains the most compelling account of how and why 
modern bureaucracies were efficient and successful in ways premodern could 
never be when it came to the task of solving problems and achieving the ends 
they  established  for  themselves.    He  paid  particular  attention  to  their 
instrumental rational orientation and studied how rational processes and the 
application of a rational means to end logic played its way through the way 
modern organisations were structured.  Modern bureaucracies were distinctive 
and  efficient  because  they  possessed  organised  hierarchies  with  a  complex 
division of labour.  They promote on the basis of merit and everyone within the 
organisation  follow  clearly  articulated  (rational)  policies  and  procedures. 
Though mindful of their limitations (for example a bureaucracy’s own tendency 
to  reproduce  itself)  such  organisations  were  successful  because  within  them 
means are rationally allocated to ensure that clearly articulated objectives are 
met in the most effective and cost efficient manner.
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While  this  tradition  certainly  provides  a  compelling  account  of  the 
properties of modern formal organisations, questions can legitimately be raised 
as to whether the formal study of formal organisations can unquestionably be 
applied  as  a  template  to  make  sense  of  the  kind  of  organisations  and 
organisational  form  of  the  street  world  under  investigation  here  and  the 
radically informal  organisations that  inhabit  it.   Can we,  for  example,  study 
informal  organisations  such  as  urban  street  gangs  as  if  they  are  rational 
bureaucracies and, if not, what kind of sociology of organisations do we require 
to do so?   This is the key question I seek to answer in the first paper introduced 
here  ‘Arborealism and Rhizomatics: A Treatise on Street Organisation’.  
The  second  question  I  pose  and  seek  to  address  in  the  next  paper 
introduced in  this  chapter,  also  addresses  a  question  routinely  posed in  the 
sociology of organisations and this concerns less discerning the properties and 
orientation of modern organisations per se but discerning instead the different 
kind of organisations that might be found in a particular environment.   This 
form of analysis often involves producing different organisational typologies. 
Atkinson’s  study  of  the  difference  between,  for  example,  modern  corporate 
organisations and late or post-modern flexible firms is indicative of one way 
that this question has been addressed in recent decades (Atkinson, 1984).  The 
shift from more centralised Fordist business organisations into distributed Post-
Fordist networks constitutes another.    In terms of the paper presented here, my 
aim is to try and understand the nature of and difference between the kind of 
organisations that populate the informal world of the street.   How might we 
label these organisations and what are their distinguishing features?   
In  addressing  these  questions  my  aim  has  not  only  been  to  provide 
answers to interesting sociological / criminological questions, my aim has also 
been  directed  at  taking  issue  precisely  with  the  way  these  questions  have 
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typically  been  addressed  by  a  number  of  contemporary  criminologists  who 
appear to believe that informal street organisations such as street gangs can be 
studied as if they are mirror images of modern organisations.  This approach is 
certainly that used by academics such as Pitts and Harding (Pitts 2008; Harding 
2016) who argue that the street world is populated by hierarchical urban street 
gangs who possess corporate features and behave in a corporate way. Control 
agents such as the police invariably concur to this corporatised model of the 
street as well.
In my paper I explicitly reject this approach.  My conjecture if that if we 
are  to  understand  informal  organisations  such  as  street  gangs  we  have  to 
embrace  a  completely  different  sociology  of  organisations.   One  grounded, 
moreover, on completely different ontological and epistemological assumptions. 
I  articulate  the  principles  around  which  this  alternative  sociology  might  be 
based by exploring the work of the French philosopher Giles Deleuze, drawing 
specifically  on  his  distinction  between  what  he  terms  arboreal  (or  tree  like) 
approaches to the study of organisation and the study of rhizomatic (or grass 
like) forms of structure as an alternative (Deleuze and Guaterri,1977; 1988).   The 
former, explicated brilliantly in the work of Weber are precisely tree like; they 
have  pyramid  features  and  within  them  control  moves  downward  from  a 
commanding point.  Deleuze contrasts these fixed, sedentary and territorialised 
formations with the de-territorialised and radically de-territorialising nomadic 
formations  of  the  Eastern  Steppes.   These  are  not  hierarchical,  they  are  not 
sedentary, and they mutate in wholly unpredictable ways.  Deleuze uses the 
image of the rhizome to capture their inherently nomadic form.  
The point I make in the paper is that organisations such as street gangs 
are  not  corporate,  arboreal  formations  but  are,  precisely,  nomadic.   To 
understand them we cannot therefore apply the categories of arboreal thought 
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and treat them as if they are.  To study nomadic formations we require instead a 
nomodology and to understand this we need a different sociology.  The paper 
concludes by trying to articulate what this alternative sociology might look like 
when applied to informal organisations which, like gangs, exhibit few of the 
properties of formal organisations – even when they try to appropriate them.  
The second paper also takes issue with the way street organisations are 
studied and profiled.  Against a criminological tradition that believes that the 
gang is the key street organisation and which then studies street organisation 
through the mechanism of  producing gang typologies  (see,  for  example,  the 
Eurogang gang typology developed by Klein, 2001; 1995), I treat the gang as one 
street  collective  which  sits  alongside  and  often  in  close  proximity  to  others 
which must be distinguished from it.   The typology I present here I developed 
initially with Tara Young for the Metropolitan Police Service (Hallsworth and 
Young,  2005).   I  subsequently   developed  the  typology  presented  here  in  a 
report for the Government for London, where it was written as a heuristic for 
practitioners.  
In  it  I  treat  the  gang  as  one  form  of  street  collective  with  its  own 
distinctive properties and distinguish this collective from what we term the Peer 
Group, and Organised Crime Groups.    What distinguishes each group from the 
other  is  their  relationship to  crime and violence.   Peer  groups are  the  basic 
building  block  of  the  street,  composed  of  individuals  who  come  together 
because they are, at heart, friendship groups.  In a street context such groups 
can encounter ‘beef’ and have to be prepared to address it.  Some competence in 
violence  might  be  required.  But  these  groups  do  not  come together  for  the 
business of engaging in violence or crime.  This is what distinguishes them from 
urban  street  gangs  whose  defining  feature,  we  argue,  is  precisely  that  their 
identify as a collective is built around violence and engagement in crime.  These 
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properties are, we argue, integral to their identity and purpose. This property 
defines, if you like, their ‘gangness’.  What separates the gang from what we 
term an Organised Crime Group, is that the latter, populated by men for whom 
involvement in crime is again integral to their identify, is the way they address 
this  business  imperative  through  a  more  instrumental  rational  orientation 
towards criminal enterprise.  Gangs, we argue, are often volatile and violence in 
which  they  engage  is  often  motivated  by  personal  more  than  business 
imperatives.  
These groups,  I  contend, can often be found together and rather than 
seek  to  encompass  the  study  of  different  groups  within  some  reified  gang 
typology,  more  can  be  gained  by  looking  at  the  street  ecology  within  any 
environment in its  totality and through such analysis decipher what kind of 
grouping  exists  within  it  and  study  how  these  groups  intersect  together  in 
distributed networks.  The paper is also directed at driving home an important 
truth for practitioners:  Be careful about the labels you apply because most street 
groups  are  not  gangs  and  need  to  be  treated  very  differently.   Each  street 
collective poses a different form and level of risk and these need to be addressed 
in any control effort.  Peer groups are not systematically criminal organisations 
and should not be treated as if they are.  Gangs are different than organised 
crime groups and need to be treated as such.  
!47
Street Representations and Street Realities
The street world is an insular world and as such difficult to apprehend in 
thought.    To an extent this is  because the people who,  like journalists and 
academics, want to explain street life, live lives very different and often very 
distant from those whose lives they want to make sense of.  They also occupy an 
arboreal  and  sedentary  order  which  is  radically  different  from the  informal 
rhizome  of  the  street.   The  street  world  is  difficult  to  comprehend  as  well 
because the motives of those who use  knives and guns on each other  are never 
clear and apparent to those who do not and the problem is exacerbated as well 
because the denizens of the street have many good reasons not to disclose their 
world to those of the outsider looking in.   
To deploy a metaphor, the street world often appears to outsiders like a 
dark lake with subterranean depths that cannot be seen.  Bystanders look and 
see amorphous shapes shifting in the depths of this lake, sometimes they even 
break the surface.   And periodically, like flotsam washed up on the beach, dead 
creatures  are  found.    When  humans  encounter  things  they  cannot  readily 
apprehend  in  thought,  one  compensation  mechanism  they  often  deploy  to 
compensate for knowledge deficits is to engage in fantasy production.  They 
project  onto  the  lake  fears  and  phobias  in  order  to  make  comprehensible  a 
world that appears otherwise incomprehensible. The result, they find monsters.
It is my contention that much of the ‘knowledge’ that has and continues 
to be produced and passed on as ‘objective truths’ about the street world and its 
denizens  represents  less  the  truth  of  the  street  but  what  I  propose  to  term 
‘representations of the street’;  that is,  a representation of the street produced 
through  the  mechanism  of  fantasy  production.   In  the  process  of  fantasy 
!48
construction street reality is not only evicted wholesale, it is repopulated by a 
weird and, at times, bizarre and monstrous fantasy life.  This idea, that these 
‘representations of the street’ reflect more the fantasy life of their producers than 
the truth of the street world, constitutes the kernel of the arguments developed 
in  the  three  papers  introduced  in  this  chapter,  each  of  which  challenge  in 
different ways a particular and powerful representation, namely that the UK in 
recent years is being over-run by a new folk devil, the urban street gang.  
In the first paper, ‘Gangland Britain: Realities, fantasy and industry’ I explore 
and critique what I term the ‘gang talk’ produced by a growing proliferation of 
what I call ‘gang talkers’ who seriously believe that the UK is being overrun by 
a  plenitude  of  large,  organised,  corporate  gangs  that  pose,  allegedly,  an 
existential  threat to society and the British way of life.   In the second paper 
Deciphering Gang Talk,  my aim is directed less at exposing and critiquing the 
fantasies around which gang talk is structured, so much as trying to make sense 
of its underlying rules of composition.   In the final paper, ‘Tilting at windmills: In 
pursuit of gang truths in a British city, I summarise what happened when we went 
in search of ‘gang truths’ in a British City apparently ‘gang afflicted’.  
Each paper then, in its own way, seeks to challenge the prominent idea 
that the UK is being overrun by gangs.  My aim in these chapters is both to 
expose fantasies for what they are; explore how and why they take the form 
they have assumed; while trying to contrast these fantasies with what I hope 
constitutes a more sober, realistic and plausible account of street realities.  
In the first paper, Gangland Britain: Realities, fantasy and industry I take on 
and challenge the gangland UK thesis  which,  in short,  holds that  the UK is 
being overtaken by a plenitude of large, corporate gangs.  A position, staked 
out, not least in the work of John Pitts (Pitts, 2008). Underpinning this conjecture 
is the assumption that contemporary gangs are novel,  proliferating, becoming 
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more organised  and are responsible for most manifestations of urban violence 
from gun related fatalities, the control of the drugs trade, the abuse of women 
and not least, orchestrating the British riots of 2011. In this paper I subject these 
claims to critical interrogation and explore just how far these conjectures about 
gangs depart from a street reality that is elsewhere.  Drawing upon my own 
research I contest the idea that gangs are new or that the social problems blamed 
on gangs are actually gang related. Applying, in my own way, a principle of 
theoretical parsimony, I surmise that there is always an excess to the violence 
blamed on gangs that is simply not gang related. If this is so, the conjecture that 
gangs  are  new is  flawed and should be  discarded.    Gang talk,  I  conclude, 
represents less the truth of the street so much as the interests of a burgeoning 
gang industry that has emerged in the UK in recent decades. One that exists 
ostensibly to liquidate gangs but which, at the point of practice, has to maintain 
the fiction of the gang as a credible enemy to sustain government funding.
While the gang talk produced by gang talkers possesses little truth and 
no  explanatory  value,  it  has  nevertheless  become  established  as  a  plausible 
thesis to many.  In the second paper I explore why this is so by studying the 
rules of  composition that  govern how gang talk is  produced as a  discourse. 
Rather  than reach  for  moral  panic  theory  order  to  explain  why groups  like 
gangs become demonised and othered - the default criminological approach to 
making sense of truth distortion and fantasy life creation; I turn instead to the 
work of the philosopher Wittgenstein and his theory of language games.   
In so doing, my aim was to uncover the rules of composition through and 
by which gang talk produced and reproduced itself.  My conjecture is that gang 
talk has a structure predicated upon an escalation narrative that gang talkers 
have to intuitively follow in the gang talk they produce.  In effect, to play the 
gang-talking game, they have to follow pre-established rules of composition if 
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they are to be heard.  In practice, they have to build their gang talking narratives 
around one or more themes of gang escalation.  For example, they can talk of 
gangs growing larger and becoming more organised.  They can associate the 
gang with more weapons of choice (rape, guns,  dangerous dogs and so on). 
Different  forms  of  gang  can  discovered  and  the  terrible  in-roads  gangs  are 
making in society can be disclosed (the invasions of schools, prisons and so on). 
Developing gang talk around these themes is permissible and this constitutes 
the rule of the game.
Those who play the game well are heard not only because they drive the 
gang-as-invader  narrative  forward,  but  because  the  narrative  of  escalation 
appears  plausible.   Nor  does  compelling  empirical  evidence  need  to  be 
marshalled to sustain gang talk because one of the fascinating things about its 
construction is that, unlike science, it does not trade in concepts of refutation but 
the eternal confirmation of seemingly self-evident gang truths (of course gangs 
rape mothers, of course they are responsible for riots).  The destiny of those who 
do not play the gang game is not to be heard.  I conclude by examining why 
gang talk is so persuasive.   On one hand it is performative, it helps makes sense 
of messy, difficult chunks of reality by articulating truths about the street world 
that appear plausible by locating them in a discourse that appeals directly to 
wider  ontological  insecurities  about  outsiders  invading  which  are  deeply 
embedded in our collective psychology.  Gang talk is also a very easy discourse 
to master and you don’t have to have met any gangs to be able to play the game.
The final paper introduced here draws upon the findings of a research 
project I was commissioned to conduct for ACPO in the wake of the English 
Riots of 2011, riots then being blamed by the government and mass media on 
gangs.  The project was initiated with the aim of seeing whether many of the 
sensational claims being made about gangs in the wake of the riots had any 
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basis  in  reality  at  all  and in  order  to  test  these  truth  claims,  we  conducted 
research in an area of Birmingham which had both an established reputation for 
gang  violence  and  where  the  police  claimed  to  had  collated  considerable 
intelligence about gang activity.  In other words, I went looking for gang truths 
in an area in which confirmation of gang excesses ought to most plausibly be 
discovered.  I  detailed one researcher to talk to young men considered to be 
‘gang affiliated’; another to see whether gangs were taking over the local prison; 
another to talk to practitioners about the seriousness of the local gang problem 
and  another  to  study  police  intelligence  about  the  gang  situation.  Each 
researcher  conducted  their  research  independently  of  each  other  and  like  a 
puppet master I retrospectively assembled their narratives together.   Far from 
coalescing into an integrated narrative, each constituency we studied, perceived 
the gang situation in radically different ways. From this I could only conclude 
there was no one gang reality but different gang realities.
In summary, we did find groups of young men who engaged in forms of 
violent territorialism, who lived violent lives in which weapons clearly figure. 
Some  confirmation  then  that  group  based  violence  was  serious  in  the  UK. 
However,  the  groups  to  which  they  the  young men belonged did  not  have 
leaders,  or much by way of any formal organisation. They did not meet the 
criteria required to be classified as gangs and could more plausibly be defined 
as  peer  groups.   Interestingly,  while  the  young  people  we  studied  did  not 
consider themselves to be in gangs (though they were well aware that this is 
how they were perceived), and did not identify gang violence as a serious issue, 
the perspective of the front line police officers echoed closely the claims being 
articulated  in  the  gang  talking  inventory.   They  saw  organised  gangs 
everywhere and blamed most of the problems of crime and violence in the area 
on gangs. 
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  In these papers I have drawn a sharp distinction between what I have 
termed gangland claims and gangland realities.   And in these papers I  have 
been pretty scathing about the representations of the street that gang talkers 
have produced. In response, I have been accused of being a ‘gang denier’, and, 
not least, ‘left idealist’ (Pitts 2008; Harding 2014).  In one critique I have been 
accused of being a Leninist who feels obliged to pursue a dogma which is to 
explicitly  deny  the  reality  of  gangs  (Pitts  2008).   With  this  in  mind  let  me 
conclude here by critically reflecting upon my own representations. Do I capture 
something  of  street  realities  in  my  writing  (the  thing  in  itself)  or,  like  my 
adversaries,  am I  simply constructing yet  another simulacra of  the street.  In 
short, am I guilty of hubris?
Let me articulate some points in my defence.
First, I have never sought to deny the reality of the violent street worlds 
under consideration here.  I  accept the Left Realist mantra: Street violence is 
real, not a myth or chimera of the control imaginary and I treat it as such.  What 
I  reject  are  attempts  to  simplistically  encapsulate  and  explain  away  such 
violence by reference to reifications which are unhelpful and limited.  This is 
why  I  am  hostile  to  the  attempt  to  reduce  urban  street  based  violence  to 
questions  of  urban  street  gangs  on  the  rise;  or  which  trade  in  dubious 
expressions like ‘gun crime’  or ‘knife crime’.  These expressions obscure more 
than they reveal about the street world.
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Rather than being a ‘left idealist ’ who denies the reality of groups like 4
gangs I consider myself a critical realist.  Somebody, in other words, as much 
concerned with questions of structure as well as with how structure intersects 
with agency and culture in any attempt to explain the very real violence of the 
street.  Applied to the study of the street world my approach is not to try to 
encapsulate  its  totality  into  one  overarching  narrative,  but  to  try  and  find 
different  ways  of  comprehending what  I  understand to  be  a  complex social 
field.  As I hope would have become clear in the narrative presented here, the 
research  findings  are  based  upon  over  20  years  of  empirical  research.   My 
findings, in other words, are evidence led.
But  is  what  I  have  produced yet  another  street  fantasy?   Yet  another 
representation of the street, despite my critical realist pretensions?  Let me end 
here with an anecdote contesting this.  When writing the ‘that’s life innit’ paper, I 
was asked to reflect by my editors on the methodological implications of our 
analysis.  I responded in the paper by observing that while the term ‘on road’ 
was a term we had taken from the street actors who deployed it to describe their 
lives,  our  interpretation  of  their  life  ‘on  road’  was  ours  and  ours  alone.   I 
concluded by reflecting that it would be an interesting project to see whether 
our interpretation of someone else’s reality was itself recognised by the very 
people whose way of life we were speaking about.  
At the time of writing the paper, Professor Alison Liebling at Cambridge 
University was conducting research in British prisons, then being exponentially 
expanded by a growing number of young men convicted for gun use.  Having 
read our paper she took up my suggestion and sought to see whether those who 
 The concept of ‘left idealism’ is never a term I have found useful or compelling.   Rather like 4
the term ‘gang’ this is one label typically imposed by one group on another.  Criminologists 
would do well to dispense of it
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used guns would recognise their world in our writing.  So she gave copies of 
‘That’s  life  Innit’,  to  men  who  used  guns.   The  feedback  she  received  was 
overwhelmingly positive.  They saw the world they lived in in the world we 
described.  Given the fact we made no attempt to romanticise or sensationalise 
their reality, I take this as indicative of the fact that whilst we can never be sure 
how  accurate  our  science  is,  I  was  nevertheless  getting  close  to  the  street 
realities I wanted to understand.   
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Conclusion: On originality and contribution 
As this thesis was being completed, weapon related violence has once 
again made news headlines across the UK on the back of figures released by the 
Home Office which show sharp rises in violent crime and the use of weapons 
including guns and knives. 285 knife related homicides were recorded in the UK 
in the year March ending 2018.  This figure is the highest recorded by the Home 
Office Homicide Index in  70  years.    Those aged 18-24 were  predominantly 
affected, though there has also been a 77% increase in knife related homicides by 
under 18s .   5
Once again explanations are being sought for the violence and various 
felons and causes are being identified.   According to the Home Office rising 
knife  crime and shootings  are  linked to  the  rise  of  new ‘county  lines,  drug 
dealing gangs’,  who allegedly ‘exploit’  and ‘groom’ young people (Deardon, 
2018a).  While  according  to  the  current  Conservative  government’s  Serious 
Violence Strategy,  young people are being ‘radicalised’ into ‘gang culture’ by 
drill  music bands, a genre which, according to one gang expert,  has become 
‘weaponised’ and which, according to the Home Office, ‘glamorise gang and 
drug dealing life, taunt rivals and normalise knife carrying’ (Deardon, 2018b). 
In summary, if we were to believe such commentary, it’s the urban street 
gang that’s to blame, and, of course, the devil music gangsters listen to.  Or, to 
put this another way, ‘gang talk’, as I term it, is once again being mobilised to 
frame and explain the violence of the street world.  If the papers I have collated 
here make any contribution at  all,  it  is  that  they collectively present a  more 
 For  a  summary of  the  statistics  see  Knife  crime:  Causes  and solutions,  The Conversation, 5
March 11, 2019, theconversation.com
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complex and plausible set of explanations for the violence all to easily explained 
away by that talismanic and enigmatic term ‘gang’; while also demonstrating 
why reducing the problems of violence back to gangs or the weapons gangs use, 
is a mistaken endeavour. 
Rather  than  approach  the  study  of  the  violence  by  reference  to  a 
particular  actor  (such as  the  street  gang);  by reference  to  the  weapons used 
(knife or gun crime for example); or by reference to a  particular offence (such as 
street robbery), my work makes the street world the key focus of enquiry.  This 
is one of the key contributions the work aspires to make. 
What is original about these papers is the theoretical and methodological 
innovations I have adopted to make sense of the street world, the motivations of 
those who inhabit it and the violence they do.  In terms of innovation, I have 
drawn on the work of philosophers who barely get mentioned in criminology.  I 
have innovated in the way I apply old theories to new problems and I have 
introduced  methods  which,  like  auto-ethnography,  have  never  been 
meaningfully applied to criminological issues.  
In mobilising new theories and methods my aim is not only to develop 
better and more appropriate ways of making sense of difficult chunks of reality 
but enriching a discipline that only ever improves by reaching out beyond its 
existing ontological and epistemological horizons.  This innovation is evident in 
the way,  for example,  I  mobilise Wittgenstein’s  theory of  language games to 
make sense of  gang talk;  Deleuze’s distinction between the arboreal  and the 
rhizome to understand street organisation; and auto-ethnography to refute the 
conjecture that gangs are new.   
Looking  more  generally  at  my  contribution  to  critical  criminology,  I 
would  note  one  broad  contribution  to  the  field.   As  I  observed  in  the 
introduction,  critical  criminology  along  with  cultural  criminology  has  been 
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loath  to  study  the  kinds  of  street  based  violence  considered  here.   The 
predominant focus of enquiry from Subcultural Theory of the 1970s through to 
Cultural Criminology today has been on the less lethal and more flamboyant 
aspects  of  youth  subculture  and  has,  for  reasons  documented  in  the 
introduction, studiously avoided studying street based violence with the same 
degree of passion and theoretical sophistication.   When it has considered street 
related violence, the location of effort has been predominantly directed at its 
social construction, less its reality.  Adopting a critical realist approach, the body 
of work presented here confronts head on this lacuna in critical criminology.  
While Left realism made a good case for examining the forms of violence 
that concern me, it could be noted that the tradition has not produced that much 
by way of a detailed analysis of the street world and its violence. In other words 
it  did not  really deliver  on its  promise.    The same also applies  to Cultural 
Criminology today.   It too has been loath to investigate street worlds which are 
simply self-destructive.  The published work I have assembled here does this.  It 
explains  why  weaponised  violence  occurs  in  street  settings,  it  helps  us 
understand the motives of perpetrators and helps explicate these by situating 
street action within a historically informed analysis of the intersection between 
structure and agency.  
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Street Violence in a Historical Perspective 
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Folk Heroes and Folk Devils: The Janus face of 
the robber in popular culture
Introduction
Let me begin with some basic facts.   Over time and in most societies, 
robbers  of various kinds have plied their trade. The business in which they 6
trade,  predominantly  robbery,  is  violent  and in  a  sense  mundane and banal 
(Bloc, 2001). Its modus operandi does not change significantly over time (even if 
the  name  of  the  robber  does).   Usually  a  victim’s  possessions  are  removed 
through the threat  or application of  violence in a street  context  (Hallsworth, 
2005). Victims come from all walks of life and the proceeds of this crime are 
minimal when compared to more sophisticated and lucrative forms of crime. 
Given that the offences robbers commit rarely extend beyond removing wallets 
from their victims, street crime does not appear at first sight to be the kind of 
offence that might justify constructing the robber as a ‘folk devil’ positioned as a 
key public enemy.  Yet periodically, the robber has found himself positioned as 
such. Given that street crime at face value lacks anything that appears remotely 
romantic or praiseworthy, it is difficult to imagine how robbers could ever be 
constructed as folk heroes, yet paradoxically, they have been considered in this 
light as well and in many societies.   Indeed, the very folk myths out of which 
 I will use the generic term ‘robber’ for the purpose of this paper but with the recognition that 6
the term bandit or outlaw could just as well have been deployed.  It could also be noted that 
bandits/robbers have also amassed a considerable number of other names over the centuries 
and in different societies.   In the UK they have also been known as outlaws,  highwaymen, 
rampsmen,  muggers and most recently jackers (see Hallsworth 2005).
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societies like the UK or the USA are founded abound with romantic stories of 
robbers and their deeds.
In this paper I want to consider this strange paradox about robbers and 
robbery and do so by attending to what I will term its Janus face.  On one hand, 
I  want  to  explore  how  low  level  predatory  criminals  can  find  themselves 
elevated to the status of what, following Cohen. we might term ‘folk devils’; 
that is evil outsiders positioned as posing an existential threat to society (Cohen 
1980). On the other, I will also examine how the self-same public enemy can also 
be reconstructed as folk heroes .  
To dissect the strange and ambivalent relationship between robbers and 
the citizens that they prey upon however,  requires recognising very clearly and 
from  the  outset  that  what  robbers  do  and  the  way  they  are  discursively 
represented in  popular  culture  are  two very different  things.   It  also  entails 
understanding why unwanted and predatory acts like robbery perpetrated by 
predatory beings like robbers, can be read in diametrically opposing terms.  In 
both cases, as we shall see, we find the robber and the act of robbery constructed 
in  ways  that  exaggerate  certain  qualities  of  the  person  and  the  act,  while 
simultaneously  avoiding  or  negating  other  traits.  On  one  hand  the  robber 
positioned  as  villain  incarnate  can  be  made  to  epitomise  everything  that  is 
wrong with the society they prey upon; on the other they can be periodically 
elevated as heroes that embody the very qualities a society values. 
On robbery
Before  we  look  at  how  the  robber  has  historically  and  indeed 
contemporaneously been constructed in popular  culture,  however,  it  pays to 
reflect for a moment on what it is that they actually do.  As an offence robbery 
involves  the  forcible  acquisition  of  goods  from  victims  in  a  public  setting. 
!64
Perpetrators either individually - but often in groups use violence or the threat 
of violence to separate victims from the things they possess (Deakin et al 2007; 
Hallsworth, 2005; Wright et al; 2006) .  They may verbally threaten them, they 
may outnumber the victim and robbers  are  often armed.   It  is  the threat  of 
overwhelming force that invariably leaves most victims with little option but to 
hand  over  their  goods.   That  said,  other  tactics  could  also  on  occasion  be 
deployed.   Pickpockets  remove  goods  from  victims  without  the  victims 
recognising they have been robbed; while other robbers may snatch goods from 
victims and run off.  Traditionally robbers would rob people for their money, 
but  other  possessions such as  cloths and shoes could also be taken.   Today, 
mobile phones are often the object of choice for many street robbers. 
In  many  respects  street  robbery  falls  into  the  category  of  primitive 
accumulation because that defines the type of crime it is.  It does not require 
elaborate  skills  to  threaten  someone,  or  run  off  with  their  goods,  though 
pickpocketing does require a modicum of ability.  The returns are not significant 
when compared, for example, with various forms of fraud or white collar crime. 
True enough, it  is  not a risk free act  and you have to demonstrate a certain 
degree of courage to undertake it successfully.  And to succeed, it is not just 
enough to be able to simply threaten someone with overwhelming force; you 
have to demonstrate an ability to use force if required.  Societies like the UK and 
the USA, like most other societies, take a pretty dim view of robbery and the 
robbers  who  perpetrate  it  and  the  punishments  meted  out  to  them  can  be 
severe.  
Though,  as  we  will  have  cause  to  note,  victims  might  include  the 
population of the rich, the glamorous and the well to do, the truth of the matter 
is that most victims will almost certainly derive from the same social class as the 
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perpetrators.   In  robbery  overwhelmingly  poor  people  victimise  other  poor 
working class people.  As Jock Young notes:
Street crime is the only form of serious crime where the victim is in the 
same social category as the offender.  It is lower working class against 
lower  working  class,  Black  against  Black  and  neighbour  against 
neighbour.  Much of it represents the ultimate in anti-social behaviour 
and  unites  all  sections  of  the  population  against  a  common  enemy 
(Young 1979).  
It is worth noting the phenomenological aspects of robbery as well before 
we start to look at how and why this act and those who perpetrate it can be 
elevated to become something more heroic than they arguably are.  Its impact 
on a victim can be traumatic.  It is not only about having your goods stolen, it is 
an act  based upon a profound violation of  the self.  If  violence is  mobilised, 
serious  injuries  can  be  caused.    Robbery  however  also  leaves  its  victims 
frightened and anxious.  The effects also last for a long time after the event.
One  obvious  conclusion  that  can  be  drawn  out  from  this  brief 
interrogation into the reality of street robbery is that it is not a glamorous act or 
one that possess any romantic elements at all.  Indeed, it is an act that appears to 
be nothing but a violent exercise in predatory machismo perpetrated by very 
unpleasant people.
Construed this way it  might appear obvious why good citizens might 
well experience a longstanding, deep seated revulsion towards robbers.   The 
reality of robbery might well explain at least one side of the Janus face of the 
bandit positioned as, in Cohen’s terms a ‘folk devil’ or in Nils Christie’s terms ‘a 
suitable  enemy’,  an enemy,  that  is,  the construction of  which,  no reasonable 
person could disagree with (Christie 2001).  Only even here, things are by no 
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means as clear cut as they might otherwise appear to be.  As we shall now see, 
the fears and anxieties street robbers induce are not simply mirror images of a 
mundane if brutal street reality reproduced in street settings.  Public fears about 
robbers, as we shall establish, can at times exceed the threats bandits realistically 
pose. To get to this however we have to move away from street realities and 
attend instead to how robbers and robbery becomes discursively reconstructed 
as folk devils to understand why.  
The robber as folk devil.
As we have seen above, there are good empirical reasons why robbers 
might be feared by the public.  In areas where street crime is high, it is also 
evident why fear of crime over their activities might occasion significant police 
and media attention.  At times however the social response to robbery is not a 
direct  reflection  of  the  reality  of  the  crime  but  takes  on  a  far  more 
disproportionate response.  In cases like this, as we shall now see, the robber can 
be attributed with a range of monstrous qualities in which the threats they pose 
are amplified and where they take on the trappings of a folk devil positioned as 
an existential threat to the wellbeing of society itself.
To consider the historical record and using England as a case study, we 
are presented with a society in which the robber in his (and very rarely her) 
various incarnations have always posed a perennial threat to honest citizens. 
During the medieval period ‘outlaws’ (as they were then known) preyed upon 
those that  travelled between the medieval  towns (Seal,  1996;  Spraggs,  2002). 
indeed the reasons why Chaucer’s  medieval  pilgrims band together and are 
armed occurred  because  of  real  threats  they  faced  upon  the  road  (Chaucer, 
1997). William Harisson, a commentator on travel in early 16th century England, 
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describes  the  extensive  preparations  that  the  travelling  public  had  to  take 
during this period to avoid robbery.
. . .the honest traveller is now inforced to ride with a case of dags at his 
sadle bow, or with some pretie short snapper, whereby he may deale with 
them  further off in his owne defense, before he come within the danger 
of these weapons.  Finallie, no man trauelleth by the waie without his 
sword,  or  some  such  weapon,  with  us  except  the  minister,  who 
commonlie weareth none at all, vnlesse it be a dagger or hanger at his 
side ( Harrison quoted in Spraggs, 2001)
 
By the eightieth century the roads linking the developing industrial cities 
had certainly became more peaceful (Porter, 1982).  The growth of the urban 
industrial  city  with  its  squalor  and concentrated  poverty  however  provided 
new opportunities for new classes of urban robber. And if England always had 
an ambivalent relationship with its robbers,  it  is  really from the 19th century 
onwards that we begin to see the robber appear in ways in which they begin to 
take on the trappings of a fully-fledged folk devil.  A monster devoid of any 
quality that  the public  can identify with and associated with qualities  every 
right thinking person should fear.
The figure of Bill  Sykes in Dicken’s novel Oliver Twist establishes the 
mould  for  the  representation  of  the  robber  as  an  inhuman villain  (Dickens, 
1994).  In this novel Dickens presents Sykes in ways that do not allow any room 
for  empathy  at  all.   He  is  simply  a  vicious,  violent,  predatory  man  utterly 
devoid of morality.   And this is what separates Sykes from, for example, the 
Artful Dodger who in his own way exemplifies many of the traits of robber as 
hero (which we will return to consider below). Dickens was of course writing at 
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a time of profound industrial change.  The London he describes in the novel 
was a deeply segregated city.  And poverty within it was concentred into ‘no go’ 
zones,  or  ‘rookeries  as  they were then popularly known.   Edward Walton a 
contemporary commentator catches well the fear that such areas induced in the 
mind of bourgeoisie in his melodramatic description of life in St Giles.  
‘None else have any business here and if they had they would find 
it  to  their  interest  to  get  out  of  it  as  soon as  possible   (Walton 
quoted in Ackroyd, 2001).  
A sentiment  that  would  be  widely  reported  by  a  growing  army  of  urban 
missionaries who, by the Victorian age, found themselves drawn towards yet 
repelled by the squalor of life in London’s poorest areas. 
Though  the  brutal  reality  of  street  crime  in  the  industrial  city  was 
certainly  a  powerful  motive  that  can  help  explain  the  demonization  of  the 
robber, the way the figure of the robber began to be mediated in the wider mass 
media  by a  growing army of  domestic  missionaries  also  worked to  amplify 
these fears.  If we look at representations of the industrial city produced during 
this period, one gains a sense that, as far as the bourgeoisie were concerned, 
there were dark satanic forces at play in urban development. This perception 
was articulated in various evocations of the metropolis as a space of corruption 
in  which crime and vice  in  all  its  forms would thrive.   Henry Fielding,  for 
example,  believed  that  the  urban  fabric  itself  was  in  some ominous  respect 
deeply criminogenic.
Who so ever indeed considers the cities of London and Westminster, with 
the  late  vast  Addition  of  their  suburbs,  the  great  Irregularity  of  their 
Buildings, the immense number of Lanes, Alleys, Courts, and Bye-places 
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must  think  that,  had  they  been  intended  for  the  very  Purpose  of 
Concealment, they could scarce have been better contrived.  Upon such a 
View, the whole appears as a vast Wood or Forest, in which a Thief may 
harbour with as great Security, as Wild Beasts do in the Deserts of Africa 
or Arabia (Fielding [1791]  1988)
Not only could the evolving metropolis be considered a jungle in which 
dark forces could gather and disappear with ease, it was also a space in which 
the possibility of redemption was subverted by the ease with which evil habits 
could be so readily disseminated among the ‘undeserving’ and feckless poor.  A 
fact  testified by urban commentators  who found themselves staring into the 
very abyss of human nature 
There  is  a  youthful  population  in  the  Metropolis  devoted  to  crime, 
trained  to  it  from  infancy,  adhering  to  it  from  Education  and 
Circumstances, whose connections prevent the possibility of reformation, 
and whom no Punishment can deter; a race ‘sui generis’, different from 
the rest of Society, not only in thoughts, habits and manners, but even in 
appearance(Miles 1839; cited in Shore 1999)
A sentiment  also  expressed  by  Thomas  Begg  who,  writing  in  1849,  found 
himself observing a race of people who were in every shape and form made 
essentially different by virtue of the depraved conditions in which they lived
A large part of the population were found to be grovelling in the veriest 
debasement, yielding obedience only to the animal instincts; brooding in 
spiritual  darkness  in  a  day  of  gospel  light,  and  much  shut  off  from 
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participation in the blessings of Christian privilege as if they had been 
the inhabitants of another hemisphere (Beggs 1849)cited in (Shore 1999).
The positivism of academics such as Lombroso whose enquiries led to 
him to the conclusion that the criminal was simply an atavistic throwback to a 
pre-evolutionary  period,  dignified  these  widely  distributed  gothic  fantasies 
about sub humans existing in the dark heart of the industrial metropolis with 
the gloss of scientific respectability (Horn, 2003; Knepper and Ystehede, 2012). 
What  these  representations  accomplish,  particularly  when  mediated  by  an 
expanding popular press, was a representation of the bandit as faceless product 
of a depraved class of sub-human individuals, devoid of morality, untouched by 
civilisation and driven to crime by primitive instincts.   From this representation 
of the robber, it would take little to persuade the Victorian audience that the 
bandits in their midst posed a real and developing threat to public order.  A 
phenomenon explored by Davis in her examination of what she identified as a 
moral panic that surfaced in the 1840s to 1860s in London as a response to a 
perceived epidemic of ‘garrotting (Davis 1980)
‘Garotting’  referred  to  a  mode  of  attack  perpetrated  by  certain 
‘Rampsmen’.   It  involved  literally  grabbing  a  victim  by  the  neck  prior  to 
separating them from their goods.  By the 1840s in the face of sustained media 
coverage,  the  public  were  presented  with  a  representation  of  what  was 
presented as a new form crime running quite literally out of control.   In the 
Cornhill Magazine in 1863 an editorial read ‘Once more the streets of London 
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are unsafe by day or by night.  The public dread has become almost a panic’.  In 
the ensuing crackdown those found guilty were either flogged or hung .7
In  many  respects  the  Victorian  demonization  of  the  robber  would 
establish  the  template  by  and  through  which  they  would  continue  to  be 
mediated  in  popular  culture  through  the  twentieth  century:  Namely  as  a 
faceless predator, devoid of moral sentiment, an enemy of the people. 
Like other folk devils, the fascination that the robber performs in relation 
to the public they prey upon often moves through phases.  For the most part 
robbery continues as a taken for granted but unremarked phenomenon, rarely 
reported  in  the  mass  media.   In  effect  a  perennial  reality  in  poor  areas. 
Periodically,  however,  as  with  the  case  of  garrotting  in  Victorian  England, 
robbery is rediscovered and the perpetrators can find themselves elevated to the 
status of a public enemy.  And during periods like this,  the robber comes to 
embody and personify quite literally an existential threat to the well-being of 
society.  
In ‘Policing the Crisis, Mugging, the State, Law and Order’ written by Stuart 
Hall,  Chas  Critcher,  Tony  Jefferson,  John  Clarke,  and  Brian  Roberts  of  the 
Birmingham  School  of  Cultural  Studies  provides  the  single  most  detailed 
account exemplifying this in their  analysis of  the social  reaction to what the 
media  were  describing  as  an  escalating  street  crime  pandemic  in  England 
during the period 1970 to 1972 (Hall et al 1978).  
 For an examination of other Victorian moral panics around street crime see Pearson, G. (1983). 7
Hooligan:  a  History  of  Respectable  Fears.  London,  Routledge.  Pearson  (1983).   For  a 
consideration of an 18th century predecessor in Chelsmford  see King, P. (1987). "Newspaper 
reporting, prosecution practice and perceptions of urban crime: the Colchester crime wave of 
1765." Continuity and change 2: 423-454.
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The text begins with an examination and then a critical demolition of the 
evidential basis that the media deployed to justify the selective and sensational 
attention they gave to street crime during this period.  The newsworthiness of 
street crime, Hall et al argued, could not be explained in terms of a sharp and 
unexpected rise in this category of crime because the empirical evidence simply 
did  not  support  this  interpretation.   Street  crime,  they  argued,  was  an  old 
offence  whose  rate  and  incidence  had  not  changed  significantly  over  time 
during the twentieth century. Nor could media and political interest in street 
crime be explained in terms of  an old crime now being perpetrated in new 
ways.   The  expression  ‘Mugging’  which  the  media  quickly  latched upon to 
describe street crime during this period was not, Hall et al argued, a statutory 
offence;  and  far  from  describing  a  new  offence  or  offender  (Phillips  2003) 
appeared  simply  to  be  new  label  imposed  to  classify  an  existing  array  of 
offences.  The public and in particular, the medias response to street crime did 
not, as a consequence, appear warranted by the reality.
In their attempt to make sense of the sensational reporting street robbery 
received  at  the  hands  of  the  media,  Hall  et  al  drew  upon  a  concept  first 
developed by Stan Cohen in his influential study of the social response to Mods 
and Rockers in the 1960s (Cohen 1980).  What the media had generated they 
argued was a ‘moral panic’.
When the official  reaction to  a  person,  groups of  persons or  series  of 
events is out of all proportion to the actual threat offered, when ‘experts’ 
in the form of police chiefs, the judiciary, politicians and editors perceive 
the threat in all but identical terms and appear to talk with one voice of 
rates,  diagnosis,  prognosis  and  solutions,  when  the  media 
representations  universally  stress  ‘sudden  and  dramatic  increases  (in 
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numbers involved or  events)  and ‘novelty’  above and beyond what  a 
sober, realistic appraisal could sustain, then we believe it appropriate to 
speak of the beginnings of a moral panic (Hall et al 1978).  
What they then sought to explain was how and why this moral panic 
around ‘mugging’ had appeared when the facts about ‘mugging’ did not by 
‘sober realistic appraisal’ justify the attention it had received.    As empirical 
facts  about  street  robbery  could  not  provide  them  with  an  answer  to  this 
question, their focus shifted towards accounting for the social response itself. 
Instead of looking at the deviant act - the conventional focus of criminological 
enquiry, they focused instead upon studying ‘the relation between the deviant act 
and the reaction of the public and control agencies to the act’ (Hall et al 1978). 
To accomplish this task they began by assiduously studying the genesis 
of the moral panic, paying particular attention to the way in which the mugging 
label  came  into  popular  usage  during  this  period.     As  their  research 
demonstrated, prior to the 1970s, the term mugging had no history of use in the 
UK.   It was however a term routinely deployed by commentators in the US to 
describe street robbery. What the British media had done, Hall et al argued, was 
to adopt this term and import it wholesale to describe what they then claimed 
was in the process of happening on Britain’s inner city streets.   
What was imported, however, was far more than a new description of an 
old offence.  For in this American import what was being appropriated was a 
label  to  which an assemblage of  already existing references and associations 
were  attached.   The  mugging  label  thus  already  came  contextualised  and 
‘racialised’ when the British media began to apply it in a ‘scene setting’ manner 
to help explain events in the British context.  As Hall et al note:
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‘Mugging’ comes to Britain first as an American phenomenon, but fully 
thematised and contextualised.  It  is embedded in a number of linked 
frames: the race conflict, the urban crisis, rising crime, the breakdown of 
law and order; the liberal conspiracy and the white backlash’.  It  is no 
mere  fact  about  crime that  is  reported.  It  connotes  a  whole  historical 
construction about the nature and dilemmas of American society (Hall et 
al 1978).
When the British media began to deploy the term mugging to define what they 
claimed  was  happening  on  the  streets  of  Britain,  they  did  so  against  a 
background characterised by economic decline, and not least the breakdown of 
the post-war welfare state  settlement.   It  was at  this  moment that  the Black 
community,  already one  of  the  poorest  and most  economically  marginalised 
populations  in  British  society,  found itself  singled  out  for  special  treatment. 
This  revealed  itself,  Hall  et  al  argue,  in  a  movement  that  would  see  Black 
communities  in  general  and  young  Black  males  in  particular  subject  to  an 
undeclared urban war by the police; the active agents of a deeply repressive and 
racist state.
By the time the moral panic over rising street crime had begun, Hall et al 
argued, this urban war was already well under way.  Young Black males were 
already finding themselves subject to racialised targeting by the police; while 
the  areas  in  which  they  lived were  subject  to  highly  intensive  and coercive 
policing.   It is in this context that an articulation between police activity, media 
coverage and street crime activity on the streets began to be forged.  Robbers 
provided the facts; well-reported police arrests confirmed them; and both street 
crime and the response towards it provided a context the media then began to 
interpret by reference to the mugging label it had imported from the US.   
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In this process of othering, the street robber came to connote something 
beyond itself.   By magnifying the threat from one posed to innocent victims in a 
street context, to a malignant alien threat that threatened not only the innocent 
white society but the British way of life, the mugger became reconstructed as a 
folk devil.    In effect  a monster epitomising everything the white victimised 
society lived in fear of: alien invasions, a deepening urban crisis, the decline of 
British civilisation.  The reality of street crime and not least young Black young 
men’s  participation  confirmed  the  plausibility  of  this  narrative.    This 
reconstruction would also justify what would become a draconian judicial crack 
down  on  the  part  of  the  government  and  enforcement  agencies  mandated 
exceptional powers to suppress this violent assault on the good society.  
The Robber as Folk Hero
Given that robbery is a violent predatory act and given that bandits of 
various forms can,  as  we have seen above,  lend themselves  well  to  become 
reconstructed as public  enemies,  at  face value,  it  would appear very odd to 
imagine that from such problematic material a hero can be constructed.  But 
over time and in many societies it is as a public hero that they often appear.  Let 
us now consider how and why this occurs.  
Consider  three  contemporary  societies:   England,  Australia  and  the 
United States.  Taken at face value these are societies that define themselves by 
reference to the fact that they are freedom loving societies in which the rule of 
law prevails.  These are, by and large, societies which also expend considerable 
resource on their enforcement agencies.  Interestingly, however, the founding 
myths  out  of  which  each  of  these  societies  are  built  are  replete  with  heroic 
myths of bandits however they are named: outlaws, robbers or gangsters. As we 
shall also observe, this fascination with robbers has been longstanding and even 
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today, the figure of the outlaw as hero still remains a potent and powerful motif 
in  popular  culture.  Before  we  establish  why  a  predatory  figure  could 
paradoxically  assume  such  heroic  status,  let’s  briefly  look  at  the  historical 
record, beginning with England before briefly considering how the myth of the 
heroic robber would migrate to societies such as Australia and the USA
Everyone knows about  Robin Hood and most  people,  I  imagine,  will 
know  something  about  his  band  of  merry  men  and  the  heroic  tales  that 
surround them.   Leaving aside the many books that have been written, this 
particular myth in which a robber plays the role of folk hero has long provided 
the staple diet upon which Hollywood has fed.  What we know of Robin Hood 
begins in the romances of the eleventh and twelfth centuries where he appears 
as  a  heroic  freeman  whose  status  as  hero  was  built  around  the  audacious 
robberies that he allegedly committed. It wasn’t until the 15th century that he 
was appropriated to the aristocracy (historically he was a yeoman) which was 
also  a  period  during  which  he  became  celebrated  for  fighting  injustice  by 
robbing from the rich to give to the poor (see,  Spaggs, 2001).    Nor was his 
legend an altogether original one, but appeared to draw for inspiration on a 
range of other myths about notorious robbers and bandits including the Anglo-
Norman romance of Fouke le Fitz Waryn, and the Tale of Gamelyn (Hallsworth 
2005). 
Nor does England’s fascination with the heroic outlaw end with Robin 
Hood. By the 16th century an entire genre of ‘cony catching’ literature was being 
published  feeding  off  and  playing  to  the  public’s  fascination  with  rogues, 
vagabonds and other violent,  masterless  men.   In 1552,  for  example,  Gilbert 
Walker wrote the pamphlet ‘A manifest detection of dice play’  and in 1561 John 
Audrey wrote ‘The Fraternity of vagabonds’.  In this genre the public were served 
up with a representation of what was presented as an organised underworld 
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populated by an exotic gallery of rogues whose lives the authors claimed to 
have some intimate knowledge and understanding of  (Twying,  2000).    This 
popular literature continued in the eighteenth century in publications such as 
the  Newgate  Calendar  (Birkett,  1992)   along with a  range of  other  pamphlets 
produced  and  circulated  about  notorious  highwaymen  in  the  17th  and  18th 
centuries.   These insured that, despite the real dangers posed by them, they 
nevertheless  retained,  as  we  shall  now  see,  a  more  heroic,  as  opposed  to 
demonic, face.
By  the  time  we  reach  the  16th  century  if  the  term ‘outlaw’  (meaning 
literally those who live beyond the reach of the law) might well have fallen into 
disuse  but  public  fascination  with  the  robber  would  continue  in  a  range  of 
myths and legends that arose around the figure of the heroic highwayman. 
While  Dick  Turpin  remains  far  and  away  the  most  famous  of  the 
highwaymen of the eighteenth century, his fame was largely derived from the 
exploits of other memorable highwaymen who preceded him and who engaged 
in the very acts for which he would subsequently be remembered. This would 
be a cast that would include figures as Gamaliel Ratsey, Captain James Hind, 
and Claude De Vall  (Seal, 1996). 
The highwayman did not, of course, suddenly appear out of nowhere, 
perpetrating new crimes or old crimes in new ways.  The term simply marks a 
change in semantic fashion: an attempt to rethink an old villain in a way that 
would appeal to whoever the contemporary audience happened to be.   The 
term was  also  only  one  among many others  that  we  could  also  observe  in 
popular  parlance  between the  16th  and the  18th  centuries.   In  this  sense  the 
highwayman could also appear as a ‘High Toby’,  or a ‘Knight of  the Road’. 
What  appears  to  have  cemented  the  term  Highwayman  into  our  historical 
consciousness was the fact that it was an expression that became synonymous 
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with the activities of a procession of famous robbers whose notoriety derived 
both from their exploits and from the way these were subsequently mediated in 
literary form.  
While it is difficult to identify any one person responsible for setting in 
motion the cult  of  the highwayman,  it  is  with Gamaliel  Ratsey a gentleman 
soldier of the early 17th century and Captain James Hind, that the myths of the 
highwayman begin to assume the form that would then persist for the next 200 
years (Spraggs 2001).  
Hanged  in  1605,  having  committed  a  number  of  notorious  robberies, 
Ratsey’s  life  became  the  subject  of  a  number  of  popular  stories.   These,  as 
Spraggs observes, would come to assume the status of models around which 
later stories, subsequently attributed to other highwaymen, would coalesce.  
If  we  consider  these  highwayman  narratives  in  the  round  then  they 
appear to condense around a few common themes which also help explain why 
the robber could also be construed in a more heroic light.   In the first instance 
these  narratives  converge  on  the  figure  of  a  man  (and  very  occasionally  a 
women) who is forced to make their living by robbery, often as a consequence of 
an  injustice  perpetrated  against  them.  Having  taken  to  a  life  of  robbery, 
however, it  is trade which is then undertaken with honour, decency and not 
least, with a sense of good humour.  Though capable of using violence, it is the 
highwayman’s capacity to avoid using it and indeed their repugnance at using 
it unnecessarily that renders them both folk heroes as well as gentlemen.   While 
many of their victims are indeed innocent, it is also the case that some are not 
and  by  virtue  of  this  their  victimisation  is  implicitly  justified.  They  are 
invariably generous to the poor and chivalrous to women.   What gives their 
stories a sense of pathos is that a tragic moral destiny invariably awaits them. 
The highwayman can avoid the forces of law and order for a time (and their 
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notorious capacity to avoid capture remains a core feature of the highwayman 
legend) but the law cannot be circumvented forever.  The kings justice will be 
done and, importantly, must be seen to be done.   Inevitably the hero is caught, 
found guilty and sentenced to death.  The myths invariably conclude with the 
hero facing execution with equanimity and dignity, to leave his mortal coil well 
respected and loved by all (Hallsworth, 2005) .
 The life of Claude Duval, a French highwaymen who plied his trade in 
England furing the 17th century exemplifies the narrative (Sugden, 2015, 2017). 
His most famous exploit, immortalised by Walter Pope in 1670 centred upon an 
occasion where he was alleged to have held up a coach containing a nobleman 
and his lady.  Knowing that escape was impossible but not wishing to appear 
frightened, the lady began to play upon a flageolet.  According to legend Duvel 
took out his own and began to accompany her.   Having concluded their duet 
Duvel is then said to have complemented the nobleman on his wife’s ability and 
then  observed  that  he  suspected  she  could  no  doubt  dance  as  well  as  she 
played.  Having danced with her on the heath Duvel then escorted her back to 
the carriage where he then remarked to the noble that he had failed to pay for 
his entertainment.  In recompense the highwayman stole four hundred pounds.   
While the story is perhaps unlikely, what we do know about Duval is that 
when he was eventually caught and tried at Newgate.  King Charles the Second 
made an attempt to save him, but to no avail.   He was executed at Tyburn on 21 
June 1670 in front of a sympathetic crowd.    He was subsequently buried at St 
Giles where his epitaph read
Here lies Du Vall, Reader, if male thou art,  
Look to thy purse. If female, to thy heart. 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Much havoc has he made of both; for all  
Men he made to stand, and women he made to fall 
(Pope 1670), cited in Spraggs, 2001)  
In  his  study  of  the  historical  role  played  by  the  Robber/  Bandit, 
Hobsbawn, drew attention to the quasi political role they played in pre-modern 
societies  (Hobsbawn,  2000;  See  also  Linebaugh,  P  (2006).   In  such  societies 
poverty  was  the  lived  reality  for  the  overwhelming  majority  of  the  people. 
Class divisions were sharply exposed, exploitation and injustice were clearly 
evident and the rule of law was applied savagely in the interests of the ruling 
class.  The figure of the robber as hero, Hobsbawn argued, grew from the fact 
that  they  not  only  took  on  the  forces  of  law  and  order  which  they  would 
heroically  outwit,  they  challenged  in  so  doing  the  manifest  injustice  of  the 
societies in which they operated.  Robbery perpetrated against the wealthy, in 
effect,  was  part  of  a  class  war  and  recognised  as  such  by  the  poor.   This 
constituted  their  political  role  and  it  was  one  that  the  wider  public  could 
empathise  with.   With  the  coming  of  the  modern  industrial  age  Hobsbawn 
argued that this perception changed.  With the formation of an urban proletariat 
and, not least, working class political parties and unions, the historic and not 
least quasi political role the bandit had played as hero would end.  Increasingly, 
it would be as predatory enemy that the bandit would be construed, in effect an 
enemy of his class of origin.
As we have seen, the robber, throughout the ages, has been constructed 
in very different ways.  On one hand we have a longstanding history of popular 
representations in which the robber appears as folk hero,  a champion of the 
poor and a figure whose audacious exploits become the stuff of legend.  In the 
English Case study presented here we can trace this genealogy from the myths 
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of Robin Hood through to the legends of the highwayman of the eighteenth 
century  popularised  in  cony  catching  literature.   We  can  take  this  journey 
further by looking outside of  England to see how the myth of  noble robber 
through imperialism leaves England’s  green and pleasant  land and becomes 
transplanted to places like America and Australia where it becomes part of the 
founding myths of  these frontier  and outback societies.   This  history would 
include the myths and legends that surrounded the Australian bushranger Ned 
Kelly,  who  together  with  his  gang  was  eventually  shot  by  the  British 
Colonialists in 1880 (Terry,2012; Meradeth and Scott, 1980; Maloney, 2001); and 
the myths that  surrounded outlaws such as Jesse James (Dyer,  1994;  Koblas, 
2001;  Welman,  1986)and  Bonnie  and  Clyde  in  the  USA,  also  executed 
(eventually) by American Law enforcement agencies (Burrough, 2004; Knight 
and Davis, 2003).  
In all these cases we once again are presented with people whose lives 
are  typically  nasty,  brutish  and short  but  which  are  redeemed because  they 
represent,  or perhaps,  more accurately,  are represented in popular culture as 
embodying traits that allow for vicarious  identification by a mass public.  At the 
most  general  what  we are  presented with in  the  literary representations  are 
outlaw figures with anti-establishment credentials, who kick back at the system 
that  oppresses  them, who live precarious lives  on the edge.   Like all  heroic 
robbers they are free, masterless men who live beyond the reach of the law until, 
that is, it finds them where they end up paying the ultimate price.
Is it possible today as we enter the 21st century is it possible to imagine 
that there is still room for robbers to be constructed as anything other than a 
faceless enemy?  Is Hobsbawn correct in arguing that the days of the heroic 
bandit robber have now passed?
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Robbery and popular culture today
In 2002 England found itself reeling from yet another instalment of street 
robbery  fever.   The  mugger  during  this  period  had  returned  (renamed  as 
‘Jacker’) and commanded headline news for a period of around 2 years.  This 
had  some  trappings  of  a  moral  panic  with  the  tropes  of  exaggeration  and 
distortion that typically accompany them ( see Ben Yehuda, 2009) but attention 
was also high because street crime was indeed rising at the very period when 
many other forms of crime (like auto theft) were in decline (Hallsworth 2005. 
Fuelling this crime wave was an epidemic of mobile phone thefts which more 
and  more  young  people  began  to  carry  during  this  period,  thus  creating  a 
population of  suitable victims upon which a growing constituency of  young 
disadvantaged young men began to pray.  As with the moral panic of the 1970s 
the  mugger  during  this  period  was  presented  as  a  folk  devil  incarnate,  an 
existential  threat  to  the  British  way  of  life.   By  2005  this  folk  devil  had 
disappeared as an object of public interest.   The press stopped talking about 
them and street robbery slipped out of the issue attention cycle even though 
quite a lot of it continued.  As with the moral panic documented by Hall et al, 
during this period the robber was represented simply as a faceless menace, an 
enemy of society, shorn of anything that made them or their acts appear human 
let alone justified.  
When robbery next appeared on the British media spectrum it  was in 
2011 following the worst outbreak of riots in post war British history.  Far from 
being seen as an act of resistance on the part of the excluded (the traditional left 
take (see Hobsbawn, 1959) these riots were understood and pretty much written 
off by the left (and everyone else) as events characterised by the mass looting 
that  accompanied  them  (see  Tredwell  et  al  2012;  Žižek,  S.  2011).   Looting 
perpetrated by what the eminent sociologist Zygman Bauman would go on to 
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identify  as  the  ‘flawed  consumers’  of  late  modernity;  a  precariat  totally 
colonised by the cult of compulsory consumption around which contemporary 
neo-liberal capitalism is organised.  A precariat whose complete immersion into 
this cultural imperative left them with nowhere left to take their grievances but 
to the shopping malls which they then looted (Bauman, 2012).  
As with the mugging fears of 2002 it would appear that in the face of 
such a negative reception there is little discursive space in popular culture for 
understanding robbery or robbers as anything other than the sad miserable acts 
of predatory criminals or ‘flawed’ consumers.  All of which begs the question as 
to whether it is possible to imagine popular culture today positioning robbers 
in any other terms in late modern 21st century times?
It  is,  I  suspect,  rather  difficult  to  imagine  the  act  of  robbery  being 
presented  in  anything  other  than  negative  terms  today.   It  remains 
predominantly perceived and with good reason as predatory act perpetrated by 
a  faceless  underclass  we  are  not  invited  to  sympathise  with  but  condemn 
unreservedly.  Yet in many respects I would suggest the personality traits that 
would once have led the robber to be elevated to heroic status arguably still 
appeal.  The public like and remain attracted to the outlaw.  They like masterless 
men.  They sympathise with people who ‘kick back’ and who mobilise violence 
as a currency, just as they sympathise with those who bend rules and live life on 
the edge in order to get what they want.  
Consider, for example, the wider public reception of American Hip-hop 
and the pivotal role that the figure of the urban street gangster plays within it 
(Krims, 2001).  This has become quite literally the outlaw culture par excellence 
of late modern times with a worldwide reach.  A figure perhaps best epitomised 
by Tupac along with other rappers such as the Notorious B.I.G., Dr Dre, Snoop 
Dog and Easy E.  Like the highwayman of old, within the Hip-Hop tradition we 
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find lawless outlaws who in the bars they spit, the clothing they wear and the 
violent aesthetics they adopt, are perceived to kick back at the system which 
oppresses them. 
At  the  same  time  and  paradoxically  rappers  like  Tupac  also  embody 
traits widely celebrated in American society more generally (Price, 2003).  These 
are sovereign individuals owned by no man who also make fortunes in what 
they do.  Like the earlier myths that surrounded Jesse James and Billy the Kid, 
rappers like Tupac also embody the spirit of the frontier.   Here we find men 
who live on their wits, operating at the edge of the law and at odds with it; who 
operate across a lawless and lethal terrain in which life is cheap and survival no 
means certain. 
The series ‘Breaking Bad’ whose hero is a downtrodden school teacher 
who turns to producing and selling crystal meth, also trades unreservedly on 
the iconography associated with heroic robber.  Rather like the highwayman of 
old,  the  hero  Walter  White  fights  the  injustice  of  an  American  society  that 
commits his family to penury, who lives by his wits outing the ever encroaching 
forces of law and order.  He might not give anything to the poor (except he 
drugs he sells) but he is a true family man who will dare everything for their 
wellbeing.
Another constituency who has come to embody the heroic  traits  once 
associated with the heroic  robber is  the category of  detectives  who confront 
them  –  at  least  as  these  appear  in  fictive  form.   From  the  world  of  Clint 
Eastwood’s  hard  bitten  detective  Dirty  Harry  in  the  1970s  to  contemporary 
series such as True Detective we are presented with hero’s who are at the same 
time outsiders; who struggle with unjust regimes which they heroically outwit 
(the criminal justice system, corrupt politicians), whilst not being adverse to a 
bit of ultra-violence along the way.  If the days of the heroic robber are dead, the 
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spirit of the heroic robber, it appears, still lives on, a timeless archetype whose 
appeal never fades. 
Conclusion
As  we  have  seen  the  crimes  in  which  robbers  typically  perpetrate  is 
relatively mundane and banal.  As noted earlier their craft rarely extends further 
than separating a victim from their  possessions through the use or threat  of 
force.  Despite the fact that there is little that is remotely heroic about this, once 
mediated through the prism of popular culture (as this is constituted in any 
age )  the robber can find his  or  her  exploits  celebrated for  their  daring and 
audacity and the robber made to embody heroic traits: a masterless man who 
kicks back against injustice.  As we have also seen despite the banal nature of 
their  crimes  the  robber  can  find  themselves  represented  as  a  public  enemy 
incarnate, a folk devil positioned as posing an existential threat to society itself. 
While  the  robber  as  folk  devil  remains  perhaps  the  most  powerful 
representation we find in popular culture today, it is nevertheless the case that 
many  of  the  virtues  once  associated  with  the  heroic  outlaw robber  are  still 
celebrated even if not necessarily associated with the figure of the robber
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The fists and the fury: My life in a sea of gangs 
“Where have all the boot boys gone” (Slaughter and the Dogs, 1978)
It was not the first time I had been mugged but it was the worst.  The 
crime location: a small back alley running off the Columbia Road in Shoreditch, 
London.   Time:  around  9pm  in  the  evening  of  a  brisk  autumn  night  in 
September 2008.  I was returning to my flat and the alley constituted a short cut. 
I didn’t stand a chance.  There were about ten of them, the oldest aged around 
16-18 - but I recall seeing younger faces as well.   Who were they? Bangladeshi 
boys, I suspect, from a local council estate.  
“Give  me  your  phone”,  demanded  one  of  the  older  ones  as  they 
surrounded me.   I remonstrated but to no avail.  They weren’t in the mood for 
talking. They had violence on their minds.  Things happened quickly after that. 
I felt blows to my back and a fist in my face.  I  dropped to the ground and 
curled up, experience told me that this wouldn’t last long.  Kicks rained in but it 
was over  quickly  enough.   They ripped my coat  pocket  open and stole  my 
phone, my wallet, and in a spirit of pure malfeasance, the keys to my house. 
Then they ran off.
I  stumbled to my feet  shaken,  more in shock than pain,  but  bleeding 
quite heavily from my nose.  I made my way to a nearby newsagent and the 
shopkeeper  called the  emergency services.   A paramedic  eventually  arrived, 
looked  at  me  and  concluded  what  I  already  guessed;  my  nose  was  indeed 
broken and would need treatment.  The police arrived but there was not much I 
could tell them.  As they left to look for the culprits, one confided to me that 
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when they caught up with the ‘scumbags’, they would leave them looking like 
me.  I found myself smiling at the thought, which was reassuring because it told 
me my sense of humour was still intact - even if grinning was painful.  I was 
subsequently taken to the local A and E at Whitechapel Hospital to be deposited 
in a room full of other victims of London’s brutal street world, many in a state 
far worse than mine.  I waited for about three hours before a doctor found the 
time  to  tell  me  that,  yes,  my  nose  was  indeed  broken  and  would  need 
reconstructive surgery at a later date.  I was then told to leave.   Would they at 
least help clean the blood off of me (I was covered in the stuff)?  He agreed and 
a pleasant nurse turned up to help.  I was then evicted on to the streets of the 
East  End  at  around  2am  in  the  morning,  with  no  house  keys  and  in  a 
considerable state of shock.  But I was no longer their problem so my problems 
were no longer their concern .8
I looked terrible.  I had bloodshot eyes; heavy bruising around them and 
my  nose  was  pointing  in  altogether  the  wrong  direction.   Truth  to  tell,  I 
resembled a street fighter, only not a particularly successful one.  By a strange 
coincidence it was Halloween and in celebration young people across the city 
were dressing up in ghoulish apparel to mark the occasion.  I didn’t need to do 
anything I looked quite scary enough.  Indeed, so scary, that people actively 
moved out of my way as I approached them.
How you might wonder did I react to this.  Did I feel vengeful?  Had my 
liberal sensibilities evaporated in the face of this brutal, unprovoked assault?  I 
knew from the moment I regained by feet dripping blood that I would need to 
 This is an issue that requires some investigation.  The hospital staff were basically patching up 8
people, many of whom were evidently in a state of considerable trauma and in no condition to 
be thrown onto the streets of the East End in the early hours of the morning   This was not 
victim support.
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make an existential choice.  Either I would let anger and rage consume me in 
which case, I reasoned, my assailants would have won.  Or I wouldn’t.  I wasn’t 
prepared to let them get to me and nor did I, so I let it go and got on with my 
life.   My friends, I found, expressed instead the anger and indignation I was not 
prepared to allow myself to feel.  I was touched.
Taken at face value this incident would certainly appear to provide pretty 
conclusive proof that urban street gangs exist today and more than that pose a 
serious risk and not only to themselves.  Some may also find in this sad incident 
stark confirmation that gangs are indeed the ‘new face of youth crime’ as argued 
by John Pitts (Pitts 2008).  My victimisation, taken together with that of many 
others today would certainly confirm that group based violence is a real and 
potent threat and needs to be taken seriously.
But  just  how  novel  and  just  how  new  is  the  gang  threat?   Was  I 
confronting  something  new or  have  we  been  here  before?   As  the  work  of 
Geoffrey  Pearson  reminds  us,  the  British  have  a  wonderful  capacity  for 
historical amnesia (Pearson 1983).  A capacity, that is, for forgetting that the bad 
things  we  experience  as  novel  today  often  have  a  long  and  established 
prehistory  behind  them.   That  the  dystopian  reveries  that  shape  our 
representations of the present, are also present in a past that is never quite as 
peaceful  and  pacific  as  fugitive  memory  discerns.  Caught  in  the  ‘infinite 
novelty’ of the present so wider continuities with the past are too often lost. 
And so it is, I will suggest, with the Gangland Britain thesis today.
One entirely legitimate way of demonstrating this would be to embark 
on  a  Pearsonesque  journey  of  enquiry.   To  revisit  the  past  and  show  how 
journalistic accounts of group deviance and delinquency in the post war period 
were often explained as ‘gang related’  at  the time;  or,  alternatively,  showing 
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how group related deviance in the past was experienced as presaging the arrival 
of terrible outbreaks of gangland violence the like of which British society had 
never  witnessed  before.   This,  for  example,  was  certainly  the  case  with  the 
arrival of the teddy boys in the 1950s, as headlines from the newspapers of the 
time will confirm.  The arrival of the Rasta’s in the 1970s was also interpreted 
the same way.
But this is not the approach I intend to adopt here.  Instead, my aim will 
be to present an auto-ethnography detailing my experience of growing up as a 
young  man  negotiating  his  way  through  environments  where  not  only  are 
‘gangs’  a  perennial  part  of  the  street  furniture  but  where  the  risks  of  being 
beaten up by them constituted a very real on-going risk.
Before we get to this, however, a brief preamble on auto-ethnography, a 
method by and large absent from criminological enquiry but which commands 
a growing body of supporters elsewhere in the social sciences and humanities. 
Auto-ethnographies can be understood as a qualitative research method that 
aspires  to  combine  the  characteristic  features  of  ethnography  with  that  of 
autobiography.   In  conducting  ethnography,  researchers  observe  the  lives  of 
others in order to study their meanings, values and practices; and through this, 
their  culture  (Geertz  1973).   Methodologically,  this  process  involves  taking 
detailed field notes, listing observations and conducting interviews with their 
research subjects.  In an autobiography authors instead: 
‘retroactively and selectively write about their past experiences.   Usually the author 
does  not  live  through  these  experiences  to  make  them  part  of  a  published 
document ; rather these experiences are assembled using hindsight.[….] Most often 
auto biographers write  about “epiphanies” –  remembered moments perceived to 
have significantly impacted  the trajectory of a person’s life (Ellis 2010).
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In an auto-ethnography the practices of  autobiography and ethnography are 
combined  in  so  much  as  auto-ethnographers  ‘retrospectively  and  selectively 
write about the epiphanies that stem from, or are made possible, being part of a 
culture and/or by emphasising a particular cultural identity’(Ellis 2010).   As in 
an autobiography the researcher assembles elements of their past but with the 
proviso that, as with an ethnography, the elements assembled are subject to the 
rigour of social scientific conventions to ensure that when subjective experience 
is documented it is examined analytically (Ronai 1992).  
As with any other historical survey auto ethnographies provide a record of past 
events,  only,  whereas  traditional  historical  approaches  are  written  from  the 
perspective of an outsider looking in, an auto ethnography presents a similar 
narrative but with the addition that this is written from the perspective of the 
insider - the subject who experiences them.  If we accept - as we should, cultural 
criminology’s injunction that crime is a dramatic lived experience that requires 
deep  phenomenological  excavation  (Ferrell  2004),  the  auto-ethnographic 
method, I contend, is a viable way of producing thick accounts of crime and 
deviance that foreground and recognise precisely this fact.  
It could, of course, be objected here that a whole genre of crime writing 
exists  that  is  wholly biographical  but  which remains of  dubious provenance 
given  that  its  authors  are  often  ex  gangsters.    What  makes  their  work 
interesting but questionable is that such accounts are typically written in ways 
that invariably sensationalise their subject matter and, not least, the lives of their 
narrators.   There  is  also  a  tendency  in  such  biographical  accounts  for  the 
narrator  (invariably  the  hero  of  his  or  her  testimony)  to  reconstruct  their 
biographies in order to narrate a redemption narrative.   In such accounts the 
heroes past life is invariably saturated with violence and sin before some life-
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transforming event propels them towards a future state of redemption.  Could 
not the same problem reproduce itself in the case of auto-ethnographies such as 
the one I propose to conduct here?   
While this is a relevant critique and one that needs to be addressed, the 
answer is no.   As will become clear in the narrative that follows, the testimony I 
provide is not that of a hero but predominantly a (suitable) victim .  Nor is this a 9
redemption narrative or, indeed, a narrative that has any sense of a beginning, 
middle and end.  I appear in the text as a spectator and participant in the events 
I describe, but most certainly was not an author of the violence that emanates 
from the groups that constitute the key focus of analysis.  When I appear, it is 
rather like the tumbleweed that rolls across the desert, blown here and there by 
the winds of chance.  My narrative simply records my contact with groups that 
have the hallmarks of gangs (as they are defined today) as I encountered them 
on my journey from childhood to adulthood beginning in a village and then 
widening out to a number of different cities.  I begin aged nine, growing up in a 
West Country village in England in the late 1960s.  The narrative ends as I enter 
adulthood in Peterborough, a relatively small New town in Cambridgeshire in 
1980. It is not my aim to sensationalise the world of gangs I describe, or in any 
way to claim that my experiences are somehow unique and exceptional.  Far 
from  it.   My  account,  I  will  hazard,  will  resonate  with  many  young  men, 
particularly  those  who derive  from or  live  close  to  working class  areas  and 
schools and who, in all probability, have also had to navigate their way through 
the same treacherous and often hazardous landscape that I will try and describe 
below.  It is precisely in the mundane nature of my experiences, that the validity 
of my narrative and its criminological relevance will be revealed. Memory also 
 In retrospect and as will become apparent in my discussion of punk, for much of the period 9
under discussion here, I was, in many peoples estimation, a walking provocation to violence.
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plays tricks but my recall of the events, I would contend, is accurate.  A good 
sociologist is invariably a voyeur by nature and inclination.  I was always an 
avid  spectator  on  the  madness  of  the  world  and  this  preceded  my  formal 
training as a sociologist.
In the beginning
I first became aware of gangs having been formally ‘groomed’ and then 
‘recruited’ at the tender age of nine into the MMM, a self-defined street gang 
that had formed under the auspices of Monkey, its self-styled leader.  I was at 
primary school at the time and the year would be 1969.  The MMM claimed as 
its territory a patch of wasteland on the edge of Wick, a small village situated 
midway between Bristol and Bath.  At the centre of its territory could be found a 
large corrugated steel barn upon whose roof we would periodically assemble. 
Well this is how my entry into the world of gangs would read if I were to 
adopt  the  vernacular  of  contemporary  control  speak   (to  adopt  Cohen’s 
expression (Cohen 1984)). The reality was somewhat different.  A school friend 
of mine suggested one day that I might like to meet up with him and his mates 
near  the  barn  where  I  could  become a  member  of  the  MMM (or  Monkey’s 
Mighty  Marauders,  to  give  it  its  full  title).   I  duly  arrived  to  find  several 
youngsters from the village milling around, most of whom were about my age, 
Monkey a few years older.   The term ‘Monkey’, by the way, was a nickname 
accumulated on the basis that that its owner had vaguely simian features.  He 
did not appear to mind.  My nickname at the time, for what it’s worth, was ‘Boz’ 
or ‘Bozzle’ and this was ascribed on the basis that a consensus had been reached 
that I read too many books (Bozzle Bookworm, (obviously)).  What exactly did 
this gang do?  As I recall events, the answer to the question was very little.  We 
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hung around the  barn  pondering  deeply  on  what  the  destiny  of  the  MMM 
might be and what its initials stood for.   ‘Monkey’s Mad Men’,  I  recall,  was 
another alternative. 
The life and times of the MMM however were short lived.  As I went to 
school one day I was approached by a local lad who lived in a Council House at 
the end of our road which was otherwise dominated by small privately owned 
bungalows one of which I knew as home.  He wanted to know if the MMM 
were prepared to do battle with the Mendip Hill Boys, so called, because they 
inhabited  another  council  estate  nearby  on  a  road  called,  unsurprisingly, 
Mendip Hill.  I can’t remember the details of the conversation but it seems I 
somehow agreed to the challenge which I then subsequently forgot all about 
and which, to my everlasting shame, I never mentioned to the rest of the MMM. 
The Mendip Hill boys duly arrived that evening and duly trashed the MMM 
who put up no struggle.  We were the soft products of the petty bourgeoisie, 
while the Mendip Hill Boys were tough working class lads.  In the melee that 
ensued  (dominated  by  a  lot  of  running  away  on  my  part)  Monkey  was 
kidnapped and beaten (but not too seriously).   And that was the end of the 
MMM.
I was, I  have to admit,  a gouache, provincial child with absolutely no 
street  awareness  at  all.   And  this  innocence,  I  think,  helps  explain  what 
happened when next I encountered the world of gangs.  There was a disco at the 
local village hall and my friend Dave suggested I went along.  The year is now 
1970. When I arrived I found myself confronted by a group of young men who 
would not let me enter the Hall until I divulged my gang allegiance.  Was I a 
supporter, they demanded to know, of the Skinheads or Grebo’s.  I was, I have 
to admit, flummoxed, as I had no idea what a Skinhead or a Grebo was.  Boxing 
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clever (or so I thought) I asked them which group they were affiliated to.  ‘We’re 
Skinheads’ they replied.  Unsurprisingly and very quickly I also found myself to 
be an avid supporter of the Skinheads.  Only this was the wrong answer.   ‘Were 
not  skinheads,  we’re  Grebo’s,  they  replied.  I  duly  received  a  kicking  and a 
lesson I  would never  forget  into  the  mendacity  of  the  Grebo.   Nor  had the 
Grebo’s quite finished with me. But before we get to this instalment in my life I 
must digress here and describe my entry into secondary education because it is 
entirely relevant to this narrative. 
The Joys of adolescence
I had the dubious honour of being a member of the first generation sent 
to what was known as a Comprehensive School.  The school in question had 
previously been known as Oldland Common Secondary Modern but had now been 
rebadged Sir Bernard Lovell Comprehensive (after the famous astrologer who had 
lived in the area but  had not  attended the local  school);  given a new set  of 
buildings and high hopes for the future were had by all.   But as the American 
expression goes ‘you can take a child out of the ghetto but you can’t take the 
ghetto out of the child’,  so the same applied to the school.   As a Secondary 
Modern its  mission was less  the  pursuit  of  academic excellence so much as 
providing a holding pen for the local working class youth who lived on the 
huge councils estates adjacent to the area; until, that was, they were old enough 
to be claimed by the local factories.  Though the ethos was supposed to change 
now  that  we  were  part  of  the  brave  new  world  of  Comprehensive’s,  this 
tradition still endured in what was at heart a tough working class school.  
The  scene  still  remains  engrained  in  my  mind  today,  the  vision  I 
encountered in my first walk into the playground of my new school.   Where, 
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there, in the very middle of it, a group of Boot Boys adorned with Bristol Rovers 
scarves,  stood  singing  with  gusto,  popular  terrace  anthems  of  the  period, 
including the following, relayed in a broad Bristol accent:
When the red, red, robin comes bob, bob, bobbing around
Shoot the bastard, shoot the bastard
And
We hate Bristol City and we hate T Rex
We love Bristol Rovers and we all love sex
Walk with a wiggle and wiggle and a walk
Doin’ the Tote End, Boot Walk . .  .
Concluded by way of a glorious finale (accompanied by clapping)
‘Your goin’ to get yer fuckin heads kicked in. 
your goin’ to get yer fuckin heads kicked in’.  
 
This  group,  which  varied  in  composition  on  a  day  to  day  basis,  were 
variously part of the youthful cohort of the Tote End Boot Boys (the football 
hooligan element of Bristol Rovers); simultaneously, the younger element of the 
Banjo Island Boys, so named because at the heart of the local council estate from 
which the school predominantly drew its pupils, could be found a park shaped 
like a banjo.  But their territorial affiliation could also extend to the school itself, 
which  was  in  an  eternal  state  of  conflict  with  another  local  comprehensive 
known as  the  Grange  (and every  other  local  school  come to  think  of  it).  A 
perennial state of conflict also existed between the boys and the teachers whose 
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tragic destiny it was to contain their innate propensity for violence to, at least, 
within manageable proportions.  
This group, aged between 12-14, were aspiring to be mirror images of the 
older Banjo Island Boys who had built up quite a notorious reputation in the 
local area and beyond.  They were the idols whose defiant pose they emulated 
and whose exploits they exalted.  My first glimpse of this group, or part of it, 
also occurred shortly after I joined the school.  I remember seeing a group of 
elder  lads  walking  menacingly  across  the  playing  fields,  two  swinging  bog 
chains in their hands; what in contemporary gang talk, would be considered 
their ‘weapon of choice’.   For the uninitiated, the ‘bog chain’ was so named 
because most public toilets then had cisterns high above the toilet and to flush 
them you pulled a chain.   Given they often had weighty handles attached they 
also made excellent weapons for self-styled bootboys .10
I also had a chance to witness the elders at our school in action, the context 
being away trips to various schools in order to play Rugby.   We were, to be 
frank, absolutely hopeless and lost miserably each time.  But sport, I was given 
to  understand,  was  not  where  the  fun  was  to  be  had.   On  one  occasion  I 
remember  standing  outside  one  local  school  after  yet  another  summary 
pulverising, when a group of our elder boys arrived having left the changing 
rooms.  We were briefly free from adult supervision and they took immediate 
advantage  of  the  opportunity  gifted  to  them by trashing the  neatly  planted 
flower beds nearby while heartedly singing ‘tip toe through the tulips’.  I can’t 
recall the lyrics but they had been changed.    
 The Banjo  Island Boys  would approximate  what  Klein  and Maxim would today terms a 10
traditional extended gang Klein, M. W. (1995). The American street gang : its nature, prevalence, 
and control. New York, Oxford University Press.
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It was around this time (1972) that the Banjo Island Boys elected to invade my 
village in ostensive pursuit of the Mendip Hill Boys.  I remember coming across 
them in the vicinity of the local village pub.  Fortunately for me a number of the 
younger  people  who had come along with  them were  from my school  and 
vouched for me - which was a relief (‘he be alright, Boz is a good un’).  They had 
arrived in cars which indicates that the age range extended beyond 18.  I clearly 
recall seeing one guy sitting in a car with a shotgun in his hands, the epitome of 
a  1970s  gangster.   Others  hung  around nearby,  some carrying  chains,  some 
clubs.  Violence had been anticipated and they were ready for it.  Fortunately, 
the  Mendip  Hill  Boys  had  melted  into  the  ether,  so  nothing  subsequently 
happened.   
By way of phenomenological  detail  these young men were dressed in the 
height of 1970s boot boy fashion.  Longish tangled hair and thick side burns (for 
those that could grow them).  Wide lapelled shirts with strange designs; baggy 
leather jackets with wide lapels,  large baggy trousers with side pockets with 
four  and sometimes  five  button  waist  bands;  and  invariably  Doc  Martin  or 
Chelsea boots.  This really was ‘life on Mars’.  I know because I lived it.  
Life then as it is today was nothing if not territorially grounded.  You were 
known by reference to the area you came from and being from the wrong area, 
or  alternatively,  in  an  area  claimed  by  someone  else,  could  entail  violent 
repercussions.  On one occasion, my friend Mark and I, whilst returning from a 
Rover’s  football  game,  were  jumped by a  group of  young men from the  St 
Georges area of Bristol.   Our error was simply to have strayed into their turf. 
More amusing was the time I received a good kicking from a group of bootboys 
who cornered me after I left a nightclub in Keynsham Centre, an area adjacent 
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to Cadbury Heath where my school was based. I would have been sixteen at the 
time.
I found myself in the unfortunate position of being surrounded by a group of 
about six young men who again had violence on their minds.  ‘Where was I 
from’,  they demanded to know.  I  told them ‘Cadbury Heath’  to which one 
responded the Banjo Island Boys had beaten him up.  This was clearly said with 
the implication that I was going to be made to pay.  Sensing that someone from 
the moon would have beaten him up if that had been my home, I challenged 
him.  ‘Come on’, I said (bravely), ‘I’ll take any one of you on in a one to one 
fight’.   Without  even  pausing  to  consider  my  entirely  reasonable  offer,  one 
immediately responded: ‘We fight as a team’.  Then they pounced.  I received a 
good kicking and one that left me with two black eyes.
Summer and Easter holidays were times when people travelled, a few to hot 
and distant climes, while most stayed in their locality or went to nearby holiday 
resorts such as Western Super Mare.   My mother instead took us to stay with 
our cousins in Birmingham.  The city was then an industrial one and its core 
business was making cars.  To signify its status as an Important Metropolis its 
city centre had been reconstructed in the spirit of post war modernist brutalism 
and in the shadow of the ‘Bull Ring’ (as it was called) strange tribes proliferated.   
One day (we are now in 1973) I found myself playing by the side of a canal 
with my cousin Martin and several of his friends.   We could have been no more 
than 12 or 13 years old at the time.  Out of nowhere a young man appeared 
breathless and in a wonderful Midlands accent relayed the dreadful news: 
‘Better Run, the Grebos are comin’.
Exhibiting what I would like to think of as a fledging interest in the sociology of 
deviance,  instead of  running away (as  everyone else  was)  I  moved towards 
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where he had told us the threat was coming from.  There in all their glory, sure 
enough, was that tribe now lost to memory; a gang of Grebo’s.   There were 
about  twelve in number,  walking towards me in a  single  flat  extended line. 
They also had violence on their minds. They wore a very distinctive uniform. 
Blue flared jeans; long greasy hair, white tea shirts, black biker jackets and biker 
boots.  As soon as they saw me the chase was on.  They were about three or four 
years older and I was quickly captured.  They also grabbed my cousin.   We 
were knocked around a bit but not too badly. Then they made off looking for 
more victims.  They also took my cousins bike, which we found a little later 
having been partially dismantled and well and truly trashed.  This upset Martin 
who  had  recently  been  given  it  brand  new  as  a  birthday  present.   I  was 
beginning to hate Grebo’s. 
Jock  Young  has  recently  argued  that  one  of  the  problems  with 
criminology  is  that  it  paints  an  unduly  dark  picture  of  the  lives  of  young 
working class men who are often its object of analysis (Young 2011).  Where, he 
demands, is the recognition of youthful pleasure; recognition of the humour and 
fun that saturates the lives of deviants who are never quite as miserable and 
excluded as much criminology suggests.  So let me set the record straight here. 
The boys whose lives I describe were not desperate, nor, for the most part, was 
their  violence  driven  forward  by  psychological  defects.   Yes,  they  could  be 
violent and clearly many sought to accomplish proficiency in its exercise.  Their 
masculinity  demanded  it;  working  class  culture  meanwhile  excused, 
reproduced  and  legitimated  it.  But  there  was  generally  a  good-humoured 
rumbustious aspect to the violence they inflicted. Yes, they would give you a 
good kicking, but there was typically a sense of humour attached as well.   Their 
violence was not so much wilful crime, it was a leisure pursuit, a space where 
they found a  welcome break from the  mundane disciplines  imposed within 
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institutions  such  as  the  school  and  the  factory  through  which  their  lives 
predominantly unfolded. In their violence a liminal space was created where 
they could spectacularly break free from the routine monotony of everyday life, 
here they could embrace and excel in what Jack Katz’s terms, ‘the ways of the 
bad-ass’(Katz 1988). And by and large their violence was contained.  Established 
codes of the street typically precluded the idea that you would continue to kick 
someone when they were down; hitting girls was frowned upon; fists were used 
more  than  the  weapons  they  sometimes  sported  and  ‘beef’  was  largely 
contained to each other.
Get Pissed, Destroy
We are now in 1977, Punk had arrived and within its extended family I have 
finally found myself a home. Punk was not some movement I joined, nor was it 
ever something I was ‘recruited’ too.  I experienced my participation from the 
beginning  as  a  vacation.   Its  aggression  and  anarchic  impulses  resonated 
immediately with my own sense of alienation from a society whose authority 
structures  and  pointless  rituals  I  was  already  beginning  to  detest.   Johnny 
Rotten’s enigmatic sign off line at the end of ‘Anarchy in the UK’ just about said 
it all: 
‘Get Pissed. Destroy’.  
It was a liberating mantra.  It distinguished us totally from the wreckage of the 
1960s  ‘summer of love’ along with all the ‘hippy shit’ that surrounded it; it also 
put us head to head with the strange, weird, fucked up place I knew as England. 
And it was pretty fucked up, at least to my way of reasoning.  A pointless queen 
was  going  to  celebrate  a  pointless  jubilee,  and  a  nation  of  pointless  people 
wanted to celebrate it with her. The British, I came to reason, were born to be 
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slaves and this active complicity in their own subjugation just about summed 
them up.  I hated it all.  I hated them all.
Trouble was, where to live and how to avoid the threat of violence that 
being part of a subculture whose raison de etre was to piss everyone else off left 
as its legacy.  Straight society would ban us from its pubs and clubs, gangs of 
bootboys,  teds,  skinheads  and  squaddie’s  meanwhile  (true  to  their  calling), 
would attack us on sight, and not least try and disrupt gigs, a number of which 
would terminate in horrendous violence.  I can vividly remember seeing a sign 
posted on the side of local clubhouse called the ‘Slab’ then used by the local 
Hells Angels chapter.  It carried an uncompromising message: ‘Any punk found 
on these premises will be shot’.  I also recall a pitched battle between the proto 
feminist punk band the Slits and a group of bootboys who had invaded their 
gig.  
Strange  as  it  might  seem,  it  would  be  the  Hells  Angels  who  would 
resolve the question of where I was going to live (at least for a while), while also 
providing me with the opportunity to reflect on the structure of drug dealing 
gangs of the 1970s.  But let me give a bit of background here to explain how 
things came to this strange impasse.
My dad had been made redundant in 1977 and in pursuit of work had 
taken up a position in Peterborough, a small provincial town I had never heard 
of, and, to be honest, didn’t want anything to do with. I, meanwhile, had just 
enrolled on a course of A levels at my local school.  Given that relations with my 
parents were already pretty tense, they agreed to let me stay at the home of aged 
distant relatives in Bristol while I completed my studies. Retrospectively, it might 
not have been one of their best decisions.  Testosterone was kicking in and punk 
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had arrived.  My life  was  changing and new priorities  beckoned.   Ian  Dury 
would encapsulate them superbly in his classic 1977 anthem: 
Sex and drugs and rock and roll
It’s all your brain and body need
Sex and drugs and Rock and Roll
It’s very good indeed (Ian Dury , 1977) 
The immediate problem I faced was not that of recognising how necessary 
these infinitely desirable goods were but – more pressingly - how to gain access 
to them.  Sex was never quite the readily available resource my adolescent self 
desperately aspired to gain access to and disappointment haunted my fumbling 
endeavours far more than the occasional success that came my way.  Rock and 
roll was fine only I never had any money to afford the records.   Drugs certainly 
appealed but where to get hold of them in a cultural milieu where drug use was 
by no means normalised?
Step forward my wonderful  bohemian friend Melissa  and her  friends the 
Hells  Angels.   The background context,  my being evicted from the home of 
aged  distant  relatives  for  indescribable  behaviour  that  need  not  detain  us 
further. This situation had the unfortunate knock on consequence of rendering 
me homeless in Bristol.    So there I found myself one evening one day in a local 
hostelry musing tragically on my future (or lack of it)  when out of nowhere 
appeared Melissa. She suggested I came to stay with her.  She was then living 
with an older ex Hells Angel.  Having no other option available to me, I readily 
agreed.  
I  subsequently met her partner,  who appeared (strange as it  might seem), 
well disposed to me; as indeed did the tribe of Biker boys and Hells Angels who 
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variously lived in his house (there were comings and goings all the time in what 
was a very mobile and shifting population).   Though they were very much a 
group of outsiders (in Becker’s sense of the word (Becker 1964)), by and large 
the truth of the matter was that this was a group that had fallen on hard times. 
Their lives as glorious outlaws riding stripped back Harley Davidson’s across 
the highways and byways of England was by and large over; only the myth of 
the good times remained.  Middle age was beckoning and none of them had 
jobs or wanted them.  They lived off benefits and exploited the welfare system 
to the limit.  In a low wage economy they supplemented their meagre income 
through  hustling  and  engaging  in  various  scams.   One  involved  selling 
household  goods  to  bored  housewives  on  the  basis  that  the  disabled  had 
produced the goods.  I was quite good at this.  But far and away their greatest 
source of extra income came through drug dealing.  They also consumed a great 
deal of the produce that they traded with which, I  suspect,  diminished their 
profit margins considerably.  
One direct  consequence of  this  entrepreneurialism was that I,  a  seventeen 
year  old  punk,  found  myself  spending  the  best  part  of  two  months  totally 
stoned and permanently high wired.   It was a hell of an education but not quite 
of the kind that would see me through my A levels.  It was also an education in 
the art of drug dealing.  First off, these were not high-level dealers.  They sat 
somewhere in the lower middle tier.   Marijuana was the key drug of choice 
though at times they also dealt LSD and Speed.  Though I think it fair to say that 
Mellissa’s partner commanded the most authority, he was not in any real sense 
an active leader.  It was more a cooperative affair.  Though much is made today 
of new corporate style gangs (with elders running youngers, running ‘tiny’s’) 
(Pitts 2008), the group I was living with had no corporate structure at all.  Nor, 
looking back, can I imagine why they would need one.   As is the case today, 
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they  were  a  loose  network  plugged  into  a  larger  distributed  network  that 
defined Britain’s then developing drug economy. 
Though at the groups edges people came and went, there did appear to be 
core group present most of the time and this group spent a lot of time trying to 
identify where next to score.  They did not rely on one source but potentially 
many.  Issues of availability and cost were key factors in the decision to pool 
money together to purchase a weight of dope.  This was then cut and sold on 
down the drug chain mostly to known users in what remained at heart a closed, 
as opposed to open, market place.  Though dealing was regular and brought in 
an income, it most certainly was not enough to raise the standard of living of 
this group beyond their bohemian roots.
This all occurred in the days before skunk had been invented along with the 
hydroponic revolution that made it all possible.  Dope in the 1970s by and large 
came in three forms.  At the bottom of the tree could be found Moroccan hash. 
The best of this was known as ‘Sputnik’.   In the middle was Red Lebanese, so 
called because of its red hue.  It was more pliable than Moroccan, which tended 
to be quite hard.  Top of the tree was Afghan Black which was black and very 
pliable.  Together with Jamaican Semsimilla and Asian opiated Tie Sticks (which 
occasionally appeared), this stuff at its best could induce something quite close 
to  a  hallucinogenic  trip.   Today  Afghan Black  and Red Lebanese  no  longer 
figure in the UK drug market.  The Israelis destroyed the dope industry when 
they invaded the Lebanon .  Thereafter the Bekka valley where the dope had 11
been produced harvested opium.  The same went for Afghanistan, now a net 
exporter of heroin to the western markets. 
 I recall meeting Israeli’s at the time who told me how they smuggled Lebanese dope back into 11
Israel in their rifles. 
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Into the eighties
Not long afterwards, devoid of money, A Levels, and any sense of what I 
was going to do in life, I made my way to Peterborough.  Eventually I found a 
job  and  rented  a  flat  prior  to  an  eventual  move  to  Brixton  in  London. 
Peterborough then was a small  provincial  market town that was reinventing 
itself as a New Town.  To signify its new status, its enlightened planners literally 
ripped the heart out of its old city and build a huge new shopping mall in its 
place. This would provoke the local punk band, the Now, to release their superb 
1977  signal  ‘Development  Corporation’  (“they’re  changing  the  face  of  the 
nation”). As with Birmingham, strange tribes proliferated in the shadow of its 
regenerated centre.  A walk on Saturday morning in 1978, for example, would 
bring any would be flanneur directly into contact with a spectacular array of 
British subcultures and these veered from the ornate and flamboyant to far more 
dangerous and lethal varieties.  
Occupying the city square were the biker boys (with Motor Bikes) and 
their Grebo cousins (without bikes).   Long hair, leather biker jackets and jeans, 
this was their uniform.  Not too far away, standing in the vicinity of the Eight 
Bells  pub (and within  it)  you would find the  local  skinheads.    They came 
shaven headed and wore the ubiquitous uniform of rolled up straight jeans, Ben 
Sherman shirts,  Doctor Marten boots,  braces and Harington jackets.   Both of 
these  subcultures  had  a  capacity  for  violence,  the  skins  a  highly  developed 
capacity  as  we  shall  see.   Enveloped  by  the  new  mall  was  another  of 
Peterborough’s pubs, known as the Still.  It had a number of bars.  Hippies and 
various  survivors  of  the  1960s  generation  occupied one  of  the  bars  and the 
punks another.  The punks were far and away the most creative and flamboyant 
of the various tribes and their local music scene was, to say the least, vibrant. 
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Various  new  romantics  could  also  be  found  in  the  vicinity,  many  heavily 
influenced by David Bowie.  Walking through the city centre, clutching Adidas 
bags and wearing outrageously baggy pants were the Soul Boys, preparing to 
head north to Wigan where, strung out on amphetamine, they would dance the 
night away.  The year is now 1980 and the sheer bio diversity of subcultures was 
startling.   
Another group also needs to be added to the mix here only this is not a 
subculture but it deserves a mention given the focus of the paper which is on 
gangs.  Again resident in a number of the local pubs could be found groups of 
squaddies home on leave.  They also sported short haircuts.  They also moved 
in  groups.  They  were  also  trained  in  violence  and  in  my  experience  were 
prepared  to  mobilise  it  against  anyone  and  everyone  who  looked  remotely 
different.  
It is important not to overstate the number of young people involved in 
these  subcultures,  they  certainly  stood  out,  but  the  numbers  involved  were 
generally small.     They lived out the round of  their  lives in vicinity to the 
straight world of ‘normal’ people, who strangely enough looked pretty strange 
given that  they were also adorned in the height of  seventies fashion.  Flared 
trousers, wide lapelled shirts and jackets, to list only some of the abominations 
in this, the decade that style forgot.  Against them, the punks, despite the spikey 
haircuts and bondage gear they sported, were an altogether more stylish outfit; 
and it  would be  their  penchant  for  straight  or  drain  pipe  trousers  and thin 
lapelled jackets that would set the style scene for the next decade.
At  this  point  some  might  well  be  wondering  why  I  am  describing 
subcultures here when the subject of this paper are gangs but there is a reason 
for this.  If by ‘gangs’ we mean discernible groups known to themselves and to 
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others and for whom crime and or violence is, in some crucial sense, intrinsic to 
their identity and practice, then in my mind there is no doubt at all that many of 
the groups I have tried to describe here fit this definition very clearly - even if 
they did not see themselves and were not at the time formally defined as gangs.  
Take the Skinheads as a case study.  They congregated in groups and 
these groups were at heart, street-fighting units.   They certainly affiliated to the 
far  right  (some more than others)  and holocaust  denial  came as  part  of  the 
package as indeed did a pronounced animosity to migrants.   But violence was 
the crucial  currency in which they traded and they valorised it.   Their  very 
social presentation of self was cultivated in a way that left you in no doubt at all 
that  these  were  people  you did  not  want  to  mess  around with.   And their 
violence could be explosive.  
My first real encounter with Skinhead violence took place at one of the 
many Anti -Apartheid Festivals in London in the late 1970s.  I was still in Bristol 
at  the  time  and  had  travelled  up  in  one  of  many  coaches  to  take  part.   I 
remember finding myself standing near a group of Chelsea Skinheads when the 
Tom Robinson Band took to the stage and sang what remains one the great 
protest  songs  of  the  age  ‘Glad  to  be  Gay’.   The  skinheads  went  berserk, 
attacking the  people  around them while  aiming a  barrage  of  beer  cans  and 
bottles at the stage.    Later in Peterborough I watched them attack the fans of 
another new wave band called the ‘Lurkers’.  There was nothing political about 
it, violence is what they did and they enjoyed doing it.  It was their currency, 
their stock in trade. 
Their propensity for violence was brought powerfully home at an event I 
was also instrumental in organising entitled ‘An Alternative Evening’, which we 
convened at the local Theatre in Peterborough.  We sought to bring together 
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avant-garde,  new wave bands of the time such as Sudden Sway and Ersatz, 
with Art  House cinema and if  I  recall  matters,  poetry.   The event  was very 
successful  and  attracted  an  audience  primarily  drawn  from  the  cities  more 
flamboyant subcultures.  The local drug squad also put in an appearance but 
unfortunately their attempt at anonymity was rather spoiled given the fact that 
they  stood out  like  a  sore  thumb given they  were  anything but  alternative. 
Unfortunately, the skins also put in an appearance and brought the event to a 
halt when they initiated their own riot having taken offence at some of the shop 
mannequins we had assembled.  They were black.  
Later that year, together with some of my friends we went into the Eight 
Bells  Pub  in  the  city  centre  as  part  of  a  wider  pub  crawl  in  celebration  of 
Christmas.  I was standing at the bar waiting to be served and found myself 
next to a skinhead.  He was half-cut but friendly.  ‘Come on’, he said, ‘have a 
drink’.   I  said  no  but  he  took  it  personally.  He  was,  he  said  “only  being 
friendly”.  I accepted.  He wanted me to join his friends.  It was Christmas, after 
all.  Gripped by the weirdness of the situation I relented thinking   ‘whatever’. 
His friends were also skinheads, by no means people I would ever willingly 
elect to have anything to do with.  There were five of them and they were well 
on the road to inebriation. They were also friendly, albeit in a way very peculiar 
to the skinhead.
I drank my whiskey, thanked them and got up to leave.  I  was told I 
needed another drink.  I remonstrated, but one of the skins sitting next to me 
put his arm around my shoulders and sat me down.  ‘We’re all friends here’, he 
said, but with a vague tone of menace.  So there I sat while another skin went to 
bar and came back with another round. The same thing happened when I tried 
to leave again with the consequence that I felt compelled to sit through three 
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more rounds bound to this band of brothers by the implicit threat that leaving 
their company just might be read as an honour slight.  I began to feel desperate 
and somewhat concerned for my safety.  How in the name of hell was I going to 
escape  the  clutches  of  this  bunch  of  psychopaths  who  were  now  trying  to 
explain to me (now a dear friend and supporter of  the Skinhead movement 
worldwide) how I could access men with guns in London.  As we were drinking 
neat spirits the rate of inebriation escalated.  Eventually they brought a final 
round, then, at a signal ran drunkenly for the exit lacking the money necessary 
to pay for it.  I escaped in the melee that ensued.  Johnny Rotten once famously 
observed, ‘never trust a hippy’, to which I would also add ‘never take a drink 
with a skinhead’.
As I observed above, the biker boys were not averse to a bit of the old 
ultra-violence.  Shortly after I moved to Peterborough, I helped organise a series 
of discos at a local village Hall.  This enterprise came to a dramatic halt when a 
group of bikers turned up in a van which they then parked across the door of 
the entrance (so nobody could leave).  They then invaded the hall kicking all 
and everyone that opposed them.  They had come in search of someone who 
had  crossed  them.   They  kicked  him  unconscious  with  the  result  that  an 
ambulance was required to take him to hospital.  The place was, I recall, covered 
in blood.
Finally  in  the  context  of  a  country  that  appears  to  be  witnessing  an 
unpleasant surge in militarism as this paper is being written, let me conclude 
this narrative by saying something very briefly about the squaddies and my 
contact  with  them.   In  many  respects  they  were  not  that  different  to  the 
skinheads.  They also sported short haircuts, they banded together in groups, 
they were innately reactionary and like the skinheads also valorised violence. 
!110
And like the skins you didn’t need to do anything ostensibly wrong to provoke 
it.  
I  had a rather unpleasant experience with squaddies at another gig in 
Peterborough when my friend and I were threatened by three of them.  They 
had, they explained, just arrived back from Northern Ireland.  They had taken 
offence to the fact that we were wearing American style combat trousers.  We 
were lucky, things didn’t kick off, but it was a close run thing.  The New Wave 
band  that  was  playing  at  the  time  was  not  so  lucky.   The  squaddies 
subsequently  attacked  them  and  two  of  its  members  were  hospitalised.   I 
subsequently ran into one of the thugs responsible.  He was, he said, “sorry”, 
but in justification claimed that he and his friends were upset because two of 
their army colleagues had recently been shot dead by the IRA.  As a technique 
of neutralisation, it didn’t really wash .12
Conclusion
What  then  is  the  criminological  significance  of  this  exercise  in  gonzo 
criminology? Do my impressionistic reminisces count for anything?  Can this 
subjectivist  account  even be trusted?   Let  me deal  with the last  point  first. 
 And here I feel I must digress but I can’t help myself.  The idea, currently 12
being  mooted  by  New Labour  that  men like  this,  schooled  to  violence  and 
scarred by it, should be held up as exemplary role models, strikes me as absurd. 
As to the idea currently being mooted by New Labour that men like this should 
be extensively involved in schools in poor areas, the very idea strikes me as 
utterly  ludicrous.   This  is  surely  something  that  only  strange,  deluded  and 
deranged fantasists  could possibly contemplate.   But this  is  New Labour,  so 
why am I surprised. 
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There is,  I  would contend,  no reason not to trust  them.  I  have not tried to 
narrate anything other than events I personally witnessed and experienced.   I 
have not tried to sensationalise these events nor am I making any claim at all 
that in any sense they were exceptional.  As I hope would have become clear, I 
am not a hero.  For the most part I am a victim or a witness to other people 
being  victimised  by  groups  of  young  men  for  whom  collective  violence 
constituted part of their everyday reality.  And I must emphasise here that there 
is  nothing  glamorous  or  exciting  about  the  violence  I  witnessed.   The 
perpetrators may well be experiencing some of the ‘seductions of evil’, but as 
victims of it we, by and large, were not.  
Auto-ethnographic accounts have gained respectability in areas such as 
the performing arts and humanities.  It has gathered a momentum in sociology 
more generally but remains very much a minority pursuit and a contested one; 
often  rejected  as  soft,  subjective  and  as  lacking  rigour  and  objectively  by 
positivists and by some ethnographers as little better than a lazy exercise in 
navel gazing (Madison 2006). 
Criminology, however, has much to gain by engaging with it.  It would 
certainly  expand  the  methodological  repertoire  available  to  cultural 
criminologists  who,  despite  their  vindication of  ethnography as  a  privileged 
mode of  enquiry,  never mention auto-ethnography (Young 2011,  Ferrell  et  al 
2008).   Its use would certainly help some criminologists of the present think 
more carefully about the uniqueness of present events, before advancing claims 
to the effect that gangs represent the ‘new face of youth crime’.
While Pearson has recently sought to challenge this thesis on the grounds 
that we are looking today at little more than a contemporary reiteration of fears 
about gangs that echo ‘respectable fears’ that have a long pre-history (Pearson 
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2011);  and while historians have pointed to the presence in the past of large 
organised  gangs  that  appear  to  resemble  contemporary  gangs  in  crucial 
respects;  this  has  not  been  the  approach  I  have  sought  to  adopt  here.  By 
adopting instead an auto-ethnographic method, I have sought to show that, far 
from being a unique product of our present, the kinds of group based violence 
today being identified as gang related,  constitutes a longstanding,  perennial, 
deeply  embedded  feature  of  street  life  in  British  society.   Its  contemporary 
novelty, as such, is significantly overstated.
In  this  respect,  at  least,  Malcolm  Klein  is  right  when  he  argues  that 
European societies are in denial of a gang problem that has always been around 
(Klein  2001).   Yes,  indeed,  they  have  always  been  present,  as  my  endemic 
exposure to and experience of territorially affiliated street fighting groups over 
the space of two decades, signify.  Nor are the groups I have tried to describe 
here rare.  As I have tried to show, by relaying my experiences of them in three 
cities over two decades, such groups constitute an intrinsic part of working class 
culture and working class street life in England.  There are, in other words, far 
more continuities as opposed to discontinuities in urban street life.
If we take the various facets of gang life and culture currently identified 
as novel, then for the most part it is not. Take violent territorialism.   This is 
reported today as new and disturbing phenomena.  It even has a new label to 
describe it: ‘postcode wars’.  As I have documented above, however, variations 
of this have always been around.  The language used to denote it might have 
changed  but  that  is  all.   As  my  experience  of  living  with  the  bikers  also 
demonstrates, drug dealing was also a commodity that was traded in by groups 
that today would, without doubt, be described as gangs.   As to the idea that 
gangs are now targeting schools in new and sinister ways, then again as my 
!113
experience of growing up in a working class school testifies, groups of street 
fighting kids with violence on their mind were always already there.  Finally, 
are  the  groups  described  as  gangs  today  more  violent  than  their  historical 
predecessors?  The issue of weapons I will touch upon below.  In relation to 
issues of prevalence and inclination I would suggest that the gangs of skinheads 
I encountered were every bit as violent as the violent urban street gangs that 
rove the streets of our inner cities today.    
So what explains this culture of denial?  A number of reasons need to be 
posed to address this.  First off, we are living through a moral panic about gangs 
which we will subsequently explore in chapter 4  (Hallsworth, 2011) In such 
times a sense of proportion is evicted in a world where gang-talking fantasies 
prevail  while the reality principle gets lost  (Cohen 1972;  Hall,  Critcher et  al. 
1978).  It could also be the case however, that the sheer ubiquity of the groups 
and the violence they did paradoxically helps render them invisible.  As Alfred 
Schulz observed long ago, we tend not to notice and easily overlook what is 
always present in our everyday life world (Shultz and Luckmann 1973). Taken 
together  with  the  fact  that  many  of  the  groups  I  have  described,  were  not 
described as gangs, nor for the most part saw themselves as gangs, this helps 
explain in part the historical amnesia British society is currently experiencing.
None of  this  is  to suggest  that  the gang situation as we experience it 
today is not in some respects different.  Between the 1970 and 1980s the groups I 
describe wore highly distinctive uniforms, and ones that clearly distinguished 
one subculture from another (Hall, Jefferson et al. 1976). Today, The aesthetics 
and styles of Black ghetto culture predominantly shape and define the uniform 
and style of urban street gangs today.  While the groups I have described were 
certainly capable of ultra-violence, by and large their violence was delimited by 
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established street  codes  with  longstanding  histories  in  what  remained,  until 
recently, stable working class communities.  My suspicion (based on significant 
research) is that today, this situation has changed and is changing.  
As working class communities have fragmented and as the new precariat 
has  grown (Wacquant  2008),  the  moral  force  of  established street  codes  has 
withered to the extent that violence is no longer delimited to the same extent. 
As one young man in Hackney explained ‘ the thing about violence rules is that 
there aren’t any’(Hallsworth and Silverstone 2009).    More weapons such as 
guns  are  also  making  their  way  into  the  hands  of  volatile,  immature,  gang 
affiliated  young  men,  and  this  coupled  with  their  engagement  in  the  ultra-
violent retail end of the heroin and crack economy, has created I would suggest, 
the preconditions for a surge in lethal violence that was not routinely seen in the 
past (Hallsworth and Silverstone 2009).   
Finally, whereas the group based violence for the young men whose lives 
I have tried to document here, constituted an extension of leisure in a world 
where their will to violence would be contained and end as they entered the 
world of work, I am not sure the same applies today in a post full employment 
society where such orderly transitions of adulthood are no longer assured for 
the burgeoning precariat (Standing 2011).   For some young men, there might 
not be an orderly transition into adulthood; more a prolonged drift  between 
adolescence  and  adulthood  in  a  low  wage,  low  skills  economy,  where  the 
presence of stabilising forces such as stable working class jobs are notable by 
their absence (Hall, Winlow et al. 2008).   In such a context the violence I predict 
will become more volatile and potentially lethal.   In a world where more people 
than ever before carry valuable goods like smart phones I will also predict that 
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violent street robbery will be the form through which much of the violence is 
channelled.  Gangs will invariably be blamed.
By contesting the alleged ‘novelty’ of the gang situation today through 
the vehicle of an auto-ethnography, my aim has both been to introduce a new 
method into a discipline which could, I will suggest, gain much by embracing it. 
At the same time, in reflecting on my personal experiences of growing up and 
around groups that have all the hallmarks of being gangs, my aim has been to 
contest in a new way, the current debate about the alleged novelty of gangs 
today.  
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Continuities and discontinuities in street 
violence 
Much  has  been  made  recently  about  the  alleged  novelty  of  urban 
violence today and gangs as we have seen have found themselves singled out as 
in part ‘the new face of youth crime’.  Though, for reasons already discussed, I 
view this conjecture as one devoid of sense and meaning, this does not in and of 
itself mean that nothing has changed.  Things, after all, do not remain the same. 
Given society more generally has changed and changed considerably it would 
appear sensible to suppose that urban violence and street culture might be as 
well.  With that in mind, in what follows, I want to examine street violence in 
the post war period using the UK as my case study.  Are we looking today at an 
economy of violence that is distinctly new and if so what is new or novel about 
it;  or  alternatively,  are  their  far  more  continuities  that  shape  contemporary 
violence.  Continuities that we tend to overlook, caught up as we so often are, in 
the ‘infinite novelty’ of the present (Pearson 2011).  
In  relation  to  the  question  of  establishing  continuities,  I  begin  by 
providing a brief overview of street based violence in the post-world war 2 era; 
a violence regime I will associate with the developing welfare state.   I then use 
this as the basis for comparing the violence I described in Chapter 6.  As we 
shall observe, if there are many dissimilarities between the two violence regimes 
I describe, there are many continuities as well. In the final part of the paper I 
return to consider the question of what might have changed or is changing.  I 
conclude that while continuities remain, neo liberal state-crafting is beginning to 
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change the contemporary economy of violence; and the direction of travel is not 
for the better. 
Street violence in the post war period
Mindful of Pearson’s injunction that we ignore the lessons of the past at 
our peril (Pearson 2011), let us begin this enquiry by examining the forms of 
street based violence that prevailed in the UK as Britain developed under the 
aegis of the Keynsian welfare state in the era of organised capitalism.  
So who were the violent young men of our immediate past and how best 
are we to understand the day-to-day violence in which they engaged?  We can 
begin with social class as a precursor because class matters.  By and large the 
violence of the street then, as it is today, was an activity predominantly engaged 
in by young, working class men.  Though this generalisation does not rule out 
the engagement in street violence of the middle classes or the scion of the ruling 
classes,  the  overwhelming  evidence  we  have  tells  us  that  the  gentle  art  of 
kicking someone’s head in, has overwhelmingly been a working class pursuit. 
The overwhelming weight of evidence would also appear to suggest that this 
violence was overwhelmingly perpetrated by young men, even though young 
women were, then as today, also involved.  To a large extent this disparity can 
be read as the direct consequence of dominant (patriarchal) gender codes that 
allowed males to dominate public spaces and which worked simultaneously to 
confine young women to the private realm of the home and household.
Before we consider more closely the violence these young men engaged 
in and their motives for engaging in it, it pays to situate their parent class within 
the wider social context of which it was a part.  Though some young working 
class men inhabited multiply deprived, perennially high crime areas, most lived 
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out the round of their lives in more stable, if by no means affluent, working 
class  areas.   The  population  of  young  men,  as  such,  contained  the  social 
residuum, the  sub-proletariat  that  welfare  capitalism had never  included;  as 
well as the male offspring of far more stable and more affluent working class 
communities. It what became at times close to a de facto ghettoisation policy, it 
could also be observed that the population of the residuum had a distinctive 
ethnic profile in so far as many migrants from Asia and the Caribbean were 
spatially located into already poor areas of British cities such as Handsworth in 
Birmingham, Tower Hamlets and Brixton in London and Toxteth in Liverpool 
(Rex, 1988; Pryce, 1979)
Though there is a pronounced tendency on the part of the powerful to 
imagine that street violence is a the product of some strange and dysfunctional 
subculture, driven forward by deranged individuals, characterised by strange 
deficits;  more  can  be  gained by  viewing the  violence  that  most  young men 
engaged in in the post war period as simply an extension of values and norms 
already long established and deeply embedded in working class culture.  From 
this perspective toughness and forms of violent machismo that accompany it, 
were not exceptions to working class norms and values but by and large an 
extension of them.  Within working class culture, as Walter Millar argued long 
ago, toughness coupled with an ability to handle yourself  have always been 
valorised and,  within limits,  excused (Miller  1975).   Not only does a certain 
competence in physical violence find tacit endorsement and cultural acceptance 
(it’s what boys do) this culture has also traditionally stigmatised and censured 
forms of masculinity that depart from this mould.  Being ‘soft’, a ‘sissy’ or a 
‘nancy boy’ I recall, from my own experience growing up in a working class 
school in the 1960s and 1970s, were terms of abuse applied to young men who 
fell short of this ideal.  
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If  we  consider  why  this  validation  of  physical  prowess  finds  such 
cultural  endorsement  then  this  follows  directly  through  from  the 
uncompromising tough, harsh and adverse conditions that the working class 
historically had to confront.  In other words, toughness and being able to handle 
yourself  are  values  that  came  to  be  valued  because  they  were  integral  to 
physical survival.   In a culture grounded on harsh, uncompromising manual 
labour, physical hardness expressed resilience of the class itself.
If violence could be tacitly legitimated in working class culture, it was 
also regulated by informal street  codes that  placed determinate limits  to the 
violence.  In a patriarchal culture dominated by an aristocracy of labour (shop 
stewards,  foreman,  sergeants),  the  activities  of  the  young  were  also  policed 
internally  by  the  working  class  community  itself  (Lea,  2002).   In  Lea  and 
Stenson’s terms, governance was regulated from below far more than it  was 
achieved by formal policing agencies from above - despite their intermittently 
and by no means successful attempts to ‘police the working class city’ (Lea and 
Stenson,  2007).   This worked to keep violence by and large within bounded 
limits  in  a  world  where  strong  cohesive  communities  were  able  to  exercise 
authority over young men who by and large, would grudgingly consent to it.
If  the  intergenerational  cultural  reproduction  of  norms  that  validated 
violence helped explain why some young men might mobilise it, this alone does 
not explain the contexts where they would predominantly deploy it.  Violence 
then, as it is today, was a de-facto response to interpersonal disputes, to honour 
slights, to group rivalries, to the search for respect that acquiring a reputation as 
a hard man can accomplish.  The means of violence after all are ready to hand, 
and violence exists as one plausible (in the right context) response to a range of 
problematic situations.
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To this we also need to factor in a range of non-instrumental motivations. 
Among these, we need in particular to factor in the quest for excitement and 
pleasure. The key characteristic of the violence that falls under this category is 
that it is predominantly non instrumental, non-utilitarian and is often engaged 
in as a hedonistic leisure pursuit by men who, in Jack Katz’s terms get their 
kicks from ‘walking the ways of the bad ass’ (Katz 1988).  For young working 
class men in particular, whose destiny in life was almost always going to be the 
factory, violence constituted the means by and through which they could seek to 
escape, at least temporarily, from the tedium of manual labour.   Violence, in this 
sense,  was  an  extension  of  leisure  in  a  world  otherwise  organised  around 
structured repetitive work disciplines.  
It could be observed that this is precisely the world that David Downes 
discovered  in  his  seminal  work  ‘The  Delinquent  Solution’  (Downes  1966). 
Based on an attempt to apply American Subcultural Theory to make sense of 
male street cultures in London’s East End, he discovered less gangs adopting a 
‘delinquent  solution’  (Cohen 1955)  but  ‘street  corner  societies’  populated  by 
young men who engaged in violence along with various other forms of wilding 
out (including hard drinking) as a leisure pursuit.
This  hedonistic  and  violent  aspect  of  working  class  culture  is 
wonderfully exemplified in the gritty realism of Alan Sillitoe,  nowhere more 
eloquently  expressed  than  in  the  opening  pages  Saturday  Night  and  Sunday 
Morning (Sillitoe 1958), a novel set in an industrial town in the 1950s, and which 
follows the day to day exploits of its hero Arthur Seaton, a machinist in a local 
factory.   The  opening  page  is  a  wonderful  reminder  to  everybody  that  the 
hedonistic, violent pleasures of life in the night-time economy are not new.  Like 
so much of our present, continuities as opposed to discontinuities figure:
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For it was Saturday night, the best and bingiest glad-time of the week, 
one of the fifty two holidays in the slow turning Big Wheel of the year, a 
violent preamble to a prostate Sabbath.  Piled up passions were exploded 
on Saturday night, and the effect of the week’s monotonous graft in the 
factory were swilled out  of  your system in a  burst  of  goodwill.   You 
followed the motto of ‘be drunk and be happy, kept your crafty arms 
around  female  waists,  and  felt  the  beer  going  down  into  the  elastic 
capacity of your guts (Sillitoe, 1958: 1). 
Nor is violence far away from Arthur’s life either.   Having been discovered 
sleeping  with  another  man’s  wife  he  finds  himself  violently  assaulted. 
Interestingly, his assailants are Squaddies.  
Why though did some young men become more proficient in violence 
than  others  during  this  period?   Paul  Willis  provides  perhaps  the  most 
compelling explanation for this in his work ‘Learning to Labour’, an account of 
why working class men often tend to find themselves confined to low status, 
manual  working  class  jobs  (Willis  1977).   Based  on  ethnographic  research 
conducted  on  a  group  of  unruly  working  class  young  men  in  a  school  in 
Wolverhampton in  the  1970s,  he  shows how they effectively  rebel  against  a 
middle  class  school  system  whose  value  system  they  quickly  discover  was 
established to fail  them.  Instead of engaging in what they came to view as 
effeminising  intellectual  endeavour,  they  reasserted  instead  more  traditional 
working  class  verities.  They  celebrated  physical  toughness  and  embraced 
misogynist not to say racist standpoints.  In so doing they explicitly rejected the 
middle  class  gateway  to  success  through  intellectual  assertion  and  deferred 
gratification.  The unintended consequence of their youthful rebellion however 
!122
is that far from rebelling successfully against the system, their adaptive response 
simply  prepared  them  for  work  in  the  low  wage,  low  status  sector  of  the 
economy which was always going to be their destiny anyway.
Was this violence predominantly group based and were gangs present? 
If we return to the late 1950s and the appearance of the Teddy boys, it is clear 
that  as  far  as  the  media  were  concerned,  gangs  were  certainly  part  of  the 
problem.  I would, however, suggest that most the violence that occurred in this 
period was group related.  In fact, going further, I would suggest that to Miller’s 
core ‘focal concerns’ I would also like to add another: ‘violent territorialism’. 
This  is  not  new  it  has  always  been  a  core  and  distinctive  feature  of  male 
working  class  culture  in  working  class  communities;  a  trait  I  have  tried  to 
elaborate in my own history of growing up in the post war period.   
For  the  most  part,  the  violence  I  have  sought  to  describe  here  was 
enacted not by people with psychological deficits and with proliferations of ‘risk 
factors’,  but as an intrinsic property of the cultures of masculinity associated 
with particular strains in working class culture.  This gendered order produced 
men shaped by gender norms that valorised toughness as a virtue, where being 
able to handle yourself  was in part  what men (as opposed to women) were 
supposed to be.  Given that the means of violence were always ready to hand 
(your  fists  or  boots)  violence  could,  as  we  have  seen,  be  deployed  for  the 
purpose of leisure, as edgework, or for defensive and offensive purposes.  In an 
adolescent  world  where  the  police  have  always  been  distrusted  and  the 
apparatus  of  the  criminal  justice  is  rarely  seen as  a  vehicle  by and through 
which justice is achieved, violence has also been used as a regulating force in its 
own right. 
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As Matza (Matza 1990) rightly argues, for the most part, young people 
tend to drift into crime and violence.  For the overwhelming majority it is not a 
life vocation or career.  For most young people it is something they would have 
encountered  at  a  stage  of  their  lives.   It  will  be  first  experienced  in  their 
neighbourhood then in the schoolyard.  Participation for some might become 
more prevalent as they enter adolescence.  It is quite likely that more serious 
forms and prolonged exposure to it will take place in poorer areas but, by and 
large, for most it is something that will end as they mature.  By navigating an 
orderly transition from childhood to adulthood, violence, at least for most, is 
something  that  will  be  left  behind.   Paid  work  and family  life  traditionally 
stabilised most adult male personality structures in the direction of law-abiding 
behaviour.  In a society where the wider violence rules are that adults should 
not engage in violence, engagement in it is actively discouraged and sanctions 
applied to those who fail to heed the injunction.  While violence still remains 
valorised in the wider culture, where it appears is in the form of entertainment, 
by adulthood it is not something most adults are expected to engage in.
This  account,  I  recognise,  is  very  general,  and  before  I  conclude  this 
section I want to reflect here for a moment on what we might colloquially refer 
to  as  the  high crime areas  that  persisted in  the  post  war  period into  which 
welfare capitalism had made but  modest  inroads.   Many of  these areas had 
always been poor and within them poverty and deprivation was always high 
and crime in its various forms, constituted an invidious feature of social life in 
them.  While it is important that we do not lose sight of the accomplishments of 
the welfare state, not least in the expansion of affordable social housing coupled 
with welfare benefits, it  could be argued that post war planning also helped 
exacerbate  as  oppose  to  reduce  the  spaces  for  crime and violence.   Soulless 
estates often appeared perfectly designed for encouraging crime and not least 
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fear of it.  Though the council house movement was initially informed by the 
benevolent vision of proving decent housing for the working class, by the late 
1960s many estates were being used as little more than social refuse sites into 
which various ‘problem families’  (as they were called) were being decanted. 
Unsurprisingly,  in  some  of  these  areas,  deeply  entrenched  subcultures  of 
violence became embedded or simply reproduced themselves.
In the post war period, the poorer areas of Britain’s inner cities were also 
becoming ethnically reconfigured as new generations of  migrants,  both from 
Asia and the African Caribbean began to settle in the UK, drawn here by the 
promise of work in what was becoming a dynamic post war boom economy. 
The welcome many experienced however was by no means hospitable.  Many 
ended  up  working  in  the  low  status  work  in  low  paid  jobs  despite  being 
qualified for better work.  Though migrant groups often tend to migrate to areas 
fellow migrants  also inhabit,  Britain was also running its  very own de-facto 
ghettoisation policy (Rex 1988)
For  the  offspring  of  these  migrants,  life  was  shaped  by  the  cruel 
intersection  of  harsh  economic  marginalisation  coupled  with  overt  racism 
deeply inscribed in the social fabric.  Racism could also manifest itself in highly 
violent  forms  and  in  response  to  it  young  migrants  had  no  option  but  to 
organise to defend themselves. Though texts such as Policing the Crisis tend to 
paint a benevolent and rosy picture of life in these communities, where crime 
and criminality is explained away as little more than the acts perpetrated by 
well-meaning spivs (Hall, Jefferson et al. 1976); as Ken Pryce’s ethnographical 
account  of  a  West  Indian  community  brings  home  an  array  of  adaptive 
responses  that  are  by  no  means  benevolent  or  positive  (Pryce  1979).   He 
examines a world populated by some men who make their money living off 
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women as pimps.  He examines, as well, the world of younger ‘rude boys’ who 
were not prepared to do ‘shit work’ for the white man in a low wage economy 
and who drifted into a life of low level crime and hustling.  His work is also 
sensitive  to  the  wider  cultural  and political  currents  that  were  also  shaping 
social  life  in the ghetto he was studying.  He examines the rise and political 
impact of Reggae which he reads as both a subculture and political movement. 
He identifies  in  the  figure  of  the  Dreadlock Warrior  an  oppositional  culture 
locked into a pan African vision predicated on a messianic return to a promised 
land,  and an escape from Babylon.   A cultural  current  that  was  profoundly 
influential and which influenced far more than the Rastaman. I will return to 
this issue.
A question of continuities 
So what has changed and what has not? Prior to looking at the latter it 
pays to study the former because there are a lot of continuities.  We can begin on 
a Durkhemian note by noting that the street level violence I have described here 
is a social fact that will reproduce itself at a certain level.  It will do so because 
wider social arrangements will always produce the preconditions that will work 
to produce young working class men who will draw upon violence as a social 
resource and mobilise it for an array of different ends.  Which means as well 
recognising  the  absurdity  and  impossibility  of  empty  political  slogans  with 
grandiose titles such as ‘ending gang and youth violence’; or which promise to 
deliver ‘within the lifetime of  this  parliament’  as one prominent Labour MP 
once stated ‘an end to anti-social  behaviour’.    Durkheim was always right, 
crime is a social fact,  and as Nils Christie reminds us in his recent work the 
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question should be less about how much there is but about how much people 
want and what constitutes a suitable amount (Christie 2004).  
With that in mind, until such times as we build a very different kind of 
society, street level violence will recur because the preconditions that justify it 
persist then as they do today.  Let us look at the continuities.  We can begin with 
gender  norms.   Today,  as  in  our  immediate  past,  forms  of  masculinity  are 
produced and receive validation which validate hardness and toughness as a 
social  virtue and as  a  means by and through which status can be achieved. 
Despite living with a society whose key violence rule is that there should be no 
violence, we also live in a contradictory space where violence is everywhere 
vicariously reinforced through a culture industry that elevates and valorises it.  
In deeply inequitable societies where hegemonic masculinity continues to 
be predominantly associated with the exercise of power and control over power 
resources  (things  as  well  as  women)  (Connell  2005),  some  young  men, 
particularly  from  multiply  disadvantaged  communities,  will  resolve  the 
predicament  of  a  power deficit,  my mobilising violence as  a  vehicle  by and 
through which they can exercise power and become ‘proper’ men in so doing. 
As Willis and the British subcultural theorists also showed and long ago, in a 
world whose institutions continue to be organised around middle class goals, 
some  young  working  class  men  will  adopt  the  long  standing  subcultural 
solution  of  falling  back  on  versions  of  a  hard  purified  masculinity,  always 
already an essence intrinsic to working class culture as we have seen.   And the 
resilience  we  find  ingrained  in  working  class  culture  and  the  culture  of 
resistance simultaneously inscribed within some ethnic communities will also 
work to ensure that violence and violent assertion remains a potent currency.  
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In a street world populated by social beings as opposed to social isolates, 
it could also be observed that the violence will predominantly be group based 
precisely because group based delinquency is what young men do.   They will, 
as they have always, ‘hang around’ street corners and they will always hang 
around them in peer groups.  As I have tried to make clear it is not that the gang 
today  reflects  the  ‘new  face  of  youth  violence’  in  so  far  as  group  based 
delinquency has always been with us.  As indeed has violent territorialism as 
we saw in chapter 2.  What has changed is the way we now tend to focus on the 
group qua group (the gang has arrived) as opposed to particular categories of 
group offenders such as street muggers. More than that, in a society in a panic 
over gangs and, as such, addicted to gang talk, the idea that street crime can be 
explained any other way, seems to have been lost to history, such is the power of 
social amnesia. 
While  much  is  made  of  the  sensational  discovery  of  gang  girls  and 
shemale gangs it  could be noted that while it  has always been the case that 
young women were capable of and have committed the same forms of crime 
and violence as their male counterparts; they have never done as much, nor is 
their involvement as significant as males, as the work of Susan Bachelor and 
Tara-Young tellingly show (Bachelor 2001; Young 2011).  
Prior, then, to accepting the populist mantra that everything today has 
changed  along  with  versions  of  ‘we  have  never  seen  anything  like  what  we 
experience to day’, it is worth bearing in mind that strong continuities with our 
immediate past remain.
But not everything is the same, I am by no means sanguine about current 
social arrangements and their trajectory of change.  So, in addition to thinking 
through what remains perennial to the regime of violence I have described, it is 
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also as important to consider discontinuities as well and a few can be noted 
because they are beginning to make a difference.  Life ‘on road’ as I described 
the volatile habitus of our present, while profoundly shaped by many of the 
same forces  that  have  always  worked to  mould street  culture,  is  also  being 
shaped by other forces as well.   
Discontinuities: Neoliberalism and its consequences
We can begin by noting the stark changes that have occurred in British 
society in the last three decades, changes that have profoundly transformed the 
economic,  cultural  and political  landscape.   These have been summarised in 
different ways: as the shift from a Fordist to a Post-Fordist society (Amin 1994), 
or as a shift from modernity to late modernity (Bauman 1997; Young 2007). I 
would, however agree with Wacquant and suggest that the direction of change 
can best be read as the shift from welfare state capitalism to that of free market 
neoliberalism (Wacquant 2009).  To put this in another way, until recently we 
lived  within  the  aegis  of  a  liberal  welfare  state  and  a  managed  capitalist 
economy.   Today that  state  no longer exists,  nor  does the economic order it 
supported.  What was a welfare state has been replaced by a neoliberal state, 
while what was once a managed capitalist economy has mutated into a harsh, 
deregulated free market.  
What has this to do with the wider ecology of violence? As we shall now 
establish the answer to this is quite a lot.  Let’s begin with the issue of social 
class  because  the  class  structure  has  changed  and  is  changing.   Within  the 
welfare state the social order resembled a diamond.  At its apex could be found 
what  Marxists  would  describe  as  the  ruling  class,  those  who  owned  and 
controlled  the  means  of  production.   Beneath  them,  but  still  in  the  upper 
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echelons of the diamond could be found a more or less affluent middle class; 
beneath them, in the bottom segment of the diamond, the working class.  In the 
post war period the most successful sections of this class were becoming more 
affluent, many enjoying wages that paralleled those of the middle classes.  This 
was both an accomplishment of welfare state managed capitalism and not least 
political struggle on the part of an organised labour movement.  This class had 
been  born  in  the  fulcrum  of  the  industrial  age,  and  had  settled  over  the 
twentieth century into large cohesive urban based communities, patriarchal to 
an extent, by and large self-governing and self-policing.  Beneath this section of 
the working class,  occupying the areas of perennial poverty and deprivation 
could be found the sub-proletariat, or the social residuum; a class which, despite 
the  integrative  programmes  of  welfare  state  capitalism,  had  not  been 
meaningfully integrated into the dream of prosperous material progress that the 
‘white heat of technology’ was supposed to deliver.  It could be noted that in the 
welfare  state  material  progress  was  supposed  to  compress  the  diamond, 
flattening it at the bottom as the poor became more affluent, merging eventually 
(or so it was hoped) with the middle class. 
It  is  within  this  social  formation  that  the  ecology  of  violence  I  have 
attempted to map above can be located. Within it, violence occurred but as we 
have seen more as an extension of working class norms into the world of leisure, 
in  a  world  where  the  promise  of  factory  labour  would  stabilise  adult 
personalities and bring an end to the drift into crime and violence. 
Only the class structure of the welfare state has changed and the change 
has been such as to justify Guy Standings argument that sociologically we need 
to  recognise  that  traditional  class  typologies  no  longer  map easily  onto  our 
present (Standing 2011).  Instead of a diamond shaped society we move instead 
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into a neoliberal present that can best be grasped through the metaphor of an 
hourglass.  The image, not least allows us to capture the reality of neoliberal 
policies  and  their  impact.   Realities  that  have  led  to  escalating  inequalities 
coupled with  declining social  mobility  for  everyone but  a  nomadic,  socially 
disconnected,  feral  over  class,  the  winners  in  a  winner  takes  all  economy 
(Harvey 2010).   Also successful  but  a  long way below the overclass,  can be 
found a qualified professional elite, the ‘salariat’ as Standing terms them.  In the 
centre  we  find  what  is  often  referred  to  as  the  ‘squeezed  middle’.   This  is 
occupied by the middle classes.  While the more successful elements of this class 
still lead prosperous and secure lives, their children are by no means likely to be 
as prosperous or secure.  Nor will they be likely to enjoy the kinds of security 
taken for granted by their parents.  This class, as a whole, is best defined by its 
sense of insecurity and by the fact that is very security conscious.  Nor does it 
feel connected to, or indeed inspired to support the classes located beneath it 
(Garland 2001; Lea 2002).  
In the bottom section of the hourglass we find a working class that is no 
longer upwardly mobile and which is fragmented and fragmenting.  Decades of 
deindustrialisation,  the  rise  of  an  increasingly  atomised  and  individualistic 
society; coupled with a ferocious class war waged against organised labour by 
successive  neoliberal  governments,  have  eroded  both  its  affluence,  its 
cohesiveness and its consciousness.  While sections of this class continue to live 
out the round of their lives in stable jobs and stable work, this is progressively 
becoming less a norm in what has become a deregulated free market society. 
Instead of facing upwards migration into the diamond, under conditions of free 
market  neoliberal  accumulation,  many sections  of  this  fragmenting class  are 
drifting down into the bottom section of the hour-glass.  
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This  section  is  predominantly  occupied  by  the  precariat,  so  called 
because  precariousness  now defines  the  social  conditions  in  which  it  exists. 
This is not, as Standing argues, a class in itself, in the Marxist sense of the word. 
This is a class in the making.  Nor is it the unfortunate by-product of neoliberal 
policy, on the contrary it is a calculated product of neo liberal state-crafting.  As 
the  violent  street  culture  described  in  the  previous  chapter  is  intimately 
connected with the growth of the contemporary precariat, it pays to reflect upon 
its constitution and the conditions of its existence.  
We can  begin  by  examining  its  membership.   While  it  contains  what 
would once have been considered the sub-precariat  of  the welfare  state,  the 
social  residuum  it  never  got  around  to  including,  its  ranks  have  been 
supplemented by the downward mobility of many sections of the fragmenting 
working class.  In a world where the ethnic composition of poor urban areas has 
been ethnically reconfigured following successive waves of inward migration, 
minority ethnic groups are also significantly represented.  In what has become a 
post  full  employment  society  and  one  where  ‘the  spectre  of  uselessness’  as 
Richard Sennett defines it (Sennett 2006), confronts many more people than the 
already poor, many other social groups are being decanted into the precariat 
and into precarious living.  Ageing members of the middle classes, working in 
companies that no longer feel compelled to invest in their staff, represent one 
constituency.   Students  now  forced  to  hike  up  huge  depts.  in  order  to  get 
degrees for entry-level jobs which until recently did not require them, represent 
another one.  Young people are significantly overrepresented more generally in 
a world where the working class jobs that would once have been available to 
them have noticeably declined. So what, then, is distinctive about precarious 
life.  We can return to Guy Standing. 
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The  precariat  has  not  yet  come  into  focus.  Many  millions  of  people  are 
experiencing a precarious existence, in temporary jobs, doing short-time labour, 
linked  strangely  to  employment  agencies,  and  so  on,  most  without  any 
assurance of state benefits or the perks being received by the salariat or core. 
Most  lack any sense of  career,  for  they have no secure social  and economic 
identity in occupational terms. The precariat is not ‘socially excluded’, and that 
term is misleading. And the precariat is not adequately appreciated if we focus 
on income poverty alone. The precariat is socially and economically vulnerable, 
subject to anomic attitudes and without any social memory on which to draw to 
give  them  a  sense  of  existential  security.  Those  drifting  into  the  precariat 
encompass what some see as urban nomads (Standing 2009).
Surplus to production; or only allowed onto the lowest rungs of production 
in a flexible labour market comprising low paid, low status and insecure work; 
this  population  has  been  socially  abandoned  in  an  economic  world  where 
wealth has shifted upwards into the hands of already wealthy, while older social 
support systems such as welfare have been dismantled or reconstructed into 
coercive  workfare  (Wacquant  2009).  This  is  population  that  has  been 
deliberately  dispossessed  and  disenfranchised  in  equal  measure.   This  is  a 
population that no longer can expect the economic prosperity and stable work 
the welfare state promised; this population exist instead in an insecure world 
where the forms of security that the welfare state sought to provide have been 
abandoned or privatized.  The world of the precariat is one characterized by 
chronic job insecurity, work insecurity and employment insecurity. This is the 
world where temporary jobs remain temporary and rarely become full time, not 
least for young people (Standing, 2011).  
If this population is materially excluded they are also, as Standing observes, 
socially included as well.  And this aspect of their contradictory standing in our 
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society also needs to be recognised if we are to understand certain aspects of the 
violence under consideration here.  For while evicted from meaningful work, 
the precariat is nevertheless included into the narcissistic culture of compulsory 
ornamental consumption around which free market society is organised (Hall, 
Winlow and Ancrum,  2008;  Young  1999).   Shaped  by  ruthless  marketing  to 
desire  branded goods,  the  possession of  which  is  now worn as  a  necessary 
talisman  of  belonging;  the  precariat  are  remorselessly  forged  to  become 
consumers  and  to  define  success  in  life  through  engaging  in  successful 
conspicuous  consumption  rituals  (Hallsworth  2005).   Jock  Young  uses  the 
metaphor of bulimia to capture this feature of late modern life.  Free market 
society, on one hand, materially excludes the precariat but culturally includes it 
as  well.   Unfortunately,  these  are  consumers  who  cannot  always  consume 
legitimately given their material exclusion and the exploitation that is their lot. 
For  Bauman,  they  are,  as  such,  the  ‘flawed  consumers’  of  late  modernity 
(Bauman 2000).
Social bulimia is a powerful metaphor with its intimations of a pathology 
organised  around ingestion  and vomiting.   But  let  me  offer  a  more  overtly 
Marxist reading of the paradox we are describing here.  What neo-liberalism 
does is both colonise the soul of the individual while at the very same time it 
profoundly alienates them.  It  colonises them to the extent  that  it  aspires to 
shape every appetite and every desire in the image of consumption and the 
market; but at the same time the political logic of neo-liberalism is to alienate 
them from any and all vestiges of tradition and ritual beyond those demanded 
by the market place.  Seabrook draws out well the implications dwelling in this 
hyper-real world and captures in so doing a key attribute of a class which has 
‘no  historical  memory.   ‘To  grow  up  under  the  domination  of  consumer 
capitalism is’, he argues:
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. . . ‘to see that part of us which used to belong to society to be colonised, torn 
away from traditional  allegiances,  and to be hurtled,  alone and isolated into the 
prison  of  an  individuals  senses.   The  child  tends  to  be  stripped  of  all  social 
influences but that of  the market-place;  all  sense of place,  function and class are 
weakened,  the  characteristics  of  region  or  clan,  neighbourhood  or  kindred  are 
attenuated.   The  individual  is  denuded of  everything but  appetites,  desires  and 
tastes,  wrenched from any context  of  human obligation or  commitment.   It  is  a 
process  of  mutilation;  and  once  this  has  been  achieved  we  are  offered  the 
consolation of reconstructing the abbreviated humanity out of the things and the 
goods around us, and the fantasies and vapours which they emit (Seabrook 1978).
The process of ‘stripping away’, must itself be read as a productive strategy, a 
mechanism by and through which the new precariat  is  being produced.    It 
functions through atomisation and individualisation where the individual self 
and its  desires  are now made a measure of  all  things.   It  functions through 
eliminating older social collectives and the organic ties that would once have 
bound them to place and community.  To grow up in neoliberal capitalist culture 
is  to  find  yourself  in  an  anomic  space,  where  historical  memories  and  any 
connection to a past history of struggle have been utterly attenuated.  It is to 
inhabit a present wholly disconnected from a past that determined it.  It is to 
dwell within the context of a depthless hyper-real culture that is fundamentally 
depoliticised. 
Whereas the logic of welfare capitalism was predicated, in principle at least, 
on a class compromise based on the assumption that to negate class conflict, it 
was necessary to deliver material benefits to the working class, neo-liberalism 
no longer  operates  to  a  similar  mantra.   Instead it  functions by deliberately 
reversing and hollowing out the very gains that the working class had struggled 
to achieve.  To grow up in the UK today is to grow up into a society where 
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welfare has mutated into a coercive form of workfare.  It is to grow up in the 
context  of  a  society  where  wages  are  relentlessly  reduced  and  where  work 
conditions for the burgeoning precariat only ever worsen.  In the context of de-
industrialised areas, it is to grow up in a world where regeneration no longer 
means investing in poor communities but subjecting them to forms of coercive 
management and control (Atkinson 2007). 
The symptoms of this are described well by Mike Davis in his dissection of 
what he terms ‘the ecology of fear’(Davis 1992).  Such ‘regeneration’ can be seen 
in the relentless target hardening of the urban environment; in the installation of 
now pervasive CCTV; in the development of  an ever more extending police 
family,  mobilising  an  ever  more  coercive  battery  of  powers  against  young 
people.   As  Roy Coleman’s  work  tellingly  shows,  while  regeneration  in  the 
developing entrepreneurial city supports the socially included, such inclusion is 
invariably  exclusionary  in  so  far  as  it  functions  by  coercively  excluding the 
urban poor and not least its young from the citadels of regeneration and not 
least  from access  to  new housing  developments  that  have  been  deliberately 
engineered  to  exclude  them  (Coleman  2004,  Hancock  2003;  Scraton,  2004; 
Burney 2009).
Not  only  is  the  new  precariat  materially  disadvantaged  it  is  also 
systematically demonised and stigmatised.  In neoliberal society, poverty has 
the  status  of  a  disease  that  is  self-authorised and this  version of  underclass 
thinking saturates political and media discourse on deprivation and poverty.  It 
can be seen graphically in the government’s response to the urban disorder of 
2011, blamed variously on criminal gangs, mindless criminality, dysfunctional 
families and dysfunctional culture.   It  is evident in the demonisation of the 
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working class as a population of ‘chavs’, a term that quite literally translates as 
stupid and ignorant people (Hayward and Yar 2006).
Jock Young is right to remind us in his recent work that life for the urban 
poor is by no means as miserable as catastrophe criminology often intimates, 
just as life for the affluent is by no means a bed of roses.  Beware, he argues, the 
dangers of  liberal  othering (Young 2011).   It  is  a  fair  point,  but if  we are to 
understand  certain  characteristics  of  the  violence  under  consideration  here, 
finding  rays  of  sunshine  in  ghetto  cosmopolitanism,  isn’t  really  the  answer. 
What we need to do instead is reflect specifically upon the affective states that 
living  life  under  the  conditions  described  above  actually  induce,  not  least 
among the young men whose violence we are trying to make sense of.  
My point is this,  these processes, what we might generically define as the 
cultural logic of neoliberalism, are not abstract forces that bear down distantly 
on the precariat.   Alienation is  not  an abstract  quality  of  life  but  something 
phenomenologically experienced and confirmed on a day-to-day basis in the 
precarious lives people are forced to lead.     Alienation is induced in the feelings 
that young people experience as a consequence of the stigmatisation they are 
subject to.  ‘We’re seen as just lost’ was one response given to us by a young 
man we interviewed in Hackney, who was talking about how he thought he and 
his friends were viewed.  Alienation best describes what it is like to have job 
application after job application turned down, a regular experience for many of 
the young people we have interviewed.  Anger and despondency coupled with 
a  deep  sense  of  lingering  resentment  are  predictable  and  entirely  rational 
responses to a world where the relations young people from multiply deprived 
areas  have  to  formal  organisations  and  their  representatives  are  often 
relentlessly negative and hostile.    Moreover, these affective states are actively 
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confirmed in the direct relations young people and their families have with ever 
more distant and disinterested authorities.  Confirmed, explicitly, for example, 
in the negative experience of being stopped and searched.  Confirmed as well in 
the invariably negative experiences young people and not least their families 
have, with benefit agencies that function to criminalise them (Rodger 2008).
Whereas the working class of the welfare state were bound to an economic 
order that aspired to secure their consent by embedding them into welfare state 
and welfare citizenship, the Achilles heel of neo-liberalism is that in creating a 
precariat subject to deteriorating life chances, it has not created a stable mode of 
regulation and one where generalised consent can be easily secured.   While the 
logic  of  neoliberalism  functions  to  maintain  and  produce  a  class  that  is 
internally  divided and for  the  most  part  passive,  there  are  good reasons  to 
suggest that the adaptive response of some sections of the new precariat to its 
conditions of existence may adopt socially destructive forms.   My conjecture is 
that the socially destructive way of life I categorised as ‘on road’ constitutes one 
such adaptation.  So, in what way then does precariousness shape new patterns 
of urban violence?  
Precariousness,  in  the first  instance,  erodes the older  patriarchal  dividend 
that would once have worked to secure viable working class male identifies. 
Violence  and  violent  self-assertion  under  such  conditions,  may  become  an 
alternative vehicle for securing a viable masculine identity among some sections 
of the precariat.   This will  particularly be the case for young males who are 
being produced as literally surplus to production in a post  full  employment 
society  (Messerschmidt  1993).  While  there  is  a  sense  in  which  violence  as 
masculinity has always been an issue among males, in a world where more of 
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them are consigned to structural powerlessness, this de facto fall-back position 
might become more as opposed to less likely.  
As Bea Cambell’s work in the de-industrialised estates of the north following 
the wave of ‘white riots’ in the 1980s demonstrated (Cambell 1993), when the 
local state is ‘rolled back’; when its welfare structures become attenuated and 
‘hollowed  out’,  in  a  world  where  the  formal  economy  no  longer  offers  the 
prospect  of  meaningful  employment,  violent  men  operating  within  an 
expanding illegal economy will fill the void .   In such spaces it  is also quite 
likely that socially disconnected young men, will assume positions in the lower 
rungs of the criminal economy, many operating in its most violent and lethal 
arenas, in particular, in the street retail section of the drug economy.  This is 
certainly the situation now in the post-industrial, de-industrialised inner cities 
in England.  
In a world where once stable and cohesive working class communities are 
fragmenting, a case can be made for suggesting that the internal controls that 
such communities would once have been able to exercise over the activities of 
their young have themselves been eroded in what has become an ever more 
atomising society. The adult world fears its young and sometimes such fears are 
justified.  To an extent,  this breakdown in informal social  control,  also helps 
explain the creation under New Labour of what would become its anti-social 
behaviour agenda (Burney 2009).  While by no means suggesting here that the 
‘solutions’  it  pioneered,  such  as  the  derided  ASBO,  were  justified,  it  was 
responding in its own way to the destructive consequences of neoliberal policies 
on working class communities it was also otherwise pursuing.
All of these factors combine in a mutually self-reinforcing way to create the 
preconditions for  what  may well  be  regarded as  the socially  self-destructive 
!139
way of life I classified as on road.   In its most developed form it constitutes a 
parallel subterranean society organised around norms and values which at time 
both overlap with those of the wider mainstream order and which embrace as 
well norms and values that are peculiar to itself.   While gang talkers fantasise 
that at the heart of this culture stand corporate gangs ruthlessly plotting to take 
over the wider society the truth is altogether different.  This is a self-enclosed 
world populated by people who watch out for and who deal principally with 
each other. The wider public can and do service this community in varies ways, 
as victims of street robbery, as purchasers of the illegal goods in which it trades. 
Sometimes innocent people are also caught in the cross fire.  But by and large 
this subterranean world proceeds according to its own sui generic logic.  Gangs 
are certainly part of this world as we have seen but they do not control this 
world nor does the term accurately diagnose its inherently rhizomatic character.  
This world becomes the destination for young men both as a consequence of 
the  magnetic  forces  that  make  it  superficially  attractive,  and  it  is  also  a 
destination in to which the losers in a winner takes all economy are themselves 
decanted.   In opposition to the insecure uncertainties of life lived precariously, 
life on road proffers in its own way, clear certainties.   These are found in the 
collegiate fraternity of your group, your ‘man-dem’, or ‘brethren’.   Certainty 
can be found as well in the space you claim, your ‘ends’.  Clarity is to be found 
in the beef  you have and which you carry.   The legacy of  past  conflict  and 
struggle constitutes for many the basis of the memories they carry (Winlow and 
Hall 2006).  In a world where formal agencies are widely distrusted, this is a 
world where  street  justice  is  practiced in  fast  time and ruthlessly.   This  too 
provides its own certainty.  Finally in a world where work is insecure, mundane 
and low status life, life ‘on road’ hold out the illusory promise of fast cash and 
possibly of access to riches beyond their wildest dreams.  For the overwhelming 
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majority this will never come true.  But the fact that some get rich and display 
their wealth openly, also works to confirm this ghetto dream. 
While  rap culture  with  its  violent  aesthetics  provides  the  vocabulary  and 
establishes  the  choreography  for  the  violent  performances  in  which  the 
participants of this street trade, it by no means a determining factor in shaping 
the violence these men are capable of.  It certainly becomes the means by and 
through which they dramatise their relations with each other and not least the 
wider excluding society.  And this culture is as contradictory as the street world 
it  expresses.    Within  it  violent  machismo  is  valorised;  the  excesses  of 
ornamental materialistic brand driven consumption are elevated, while women 
are reduced to sexual objects.  If there is a wider politics or political message 
being  dramatised  and  reproduce  in  the  cultural  productions  of  this 
subterranean world,  not  least  by the MCs that  produce it,  then the message 
mediated is that of politics as violent nihilism.  
If we return to Ken Pryce and his ethnography conducted in the 1970s, we 
can note that there has been a cultural shift of some magnitude here.  Reggae 
was as much a political movement as a cultural one.  It not least intersected with 
and cannot be disaggregated from the wider radical political currents of its time. 
Today the dream of a mythical return to Africa no longer figures in the world of 
the  street,  while  the  oppositional  culture  that  Black  radical  politics  once 
embraced appears attenuated in a world where all that appears left is the neo 
liberal market place.
Most  young  men,  it  must  be  emphasised,  exist  on  the  edges  of  the 
subterranean street world I have tried to describe.  Most will eventually drift 
out as they mature, age or become more productively entwined with the rituals 
of  mainstream  society.    Having  jobs  and  families,  will  end  for  most  their 
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immersion into street existence.  Only whereas in the welfare state young men 
would drift  into  deviance  and then drift  out  as  they matured and obtained 
working class jobs, in a neoliberal order that does not provide such work, or 
work of  any meaningful  status,  this  drift  in is  not  necessarily matched by a 
corresponding  process  of  drifting  out.   Instead  of  navigating  an  orderly 
transition  to  adulthood,  neo-liberalism  makes  available  instead  only  the 
possibility of fractured transitions.  My point is this.  For many young men, their 
destiny will not be that of drifting out of this subterranean world, instead they 
will  become more embedded within it.   As they do,  they will  become more 
brutalised by the violence that defines it, and the longer they remain, the more 
likely they will experience differential association with other people also deeply 
immersed.  While this world is adept at creating hard men adept at violence, 
this world does not produce people who can easily intersect with mainstream 
society on its preferred terms.  
For the most part the deeply internalised anger and resentment these men 
carry with them will be expressed in the form of implosive, inwardly directed 
violence.  And it is this violence that has and continues to produce the litany of 
fatal stabbings and shootings we witness in the UK’s poorest and most deprived 
areas.  However as the riots of 2011 remind us, deeply internalised anger and 
resentment can also be externalised and in the wave of destruction and looting 
and violence that accompanied the disorder, so this class dramatised in the form 
of violent performance their relationship to the wider excluding society.  While 
the critical left appear to view such disorder as little better than the depoliticised 
acts of the deluded, ‘flawed’ consumers with the mindset of a ‘rabble’ (Bauman 
2011; Žižek 2011), I think we need to be more charitable.  In a riot what is being 
dramatised is a fundamental repudiation of the very principles around which 
rule based societies are constructed, namely that within them, people normally 
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obey  rules.   And  this  is  mediated  in  the  form  of  a  dramatic,  improvised 
performance  in  which  the  normal  rules  that  govern  everyday  life  are  quite 
literally turned on their head in a carnivalesque manner  .  Instead of respecting 13
property rights, property is burnt or destroyed, instead of respecting the forces 
of  law  and  order  they  are  attacked.   In  consumer  driven  society  you  are 
expected to pay high prices for your designer goods.  In a riot you loot them.  In 
my reading, therefore acts like ‘violent shopping’ are intensely political.  By and 
through  its  inversion  of  normal  rules,  so  the  rioters  are  dramatising  their 
relationship to their objective conditions.  Given that the precariat are a class in 
the making, I also fail to see why they would as yet have evolved a clear class-
consciousness.  They are not as yet, a class in themselves.  Brutal tutelage under 
conditions  of  neo-liberalism however  might  be  changing  this.  What  the  left 
decry I find myself instead celebrating. 
Conclusion
In conclusion then, there remain many continuities between the violence 
I  described in  the  last  chapter  as  life  ‘on road’,  and the  violent  regime that 
characterised life in welfare state capitalism.  In both regimes violence finds tacit 
endorsement; it is embedded within and reproduced in working class culture; it 
is intrinsic to hegemonic versions of masculinity.  Only whereas in the welfare 
state era, young men typically drifted in and then out of deviance, where the 
violence they engaged in represented more a leisure pursuit  than a criminal 
 This reading of riots is decidedly Bakhtinian in so far as riots are also carnavelesque occasions. 13
Which also explains why so many of the rioters expressed such elation despite the many reasons 
they  have  to  feel  angry  at  their  lot.   See  Bakhtin,  M.  M.  (1984).  Rabelais  and  his  world. 
Bloomington, IN, Indiana University Press.
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vocation, this is now beginning to change.   The class structure of neo-liberalism 
and  the  low  wage,  flexible  market  place  it  has  created  have  removed  the 
material foundations out of which the drift out of crime would be accomplished. 
For the new precariat, the promise of stable and worthwhile jobs for many have 
been withdrawn.  Meanwhile the other gains that the working class had made 
in the welfare era are being attenuated and rolled back.  Welfare transforms into 
workfare, while poverty itself becomes criminalised.  While the new precariat 
are  relentlessly  colonised by the  logic  of  the  market,  the  attack on the  very 
conditions of their existence create the preconditions in which deeply alienated 
men  (and  sometimes  women)  carrying  deeply  internalised  anger  and 
resentment, turn inwards upon each other.  For the most part the violence will 
be  inwards  directed  and  will  take  the  form  of  a  slow  festering  riot.   But 
periodically it will be externalised as it was in the urban disorder we witnessed 
in England in 2011. 
Neo liberalism then is changing the ecology of street violence and the 
direction of change is not for the better. While it would be amiss to suggest that 
the  welfare  state  was  a  paragon  of  virtue,  at  least  it  provided,  in  its  own 
contradictory way, a regime of regulation that worked to maintain the ecology 
of  street  violence  within  broad  regulated  limits.   The  problem  with  neo-
liberalism,  its  Achilles  heel,  is  that  it  cannot  sustain,  nor  is  it  capable  of 
producing  a  stable  made  of  regulation.   The  problem  here  is  that  as  neo  -
liberalism destructively reproduces itself from above, lurching as it does from 
crisis to crisis, it has the unfortunate consequence of creating the preconditions 
for what we might read as social destruction from below. And this is what life 
on road ultimately represents.  A socially destructive world in which young men 
dramatise their alienation in displays of violence directed at other people no 
different from themselves.   
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The aetiology of street violence
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The Production of Motivated Offenders
In examining  how and why young people  become involved in  street 
robbery a number of questions need to be addressed.  First, we need to establish 
where the will to consume the objects they wish to appropriate through robbery 
comes from.  Second, we need to consider why they appropriate these objects of 
desire  through  the  medium  of  street  robbery  as  opposed  to  appropriating 
desirable goods through more legitimate avenues.  Third, we must then explain 
why only some young people as opposed to all come to engage in street robbery 
as the chosen strategy of appropriation.  This as we shall see will also mean 
examining  the  characteristics  of  the  outlaw  cultures  where  street  crime  is 
practised and, not least, attending to the seductions and pleasures attendant on 
the act of street robbery itself. 
To  investigate  the  reasons  that  impel  young people  and in  particular 
young  men  to  engage  in  street  crime  we  must  as  a  precursor  to  our 
investigation,  understand the reasons that  lead them to engage in  offending 
behaviour to begin with.  To do this we must understand why they wish to 
acquire the kind of goods suitable victims regularly carry; and explore why they 
seek to  acquire  these  objects  through the medium of  offences  such as  street 
crime.  To  examine  this  we  must  begin  by  looking  not  at  issues  of  faulty 
socialisation (the focus of underclass thinking as we saw in chapter 4) but at the 
forms  of  successful  socialisation  young  people  are  subject  to  in  free  market 
societies.
To interpret  this  we must examine why young people who engage in 
street robbery desire so intensely the commodities street crime provides illegal 
access to. Why, we must ask, do they come to covet these objects of desire so 
!146
intensely that  some will  embark upon illegal  acts  in order to possess  them? 
While  one  answer  to  this  question  might  be  to  suggest  that  such  desires 
represent aberrant personality traits on the part of those who hold them, this I 
suggest is the wrong way of looking at this issue.  A more productive line of 
enquiry  involves  seeing  such  desires  not  as  deviant  but  as  a  common  trait 
evident in most young people.  More to the point, it is my contention that if we 
want to understand where the will to possess desirable objects derives, then its 
proximate  cause  is  exposure  to  and socialisation into  capitalist  consumption 
norms stimulated by capitalist culture industries. 
Let us consider this in more detail.  What I am proposing is that young 
offenders are products of a society in which the consumption of material goods 
is an integral aspect of their lives. As such, it is a universally distributed desire. 
It  is  something  acquired  moreover  via  a  range  of  different  sources.   It  is  a 
message they see mediated through the medium of advertising which targets 
them directly; it is something they learn to acquire through direct involvement 
in consumption rituals either as observers or as active consumers themselves. 
As we shall now see, the impact of being produced as consuming beings in free 
market  societies  has  important  implications  for  how young people  live  and 
conceive the world around them.
In their exposure to the consumer society young people learn from a very 
early age that well-being and success in life is contingent upon the possession of 
desirable goods.  In particular branded goods marketed to them by the culture 
industries.   They  are  also  taught  and  from  a  very  early  age  are  given  to 
understand that, in the possession of these desirable objects – the right trousers, 
trainers, and accessories such as mobile phones – other desirable things follow 
including  self-respect  and  the  respect  of  others.   In  and  through  mass 
consumption  identities  are  produced  and  reproduced.   In  consumption  a 
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lifestyle is simultaneously lived and constructed. To ‘be’ is literally to be in a 
world defined by the possession of these desirable goods. Possession defines 
their bearer, not only as a possessor of what everyone desires, but as a viable 
and sovereign agent in their own right.  
In the possession of desired goods things are not simply appropriated, 
identities  are  also  produced  and  reproduced.   By  and  through  processes  of 
cultural appropriation so a sense of who and what you are is constructed while, 
in the competitive order of the young, a sense of distinction relative to other 
people  is  forged.   The  consequences  of  this  process  are  stark.   Your  status 
relative to others is marked out and defined by the kind of phone you possess, 
the trousers you wear, and the way you wear them.  Possession of desired goods 
in this sense also provides a visible marker that defines where you stand relative 
to  others  in  the  world  around  you.  Non  possession  conversely  entails  an 
absence of these values.  It is a world of non-being, of not being part of the in-
group.  You stand by virtue of non-consumption or ineffective consumption as a 
non-person.  Someone to whom respect is not conceded in a world in which 
respect is everything.  In the words of one young man it meant ‘not being on the 
level’.  As he then put it ‘you’re like a no one’. This, translated literally, meant 
being outside the circle of being and belonging. It  rendered you someone to 
whom no status in the world could be conceded; it could define you - as we saw 
in the last chapter - as a victim
The culture industries consciously accentuate these trends through the 
way they brand and market their goods.  Maintaining high prices stimulates the 
market for exclusive goods that confer high status among young people.  At the 
same time, the corporations, by drawing heavily and parasitically upon street 
culture (the hip-hop gangster  look for  example)  reproduce it  a  commodified 
form.  This is then sold back as a lifestyle option other young people are invited 
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to  emulate.  The  rise  and  fall  of  various  consumer  fads,  the  advent  of  new 
technologies and the constant succession of new models accentuate these trends 
further. Excessive profiteering by the corporations promoting desirable branded 
goods  also  exacerbates  the  problem because  it  makes  the  very  brands  most 
desired impossible to obtain within financial constraints poor populations face. 
The in-built obsolescence of desirable consumer goods also feeds this problem 
because it forges an incessant desire among the young people for next year’s 
model;  which  means  socially  generated  needs  can  never  be  finally  realised 
anyway.  In effect, the consumer society produces a world of always unrealised 
and ultimately unrealisable desires.  The trousers you are obligated to want this 
year are obsolete in fashion terms by the next, while this mobile phone will be 
replaced by the next variety and so on. At the dark heart of this consumption 
revolution  can  be  found  a  process  with  sinister  implications:   As  Cote  and 
Allahar aptly describe it ‘What lies at the heart of this activity, however, is the 
fact that the media can sell young people some element of an identity they have 
been taught to crave (Cote 1996)’
Though the transformation of young people into effective consumers has 
always been important to capitalist societies – at least since young people were 
first identified as conspicuous consumers in the post war period (Miles 2000) - 
the  nature  of  youth  consumption  in  contemporary  world  has  changed 
significantly in recent  decades.   From an exercise  directed at  purchasing the 
good life  in the context  of  rising affluence under conditions of  welfare state 
capitalism of the post war period, it has become by the 1990s a rite of passage 
into everyday ‘normal’ life in the world of free market, neo-liberal society.  As 
Miles  explains:  ‘by  the  1980s  it  was  it  was  almost  as  if  consumerism  had 
emerged as a way of life for young people.  Not only did it represent a valuable 
means of self-expression, but it provided a resource for the construction of their 
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everyday life’ (Miles 2000). What he means by this is that they represent the 
vanguard of a social movement that has witnessed not only the decline of a 
society  where identifies  were constructed through solidarity  with other  peer 
groups (such as your class of origin); but the advent of an era where identify is 
now forged in and through consumption alone.
Not  only  has  the  social  meaning  of  consumption  changed  for  young 
people, it also changed in relation to the growing intensity of their exposure to 
it.  They are now not only engaged in the rites of consumption from an early 
age, they are subject to an advertising industry that ruthlessly targets them in 
ever more sophisticated ways (Klein 2001) At the heart of the crime problem as 
it unfolds across the UK we consequently find an extreme form of commodity 
fetishism at play.   My thesis is that this particular form of fetishism brings with 
it  the  desires  that  stimulate  the  insatiable  demand  for  objects  that  are 
subsequently apprehended in the act of street robbery. 
While the will to consume is a universal disposition into which all young 
people  are  socialised,  the  free  market  society  is  not  an  economic  order  that 
universalises  the  means  necessary  to  ensure  that  all  young  people  can 
appropriate the social goods that they have been taught to desire legitimately. 
In a free market capitalist society that both produces and tolerates wide and 
growing inequalities, what we find is a socio-economic reality in which certain 
populations are accorded the means to gratify their consumption desires, while 
others are located in socio-economic conditions that effectively prohibit effective 
consumption.   What  distinguishes  these  two populations  is  their  differential 
access  to  life  chances.   These  include  labour  market  opportunities  and 
established wealth that  allows consumption desires to be socially realised in 
legitimate ways.  
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The differential distribution of life chances can be starkly observed if we 
consider once again the case of Lambeth, studying as we do, the socio-economic 
characteristics of the area.  While the borough is home, as we have seen, to a 
predominately white affluent population, well equipped with the resources that 
will  allow it to consume easily and legitimately, the same cannot be said for 
more deprived communities, including Lambeth’s Black population which also 
produce  the  majority  of  its  offenders.   For  while  Lambeth  has  witnessed  a 
significant  process  of  economic  and  social  regeneration  over  the  last  two 
decades, the effects of regeneration have been very uneven and not everyone 
can be considered winners in the process. The socio-economic position of young 
working class people - particularly young Black people on the estates - remains 
desperately poor, as deprivation indicators for the area testify.  Unemployment, 
for example, remains at around 40% on the estates in the area.  This is far higher 
than average unemployment rates are for London and the UK as a whole.  To 
this must be added a range of further factors which enhance deprivation and 
social exclusion more generally.  This would include the impact of institutional 
and  overt  discrimination  on  the  Black  community,  particularly  young  Black 
males  that  limit  entry  into  the  labour  market.   One  young  man  explained 
graphically why robbery became for him and his friends a career choice:
Some of them do it, yes, for the money, but most of them can’t get 
money from their parents most times.  And then most don’t work. 
And some of  my friends don’t  have homes so they have to be 
hustling.  They have to make money somehow.’
Benefits  for  poorer  populations  are  also  harder  to  obtain  given  the 
governmental  response  to  what  has  been  represented  as  a  ‘culture  of 
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dependency’.  For the same reasons, young people under 18 are now unable to 
claim any benefits at all.  If we consider the impact of receiving low rates of 
benefit in conjunction with living in the most expensive city in the UK, it  is 
evident that poor populations in Lambeth find it extraordinary hard to sustain a 
minimal lifestyle,  let alone gratify overt consumption desires they have been 
taught to regard as normal..  As one young man expressed this  
‘I don’t want to blame it all on Britain…but living in Brixton is hard .
Significant  patterns  of  change  in  the  post  war  economy  have  also 
reinforced  the  entrenched  deprivation.   In  particular,  the  decline  of  the 
manufacturing sector in the last three decades has had the effect of removing 
labour  market  opportunities  from many working  class  areas.   This  has  two 
knock  on  effects:  first  it  acts  to  sustain  mass  unemployment  among  young 
people and thus their exclusion from participating in legitimate consumption. 
Secondly,  exclusion  from  the  labour  market  also  prolongs  the  state  of 
adolescence and disrupts an orderly transition into adulthood on the part of 
young people in this situation.  It does this by removing from them the rituals, 
interdependencies and security that secure jobs once provided, and which in 
their  possession  would  once  have  confirmed  an  adult  identity.   One 
consequence  of  these  changes  has  been  to  spatially  compress  young  men 
together for large parts of their day to day lives on local streets.  Another, as 
noted by Rutherford., has been increase pressure on already highly pressurised 
families many of whom are also welfare dependant (Rutherford 1997) This in 
turn produces a pattern of routine activity that creates the space where street 
robbery becomes a distinct possibility.  To escape from overcrowded and often 
highly pressurised family units young men congregate in the streets.  There the 
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conditions are created both for meeting and having to deal with outlaw cultures 
that practice street robbery; while also placing young men in proximity with 
populations of assessable and suitable victims. In other words into conjunction 
with more affluent populations who, as we have seen,  carry the very goods 
poorer  sections  of  the  community  cannot  readily  appropriate  legitimately. 
Economic  change  then  itself  helps  to  sustain  an  environment  that  is  highly 
conducive to crime.
The situation in  poor  inner  cities  areas  like  Lambeth,  is  consequently 
characterised both by patterns of real deprivation and poverty among certain 
sections of its population.  Like the affluent society around it however, these 
populations also share the dream of a good life defined in material terms.  This 
is  thus  a  population  characterised  not  only  by  real  deprivation,  but  also 
intensifying levels of relative deprivation as well.  Together these factors have 
created  what  criminologists  such  as  Lea  and  Young  (Young  1984)  would 
consider to be a highly criminogenic environment. In effect, it is my premise 
that by failing to universalise the conditions by which desirable goods may be 
universally  appropriated,  the  free  market  society  has  created  a  situation  in 
which some young people have ‘innovated’ in their consumption.  They do so 
by  becoming  involved  in  cultures  that  sanction  rule  breaking.   Unable  to 
consume  legitimately  many  have  come  to  develop  innovative  consumption 
strategies and one of these is street crime. 
The  turn  towards  street  crime then can be  viewed as  a  practical  and 
rational resolution to the contradiction of being socialised into a world which 
shapes you to aspire to the consistent consumption of material goods and being 
located  in  a  socio-economic  reality  that  does  not  universalise  the  legitimate 
avenues by which such goods can be appropriated. In making this statement it 
must be emphasised that such a resolution is by no means inevitable.  Only a 
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few young people respond to the predicament of unrealised and unrealisable 
consumption in the same way.  Many poor people struggle through legitimate 
avenues such as education to accumulate the life chances that will allow them to 
become,  as  it  were,  ‘normal  consumers’.   There  are  also  other  patterns  of 
adaptation available to young people faced with this contradiction. Drug taking 
and radical political mobilisation for example represent other life opportunities 
that might not necessitate participation in street crime. 
So far we have studied why young people wish to consume and we have 
examined why alternative and illegal consumption strategies might be pursued. 
What  we  now  need  to  consider  is  why  some  young  people,  and,  indeed 
growing  numbers  have  chosen  to  drift  in  the  direction  of  a  consumption 
strategy that  resolves  itself  into  street  crime.   Why,  we must  ask  have  they 
chosen to become flawed consumers.  To accomplish this we must now move 
from  a  consideration  of  structure  towards  an  examination  of  process.   In 
particular  the  diverse  processes  characteristic  of  what  terms  ‘differential 
association’ (Sutherland and Cressay 1979) We need to attend, in particular, to 
the  social  process  by  which  allegiance  to  norms stressing  adherence  to  rule 
abiding behaviour become abandoned in favour of an alternative value system 
which encourages rule breaking that embraces street crime.
In what follows I will argue that there are five factors we need to examine 
to explain how this process works. 
❑ Though  aware  of  condemnatory  messages  stigmatising  street  crime  the 
messages young people receive are not consistent and can readily be ignored 
or circumvented
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❑ Proximity to and engagement with those who already break rules not only 
encourages this behaviour it sanctions participation in an outlaw culture that 
can actively celebrate and justify deviant values as a way of life
❑ Street crime as an activity carries with it an array of seductions and benefits; 
❑ Once engaged in street crime young people can find it difficult to exit; 
❑ There is a readily available stock of  legitimations that permit rule breaking 
to be excused or validated by bystanders and by participants
Young  people  in  Lambeth,  like  young  people  in  British  society,  are 
products of an order that not only stigmatises forms of rule breaking such as 
street crime, it also imposes harsh penalties for those caught engaging in it.  In 
the case of street crime, for example, a custodial sentence is a likely occurrence 
and this can last for up to and around three years or more.  Life is the maximum 
permitted tariff.  Condemnation certainly exists and condemnation is supported 
by an array of sanctions.   And these, it can be emphasised are almost always 
deployed to perpetrators apprehended through law enforcement activity. 
To  understand  why  some  young  people  turn  to  street  crime  as  an 
adaptive strategy, we need to examine why they refuse to heed, or choose to 
ignore wider messages of condemnation attached to this activity.  To examine 
this  issue  young  offenders  interviewed  were  asked  an  array  of  questions 
directed at ascertaining whether in fact they were aware of these condemnatory 
messages and which also explored their moral perceptions more generally.  In 
asking  these  questions  a  number  of  subsidiary  themes  were  also  pursued. 
These related to the consistency of the messages of condemnation young people 
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received; the appropriateness of the means by which they were mediated, how 
this message was appropriated by its target audience and how such messages 
relate  to  the  weight  of  non-condemnation  they  may  receive  from  other 
bystanders.  
While the young people evidently knew that street crime was wrong and 
was  morally  reprehensible,  it  was  also  evident  that  the  messages  they  had 
received about crime were mixed and variable.  The issue of street crime was 
rarely raised and discussed by parents many of whom were entirely surprised 
and upset when they subsequently found that their child had become involved 
as perpetrators.  All the young people interviewed, claimed that schools did not 
provide much if  anything in the way of any information about street  crime. 
Indeed,  upon  subsequent  investigation,  there  was  and  remains  no  credible 
policy in schools regarding this issue .   Most of the young offenders had never 14
been told much about how the criminal justice system worked, nor about what 
it would do to them if they were subsequently to be processed by it.   Indeed the 
only information about street crime they heard in the course of their schooling 
was that often provided by a single visit by as police officer. Time and again the 
words  ‘not  knowing  the  consequences’  or  ‘not  thinking  through  the 
consequences’ of ones acts were noted as a primary cause for involvement in 
robbery.  
Though local community safety providers had embarked upon a media 
campaign part  of  which was directed at  warning young offenders about the 
consequences of offending, it was clearly lost upon its target audience.  To a 
point this occurred because the message was not tested before hand upon those 
 Which was strangely ironic because in the meetings I convened with them, the Head teachers 14
were adamant that the environments they provided for young people were bastions of morality 
and good citizenship
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who were  subsequently  supposed to  consume it.  There  was  also  a  problem 
evident that no clear and consistent message was being delivered by anyone. 
What this vacuum has created I will suggest is a space in which other messages, 
specifically  those  that  can  come  to  sanction  rule  breaking,  can  and  have 
prospered.
With regard to the exposure of young people to messages that would 
both act to encourage rule abiding, as opposed to rule breaking behaviour, it 
was by no means evident that there was too much of this around.  The role of 
organisations  such  as  churches  was  entirely  limited  given  the  secular  and 
materialistic character of the world in which young people tend to live.  While 
the free market can certainly encourage the will to consume – itself as we have 
seen part of the problem - it must be emphasised that it offers no alternative 
morality or vision of the good life beyond the will to consume more.  It is, in 
effect, an amoral entity.  As regards the pronouncement of other self-professed 
moral entrepreneurs such as politicians then their utterances had no impact on 
the lives of these young men.  They were perceived to embody a world that was 
distant and irrelevant to their lives.  Nor could what they said be trusted.  As 
with many forces of authority in their lives, such figures could easily be viewed 
as the enemy.  Nor did political ideologies have much if any impact upon the 
conduct of these young men.   To this extent they were certainly products of a 
postmodern de-politicised culture that had well and truly separated itself from 
older  and  more  benevolent  meta  narratives  of  progress.   Nor,  could  it  be 
observed,  were  there  many remnants  left  of  older  working class  patterns  of 
solidarity that might have induced their young into evincing more respect for 
older  traditional  verities.   Capitalism’s  triumph  at  the  ‘end  of  history’  as 
Fukuyama characterised the  process,  had successfully  eliminated even these 
(Fukuyama,  1992).   In  the  era  of  unfettered  competitive  individualism, 
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celebrated as a virtue in the free market, belt and braces socialism was well and 
truly starved of the oxygen that might once of nurtured it.
While much has been made by the media about the need for appropriate 
role models in young people’s lives, what the interviews with young offenders 
revealed was that these young men tended to have none.  If they did then it was 
often  their  parents  and  in  particular  their  mothers   -  which  was  itself  an 
interesting insight because it clearly demonstrated how attached they were to 
traditional notions of family life.   Leaving aside the arrogant assumption on the 
part  of  the  adult  world  that  youth  should  respect  it  more,  it  could  also  be 
remarked here that even if a positive role model could be identified so too could 
plenty of others that the wider society would not view in such terms.  Among 
these, as we shall see, could also be those who were successful practitioners of 
street crime and crime more generally. 
For young people to become involved in street crime it is not enough that 
the voices that might condemn such behaviour go unheeded.  Involvement in 
such activity was also contingent on being in contact with or in close proximity 
to  what  I  will  generically  term outlaw groups who not  only engage in  rule 
breaking  but  who  inhabit  a  culture  that  justifies  such  activity  and  actively 
encourages it.  As was indicated above, while all young people are socialised to 
become  active  consumers  of  material  goods,  not  all  resolve  problems  of 
thwarted consumption by engagement in street crime.  If we now attend to the 
career pathways of those who do traverse this path then it would appear that at 
the very least they must: 
❑ Have witnessed street crime practised successfully by others around them; 
❑ Live in proximity to or actively socialise with those who practice it
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❑ Have over time become active and confirmed members of these groups 
❑ Have  come to  appreciate,  as  a  consequence  of  successful  engagement  in 
street crime, the benefits such activity can deliver to their lives.
To engage in offences such as street crime, a person typically has to have 
come into contact with those who already have some experience in its practice. 
It is not an activity that just occurs or simply happens.  Like any other social 
activity it requires skill and dexterity to practice well.  It is an activity which is, I 
would  argue  in  most  cases,  socially  learnt.   It  also  requires  a  certain  social 
presentation of self; a certain amount of planning and teamwork to accomplish. 
Successful  practitioners  must  be  competent  in  their  capacity  to  demonstrate 
aggression  and  violence.   They  must  be  able  to  use  violence  if  violence  is 
required.   Speed and agility are also prerequisites for initiating a successful 
robbery; as must be the ability to plan escape routes and identify suitable target 
areas.  In addition to the above, those who practice it must be able to inhabit a 
world where they can live easily with such acts in themselves. 
The way in which contact with already offending groups was established 
however differed in terms of its intensity.  For some young people it could be 
that  they  had  witnessed  others  successfully  prosecuting  street  crime,  lived 
within the context of a culture whose values excused it, and who consequently 
sought to emulate such activity.  Given the sheer volume of street crime in areas 
like Lambeth, it could be surmised that its prevalence was such that most young 
people were placed in this situation.  For the same reason most would also be 
aware  of  successful  street  robbers  around  them;  not  least  given  that  many 
would openly flaunt the rewards of their enterprise and initiative.  Most would 
also be familiar with and live in proximity to a cultural order in which street 
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crime  was  perceived  as  an  inescapable  feature  of  social  life.  As  one  man 
expressed the matter 
‘yes I’ve seen people getting robbed.  I’ve seen my friends being 
robbed’.  There is lots of bad stuff around here’. 
 In conjunction with boredom (a regularly cited feature of some young 
people’s lives) unrequited consumption desires,  and living with poverty, this 
conjunction  of  circumstance  could  on  occasion  provoke  street  crime  as  an 
adaptive opportunist strategy. One man explained how he became attracted to 
street robbery
When I was young I would say to my mum something like ‘can I have a 
pair of trainers’ and because my mum didn’t work and was like on social 
security she could hardly put food on the table.  And when I was young I 
would look at that and I would see other people making money, driving 
around in the latest cars and I would think ‘there must be an easier way.  
As interviews with young offenders  showed,  the most  likely gateway 
into street robbery lay not only in being part of a group that had observed it or 
living in a cultural milieu that excused it; participation rather occurred though 
intensive exposure to outlaw groups in the areas that practised it. Just as Oliver 
Twist became an apprentice to Fagin and his gang, so to do street robbers of 
today  require  access  to  those  who  already  possess  the  skills,  craft  and 
experience  necessary  to  accomplish  it.   Not  only  is  the  proximity  to  actual 
offenders a necessary condition for this reason, such proximity also functions as 
an alternative space in which deviant values and necessary criminal skills can 
be learnt, internalised and developed. 
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Again, the route-way into contact with such outlaw cultures could differ. 
It  could  occur  because  you  grew  up  with  people  who  belonged  to  outlaw 
groups such as neighbours, friends or family members.  It could occur because 
you moved into an area where members of such groups congregated or lived.  It 
could also occur because you became friends with group members or wished to 
become accepted by them in a relation of friendship in order to achieve respect 
in  their  eyes  or  -  and  this  could  be  important  -  to  avoid  the  possibility  of 
victimisation at their hands. Contact then could also arise as a consequence of a 
defensive strategy. Whilst it might be tempting to view the decision to become 
involved with such groups in terms of an active choice made consciously, this 
would  be  to  overstate  a  reality  where  the  choices  available  are  highly 
constrained.   Spatially  compressed  into  estates  from  which  there  were  no 
realistic exit strategies available, proximity and contact were, for most young 
offenders,  inescapable  features  of  their  life.   As such,  an important  question 
many young people tended to face was not how to avoid contact with such 
groups.  More important in their eyes was doing the kind of things that would 
earn you their respect. As we shall see, this could involve street crime. 
One of  the  young men explained how he  was  initiated.   He  had,  he 
explained, recently moved to Brixton where he found himself something of a 
stranger on the local estate and in the proximity of an older group of boys who 
did street robbery and who put pressure on him to become involved. I asked 
him about the kind of pressure they placed on him.
‘like they would say ‘are you coming out there’ and if you like 
said no, then they say ‘you going to come along with us’ and I 
would say ‘no’ so they say ‘you a pussy’, you going to have to 
come with us’.  
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Another  young  man  also  cited  his  exposure  to  a  gang  of  older  men  (aged 
around 19-21) all of whom were involved in illegal activity, specifically robbery 
and selling drugs.  In his words
I started hanging round with some people in Brixton.  I would see 
them every day.  I was with my friend and his older brother used 
to always do crime.  And I would hang out with my friend and he 
would always try  and be  like  his  older  brother  and we would 
hang out with the gang as well and do stuff.  And that’s when we 
thought we would try it (robbery). 
The element of peer pressure to engage in robbery was intense as the young 
man explained in relation to his first street robbery committed against an older 
man in Clapham.
They (the older gang) were gerrying me on like to make sure I did 
it.  Then after I did do it like they said ‘he’s one of us now’ and 
after that they didn’t say so much’
Where the analogy with Fagin ends is that the groups of offenders who 
inhabit  these  outlaw  cultures  do  not  approximate  the  Fagin  model  of  an 
organised criminal gang.  What we often looking at here are looser associations, 
specifically composed of young men, all of whom will have offended and who 
consider  offending  behaviour  to  be  an  obligation.    At  the  heart  of  these 
associations will be certain people who are more proficient and more motivated 
to offend than others.  They are often likely to be older than the young people 
around them, and many will have had their criminal status conferred by having 
been  ‘successfully’  processed  at  some  time  or  other  by  the  criminal  justice 
system.  In the words of the young offenders interviewed for the purpose of this 
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research,  these were the ‘bad-boys’:  an already existing population of highly 
motivated  offenders  many  of  whom  would  already  have  served  custodial 
sentences.  There was, said one young man ‘no leadership thing’.  These men are 
those who have already been labelled criminal by the wider society, and who 
have, as designated criminals, consequently internalised the label and accorded 
to it a number of positive connotations.  In effect, as a consequence of successful 
labelling processes conferred by the criminal justice system, there now exist a 
number of  young men who quite  happily  accept  and celebrate  their  outlaw 
status.  They live the life, they walk the walk and they talk the talk.   This came 
through powerfully in a conversation with a young man in his early 20s who 
had  recently  been  released  after  serving  a  prison  sentence  for  robbery.   In 
response to how he felt he was perceived by those around him, he characterised 
their response as 
‘yes it’s a kind of respect in a way.   Now, no matter what I do, 
even if I choose not to do crime they respect me because I earned 
their respect by doing crime.
When I asked him about the friends he grew up with on the street he laughed 
and admitted, ‘yes, most are in jail’. 
Though  quantifying  precise  numbers  remains  inherently  difficult,  it 
could  be  surmised  that  these  outlaw  associations  are  widespread,  and  are 
specifically active when legitimate employment avenues are blocked.  As my 
research in Lambeth suggested many were well established on many estates. 
Group  membership  is  often  conferred  by  point  of  origin  or  proximity  to  a 
particular territory and by virtue of the fact that most of those who are involved 
in such associations have grown up together.  They would have gone to the 
same schools and have the same friends. Interviews also indicated that the more 
confirmed members of these groups were also those who were the oldest and 
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who  also  were  also  involved  with  a  range  of  other  illegal  activities.   In 
particular, they were likely to be connected with grey and illegal markets. They 
would know, for example, where to buy drugs to deal and who to market them 
to. They would also know whom to fence stolen goods to and were often in 
contact with those who would commission them to appropriate certain objects: 
20 mobile phones, for example, with this particular specification.  When I asked 
one young man about these networks he argued that 
Yes there are a lot of people who do stuff.   It’s like you with a 
friend and you met people and they maybe sell heroin and your 
with someone else who knows someone else who knows someone 
else whose selling something’
The most accomplished of the ‘bad boys’ also knew precisely what make to take 
and were very selective about what they chose to target.  As one young man 
commented
‘he don’t steal anything less than a 32-10.  He wouldn’t steal that. 
It’s the newer phones.  You don’t steal anything less than you can 
sell for £200.
What  acted  to  reinforce  the  involvement  of  young  men  who  found 
themselves in proximity to such associations was the fatal way in which the 
focal concerns of the group often came to predominate over other more legal 
and legitimate attachments young people might have such as their families.  As 
one man explained
‘All  you  know  about  is  your  friends.  You  forget  your  family. 
Friends are all that matter’.
And another  
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‘its  like your friends are all  there is and you don’t think of the 
consequences’
And another
When you got a set of friends and someone fights, you got to fight 
with them. 
And when, for example, they find themselves together – for example at a youth 
club – 
‘there you meet people and…someone suggests ‘let’s do this’, and 
that’s how things (crime) begin’.  (Koyo, 18)
With  group  membership  other  positive  benefits  could  also  be  accumulated 
specifically security in a dangerous world 
When I’m with them no one like tries to trouble you.  But when I 
am by myself then they would try and trouble me.
In terms of the values celebrated within these outlaw groups then what 
we  can  observe  is  a  hybrid  subculture  which  is  forged  out  of  a  symbioses 
between activities celebrated in the wider society as well as those condemned 
by it. Where it joins with the wider order is in its celebration of conspicuous 
consumption, and the equation of acquisitive materialism with notions of status 
and standing,  distinction  and respect.   Where  it  departs  is  in  its  pursuit  of 
socially sanctioned consumption norms by illicit means that sanction violence 
and rule-breaking as a way of life.  This orientation also goes hand in hand with 
a celebration of a world that is specifically gendered in its form.  Typically, what 
we can observe here is a world in which a particular vision of masculinity is 
celebrated.  This is one in which the capacity to practice violence is validated 
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and where  being tough commands respect.   This  is  also  a  cultural  order  in 
which the capacity to physically assert self is celebrated as a valid marker of 
being a man.  It is a social currency that commands respect and begets for its 
holder social distinction and honour.  For the young men I interviewed fighting 
was  a  recurrent  feature  of  life  in  a  world  considered  itself  violent  and 
dangerous.  ‘Yes,  you have to fight all  the time’  said one young man,  whilst 
another noted ruefully that even though he knew many people in Brixton, ‘there 
are still people out there you got to be careful of’. This vision of masculinity 
moreover reaches into the detail of life.  It is there in the physical presentation of 
self to the world: it is evident in the clothes, in the language and in the walk and 
in speech itself.  It is evident in acts and deeds, in what is spoken about, and 
what is celebrated in speech.  
The gendered character of this worldview is evident not only in what it 
selects as worthy of celebration, but in what it has to deny in the process of its 
own becoming.  The vision of purified masculinity that it  celebrates is  often 
bought  about  at  a  cost  of  disavowing  much  of  what  the  wider  society  has 
chosen  to  endorse.   This  can  include  the  idea  that  worldly  success  can  be 
established  through  hard  work  at  school,  or  that  self-respect  can  be 
accomplished through entry into the legitimate job market.  Often the way in 
which  this  disavowal  is  socially  demonstrated is  by  coding such activity  as 
explicitly  feminised  behaviour.   Working  hard  at  school  or  demonstrating 
intellectual effort is perceived in these terms as unmanly, as something that is 
real  men do not  do.   This  could lead some young men to actively preclude 
themselves from mainstream society and work in the formal economy (Willis 
1977).  As one young man observed:
They don’t want it (work). They ain’t looking for it.
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This gendered perception is  also associated with a disavowal of  what 
society  itself  codes  as  feminine:  this  can  include  being  overtly  emotional, 
intimating care and evincing compassion for others.  Unsurprisingly the kind of 
culture  this  produces  and  the  kind  of  individual  it  sanctions  is  not  well 
equipped to interact with society on its preferred terms.  What it sanctions is a 
form of ‘lawless masculinity’ (Cambell 1993), evident in males unable to resolve 
conflict without recourse to aggression, and who are, in turn, often homophobic 
and sexist in their behaviour.  This kind of individual is however well equipped 
and motivated to practice street crime and engage in criminal behaviour more 
generally.  Such individuals once confirmed within the rituals of outlaw culture 
not only reproduce it,  they can actively induct other young people into it  as 
well.
The culture of aggressive masculinity discussed above is not unique to 
Lambeth or indeed to any specific ethnic group.  Criminologists have explored 
variations of it in different countries and between different groups  (Willis 1977; 
Cambell 1993).   In content it remains quite consistent over time and between 
states.  It does however manifest itself via a number of stylistic variations which 
distinguish  various  outlaw  cultures  from  each  other.    The  social  rituals  it 
practices may vary, as might its stylistic expression: the style of clothes, music 
etc.  
In the case of  its  instantiation in Lambeth,  social  conditions described 
above have created an ideal environment in which such outlaw cultures can 
thrive.  In terms of the way it is grounded in the culture of street criminals, 
particularly  among  certain  young  Black  males,  it  is  evident  in  the  social 
presentation to the world that borrows heavily from the hip-hop, gangsta rap 
culture  of  the  United  States.  This  influence  is  particularly  evident  in  their 
physical  presentation  of  self  to  the  world.   It  is  evident  in  the  aggressive 
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assertion of self that can often be observed in the way young men move.  It is 
there in the loose fitting trousers worn as if hanging off the crotch; it is there in 
the  way  express  themselves  in  their  body  language  and  through  the  sign 
language  they  use  to  communicate.  Unsurprisingly,  many  of  these  stylistic 
features also had their origin in the penitentiary culture associated with the US 
punitive  mass  incarceration  policy.   Baggy  trousers  and  unlaced  shoes,  for 
example, derive from prison uniforms, while the sign language evolved as a 
mode of  communication among inmates in an institutional  context  in which 
silence was often policy . 15
As subcultural  theorists  observe,  the  social  rituals  attached to  outlaw 
cultures  are  both  complex  and  highly  creative  (Hebdige  1979)  (Hall  and 
Jefferson, 1976).  In effect they produce and reproduce a culture that consciously 
aspires to define itself away from a dominant order which it faces and confronts 
in a relation of  hostility and often aggression.   Such cultures work however 
precisely because they confer many benefits to their members.  Against a society 
which  provides  them  with  little  in  the  way  of  life  chances,  it  provides  an 
alternative  and  parallel  set  of  opportunities  to  appropriate  what  the  wider 
society holds out as desirable but simultaneously denies.  Against an order that 
provides little by way of market opportunity, it offers the possibility of work – 
though of an illegal kind.  Like the formal economy it also offers you on-site 
training.   Against  an  emerging  economy  where  the  work  provided  is  often 
menial,  low  paid  and  of  a  nine-to-five  variety,  it  offers  instead  work 
opportunities which can command you peer respect, while providing you with 
the means to gratify material desires in a much quicker time frame the formal 
job market allows.   As a number of young men pointed out, in an economy that 
 The relation between the gangster hip hop look and US penitentiary culture was explained to 15
the author by D. Brotherton
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paid only £3.50 per hour, street crime was an entirely rational career move.  It 
could generate over £150 for less than an hour’s work. As one man put it 
‘when you is young and  you realise that you can make over a 
thousand and ten pounds in half an hour, you going to do the half 
hour.
And another
It’s easy money’  
Finally if in the low wage ‘mac-economy’ where the only work available was 
likely  to  be  dull,  repetitious,  monotonous  and boring,  that  provided by  the 
alternative counter-culture stressed values celebrated by many young people 
including the possibility of risk, thrills and danger.  
What also sustained these cultures as viable enterprises is that they can 
individually  and   collectively  help  sustain  alternative  economies  in  areas 
characterised by high levels of deprivation and poverty. In effect, street crime 
can be  viewed as  an  economic  enterprise  that  is  itself  part  of  a  large  Black 
market economy (Sutton, 1995).  In the case of Lambeth this market included a 
range of goods including drugs, people and, not least,  the proceeds of street 
crime.  Like all successful economies this economy possesses a complex division 
of  labour.   Some  participated  within  it  as  primary  suppliers  of  goods  and 
services that other consumers (such as drug users,  or those looking to make 
cheap purchase off the back of the proverbial lorry) would then buy. There are 
also a lot of middlemen engaged in this industry including those who would 
help  purchase  stolen  goods  and  provide  retail  outlets  through  which  these 
goods could be moved on.  According to the testimony of offenders, a number 
of shops and stores in Lambeth performed this role.  Offenders also mentioned 
shadowy  figures  that  would  commission  illegal  acts.   The  more  confirmed 
!169
young people  became in  various  outlaw cultures,  the  more  knowledge they 
would accumulate about how the illegal market economy operated.  With this in 
mind I would suggest that if we want to offer another reason why Lambeth has 
such a high crime rate then this can in part be explained by reference to the size, 
strength and market vitality of this economy.  Street crime it might be said not 
only flourishes because the formal economy cannot universalise the means to 
consume legally, it also rises because there is already an alternative economy to 
sustain it.
If we now attend to what Katz (Katz 1988) refers to as the ‘seductions of 
being evil’ then the pleasures attendant on being involved in street crime and 
the  subculture  that  sanctions  it  become  more  obvious.   In  the  act  of  street 
robbery a power relation is forged between the violent aggressor and the victim. 
In  the  assertion  of  power  through  violence  a  form  of  pleasure  can  also  be 
accessed on the part of the perpetrator: specifically, the pleasure in power.   For 
those who typically inhabit a social order that confers little of this, this is by no 
means a minor issue.  If we attend to the phenomenology of street crime more 
closely other pleasures can also be observed.  Though for the wider society the 
act  might  well  look  like  a  form  of  cowardice,  from  the  standpoint  of 
perpetrators the act can have other connotations.  To knowingly break rules that 
command severe  penalties  if  caught  can take courage.    Not  least,  a  certain 
existential abyss has to be crossed. Can you make the grade?  Do you have what 
it takes?  Then there is the status and respect that you can accrue in participating 
in the act.  The respect that will be accorded to you by others, specifically, those 
already engaged in street crime and other offences themselves: your direct peer 
group.  This fact  came through recurrently in the way involvement in street 
robbery was often represented in interview as a kind of initiation ceremony; a 
right of passage into the outlaw culture wherein you become a (mostly) man of 
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respect in a world where respect is everything and where being ‘a pussy’ as one 
man put it was unthinkable..
As contact with victims was often very fleeting, the act of street crime 
was characterised by a social distance between victim and perpetrator which 
meant that  the latter  would have little  opportunity to think of  the victim in 
anything approaching human terms.  Street crime, it  could be observed, is a 
very dehumanising act. Finally, having successfully prosecuted street crime, you 
could then openly display to others the results of your labour. Many apparently 
do.  Given a cultural order of street values beholden to a norm that holds you 
never inform to the police, it is easy to see how this tendency can flourish. The 
active threat of violence that would invariably be directed at those who violate 
this principle also reinforced it.
As a number of young offenders interviewed for this project testified, the 
peer pressure they faced to commit street crime was intense.  In effect, it became 
a rite of passage for many into the order of the outlaw culture on whose fringes 
they may have found themselves for reasons explained earlier.   In participation 
you received the respect of your peers and also  - and this was also significant - 
you lowered the likelihood of being coded as a victim: as someone that is, who 
could be judged as a target either of robbery or of violence.  In the act your 
status as a man was in effect socially demonstrated and also validated in action. 
In street crime there was also a sense expressed that you were getting one over 
on ‘them’, the wider society, and no least the police whose effort to catch you, 
you were able to avoid.   This fact  was attested to a number of times in the 
interviews.  Often the terms of this discussion were polarised in terms of the 
perceived  fitness,  agility  and  cunning  of  the  street  robber  and  the  unfit, 
pondering and dull reflexes of law enforcement officers.  That young men who 
had actually been caught, were responsible for this testimony was rather ironic, 
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not least, because it was clear that their thesis had been disconfirmed in the act 
of their arrest.  
In street crime young men were also accorded the means to achieve an 
autonomy and self-reliance  they otherwise  found it  difficult  to  obtain  given 
their limited capacity to enter the formal labour market.  Often acutely aware 
that their families could not afford to provide them with the material goods they 
had  been  taught  to  covet,  a  number  considered  such  activity  in  cold 
instrumental  terms  as  a  viable  means  by  which  they  could  provide  for 
themselves.  In a state of prolonged adolescence provided by limited market 
opportunities and mass youth unemployment, such independence also could be 
viewed as providing a gateway into adulthood more generally.  
Finally, in street crime another benefit can also be observed which raised 
it above participating in other forms of offence such as burglary.  For those who 
had  acquired  the  right  skills,  it  was  easy  to  commit  and  the  risk  of  being 
apprehended was slight.   In relation to other possible illegal activities,  street 
crime also conferred more advantages which have cumulatively acted to make it 
the  most  favoured  form  of  crime.   To  commit  financial  ‘scams’  required 
equipment and expertise most young people did not have access to.  For similar 
reasons the gateway to more lucrative forms of white collar crime were also 
denied to these predominately young working class men.   Exclusions in the 
formal labour market it could be observed are also reproduced in the illegal. 
Given that  most  developments  in ‘community crime control’  in  the last  two 
decades have concentrated on situational prevention measures evident in target 
hardening of  fixed targets  such as  shops,  homes and cars  (Clarke 1980),  the 
cumulative effect of this has been to render such targets harder to attack.  Such 
enhanced defences also make detection more likely.  The turn to street crime can 
thus be seen as an entirely rational response to an overall reduction in target 
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availability more generally.  If we now connect this observation with the rise of 
populations  of  suitable  victims,  then  it  self-evident  why  street  crime  has 
provided such a growth industry. 
An important phase in the process of differential association lay in the 
difficulties  that  people  who  have  become  engaged  as  perpetrators  in  street 
crime face in returning to a law-abiding existence.  First, in acquiring the skills 
to  commit  street  crime  –  not  least  the  capacity  to  demonstrate  physical 
aggression – young men, in particular, further confirm the drift towards a form 
of  aggressive  masculinity  that  can  further  confirm  their  participation  in  an 
outlaw culture.   The problem here is  in becoming such a male they have to 
purify themselves through disavowal of other qualities that permit alternative 
and positive associations with the wider society.  They can also assume a fully 
outlaw status and this can become integral to their identity.
If they get caught and are processed by the criminal justice system, then 
though  this  might  well  be  the  preferred  vehicle  through  which  societal 
displeasure is evidenced, the process can also have the effect of confirming their 
criminal status by formally conferring to them a criminal label.  Being processed 
in this way it  might be added has a number of further consequences.   One, 
being processed through custodial institutions does not carry a street stigma on 
the part of those who have been processed this way.   It can and often is worn as 
a marker of respect.  Second, it is also a process in which young men can and do 
acquire an enhanced set of criminal skills.  Third, when young men are released 
back into society their life chances are so reduced that participation in crime 
becomes their only viable option. As a research project conducted by the local 
probation service in Lambeth found, the living conditions for many offenders 
could only be described as chaotic.  
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The final factor that is important in sustaining a culture conducive to the 
production of motivated offenders ready and willing to commit street crime, is 
that the desire to break rules in this way can easily be sanctioned.  This can 
happen both by those who break them and by other onlookers as well.  As the 
work of Sykes (1957) and more recently Cohen (Cohen 2001) has shown, one 
reason why people come to break rules and continue to do so is that they can 
deploy various techniques of neutralisation to justify what it is they do.  These 
techniques can take a number of forms and involve the creation of plausible 
narratives that can act to justify rule breaking or inaction in confronting it.  In 
Lambeth, one such narrative was that young people were engaged in a kind of 
Robin Hood existence: stealing from the rich and giving to the poor.  Another 
was that  in street  crime young Black people were engaged in ‘resistance’  to 
white racist culture.
In  conclusion,  in  our  consideration  of  the  production  of  motivated 
offenders we have examined the background structural factors that create the 
underlying causes that produce the will to offend.   In exploring this issue we 
have examined why young people have come to covet and desire the goods that 
are  stolen.   We  have  also  examine  why  general  socio-economic  conditions 
conspire to produce a situation in which a number of young people will come to 
choose  illegal  as  opposed to  legal  consumption  strategies.   Finally  we have 
traced through a number of more proximate factors whose conjunction favours 
a  drift  into  an  outlaw existence  in  which  street  crime  can  be  sanctioned as 
legitimate.
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 ‘That’s  Life  Innit’:  A  British  perspective  on 
Guns, Crime and Social Order 
Simon Hallsworth and Daniel Silverstone
Abstract
Recent years have witnessed an escalation in the number of young men involved in 
lethal gun related violence in the UK.  Within the last two years these have resulted in 
over 80 deaths. Lacking any overarching explanation some have attributed such 
violence to a burgeoning 'gun culture', others to the (alleged) arrival of American style 
gangs onto the streets of the UK.. This paper rejects these explanations as inadequate on 
the basis that the problem of gun related violence cannot be reduced to the problem of 
gangs,  while terms such as 'gun culture' and ‘gang culture’ are too general to explain 
the differing contexts of gun use.  The paper makes the case that to understand 
contemporary gun use we need to locate it within an examination of the lifeworld of gun 
users. There are, we suggest, two we need to consider.  First, the patterned world  of 
'successful' violent career criminals, and second, a far more volatile street based world 
termed by the violent young men who inhabit it as 'on road'. 
Following a wave of fatal shootings that saw more than 80 young men 
lose their lives between 2007-8, gun crime is now perceived as a major threat to 
public order in the UK. In the absence of easy explanations policing agencies 
and journalists have been quick to propose the existence of a new ‘gun culture’ 
to explain the killings (NCIS, 2003,67). Other commentators have connected gun 
related  crime  to   criminal  gangs  and   ‘gang  culture’  (Pitts  2008).  The 
government, under pressure to act, has made confronting what it terms ‘gun 
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knife and gang crime’ a priority and an array of measures to tackle the problems 
posed by  gangs  and weapon use  were  revealed  in  its  recent  action  plan  to 
confront  violence.  These  include  extending  stop  and  search  operations  to 
prevent weapons being carried and mandating dedicated policing operations 
designed to suppress the gangs that are believed to carry them (Hallsworth, 
2008).
In this paper we argue  that attempting to explain the problem of guns by 
reference  to  terms  like  ‘gun  culture’  or  ‘gang  culture’   possesses  limited 
explanatory value. A more profitable line of enquiry, would be to understand 
weapon use by attending to the ‘life world’  where weapons are used the most. 
In  what  follows we make the  case  for  developing a  cultural  analysis  of  the 
violent life worlds of gun users and conclude by describing those where guns 
are  principally  used.  These  we  describe  as  the  occupational  culture  of 
professional criminals and the more volatile street based culture we term ‘on 
road’.
From ‘gun culture’ and ‘gang culture’ to the culture of gun users
While we accept that in common parlance  ‘gangs’ might use guns, and 
whilst we recognise that, to understand the motives of gun users, we need to 
examine the culture of those that use them, we nevertheless find terms such as 
‘gang  culture’  or  ‘gun  culture’  theoretically  weak.  Nor  do  we  accept  that 
explaining gun use via the concept of the gang is helpful.  The problem is that 
such terms are  not  rigorously  defined if  indeed they can be  defined in  any 
rigorous way. At their worst such terms mystify a street reality that is elsewhere.
Let us begin with the idea of an overarching ‘gun culture’, the evocation 
of which explains gun crime. The problem here is that different guns are used 
by different populations for an array of different purposes (Povey et al 2009). 
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Young people, for example, mostly use air pistols which are very different from 
the kind of artillery used by professional criminals. And, even within criminal 
circles (as we shall see) there is not one gun culture but rather different players 
in a segmented criminal life world who seek to  profit from and exploit each 
other. Trying to embrace all of these disparate acts into a reified term called ‘gun 
culture’ adds little to our understanding of why certain young men come to 
engage in lethal violence.
Similar problems accrue when evoking the term ‘gang culture’ to explain 
the aetiology of gun related violence. What precisely a ‘gang culture’ is defies 
easy description. As with the term 'gun culture' we are dealing here with an 
undiscriminating blanket term with little explanatory value. Leaving aside the 
definitional conundrum of what constitutes a gang, and whether the UK is now 
witnessing their proliferation, it could be observed that there are many forms of 
street organisations that are not gangs but which also use weapons . While not 16
disputing that some self-described gangs carry guns and while we also accept 
that  intra-gang  conflict  might  provide  the  context  for  gun  use  on  some 
occasions, as our research uncovered, many fateful situations where guns were 
used, had nothing to do with gangs. Guns, we found, could be used by gang 
members acting in an independent capacity or by violent individuals who were 
not in gangs.  Guns may be used for a variety of reasons in a variety of contexts, 
including  armed  robberies,  and   enforcement  in  the  drug  market.  Criminal 
opportunities  that  licence  gun  use,  in  other  words,  transcend the  gang  and 
invoking terms such as ‘gang culture’  misses this important point. 
 See Hallsworth and Young,( 2008) for a wider critique of ‘gang talk’ and ‘gang talkers’. For a 16
discussion of street organisations which are not gangs see Hallsworth and Young (2006) and 
Hales, Lewis & Silverstone (2006) 
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This criticism however does not mean that a concern to understand the 
visceral and violent social milieu of offenders is not important.  The question is 
how best to study this lifeworld?   Following the lead of cultural criminology 
one potential way forward might be to invoke subcultural theory.  The problem 
that arises here however is the extent to which the way of life of gun users can 
indeed  be  classified  as  a  distinctive  subculture.   To  begin  with,  it  could  be 
observed, we are not looking at a population that is wholly excluded.   The 
world of gun users, as with young people more generally  is shaped profoundly 
by the consumption logic of consumer capitalism and to that extent they are, as 
Jock Young observes, very much a culturally included population, even though 
manifestly  excluded  materially  in  many  other  ways  (see  Young 
1999;Nightingale 1988).While it is the case that many young people who carry 
guns  tend to adopt a particular style, typically influenced by American hip hop 
culture, to define this as the foundational aspect of their subculture would be to 
place far  more emphasis  on style  than it  deserves.    Adopting the look and 
manner  of  the  ghetto  warrior  undoubtedly  remains  a  profoundly  important 
reference point in some people’s  lives, but style and music do not define the 
relationship between the individual and the violence they do, or the weapons 
they  carry.   While  the  street  world  they  inhabit  certainly  has  its  culture  it 
nevertheless is  as Bourgeois observes,  not  a coherent and unified space but 
rather  a ‘conflictual web of beliefs, symbols, modes of interaction of values and 
ideologies’ (Bourgeois)  page ) that defies being classified as a subculture.  
Secondly, If we reject the label subculture this does not mean we reject 
the object lessons of subcultural theory which conceive culture as a dynamic 
response to the  social conditions in which people live.  As with the subcultures 
previously studied (see Hall and Jefferson, 1976), the life worlds of gun users 
continue to  be   grounded in  the  terrain of  lived experience as  it  unfolds  in 
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particular localities with particular histories, while also emerging as a (socially 
destructive) response to the wider social conditions in which people live; in this 
case,  in   opposition  to   the  forces  of  social  exclusion  these  predominantly 
working class men confront in mainstream society. 
However,   gun  users  are  not  a  homogenous  population  and  for  this 
reason we distinguish between two classes of gun user in the discussion that 
follows.  First we describe the lifeworld of what can be termed the professional 
criminal.   This,  as  we  shall  see,  is  a  world  populated  by  men  ‘doin’  the 
business’,  who undertake crime as a vocation.   These are men are relatively 
successful at their trade , not least, because their social  order is shaped by the 
presence  of  and adherence  to  conduct  rules  that  licence  violence  rarely  and 
primarily for business imperatives.   The second way of life we discuss, often 
spoken of by our respondents as being ‘on road’ constitutes a far more violent 
and volatile social milieu.  This is a parochial social order populated by young, 
often immature young men who dwell in dangerous street settings where many 
also strive to earn a living in the least lucrative but most violent part of the 
criminal economy.  This is a street world where rules that might delimit violence 
rarely exist and where the injunction to retaliate is an  obligation.
A note on methodology
The empirical basis for our claims are derived from a number of research 
projects  conducted independently by the authors. . These studies employed a 17
variety of research methods  including  face to face interviews with people who 
had used weapons or had experienced weapon use in their area;  interviews 
with control agents such as youth workers and police officers; examining recent 
 The research projects from which this article is derived include Hallsworth and Young (2006), 17
Young et al (insert 2007) and (Hales & Silverstone 2005 ;Hales, Lewis & Silverstone 2006) 
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and relevant documents on the history and socio-economic conditions of the 
areas in which violence was typically concentrated and  secondary analysis of 
police data on crime violence and weapon use. Interviews were also conducted 
in different cities  across the UK.18
To summarise a complex picture, the lifeworld’s  we were studying were 
typically located within poor multiply deprived inner city areas within large 
metropolitan cities. The people we talked to are typically males aged between 16 
and 34. Most had a bad experience of formal education and limited success in 
the legitimate labour market. Many experienced a chaotic childhood and many 
had been  processed  through various points of the criminal justice system. Most 
had  a  long  and  complex  history  of  violence  and  violent  victimisation.  For 
example,   the sample of  80 used in the Home Office study (Hales,  Lewis & 
Silverstone 2006),  59 reported a disrupted family life,  including 35 who had 
grown up in a single parent household. Of that sample, only fifteen reported 
any post-16 education, ten offenders had never worked; 49 only in unskilled or 
manual  occupations.  Overall,  the  ethnicity  of  respondents  was  mixed,  and 
although males were certainly the dominant presence in the population that 
used weapons the testimony of young women was also taken.
We should  emphasise  that  our  empirical  research  was   not  originally 
commissioned with the aim of understanding the social and cultural aspects of 
weaponised violence. Instead, the primary focus of enquiry in two of the largest 
research reports, the Home Office report and the Youth Justice Board report lay 
in  studying  firearm   availability  and  how  weapon  related  violence  was 
connected with the formation of street based organisations such as gangs. In the 
course  of  that  research we became interested in  the  narratives  of  our  many 
 The  interviews  were  conducted  with  respondents  from  London,  the  West  Midlands, 18
Manchester and Merseyside, where a disproportionate amount of gun crime occurs. 
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respondents.  These  narratives,  we came to  recognise,  shared many common 
features both in how they were articulated and also in the shared motivations 
for violence they revealed. 
In what follows we identify the defining features of the two lifeworld’s of 
violence  where  firearms  are  used.  Where  relevant  we  cite  from  interviewer 
testimony to provide empirical  support for the issues we discuss.  While our 
interviewees  certainly  had  a  clear  sense  of  the  social  situations  they  were 
describing to us (including, in the case of being ‘on-road’, a name), it must be 
emphasised that the interpretation of these narratives is ours and ours alone. 
Whether  our  interpretation  would  be  recognised  by  the  street  actors  whose 
world we describe remains an issue to be tested.
The life world of the professional criminal
“…there’s these certain rules you know, and like you got in jail where 
you got a structure in place, you’d have certain people abide to it out 
there  as  well…  We’re  not  really  a  threat  to  anyone,  unless  someone 
threatens us.” (Greater Manchester)
The first lifeworld we are interested to narrate is that of the ‘gangster,’ 
known more formally by academics as ‘professional criminals’.  In relation to 
those  interviewed,  the  offenders  who  fitted  into  this  category  were  drug 
traffickers,  armed robbers  and middle  to  upper-level  drug dealers  who had 
sustained their business over time. These were  men ‘doin’ the business’ where 
the business was in the illicit market. Some inhabitants of this world are men 
who had worked long at their craft and who, in various ways, had progressed 
up the criminal status hierarchy by virtue of their capacity for violence, their 
ability to control their violence, and deploy it with a wider set of entrepreneurial 
skills enabling them to maximise market position within the illegal economy. 
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This milieu is far from homogeneous and, as within the formal economy can be 
differentiated between the more and less successful protagonists (Hobbs 1998, 
Pearson & Hobbs, 2001).
Although there is  not  and can be no consensus over what constitutes 
professional  crime,  the ability to network,  to mix with others and to stay in 
business over the longer term are obviously important features. Wide networks 
of  criminal  associates  certainly  have a  bearing on the  ability  of  professional 
criminals  to  source  firearms  (Levi,  2004;  Wright  2006).  What  this  research 
indicates is that criminal contacts are pre-eminent in determining the ease with 
which quality illegal firearms can be obtained; the better connected someone is, 
both in terms of numbers and seniority of contacts, the easier it is to get hold of 
a gun (Morselli,  2002).  One implication of this is  that a very well  connected 
criminal will be able to obtain an illegal firearm even when overall supply is 
very low, while someone without the necessary connections may find it difficult 
to obtain an illegal firearm even when supply is relatively plentiful. For a well-
connected criminal, this can mean having ready access to a selection of good 
quality firearms that can be bought relatively cheaply and yet as one respondent 
from the West Midlands observed:
 “I know quite a lot of very high up the scale lads who won’t have anything 
to do with firearms, anything. And they won’t even deal to people who carry 
firearms.”
Though members of this  group were the most skilled in handling and 
accessing weapons, many of the older or more well-connected criminals did not 
choose to  carry or  handle them. This  was the case even though many were 
adept at physical violence, through having trained in martial arts and/or spent 
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time being a nightclub doorman (Pearson & Hobbs 2001). For example, in the 
Home Office sample, highly knowledgeable gun users accounted for only nine 
offenders  in  the  interview  sample  of  eighty;  these  were  the  ones  who  had 
actually practised shooting. Typically they treated the weapons as tools to be 
used only in set times for very specific purposes. They adopted a professional 
orientation to their weapons and discussed firearms in terms of the advantages 
and disadvantages the cautious and instrumental use of these tools brought to 
criminal business.  For example, they demonstrated awareness of the forensic 
risks of the various weapons they used. Knowledgeable gun-users knew that, 
with relation to forensic residue, converted firearms are harder to trace but less 
lethal,  whereas  with  real  firearms  the  opposite  is  the  case.  These  gun-users 
invariably  claimed  to  destroy  guns  once  used  for  professional  purposes  – 
crushed in a car at a scrap yard was one example of this auto-destruct principle. 
These  were  men  who  were  also  successful  enough  to  be  able  to  employ 
‘henchmen’ to protect them, or junior criminals to carry guns on their behalf, in 
some cases under duress.
“…it’s more elders like, giving younger people false promises. Like, ‘You 
sell for me like, I‘ll make you anything, you can have anything you want, if 
you have any trouble call me’. (London)
This puts them in an enviable position in relation to younger criminals as they 
avoid much of the risk associated with firearms possession while also being best 
equipped to use the guns they had access to. They are also well aware that their 
attitude towards violence is not the norm and are also therefore wary of sharing 
firearms with the less experienced younger generation. The quotation below is 
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typical of these sentiments and they disparaged the frequency firearms were 
used by the younger generation.
“It used to be, like the heavier lads, the heavier lads they’d use a gun, but as 
times gone on other people have been getting them. Still doing things in the 
old school way of thinking but they have sold the gun on. They’ve passed the 
guns on to other people and that’s when the guns have become street level, 
that sort of thing. That’s when things start going wrong” (London)
In the narrative of  the lifeworld of  the professional  criminal  guns are 
reserved for precisely those occasions when weapons are required. This might 
include armed robberies, confronting the risk or actuality of being threatened by 
other criminals, or ensuring dept payment of substantial drug debts . Finally, in 
this narrative when guns are used the use to which they are put is  invariably 
justified on  business  grounds.  These  are  men who are  also  well  aware  that 
business  can  suffer  if  weapons  are  used  indiscriminately  as  invariably  this 
brings down an enforcement response (See Desroaches 2005;  Sheptycki 2009, 
this volume).
However,  the position of  these criminals  in the criminal  elite  is  never 
secure. It lasts only insofar as the successful presence  in this criminal milieu can 
be upheld. Developing a drug habit or being unlucky or stupid enough to be 
prosecuted and incarcerated can mean that even very successful criminals find 
themselves  propelled  towards  the  more  violent  and  volatile  street  culture, 
referred by them and by those within it, to being ‘on road’.
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‘On Road’ 
The  term  ‘on  road’  was  a  term  used  recurrently  by  many  of  our 
respondents. Some used ‘on road’ as the descriptive term for a way of life you 
elected to take, while for others it was perceived as a destination, a place  in 
which you ended, specifically if you were excluded from mainstream society 
and its  institutions.  Respondents thus spoke of having lived ‘on road’,  or of 
having met others who were ‘on road’ along the way. For some young men 
deeply immersed in life ‘on road’, it constituted a liminal space where they felt 
they could find a form of authentic sovereignty. Freedom from the constraints 
they experienced at the hands of what most viewed as a hostile society. This was 
a place where you could ‘roll’ (move) with your ‘man-dem’ (colleagues), a place 
where  you  became  a  sovereign  agent.  ‘On  road’  was  a  place  where  it  was 
possible to transcend the limits of rule based society and enjoy the fleeting sense 
of empowerment this can bring. On a more mundane level, it was also where 
you  ended  up  in  a  world  of  high  unemployment  or  underemployment, 
structural  features  of  wider  and  principally  poor  environments  from  which 
these predominantly poor young people came.
One of my co-d’s [co-defendants], he was constantly at the job centre, he was 
really trying to get a job. At the time we all laughed at him. He actually got a 
job, he was working nights packing but the wages were silly. He was really 
willing to work but that was the best he could get. He couldn’t read or write; 
that was the best the job centre could offer him. It just broke him when he 
came round and we were counting the money [from the armed robberies], the 
wages that he would work for a year. It’s not a contest there.” (London)
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Yet all respondents saw life ‘on road’ as a space in which violence and its 
threat were everywhere. Surviving ‘on road’, as such, requires a certain mastery 
of violence, it comes with an obligation to be able to do violence or, at least, 
mobilise  it  in  ways  that  might  ward  it  off.  ‘On road’  the  choices  are  stark: 
survive or become a victim. If the orientation towards violence on the part of 
professional criminals can be typified as a cold instrumentalism, weaponisation 
‘on  road’  is  far  more  visceral  and  emotional  and  extends  beyond  business 
imperatives.   Violence can  emerge over perceived honour slights, territorial 
disputes between gangs, and is  endemic within the retail sector of the illegal 
drug market which is where many young men on ‘road’ sought a living.  
While the possession of a firearm can certainly be explained by reference 
to the criminal intent of the gunmen: for example, involvement in drug dealing 
or gang violence this we found may have nothing to do with the context in 
which  guns  and other  weapons  are  eventually  used.  This  is  because  in  the 
minds  of  those  ‘on  road’,  issues  regarding  drug  deals,  petty  interpersonal 
disputes, jealousy and internal group status competition are rarely treated as 
individual events that require separate solutions.  Often they merge in thought 
and action where they become reduced to the ubiquitous but vague street term 
“beef”.
“...when  you’re  in  a  group  of  people  you  get  yourself  involved  in  their 
arguments. You know what I mean? You stick together like. I back certain 
people up and they back me up at the end of the day... They know if you’re 
moving with a certain crew, it’s not only one person you got to worry about 
is it? It’s everybody.” (London)
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Possession  of  a  gun  holds  multiple  meanings  for  criminals  in  this 
predominantly  street  based  life  world.  Interviewees  indicated  that  it  was 
acceptable  under  some  circumstances  to  carry  an  illegal  firearm,  not 
surprisingly, when engaged in illegal activities that exposed them to the risk of 
violence,  or when directly threatened and fearful for personal safety.  Several 
drew a distinction between acceptability and need. Yet in reality, this distinction 
can  quickly  disappear.  As  one  respondent  observed  in  interview “the  thing 
about  ‘violence  rules’  is  that  there  are  none”.  “The  gun”,  as  another  street 
respondent observed, “is a great leveller”.
“If your life was in danger… You know the police are not on your side and 
there’s nothing you can do… That’s self-defence,  right? Then you have to 
protect yourself, any way you know of.” (London)
Criminal entrepreneurs ‘on road’ use all the weapons available, including 
converted  imitation  firearms  loaded  with  home-made  ammunition  and,  not 
least, knives. Most do not have the opportunity to practice using the firearms 
they carry. They seldom know the provenance of their weapons, they are not 
able to use them very efficiently and are frequently purchasers of guns used in 
previous crimes. . Gun-use ‘on road’ is much less instrumental and planned and 
far more erratic and situational.   
For once you’ve robbed a drug dealer they ain’t gonna go and say give 
my money back, you are either going to die or they will beat the shit 
out of you. I mean seeing this guy get hit like this and that, with a bat 
over his head, I mean fucking hell man, I didn’t know what to do, I 
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mean  you  need  to  see,  like  teeth  coming  out  of  a  guy’s  mouth. 
(London) 
The  lingering  psychic  implications  of  past  trauma  accumulated  through 
often chaotic family backgrounds and endemic exposure to violence create the 
preconditions  for  a  self  that  is  capable  of  ultra-violence  in  the  face  of  the 
slightest provocation.  This makes many of these young men very dangerous 
and this proclivity for violence  produces in its wake a world of enemies. We 
have been repeatedly struck not just by the degree of violence those ‘on road’ 
are capable of but also by their frequent experience of violent victimisation. For 
example,  from  the  Home  office  sample  of  80,  “40  had  previously  been 
threatened with guns, 29 shot at and eight had been shot; 28 had been stabbed, 
17  injured  with  other  weapons,  34  had  been  robbed  and  three  had  been 
kidnapped.  Additionally,  26  reported  friends  or  family  members  shot  and 
injured and another 26 reported friends or family shot dead” (Hales, lewis & 
Silverstone, 2006; iX).
What  life  ‘on  road’   also  encourages  is  a  hyper-aggressive  form  of 
masculinity (Cf. Campbell, 1993).  This is a vision of purified masculinity where 
being ‘hard’ is the master status. This is a masculinity where backing down in 
the face of honour and status threat is difficult and where the onus to retaliate to 
provocation is  an imperative. This is  a very patriarchal form of masculinity, 
and homophobia and misogyny run through it. Those defined or hailed in its 
terms may well be successful street predators, but these are not young men who 
can easily intersect with society on its preferred terms.
In a world where problematic situations proliferate that cannot be  resolved 
through legal channels in the civil courts and certainly not by a criminal justice 
system widely distrusted. Instead, they are resolved in ‘fast time’ (as opposed to 
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slow bureaucratic time) through violent extra-judicial means directed at those 
who cause offence or at proxies for them, such as friends or family members. 
The  emotional  intensity  and  enmity  ‘on  road’  is  all  the  more  exaggerated 
because  of  the  extreme  parochialism  of  those  who  live  the  life.  Within  this 
world, small-scale disagreements, feuds and rivalries take on huge significance; 
a significance that would appear difficult to grasp for those who live outside of 
the claustrophobic world in which life ‘on-road’ unfolds.
If  we  look  more  closely  at  the  flash  points  that  provoke  weaponised 
violence,  then  four  themes  typically  recurred  in  the  testimony  of  our 
respondents.   Violence is  often associated with issues of  territoriality,  it  was 
often provoked in the context of clubs and other leisure venues. It is certainly 
feature of life within the retail sector of the drug market and could be provoked 
by a range of interpersonal disputes over honour.  
“They see it [as], you can’t come into my territory and you can’t go into their 
territory. That’s within the drugs, because they’d get robbed and whatever 
else. Everyone seems to stick to their own patch.” (West Midlands)
Though those on road often inhabit bleak rundown estates they would 
nevertheless manifest a strong attachment to their estate and those who inhabit 
it.  These spaces are  colloquially referred to by them as their ‘ends’. 
“No not a gang, I  wouldn’t  say a gang… it  is  just a group of friends…in 
London. I don’t know any gang that exists really and truly, it is just a bunch 
of friends...just  local  people who went to the same school and things like 
that… It was a group not a gang, like ten of your friends for example, and 
you all live close by.” (London)
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At its most elemental your ‘ends’ constitute  your territory. Within your 
‘ends’  you associate  with  others  like  you,  you share  a  common history and 
biography. Importantly, your end will come to define you in the eyes of others 
located in different ‘ends’. For the minority who become immersed in life on 
road, your end is not simply a place you inhabit, it is a place you may be called 
to defend, specifically from outsiders who physically resemble you, who enter 
from  different  places .  ‘Reppin  ends’  is  the  street  parlance  that  defines  the 19
practice  of  defending  your  territory  from those  who  are  caught  ‘slippin’  or 
entering it. These conflicts include long running feuds with other groups from 
other  ‘ends’  and  these  can  provide  a  broad  context  for  firearms  violence 
although the original cause of these disputes are often not understood by the 
younger protagonists.
The ‘ends’ also provide the social geographic context for the earning of 
criminal  wealth,  the  cultivation  of  a  criminal  reputation  and  finally  and 
importantly  the  immediate  backdrop  for  the  display  of  criminal  wealth. 
Firearms used to  defend these  spaces  from the  predatory advances  of  other 
groups will also be carried when the groups leave their ‘ends’ and move into 
what  for  them  are  uncharted  spaces.  As  such  ‘the  ends’  are  confining  and 
several offenders expressed fear in relation to leaving their territory and were 
aware that their geographical ambit  did not extend very far. It is also noticeable 
that offenders often have an informed view of who controlled their local street 
 Though issues of postcode wars have recently commanded considerable media attention, the 19
affiliation of young people ‘on road’ and indeed those who otherwise dwell within these areas 
to their ends has a longstanding tradition in working class areas. So have territorial conflicts 
between certain of the residents who live there.
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drug market and orientated themselves in relation to their counterparts in other 
‘ends’, but had a limited view of what went on above them in the world of the 
professional criminals  they idolised.   Within specified  areas there could be 
several  different  networks  operating  including  professional  criminals   or  on 
occasion they could be notionally controlled by one gang or ‘crew’.
“No-one wants to look stupid. Everyone wants the big chain, 
everyone wants the big watch, everyone wants a nice car, all the 
girls, that’s how it is.” (London)
Though life typically unfolded within their ‘ends’, nightclubs and parties 
(including ‘pay parties’) represented a key focus of leisure in the lives of many. 
These venues were significantly associated with constructing and defending a 
public  identity,  displaying  conspicuous  material  wealth  and  responding 
vigorously  to  social  challenges,  notably  including  disrespect  and  masculine 
honour issues concerning girlfriends and peers. Although different ethnicities 
have different preferences in  music, venues and drugs of choice (see Hales et al 
2005  &  Silverstone  2006  for  a  more  detailed  discussion),   night-clubs   are 
especially important in relation to understanding firearms disputes as this is one 
of the few times offenders leave their locals and  interact with other people like 
themselves.  Few offenders admitted to carrying firearms regularly, but most 
talked of taking them to these venues (although not necessarily bringing them 
inside). Almost all of the interviewees had experienced or witnessed violence in 
and around night clubs; half reported having seen guns, including guns being 
carried, brandished, fired into the ceiling and fired at people.
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“I went to a club in slough, and a geezer's got shot dead in there. I seen 
the geezer on the floor. I seen the geezer shot dead in the club in Leicester 
as well”.
Nottingham 
While violent territorialism could itself provoke gun related violence the 
use of guns is  significantly more likely  for those involved in the street level 
drug market.   Here guns could be used for the purpose of robbing drug dealers, 
debt  enforcement,  sanctioning  informers  and  protecting  drug  markets  from 
external  predators.  (Jacobs,  1999 and 2000;  Lupton et  al.,  2002;  Wilson et  al., 
2002). To give an example of how violent life can be within the retail drug sector 
one individual who had worked in a crack (dealing) house had been kidnapped, 
seriously  assaulted  and dumped in  woodland,  seen  shots  fired in  the  crack 
house during several robberies, been shot at and seen a man shot. He had also 
been robbed at gunpoint in public on several occasions. None of these attacks 
were reported to the police.
“Everybody is selling drugs, and there is not enough money. So people start 
robbing drug dealers cos they get the drugs and the money.” (London)
Our  research  echoes  the  conclusions  of  other  studies  conducted  in 
America which show that it  is within illegal drugs markets,  (particularly the 
street level dealing of crack and heroin),   that guns are most often  used.  The 
reasons why such violence proliferates may be attributed to the fact that drug 
markets  remain  a  significant  economic  generator  within  the  street  criminal 
economy in the marginalised areas from which those ‘on road’ hail, and this is 
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an economy in which different and invariably armed player s compete for drug 
profits.   Because these markets are both competitive and illegal and operate, 
outside  of  formal  regulation,  violence  becomes  the  defacto  regulating  force 
within them.   (Hales, Lewis & Silverstone, 2005). 
“If you are robbing drug dealers they are not exactly going to call the police. I 
can deal with being shot at. But I can’t deal with 15 or 20 years behind the 
door and that.” (London)
When violence occurs it  is typically found in the street retail   market. 
This is where the relationship between buyers and sellers is more numerous and 
ephemeral  and where dealing activities  are  more visible.  The dealers  at  this 
level  are  also  young  (May  et  al  2006)  and  are  at  a  physical  disadvantage 
compared to their often older clients. It is possible that firearms compensate for 
this. As more professional criminals tend to avoid the street and mobilise their 
resources and acumen to subcontract out the street retail end of the business, it 
is typically those who live ‘on road’ that find themselves targets. It could be 
observed  here  that  the  over-representation  of  young  Black  males  in  the 
population  of  victims  and  perpetrators  of  gun  related  crime  could  well  be 
explained because this population is more actively involved precisely in this 
sector of the drug market. 
That  said,  it  is  important  to  recognise  that  the  kind  of  violent  street 
worlds we are describing here is not an issue for the Black community alone but 
defines the way of life for marginalised males drawn from many ethnic groups. 
A point too often lost by selective media coverage has contributed to it being 
identified as a Black community issue.
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While  ‘on-road’  culture  described  here  constitutes  the  destination  for 
young  poor  people  drawn  from  a  range  of  different  ethnicities,  its  stylistic 
features  are  however  profoundly shaped by media  images of  a  Black urban 
ghetto culture as this has evolved in the United States. This influence is evident 
in  the  street  uniform   adopted,  the  social  presentation  of  self,  musical 
preferences and not least the language.  Much has been made of the causal role 
rap music, often preferred by those ‘on road’, in driving urban violence forward, 
but this argument was not accepted by interviewees.
“Some people put it down to rap music; it’s nothing to do with the music. 
You  [the  interviewer]  listen  to  that.  Every  generation  looks  to  the  last 
generation and even if they don’t think they are being influenced they are 
being influenced. They don’t realise it: look at that guy who’s made it big, I 
can be that guy. And that’s it, you are there and you are into crime and gun 
crime and that’s it.” (London)
Instead both argot and music are best  viewed as providing a cultural 
reference point and providing much of the language and a mode of expression 
which those ‘on road’ can relate to and excel at. The street argot is comparable 
to  that  found   in  African  American  communities  as  described  by  Elijah 
Anderson (1999).  The terminology employed by firearms offenders is  replete 
with terms such as ‘elders’ and ‘youngers’ applying to older criminals and their 
young protégées.  Police are routinely referred to as the ‘five o’ or the ‘feds’ 
echoing  American street slang. The reference to a firearm previously  used in 
murder is also identical, described by Anderson and our offenders as having “a 
body  on  it“  (1999;119)  while  those  killed   are  described  as   having  been 
‘smoked’. While urban music (hip-hop, garage, R&B) – certainly provides an 
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important cultural reference point for the majority of the offenders interviewed, 
be they Black, White or Asian, its relationship to crime and violence appears 
peripheral.
Power man, powerful, that is the addictive side of it. It is like, you know, 
the control,  the power you have got when you have got that [gun] in 
your hand. And the way people react to it, that is a buzz in itself. You 
know, it is like, ‘I am the fucking man. You are not going to say nothing 
to me, no-one is going to say anything to me, because if you die I will put 
one [a bullet] in you. It’s just crazy powerful”
(London) 
Though the volatility of the violence that those on road are capable of can 
in part be related to psychological damage and the hard  purified masculinity 
that street life encourages, it is also in part a product of the conduct norms to 
which  those  on  road subscribe.  To  a  certain  degree  the  conduct  norms that 
prevail in criminal fraternities, what Anderson terms the ‘codes of the street,’ 
are shaped by the demands of the trade itself, thus a street level drug dealer or 
street  robber  needs  to  be  physically  strong  or  intimidating  and  there  is  a 
‘business logic’ to punishing those who steal from you. But these street codes 
also  embody  notions  of  honour,  obligations  and  patterns  of  action  that  are 
required in the face of particular events. These norms include the imperatives 
“never  inform  the  police”,  “one  must  always  be  loyal  to  one’s  area  and 
associates”.  They  also  stress  the  imperative  of  “righting  physical  attacks  or 
verbal attacks with equivalent or superior force”. But such is the power of these 
conduct norms that they might be better seen as myths. These myths, like other 
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myths,  (Eliade,  1955;  Levi-Strauss  1968)  are  supremely sacred and for  many 
young men they shape the honour codes by which they live.   Indeed such is 
their commitment to these street codes that  those who are beholden to them 
will persist in seeking to right a perceived honour slight, even though doing so 
often licences their own violent victimisation, or indeed arrest and prosecution. 
On  this  point  it  can   be  observed  that  one  of  the  key  differences  between 
professional  criminals  and their  ‘on road ‘counterparts  is  the realisation that 
these  are  indeed  myths.  That,  in  fact,  cooperation  with  the  police  or  the 
avoidance of violent confrontation and the ability to transcend their locale is 
critical in remaining out of prison and generating illicit wealth. Thus,  one of the 
key differences between organised criminals and those ‘on road’ is that whereas 
the latter remain locked within the mythic order, the former, more beholden to 
the reality principle, do not.
Just as control agents have a tendency to produce their own mythology 
about the street and its organisation and develop policies to confront the street 
on  that  basis,  this  tendency to  live  in  the  imaginary  is  also  reflected in  the 
narratives told by those who live ‘on road’. Their life world is also populated by 
stories woven about the local criminal pantheon of infamous role models and of 
actual or imagined injustices which  provide the pretext for using a firearm. In a 
hothouse world where rumours abound and where the violence rules licence 
violent escalation, slights, (real or imagined) can quickly licence retribution and 
weapons can and are used to settle them.
Guns and social order
Both of the weaponised social worlds we have sought to describe here 
are unified in so far as protagonists in both carry weapons and are prepared to 
use  them,  but  there  are   important  differences  between  them.  For  the 
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professional criminal, doing the business of crime entails holding a professional 
orientation  with  regard  to  the  weapons   carried.   Ideally  it  does  not  entail 
carrying  weapons  at  all,  or  it  involves  delegating  their  use  to  younger 
individuals ‘on road’ who then used them.  It  could be observed that, while 
certainly  ruthless,  the  people  who  inhabit  the  world  of  professional  crime 
conform to conduct norms shaped by the pragmatics of the trade in which they 
are   involved.   These  carefully  delimit  the  spaces  where  violence  could  be 
mobilised and guns used.  Violence, in other words, is regulated. 
Such a pragmatic orientation however scarcely defines the world of those 
‘on road’.  This is  a far more volatile milieu where gun use can be justified for 
uses that extend beyond business imperatives to include a range of personal 
disputes and disputes over territory. This is a world that is volatile because the 
violence  rules  that  exist  within  it  licence  escalation  while  precluding  the 
breaking  mechanisms  that  would  delimit  the  possibility  of  violence  from 
erupting and spreading. Because of this, conflict situations abound, vendettas 
proliferate and young men tragically shoot at each with fatal consequences. 
What  makes  this  social  order  so  self-destructive  is  that  it  is  socially 
disorganised in significant ways.  The violence within it is anomic as opposed to 
ritualised making it difficult to predict and thus control.  The unpredictability of 
life ‘on road’ is  shaped by the fact that life unfolds in unpredictable ways.  This 
is a world where ‘beef’ happens because people look at you the wrong way, 
because  you  are  not  where  you  are  supposed  to  be,  because  someone  did 
something to your friend and as a consequence someone else has to be hurt. Life 
here is unpredictable because many of those who inhabit it are psychologically 
unpredictable  as  well.    ‘On road’  is  not  a  place  where  instrumental  reason 
prospers and pragmatic resolutions occur.  It is an intense hothouse of emotions 
that find expression in deeply internalised anger and rage felt by these unstable 
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young men. While, what we term ‘on road’ certainly constitutes a way of life, 
this is a violent life world which, to quote Bourgois, ‘is predicated  precisely 
upon the social destruction of the population that inhabit it. (Bourgois: 1995)
 
If  we  were  to  reach  for  a  general  explanation  that  might  help  explain  and 
understand  the  social  production  of  life  ‘on  road’  then  this  might  best  be 
grasped  through  attending  to  what  John  Lea  drawing  upon  the  work  of 
Mouzarios terms the destructive self-reproductive logic of capitalist development. 
Underpinning this Marxist thesis is the idea that capitalism reproduces itself , 
but in ever more socially destructive ways.   As Castells remind us, we live in 
socially polarised cities where wealth inequalities proliferate and where spatial 
segregation has become ever more entrenched (Castells:1996).  These are cities 
whose  poorest  populations  have  become,  under  conditions  of  globalisation, 
increasingly surplus to production.  Dwelling in deracinated estates, trapped in 
areas characterised by permanent recession, bare life unfolds here for many in 
the context of structural long term unemployment and underemployment.  
The problem here is that just as capitalism destructively reproduces itself 
from above by marginalising and excluding its poorest citizens, it creates as its 
concomitant  effect,  patterns  of  destructive  self-reproduction from below and 
this is what life ‘on-road’ ultimately represents.  Here the socially marginalised 
respond to their predicament destructively in what becomes, at times, close to 
what Thomas Hobbes described as ‘a state of nature’, what he termed a ‘war of 
all against all’. Life ‘on road’,  is not a world where the social contract has much 
salience or purchase.   This  is  the zone of  the outlaw.  This  is  a  zone where 
deeply internalised anger and rage among depoliticised and deeply alienated 
young men finds violent expression.  The tragedy here is that the rage and anger 
they  feel  is  not  directed  outwards  and towards  the  world  that  marginalises 
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them.  Instead it is directed inward and against each other.   Guns have become 
a  part  of  this  logic  of  self-destruction as  young men pointlessly  die  at  each 
other’s hands.
Conclusion
The use of firearms in the United Kingdom is to be understood within the 
confines of criminal cultures of gun users. The most obvious criminal culture 
with access to firearms is professional crime. These seasoned criminals have the 
ability to access firearms and an understanding of how to use them and how to 
get rid of them. Yet our research indicates they use their firearms sparingly and 
instrumentally. They are disparaging of the ‘on road’ subculture round them. 
They are also able and willing to manipulate young criminals who refer to them 
as their ‘elders’ into carrying and using firearms on their behalf thus passing on 
the risk.
Conversely,   the more frequent (and often more tragic) deaths which also 
include the killing of the wrong person by firearms in the UK is a product of the 
prevailing  culture  known  amongst  offenders  as  being  ‘on  road’.  This 
overwhelmingly consists of young men from excluded backgrounds who have 
opted into a street  level  criminal  economy within the areas where they live. 
They are committed to making money illicitly and  to following a code of the 
street which eulogises but also reinforces their lowly criminal position.  This 
culture is  extremely violent and it  is  highly likely that those who ultimately 
resort to firearms have been subject to serious violence themselves, including 
being shot.
Firearms  are  not  routinely  carried  by  this  group  but  they  will  be 
principally used to tackle other offenders similar to themselves. This could be 
due to variety of reasons;  one is  financial  gain or ongoing disputes between 
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rival  street  criminals  over  control  of  territory.  Yet  due  to  the  very  local, 
internecine and closed environment  with offenders  often sharing girlfriends, 
family and criminal contacts the origin of a potentially fatal  dispute may be 
social rather than strictly criminal. In this claustrophobic environment, firearms 
for this group represent both power and the ability to inflict deadly violence on 
young people who are not necessarily physically strong. 
The structural preconditions for the volatile weaponised street world we 
have tried to describe here must be sought in the escalating inequalities at play 
in our society, and the formation of a sub-proletariat surplus to production in 
our polarised and segregated cities.  But just as capitalism reproduces itself self- 
destructively  from  above,  its  concomitant  effect  is  to  reproduce  itself  self 
destructively from below.  In this respect what we have termed ‘on-road’ may 
also be legitimately conceived as a self-destructive response to the  conditions 
which late capitalism has created.   
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Violence and Street Culture
It was late in the evening of a winter’s day in 2009 and I was travelling 
home on a bus that was winding its way along the Old Kent Road in south 
London. The bus stopped and four young men boarded. They were, I’d say, 
between 16 and 17 years of age, they were Black and dressed in the de facto 
uniform of the urban street warrior:  hoodies,  baggy jeans and trainers.  They 
were noticeably aggressive as they pushed their way through the bus. One, I 
recall, punching a fist into the cup of his other hand, muttering as he passed me: 
‘I’ve got a fucking rage.’ As a calculated performance in what Jack Katz (1988) 
terms ‘the seduction of evil’, these young men were quite successful. Everyone, 
myself included, felt suitably intimidated.  
At the rear of the bus sat a young woman of Asian appearance. She was 
slender and could have been no older, I guess, than 23. The young men settled 
noisily in the seats around her. One sat next to her. A couple of stops further 
along some people  vacated the bus and the young Asian woman,  evidently 
intimidated by these would-be gangsters, gingerly stood up and made her way 
forward and sat down on a seat next to one of the exit doors. At no point in time 
did she say anything to the young men or even look at them. I can say this with 
absolute  certainty  because  I  was  watching  them with  intense  criminological 
interest. A stop later, the young men left the bus. However, just before the door 
closed behind them, one boarded the bus and smashed his fist hard into the 
young women’s  face.  Then  he  left.  The  violence  was  as  shocking  as  it  was 
unprecedented.  She  had,  from  the  beginning  made  very  clear  she  was 
intimidated by them and they, in turn, had gone out of their way to intimidate 
everyone else. Like everyone else, I found myself literally paralysed by what I 
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had just witnessed. Hitting women, was, by and large precluded in the street 
culture I grew up in (at least publicly) – it was not the kind of thing men were 
supposed to do.
In this instance, at least, other weapons were not used. However, in cities 
like London today, street violence is weaponised with the result that a number 
of young men have lost their lives at each other’s hands, pointless casualties of 
Britain’s street wars. I came across one of the victims in the vicinity of my house 
in New Cross Gate in 2008. He was a young Black man, no older than 17. He 
had been shot and was about to be placed in an ambulance by paramedics. One 
of  his  neighbours (whom I knew) asked him how he felt.  His response was 
deeply  philosophical:  ‘That’s  life,  innit’,  he  replied.  Unfortunately,  innocent 
victims have also been caught in the cross re, as was a young Polish nurse who 
was walking home through a local park where I regularly walked my dog. On 
this occasion two men decided to have a gun fight and a stray round killed her 
in the cross fire. In the same park I often met and spoke with a 14-year-old boy. 
He was the proud owner of a Staffordshire bull terrier that liked to play with 
my pit bull terrier. The police subsequently raided his house and retrieved a 
haul of weapons including a semi-automatic pistol. He is currently in prison.  
These cases have been blamed by many on what has been defined as 
Britain’s ‘gang wars’, itself the outgrowth of a new ominous ‘gang’ and ‘gun 
culture’, now apparently rampant in Britain’s inner cities. In this chapter, rather 
than contest the novelty of the violence, or the sensational ways in which it is 
reported, I will reflect on how best we might make sense of it.  
While by no means losing sight of the fact that some of the violence and a 
number of the fatalities can indeed be laid at the door of the urban street gang, 
my aim in what follows will be to contest the reductive logic at play in this 
explanation by establishing that the violence we are looking at here cannot be 
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reduced simply to a problem of gangs. Nor are many of the terms currently 
deployed to make sense of the violence, such as ‘gang culture’ and ‘gun culture’, 
helpful either. To make sense of the violence, we need to examine, I will suggest, 
the violent culture of the street world of which gangs are a part, and to do this 
we  need  to  study  street  culture  and  the  imperatives  around  which  it  is 
organised.  
In terms of structure, I will begin by examining the problems attendant 
on blaming gangs for the kind of violence described above. I will then examine 
what I will term the culture of the street world studying the three imperatives 
around which social life within it is structured. These I identify respectively as 
the search for pleasure, the search for respect and the search for money. If these 
identify the ends to which social action in a street context is principally directed, 
what is unique about street culture is not so much these ends themselves (which 
are widely shared) but the particular way in which they are realised in a street 
context. Having outlined these imperatives I return to consider how and why 
the way in which they are realised creates an inherently violent and unstable 
world, one predicated quite literally on the self-destruction of its inhabitants.  
In this attempt to move beyond the gang, I have two overarching aims. 
First, my aim is to suggest that the social meaning of gangs, in effect, what it is 
they are all about, cannot be understood by examining their internal dynamics 
or invoking that mythical alchemy ‘gangness’ to make sense of them. Gangs, it 
is my contention, are part of the street but do not envelope or determine street 
culture in its  entirety.  To suggest they are is,  quite literally,  to place the cart 
before the horse.  To understand gangs,  then,  we have to examine the wider 
culture of the street of which they are a part. Gangs, in this sense, express and 
articulate  in  their  actions  imperatives  that  already  structure  street  life  more 
generally. All that gangs do, at least insofar as I understand them, is embody 
!203
these  principles  in  their  self-actualisation.  My second aim is  to  suggest  that 
instead of reifying the gang as current fashion dictates, more can be gained by 
studying  street  culture  in  its  entirety.  Only  when  we  grasp  this  can  more 
sensible  and proportionate  responses  be  developed to  confront  the  range  of 
problems currently blamed on gangs. It could be observed that in adopting this 
orientation my aim is not only to take issue with current gang fixations but to 
suggest that commentators like Bourgois (1995) and Anderson (2000) exemplify 
better  the direction of  travel  we need to take than the burgeoning academic 
gang-industry. Both, in this sense, look at the wider cultural order of the street 
to make sense of the problematic situations that emanate from it.  To change 
metaphors they look at the proverbial wood and do not get lost among the trees. 
Where they tread we need to follow.  
Instead of beginning with the gang and making this the focus of analysis, 
I propose instead that we need to foreground street culture and examine this 
instead.   By  this  term  I  mean  to  evoke  a  subterranean  world  governed  by 
distinctive norms, values, repertoires of action and practices that organise and 
define the patterns of social  action that those who participate in this culture 
engage in.  Those who participate in street culture are those who can be defined 
in the first instance as 'street orientated' in the sense that they find a home and 
meaning in the rituals of street culture and who become, over time, participants 
within it. The street world has both a core and a periphery. At the core, deeply 
immersed in it  can be found those that  quite  literally live their  life  through 
illegal means.. This section of the street world intersects seamlessly with what is 
often referred to as organised crime At the periphery we find younger people, 
predominantly  but  by  no  means  exclusively  male  who typically  coalesce  in 
volatile peer groups and sometimes gangs.  
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One way to conceive this subterranean world would be to invoke the 
image of a whirlpool. Those at the periphery enter the edge of this maelstrom 
but most will not be pulled deep within it. They circle for a while in the outer 
eddies  and are  thrown out,  or  leave.  But  then,  for  most,  it  was  never  their 
intention to seek full immersion anyway. Others become more heavily engaged 
(some  willingly,  some  by  accident)  and  are  pulled  more  deeply  into  the 
maelstrom (pulled deeper and towards its centre). The more deeply involved 
they are (differentially associated), the more difficult they find it to exit.  
In order to study street culture sociologically I propose to examine the 
various ends around which social action in a street context appears to be most 
directed. In suggesting we study the ‘ends’ as opposed to the ‘end’ I also mean 
to signify that there is not one ‘end’ but potentially many. We are thus looking 
then at more than one goal,  even if,  as we shall see, the ends around which 
street culture is organised intersect in various messy ways. These ends, in their 
various forms, constitute what I propose to term the governing imperatives of 
street life. To study these we need to identify both the ends themselves and, 
more  specifically,  study  the  particular  means  by  and  through  which  these 
imperatives are realised in a street setting.  
Let us begin by studying the ends to which street life is directed. If we 
consider  the  wider  literature  then  clearly,  as  Anderson’s  (2000)  and 
Bourgeois’  (2003) work testifies,  and well,  the search for respect and honour 
appears to be one imperative around which street life, particularly for young 
men, appears organised. Indeed, for Anderson and Bourgeois, it is precisely this 
feature  of  street  life  that  they  emphasise  in  their  work.  Bourgeois’  study, 
however, is substantively about a group of men who make their money illegally 
through selling and dealing in crack cocaine. While it is clear that in pursuing 
their trade these men also seek to obtain respect, nevertheless, they are also in 
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search of money as well.   In other words we are also looking at a separate and 
distinct factor here, or, in my terminology, street imperative. This gives us two. 
Mindful of Jock Young’s (2011) insistence that we do not make the mistake of 
making street  life  appear  wholly  miserable  all  of  the  time and construct  its 
inhabitants  in  so  doing  as  merely  sad  and  miserable,  let  me  add  a  third 
imperative to the mix, and that is the search for pleasure. Street life, after all, as 
the work of Katz (1988) and other cultural criminologists attests, constitutes a 
liminal space where risk and danger exists, but where all manner of intoxicating 
pleasures are to be found, quite literally ‘there for the taking’.  
Three core imperatives therefore govern street life and by extension the 
range of actions and situations groups like gangs find themselves engaging in. 
The first imperative involves the search for pleasure; the second, the search for 
respect; the third, the search for money. Social life in a street context is usually, if 
by no means absolutely,  directed at realising the means necessary to achieve 
these  desirable  ends.  In  making  this  point,  I  am  not  suggesting  that  each 
imperative is pursued equally and at the same time insofar as one or more of 
these imperatives may be more important at a particular time in an individual 
or  groups existence.  Having fun,  for  example,  is  quite  likely to  define what 
younger people want most of the time, while making money might well become 
more important as they mature.  
Before we explore further how these imperatives are realised in a street 
setting it  must be observed that there is  nothing extraordinary about any of 
them. Humans, as Freud (2011) observed long ago, are invariably beholden to 
the pleasure principle, or Eros, as he defined it (he also spoke of Thanatos (the 
death instinct),  and I  will  return to this  later).  It  is  not  in and of  itself  then 
anything extraordinary insofar as it is an imperative that governs the lives of 
those who are not part of street culture as well. It involves searching for, seeking 
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out, or creating situations that will generate what we might colloquially refer to 
as ‘a good time’; situations that, in various ways, will leave those engaging in 
the search feeling good or satisfied – sometimes happy, sometimes elated and 
sometimes as high as a kite. The search for pleasure, it could be observed, is, in 
part, stimulated for the highs it brings but is also motivated by the desire to 
minimise or transcend situations or events that involve un-pleasure, or which 
are pleasure-less. This does not entail minimising pain or avoiding danger by 
any means, because pain itself can be intensively pleasurable just as danger can 
be exiting.  
The search for respect is likewise by no means an abnormal behaviour 
insofar as it shapes the lives of many more people than inhabit the street world. 
It  involves engaging in acts  or  creating situations where admiration may be 
accumulated on the  part  of  those  engaged in  them.  It  involves  engaging in 
pursuits designed explicitly or implicitly with aim of accumulating honour or 
status. Becoming, in so doing, someone to whom respect is due. As we shall 
establish,  this  is  also  about  cultivating a  self  that  others  will  treat  with due 
regard (respectfully). In part, this project is also about creating or manufacturing 
a  persona  that  people  will  not  disrespect.  As  an  imperative,  the  search  for 
respect is a process that has to be accomplished. It is something that cannot be 
presumed but which needs to be cultivated. Once achieved, it remains a quality 
that  has  to  be  retained,  sometimes in  the  face  of  those  who will  deny it  or 
contest it.  
In  a  capitalist  economy,  making  money  is  of  course  an  overriding 
necessity.  There  are  a  variety  of  different  ways of  making it  and these  vary 
between the legitimate pursuit of wealth through the legal marketplace to less 
legitimate pursuit of it in the illegal economy. In a free market society organised 
around the logic of compulsory consumption, making money is not only about 
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brute survival but about being able to live life as an active consumer, the raison 
d’être  of  neoliberalism  and  the  culture  of  compulsory  consumption  around 
which it is articulated. Not having access to money or not having enough of it to 
sublimate socially induced consumption desires consigns those without it into 
the order of non-being (Young 1999; Hallsworth 2005; Winlow and Hall 2006). 
The  implications  of  this  for  those  who  dwell  in  an  ‘on-road’  existence  are 
significant.  
Three imperatives then, each of which is pursued more widely that the 
street world under investigation here, but which still constitute the key focus of 
the  street  world  and those  who populate  it.  Before  we turn to  consider  the 
unique ways in which these imperatives are realised in a street context it pays to 
consider  how  each  is  interrelated  to  the  others  because,  as  we  shall  now 
establish,  these  are  not  wholly  autonomous.  We  can  begin  this  exercise  by 
noting that the pursuit of each imperative also allows other imperatives to be 
pursued simultaneously. Making money, for example, can be pleasurable and 
obtaining vast amounts of it can allow those who engage in it to accumulate 
status as well through accumulating cultural capital. One can be proficient and 
skilled in a particular craft and gain pleasure from craftsmanship. One can be 
respected for this as well.  In a society where status is also equated with the 
possession of the right branded goods, the search for respect is also intrinsically 
bound up with the search for money. Imagine these imperatives, then, like a 
Venn diagram.  
It  is not the ends to which street life and culture are directed that are 
unique because the pursuit of pleasure, respect and money is a desire widely 
distributed.  What  is  unique  and  particular  to  street  culture  is  how  these 
imperatives  are  realised.  In  what  follows  we  will  consider  how  they  are 
beginning with the pursuit of pleasure.  
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The search for pleasure  
We might begin this task by engaging with the recent work of Jock Young 
(2011) who is scathing about a criminological tradition which he argues makes 
the serious error of failing to recognise that the lives of the young deviants, so 
often  its  focus  of  analysis,  are  rarely  as  dark  and  miserable  as  too  much 
criminology suggests. This enterprise he terms ‘liberal othering’.  In line with 
this cultural criminological injunction let us therefore begin our analysis of these 
street imperatives by recognising that, in part, the lives of those who inhabit this 
world are orientated towards the pleasure principle. Like everyone else, having 
fun, seeking out pleasure, is what they are also about. Before we consider how 
they accomplish this it pays to reflect for a moment on the pleasures we are 
talking about, for there are many. We can begin by identifying what I propose to 
term the pleasures of everyday life; the everyday pleasures that can be found 
undertaking  many  seemingly  innocuous  things:  enjoying  a  good  meal,  the 
company of friends, a sunny day – pleasures too often ignored by criminologists 
who are more attentive to what may be termed the pleasures of excess. Unlike 
the  simple  pleasures  of  everyday life,  the  pleasures  of  excess  entail  extreme 
affective states, a movement away from the natural attitude towards a state of 
transcendence that can in some cases be read as a state of ecstasy.  
In the first instance we can note that the denizens of the street world seek 
out pleasures by doing many of the things that the wider population of non-
gang,  non-street-affiliated  young  men  do.  These  certainly  include  playing 
computer  games (often violent  ones),  watching DVDs (many about  gangster 
life) and partying in various clubs and houses and, not least, playing the mating 
game. Much of the pleasure they find would fall into the category of everyday 
pleasures.  However,  they  also  search  out  pleasure  in  ways  that  are  more 
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peculiar to the street society of which they are a part, and in part they also seek 
out pleasures of the more excessive not to say transgressive kind. One way they 
produce it is through the time-honoured strategy of ‘hanging around’, often in 
‘street corner societies’ in the vicinity of the estates where they are live, or in the 
playgrounds of the schools they attend (Whyte 1943). This is invariably read as 
indicative of anti-social behaviour on the part of the adult world.  
While the street constitutes a place and space young men are decanted to, 
not least given poor living conditions, it must be remembered that the street is a 
place of wonder and enchantment as well.  It is a place where little happens, 
often for a long time. It  can certainly be a boring space, not least for young 
people who often complain that they have nothing to do. At the same time the 
urban  street  world  is  a  place  of  adventure,  a  seductive  environment  that 
promises excitement and pleasure, tinged with the risk of danger that makes it 
that much more appealing (Hayward 2002, 2004). It constitutes a liminal space 
where  the  rule-bound  conventions  of  everyday  life  can  be  magically 
circumvented, or, at least for a short period, suspended. The street world thus 
offers  the  individual  with  a  space  to  achieve  a  sense  of  personal  authentic 
sovereignty,  a  sense  that  everyday life,  at  least  as  it  is  lived by  structurally 
powerless young men, is  often bereft  of (Bataille 1988).  By escaping into the 
nocturnal order of the street the individual and the groups to which they are 
affiliated  leave  behind  the  rhythms  of  conformity  that  life  lived  within  the 
straight, homogeneous world of the everyday proffers as its reward and enter 
instead into the wonderland of a heterogeneous order where normal rules do 
not necessarily apply.  Against a world characterised by the usual space-time 
disciplines, ‘on-road’ you live by your wits in a world where risks and dangers 
abound. Integral to this shift away from the mundane and boring we find two 
intrinsic  properties  of  pleasure  production  in  street  culture:  first,  the  art  of 
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transgression and, second and by no means outside of it, rule-breaking (Katz 
1988).  In  both  activities  not  only  is  excitement  generated,  so  too  is  the 
acquisition of  power,  an intoxicating medium for  those who otherwise have 
little of it.  
For the members of the peer groups and gangs who inhabit the street 
world, that is, groups populated by people not orientated towards living placid 
or pacific lives, pleasure is predominantly obtained, in Goffman’s (1982) terms, 
by being ‘where the action is’. This involves engaging in problematic situations 
that  can have  fateful  consequences,  where  the  events  in  question are  by  no 
means instrumentally driven and which, consequently, can have no end to them 
beyond themselves. Violent exertion and what Lyng (2005) terms ‘edge work’ 
are the media by and through which action is sought out. By ‘edge work’ we 
mean acts and activities that involve risk and danger to an individual where 
these dangers and the perils attendant on them are actively sought out. Fighting 
in an individual context or in a group is one way in which pleasure is generated; 
others include engaging in excursions into territory claimed by others; or, more 
recently, engaging in acts of online bravado where members boast about their 
daring  exploits  and  disrespect  others.  Vandalism  and  joyriding  are  also 
pathways by and through which a good time may be had in a street context, as 
may drug-taking and graffiti  (Fenwick and Hayward 2000);  as  indeed are  a 
myriad of acts engaged in by those who, in Katz’s terms, are not only attracted 
to the ways of the badass, but who, in their celebration of badness, take delight 
in offending the denizens of the straight world. While highs are certainly to be 
had through acts like violent exertion, the drug economy, invariably itself a key 
force in street life, also allows access to a range of chemically-induced highs. 
Pleasure,  then,  is  a  social  good actively sought  out  but  in ways that  can be 
dangerous to the point of becoming self-destructive.  
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The search for respect  
While bound up with the pleasure principle, the search for respect also 
constitutes an autonomous variable in its own right and it needs to be treated as 
such. Like the search for pleasure, the search for respect is not in and of itself an 
abnormal or deviant activity, it is a social good also sought by everyone else in 
mainstream  society  including  the  wealthy,  powerful  and  privileged.  What 
distinguishes the search for respect among more marginalised groups of street-
orientated young men is the means by and through which it is achieved and the 
nature of the hyper- masculine norms around which it is structured.  
One way to visualise how respect is established is to consider the task of 
obtaining it, a game that, like all games, is rule-bound and where the rules that 
govern it are implicitly understood by the players but never formally composed 
or articulated.  There are two parts to this game. First,  you have to establish 
yourself as a viable player in your own right. You have to establish that you are, 
in street parlance, ‘on the level’. To evoke a footballing metaphor, to enter the 
game you have to demonstrate proficiency in your craft and good enough to be 
selected from the  bench to  play.  Second,  and this  is  particularly  the  case  in 
urban street worlds, you play to win out over others around you who are also 
playing the same game. In a practical sense this means that ‘to score’ you have 
to accumulate and retain honour, and this is accomplished in an environment 
populated by rivals who are playing the same game and who, as part of this, are 
trying to prevent you from obtaining or retaining the honour you claim.  
To be seen to be, as it were, ‘ worthy to play’ constitutes a social project in 
its own right. It involves cultivating and constructing a social presentation of 
self that is appropriate to the field. On one hand, it involves wearing the right 
clothes with the right brands in the right way. Street culture, it could be noted, is 
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wholly incorporated (at least today) into mainstream consumer culture. Indeed, 
the  young  street-  affiliated  men  I  recently  studied  in  Birmingham  certainly 
ensured that they looked sharp (against them we, the university researchers, 
looked positively poor and shabby). It certainly means ensuring that you are not 
caught wearing low-brand goods. Integral to this project is ensuring that you 
are not seen as a person to whom respect cannot or ought not to be conceded, 
which is also about confronting head-on those that try to intimate that you are 
not what you claim and who as such challenge your honour.  
In part the search for respect is a project that also involves embodying in 
word, presentation of self and deeds the standards that embody masculinity as 
it is dominantly constructed in Western societies (Connell 2005). Many of these 
qualities stem less from gangs or gang culture but are embedded in mainstream, 
not to say working-class, culture. Being tough and being able to handle yourself, 
confronting status challenges when they arise, and not least mobilising violence 
if required to settle them, embody these desirable traits. To an extent, playing 
the game also entails embodying other codes of the street, such as not talking or 
‘grassing’ to police, and backing your brethren if they are threatened (Anderson 
2000).  For men in particular,  it  is  also about being seen to be virile.  Being a 
virgin and celibate are qualities that have no status in the street world and will 
disqualify you from the ranks of the elect.  
As in  mainstream society,  respect  is  also  bound up with  competence, 
being seen to be skilled at or in activities valued within the field. In the case of 
street life a competence for violence might well be one virtue that is recognized; 
many others are as well. Entrepreneurial ability, as we shall see, is itself a valued 
skill, as indeed is achieving a reputation for being trustworthy, which entails not 
just competence but not disclosing to outsiders inside business (Hobbs 1995, 
1998).  
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The business  of  obtaining respect  involves  playing a  game where  the 
stakes  being  fought  for  are  conducted  in  a  social  field  that  is  ruthless, 
unforgiving and socially destructive.  In this sense the struggle to affirm and 
retain reputation and accumulate respect is conducted in a highly competitive 
and, not least, sceptical street environment where men face disrespect and status 
challenges at every step along the way. In many respects the aim of those who 
enter  a  life  ‘on-road’  is  to  successfully  navigate  their  way  through  this 
environment; warding of status challenges as they arise while also challenging 
the authenticity of other participants in the street world. To win is to survive 
and to have accumulated along the way a reputation either for yourself or your 
group.  
By being ‘where the action is’ a group and its members engage in the 
game  through  the  medium  of  a  dramatic  performance  where  they  put 
themselves and sometimes their lives, quite literally, on the line. As Goffman 
(1982) argues, they gamble with both their welfare and their reputation. In edge 
work, they take risks where the stakes can be very high with a consequential 
payoff that might well follow them into their future. They may run, for example, 
the risk of being caught by the police who exist to prevent the action – and 
prison might follow; or they may be violently assaulted by other men just like 
themselves. At the same time, by engaging in risky endeavours, they also have 
to demonstrate that as individuals they possess character; that they are capable 
of rising to the challenge, backing each other up, while also demonstrating in 
performance a range of other qualities valued in street-corner societies such as 
toughness, courage and integrity.  
To an extent,  the  business  of  establishing respect  cannot  be separated 
away  from  the  need  to  cultivate  and  affirm  a  viable  masculine  identity. 
Manliness in this world cannot simply be presumed but has to affirmed and 
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demonstrated through action and in performance. To an extent the violent ways 
in which manliness is affirmed in this street world owes much to fact that in a 
society where masculinity continues to be equated with control and power over 
things and people (traditionally, women), for young men from predominantly 
poor communities violent assertion becomes for some the only power resource 
they can access and mobilise to produce an identity that corresponds with this 
patriarchal imperative (Messerschmidt 1993). To put this another way, middle-
class men, by and large, do not have to assert and affirm masculinity through 
violence because they own and control things like people and resources. They 
can fall back on the power that status brings, exemplified, for example, in high 
office or a high-salaried job. No such presumption can be made by men who are 
consigned  to  precarious  lives  in  a  low-wage,  low-status  economy.  Violence 
becomes part  of  the means by and through which viable male identities  are 
constructed among subjugated groups because it is a resource that is available 
and ready to hand. It  is  also a currency that finds validation in their parent 
communities and, not least, in mainstream society through the medium of the 
culture industries that incessantly promote and celebrate it. This is a vision of 
purified  masculinity  where  being  ‘hard’  assumes  a  master  status.  This  is  a 
masculinity  where  backing  down in  the  face  of  honour  and status  threat  is 
difficult  and  where  the  onus  to  retaliate  to  provocation  is  an  imperative 
(Hallsworth 2005).  
What also makes the street search for respect significantly different from 
the ways it is established in mainstream society is that the task of establishing it 
has to be constructed in the context of a violent world where participants cannot 
take for granted that the respect they claim will necessarily be recognised by 
others. In his recent ethnographic account of the development of a street gang in 
a rustbelt city in the US, Timothy Lauger (2012) brings this aspect of the game 
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into  stark  relief.  He  charts  how a  group of  urban  nomads  try  to  constitute 
themselves as a gang by building a reputation for themselves, and he shows just 
how difficult realising this ambition is in practice. What made it difficult was 
less their capacity to be violent (they held all the right credentials as far as this 
was concerned) and more their difficulty in getting other people within the local 
street  scene  to  take  their  gang  claims  seriously.  In  other  words,  who  they 
claimed to be was not accepted by an audience that was inherently sceptical of 
such claims and saw instead ‘wannabes’ rather than the gang of their dreams.  
In  the  street  world  then,  claims  will  be  tested  and  if  someone  is 
discovered to be a fake (that is, a person whose myths do not accord with the 
claims they make) then brutal retribution can follow. Disqualification can also 
follow if public status challenges are made which are not effectively responded 
to. In some cases, not responding, or failing to rise to the challenge, will also be 
read as an indication that the person concerned falls short of the requirements 
necessary to be considered a viable player.  
The task of warding off and confronting status challenges therefore has to 
be mastered as a key life-skill. As Anderson (2000) shows, it involves knowing 
and  recognising  the  signs  of  disrespect  when  they  manifest  themselves.  It 
involves cultivating a vigilant disposition, one that can discern disrespect in the 
way people look at you, let alone treat you. The ego structure that street culture 
encourages, it could be remarked, is hard but brittle. It looks out upon the world 
with suspicious eyes for signs of disrespect and responds violently when it is 
encountered. (To add a brief biographical note illustrating this, I found myself a 
few years ago in a situation that could have turned very violent very quickly. I 
was leaving a train at London Bridge when I tripped over and literally fell into a 
group of young men. Instead of behaving as most would by simply accepting 
my apologies, the young man I directly bumped into went into a state of war 
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readiness  and  responded  aggressively  as  if  I  had  consciously  elected  to 
disrespect him. I had evidently violated far more than his personal space.)
Today,  the  game  of  respect  moves  well  beyond  the  simple  time- 
honoured medium of invective conducted in a street setting. In grime music and 
in the stream of videos produced and uploaded by men claiming street/gang 
authenticity,  talented  MCs  ‘spit  bars’  purposely  designed  to  big  up  the 
reputation  of  a  particular  group  (and  the  MC himself)  while  also  throwing 
down status challenges to the other enemies. Given that video formats allow the 
producers to visually dramatise the status challenge as well as narrate it, such 
formats with their violent aesthetics function perfectly as media through and by 
which the game of respect is played out. The bulletin boards that accompany 
such  videos  also  provide  other  formats  that  also  work  to  exacerbate  the 
challenges being made. The use of underground radio by the participants in this 
world to challenge and disrespect each other constitutes yet another medium in 
what remains a way of life predicated on the self-destruction of its inhabitants.  
Though much is made of the threats that those who occupy this street 
world pose to the wider society, in many respects this paranoiac way of thinking 
ignores  the  fact  that  the  search  for  respect  occurs  within  the  context  of  a 
subterranean street world where the overriding focus of attention on the part of 
the population who inhabit it is each other. They inhabit as such the interstitial 
spaces of society and though, at times, innocent bystanders, can become victims; 
the predominant enemy the participants of  the street  face derives from each 
other. The street, in other words, is the arena in which the game unfolds and is 
played out; the rest of the world is a distant sideshow.  
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The search for money  
Street culture is found in its most developed form in areas characterised by high 
indices  of  deprivation  where  local  labour  markets  provide  little  by  way  of 
secure employment where the jobs on offer are of the precarious form. In such a 
labour market, rates of youth as well as adult unemployment are high and for 
the young people destined to a life of labour within them, the possibility of 
securing secure,  decent  paying jobs cannot be guaranteed.  For this,  the new 
precariat,  as Guy Standing terms them (Standing 2011), finding work will be 
difficult, while much of the work they will find will be low paid and temporary; 
where temporary work becomes a permanent feature of working life. Caught in 
a state of constant churn moving between low paying short term jobs and a 
welfare system that is set up to fail them, obtaining money, their ‘P’s’, is by no 
means an easy talk for populations of young people destined to dwell in this 
precarious economy.  
At the same time as they face manifest material exclusion, the denizens of 
the  street  are  also  culturally  included  to  the  extent  that  they  have  been 
successfully  socialised  into  the  consumption  logic  of  free  market  capitalism 
(Young 1999). They as such are also seduced to believe that success in life is to 
be obtained by owning the right things. At the same time and as part of this 
lesson they will also come to recognise that failure lies in not owning the goods 
they have been taught to desire, goods that are invariably designed to become 
quickly obsolete, after which they will need to be replaced by the next model or 
style. Given that exclusive brand status is also bound up with the high prices 
needed to purchase them, the money needed to live a good life, or at least one 
that  is  consistent  with  the  standards  young  people  have  been  schooled  to 
expect, is quite likely to exceed that which life in a precarious low-wage, low-
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status  market  will  deliver.  Adaption  through innovation  thus  becomes,  in  a 
Mertonian  sense  (Merton  and  Nisbet  1963),  the  rational  response  for  many 
street-orientated young people as they opt away from the diminishing returns 
of the formal labour market, to make their Ps (money) ‘on-road’ in the informal 
economy.  
Within this economy, street-orientated young people seek to make money 
by mobilising whatever entrepreneurial talent they possess in whatever activity 
will deliver it. And opportunities always exist. For street- orientated young men 
who lack well-connected elder criminal contacts, some may engage in the time-
honoured pursuit of street robbery to accumulate money where violence is the 
medium they mobilise for obtaining it (Hallsworth 2005); some might develop a 
capacity for breaking into houses or cars, while others will innovate in different 
ways,  exploiting whatever opportunity comes their  way.  Dealing and selling 
drugs for more established dealers is another alternative, and in inner-city areas 
where  drug  markets  are  well  established  and  saturated,  this  is  a  key  net 
employer. For most young men who take this route, this will mean selling drugs 
in the lower echelons of the street retail sector, often in open marketplaces. Some 
entrepreneurs,  using  hydroponics,  might  be  engaged  in  growing  ‘skunk’. 
Breeding illegal dogs might be another alternative; selling fake designer clothes 
and jewellery, another. More entrepreneurial participants may engage in fraud. 
As within the formal  economy,  success  is  largely contingent  on the contacts 
street  hustlers  are  able  to  establish with already established players  and the 
entrepreneurial  flair  they  may  innately  possess  (Hobbs  1989).  While  some 
young people  may be  very  successful  entrepreneurs  and make  considerable 
money, this will not be the case for most. The returns they make are generally 
low and certainly not likely to radically transform their lives, even though a 
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ghetto  narrative  suggests  that  vast  riches  will  be  accumulated  beyond their 
wildest dreams.  
In contemporary street culture, successful engagement in music might be 
for some the chosen way of making money, and there is no doubt that some 
certainly  seek  to  do  so  in  the  street  world.  Talented  MCs,  looking  to  gain 
credibility and reputation by the authenticity of their street connections, work 
with  street  gangs  producing  well-crafted  videos  characterised  by  high 
production values, orchestrated around highly aggressive lyrics coupled with a 
violent street performance. Rapping your way to financial success is a potent 
ghetto narrative, though few performers are likely to make it big this way.  
Illegal endeavour comes with noticeable risks attached. Just as the search 
for respect involves gambling with welfare, so too does the business of making 
money. Risk of arrest, and prosecution and imprisonment, is one likely outcome; 
becoming a victim of violence is another, and just how likely and probable the 
real  risk  of  victimisation  is  can  be  adduced  from  the  sample  Hale  and 
Silverstone  studied in  their  research  on gun crime:  ‘40  had previously  been 
threatened with guns, 29 shot at and eight had been shot; 28 had been stabbed, 
17  injured  with  other  weapons,  34  had  been  robbed  and  three  had  been 
kidnapped.  Additionally,  26  reported  friends  or  family  members  shot  and 
injured and another 26 reported friends or family shot dead’ (Hales et al. 2006). 
Accumulating  enemies  as  a  consequence  of  business  endeavours  such  as 
robbing drug-sellers is also a risk (Jacobs 2000), as are rising levels of stress that 
living life on the line brings as its reward. For those exposed to high levels of 
violence there are psychological costs as well.  
It is important to recognise that this level of criminal endeavour is not 
simply the  prerogative  of  groups like  gangs  as  these  groups are  themselves 
plugged into distributed networks populated by people who are not necessarily 
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gang members. And even within gangs, individuals are quite likely to engage in 
scams as individual operatives working for themselves as much as they are part 
of a collective group enterprise. Many members of legitimate society are also 
involved in  these  hustling networks.  The public  might  be  the  purchasers  of 
stolen  goods,  or  desirable  goods  such  as  drugs  which  state  criminalisation 
ensures cannot be obtained legally. A number of ‘legitimate’ businessmen might 
also be involved in helping to fence and sell on illegal goods as well. This, then, 
is not a black market with clear boundaries that separate it from the licit, but a 
grey one given its intersection with the wider legal economy (Hobbs 1995).  
Unless street-orientated young men are well networked into the wider 
criminal  economy,  that  is,  have  close  friends  or  relatives  with  significant 
criminal involvement, and successful criminal careers, it is unlikely that most 
will  migrate  from the order of  small-time hustling to become players  in the 
world of what might be termed more organised crime. Most individuals lead 
quite parochial lives;  most will  not have these contacts;  most are not wholly 
committed to crime and will pursue the task of making money in the formal 
economy through legitimate means; and some might choose not to exploit such 
links  even  if  they  had  them because  they  lack  the  requisite  entrepreneurial 
talents. But some do, and this might well change the trajectory of their criminal 
careers.  
A group that is relatively well integrated might begin to innovate in the 
development of its criminal involvement.  If  they are able readily to mobilise 
violence successfully and is populated by men willing to deploy it, this might 
lead them to identify arenas where they can do so. At this point weapons might 
be carried and used. Weaponisation, however, is contingent on two factors: the 
existing presence of weapons in the street culture, and the arrival into an area of 
men who routinely use weapons. In relation to the former, once one group uses 
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or carries weapons then other groups will invariably tool up in response on the 
basis that not to do so would place them at a hopeless disadvantage to those 
that do. In the case of Birmingham, where we recently conducted research, guns 
became  more  commonplace  because  men  trained  in  their  use  and  who 
habitually  used  them  began  to  arrive  in  the  city.  This  population  included 
Yardies who came from a parent society in Jamaica where weaponised violence 
is deeply embedded. Other groups such as Somalis also began to arrive from 
what was essentially a war zone.  
From small-scale hustling, these street entrepreneurs become locked into 
wider criminal networks and gain criminal capital. They become educated in 
various scams, and learn how to become players in them. To begin with, this 
will take the form of undertaking junior and subordinate positions relative to 
more established criminals who, in effect, subcontract dirty work to them. From 
small-scale hustling and territorial conflict, these individuals and the groups to 
which  they  belong  may  begin  to  migrate  into  more  organised  crime  and 
criminality.  They  may  become more  heavily  enmeshed  into  the  illegal  drug 
trade, either as dealers or as groups who make a living robbing other dealers. In 
a world where business imperatives matter,  the group and its  members will 
learn, often from more established gangsters, to be more careful in relation to 
the  way  violence  is  exercised.  It  could  be  that  they  discover  market 
opportunities that allow them to make significant money.  
Although for some gang-talkers this transition is often spoken about in 
terms  of  the  evolution  of  large  corporate  gangs  with  extensive  divisions  of 
labour and complex vertical command structures, we are looking here less at 
shadows corporations as Cressey (1969) once imagined the mafia, and more at 
distributed networks within which a range of actors; some individual, some in 
duos and some in larger collectives each play a particular role. Though much is 
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made of large gangs sometimes imagined to possess hundreds of members, it 
could be noted that, were such groups to exist, this is not a functional way of 
organising to make money. The group is unwieldy, too difficult to organise, too 
leaky, and finally it is never entirely clear who is a committed member or simply 
a ‘wannabe’ (a street term of abuse).  
Instability, Trauma and Street Life  
One of the dominant themes that have accompanied the contemporary 
rediscovery of the urban street gang is the idea that the UK is confronting an 
organised counter-force that means it harm. Against this interpretation I would 
suggest instead that what we are dealing with is a street world populated by 
groups that certainly organise together to achieve common goals (having a good 
time, playing the game of respect and making money) but who do so in the 
context of a world that is neither corporate nor organised in the way in which 
bureaucracies are. The street world is a world that is radically contingent, where 
violence happens very quickly and where the violence in question often appears 
like the lightning that strikes at the door: unforeseen and unannounced. Here, 
business motives and more personal ones intersect in messy ways that make 
bureaucratic organisation near impossible.  
What makes this street world so unstable is that the violence and edge 
work in which gangs and other occupants of this world engage penetrates into 
and profoundly structures the way in which each of the imperatives outlined 
above are realised. Having fun in the street world of gangs involves, as we have 
seen, violent endeavour, as this is where the action is to be found. Violence in 
this  sense  becomes  a  medium  for  transcending  the  routine,  mundane  and 
boring. It is through the medium of violence that street-orientated young people 
(in groups or as individuals) seek to play the game of respect. In so doing, they 
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gamble reputation and welfare in a game of high stakes where the risk of violent 
repercussions is  a risk that has to be faced and confronted head-on. Making 
money in the illegal economy, or at least in, those sections of it open to street-
orientated young men, can also be an endeavour fraught with dangers. Leaving 
aside the very real danger they face of criminal conviction, the arenas in which 
money is  made are  themselves incredibly violent;  none more so than in the 
street retail trade in drugs which is where a number aspire to carve out a living 
for themselves (Jacobs 1999). In an economy devoid of formal regulation by the 
rule  of  law,  regulation  through  violence  becomes  the  de  facto  mode  of 
regulation.  
The problem escalates because weapons like knives and guns have in 
some quarters supplemented fists and boots. The problem becomes even more 
problematic when guns are no longer simply the property and prerogative of 
more organised elder criminals and make their way down into the street world 
of young, unstable, adolescent men. This is certainly now the case in the UK. It 
becomes worse because once your enemy has weaponised you are left with little 
alternative but to engage in an arms race as well.  
In a street world where these imperatives are not,  as it  were, vacuum 
sealed, seepage also occurs across and between them and this also makes this 
world unstable and unpredictable. A drug dealer might carry a weapon in order 
to  protect  himself  (and his  drugs)  from the  risk  of  victimisation from those 
members of the street world that might want to rob him. However, someone, 
somewhere may also look at him the wrong way, intimating an honour slight 
that  has  to  be  responded  to.  His  weapon  might  well  in  this  occasion  be 
deployed,  but  not  for  the  reason it  was  originally  intended.  Far  from being 
predictable,  the  street  world  is  inherently  volatile  and  unstable  precisely 
because  business  motives  for  carrying  and  using  weapons  can  be 
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overdetermined by far more personal motives. Whereas professional criminals 
like bank robbers mobilise violence instrumentally, in a street context violent 
events are often less pre-planned and more situationally determined. Here, bad 
stuff happens because someone, somewhere, looked at someone else the wrong 
way and someone somewhere else will have to be made to pay.  
In  a  world  where  problematic  situations  proliferate,  rarely  resolved 
through legal channels in the civil courts and certainly not by a criminal justice 
system widely distrusted,  formal means of  conflict  resolution are notable by 
their  absence.  Instead,  they  are  resolved  in  ‘fast  time’  (as  opposed  to  slow, 
bureaucratic time) through violent extrajudicial  means directed at those who 
cause offence or at proxies for them, such as friends or family members. The 
emotional intensity and enmity ‘on-road’ is all the more exaggerated because of 
the extreme parochialism of those who live the life. Within this world, small-
scale disagreements, feuds and rivalries take on huge significance; a significance 
that  would  appear  difficult  to  grasp  for  those  who  live  outside  of  the 
claustrophobic world in which life ‘on-road’ unfolds.  
Violence, then, is like the genie who refuses to enter the bottle once it has 
been released.  It  won’t  go back and it  won’t  go away.  More than that,  it  is 
contagious.  In  the  street  world,  violence  does  not  just  provoke  violent 
retaliation, violent acts leave in their wake brutalised, damaged individuals and 
a world of enemies with long memories who carry their ‘beef’ with them. These 
problematic situations in turn set in motion vendettas that continue which can 
be intra-generationally mediated. In fact, so lost in the midst of time can they 
become that the very reasons that set them in motion are often lost on those 
burdened with the necessity of taking them forward.  
Though  it  would  be  fair  to  say  that  the  logic  of  mutually-assured 
destruction that defines the grammar of this world can spill over into the world 
!225
of innocent bystanders (nowhere more graphically demonstrated than in the 
drive-by  shooting  of  the  Charlene  Ellis  and  Letisha  Shakespeare  in 
Birmingham), by and large the victims of violence in the street world are the 
young  men  and,  sometimes,  young  women  who  populate  it.  Though  the 
motives  that  legitimate  violence  might  appear  insane  to  the  outside  world 
looking in, in the hothouse world of the street seemingly small slights take on a 
significance  and  have  an  intensity  that  can  provoke  often  disproportionate 
responses.  
Living life in this violent milieu carries a range of psychological costs. 
Seeing a friend shot and killed, or knowing a friend who has been murdered is a 
traumatic event. Living life on the edge carries with it high levels of stress. As 
one ex-gang member who had a heavy immersion into street life explained, this 
way of living often left him unable to sleep at night, staring at the ceiling. It left 
him feeling unable to use anything but public transport, so fearful was he that 
someone might just fire a gun into his car should he use it. It could be noted that 
research  suggests  that  it  is  when a  gang member  eventually  has  enough of 
living with such risks that many elect to migrate out of gang life and seek a 
more  benevolent  alternative.  Deeply  internalised  anger  and  rage  are  also 
endemic to the participants of this world, as is the absence of any clear sense of 
an  alternative  that  might  be  different  and  perhaps  better.  Though  trauma 
impacts at the individual level, it also impacts on the wider community itself. 
Self-maiming on this scale carries psychological costs that damage everyone.  
One way to make sense of the horror that is being described here is to 
consider the fact that we are looking at a culture that violates the very meaning 
of the term ‘culture’ (let alone ‘subculture’) if ‘culture’ is meant in the simple 
anthropological sense of ‘a way of life’. This is a way of life, certainly, but one 
predicated,  to  use  Bourgeois’  terms,  precisely  on  the  self-destruction  of  its 
!226
inhabitants;  a  way  of  life  in  which  psychological  damage,  trauma,  violent 
injuries and sometimes death are ineluctable features. A way of life which, not 
least, accounts for the expression I have often heard the denizens of this street 
world use to describe their lot on more than one occasion: ‘dead men standing’. 
For much the same reasons, the concept of subculture is difficult to apply to this 
street world. Subcultures ‘magically’ resolve the predicaments they face through 
the rituals they engage in and the narratives they weave to justify them. Does 
this  realistically  apply  in  a  way of  life  in  which Eros  appears  to  have been 
evicted and only the spirit of Thanatos appears to figure? I suggest not.  
While much is made today of large organised gangs it could be noted 
that, were they to exist, it is quite likely that the violence in which they engage 
would  be  more  predictable  because  leaders  would  be  able  to  control  and 
regulate more effectively the violent inclinations of their subordinates. In the 
street world such a situation does not prevail, with the consequence that young 
men (some in gangs, some not) find themselves inhabiting a life-world where, in 
the words of one man, ‘bad stuff’ happens for often no reason and where you 
can, as one young man we interviewed found out, simply be shot by finding 
yourself in the wrong place at the wrong time. Rather than see street culture, 
then, as a game of chess played by rational villains confronting the forces of law 
and  order  (an  image  exemplified  in  films  like  Speed),  street  culture  best 
resembles a game of snakes and ladders. The inhabitants of the street dream 
incessantly of the good times that will happen that will take them onwards and 
upwards (the final deal, the perfect heist, the successful rap), but the reality is 
that, too often, even when things go well, the snake is there to greet you: the 
policeman raiding your house, retribution for a past wrong that has never been 
forgotten, the murder of a close friend.  
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Conclusion  
In  this  chapter  I  have  consciously  sought  to  move  beyond  seeking 
explanations for violence by finding its cause in a new and novel folk devil, but 
have elected to study the causes of violence by attending to street culture and 
the imperatives that define it. As we have seen, the imperatives I identify are by 
no means unknown to those who live beyond the world of the street. What is 
unique  about  the  street  world  is  the  particular  way  these  imperatives  are 
realised in a street context and the structuring role that violence plays as an 
ordering process within them. As I have tried to establish here, to engage with 
the  many  problems  currently  blamed  on  gangs,  we  need  to  forsake  gang 
obsessions  and study the  street  world  of  which gangs  are  a  part.  American 
researchers like Anderson and Bourgeois lead the way here, British criminology 
needs to catch up. 
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Street Organisation and Structure
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Arborealism  and  Rhizomatics:  A  treatise  on 
Street Organisation
How do we understand and make sense of informal organisations such 
as gangs? For gang talkers, this is not a question that appears to present any 
serious  epistemological  and  ontological  challenges.   Gangs,  from  this 
standpoint, are simply considered criminal organisations with clear determinate 
features that can be established and measured.  Considered this way, they are 
imagined  to  possess  fixed  essences  the  compilation  of  which  provides  an 
understanding of the whole.  This tendency is wonderfully exemplified in the 
quantitative tendencies at play in the American administrative, gang research 
industry.  It is particularly evident in their autistic obsession with reducing the 
complexities  of  informal  street  organisations  to  denaturalised  and  de-
contextualised clusters  of  risk factors  from which the truth of  gangs is  then 
discerned (Klein 2001).
The  tendency  to  essentialise  however  does  not  stop  here  and  is  also 
evident in another characteristic feature of administrative gang research. It is 
particularly evident in the tendency to presuppose that the organisational forms 
and structures of gangs not only parallel those of formal organisations but can 
be described in the same terms.  This tendency is particular evident in various 
attempts to corporatise the street; to ascribe to it the hierarchical bureaucratic 
features typically found in armies and corporations.  This way of approaching 
the  gang  has  many  adherents.   John  Pitt’s  in  the  UK  established  his  gang 
credentials by discovering super organised gangs of this sort and the tendency 
is also reflected in the USA in the work of Jankowski (Jankowski 1991; Pitts, 
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2008).  Indeed, looking beyond academia this trait is the dominant characteristic 
of gang talk everywhere.
Cultural criminologists have taken the lead in contesting the attempt to 
reduce the study of complex social movements into the denuded language of 
risk  variables  and  in  opposition  to  the   ‘voodoo  statistics’  of  Zombie 
criminology have asserted the necessity of engaging with the phenomenological 
reality of street organisation (Ferrell and Sanders, 1995; Presdee, 2000; Ferrell, 
Hayward  et  al.,  2004;  Young  2011).  Only  though  through  an  appreciative 
ethnographic  approach and one sensitive to  the values and meanings actors 
give to their actions can the reality of street world ever be fully disclosed. An 
approach exemplified in the work of critical ethnographers such as Hagadorn 
(Hagedorn and Macon, 1988), Brotherton and Barrios (Brotherton and Barrios, 
2004), Congourgood (Congourgood, 1994) and Vigil (Vigil, 1988).  And it is in 
the work of critical ethnographers such as these that we also find approaches to 
study  of  informal  street  organisations   suggesting  that  the  organisation  of 
informal  organisations  cannot  be  grasped  through  imposing  upon  them the 
bureaucratic properties of formal organisations such as corporations and armies. 
All  of  which  takes  me  logically  to  the  question  I  want  to  pose  and 
address in this chapter.  How do we comprehend the structure of informal street 
based organisations if we accept that they are not corporate?  Which is also to 
say, how do we move beyond gang talk and the deeply flawed representations 
of the street in which it trades?  This is, at heart, a question of ontology as much 
as  it  is  a  question  of  epistemology  and  methodology.   It  is  about  the  very 
conceptual lens by and through which we make sense of complex street worlds. 
A reality, whose sui generic properties are, I contend, wholly different to that of 
the world of formal organisations such as those that most gang talkers inhabit. 
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Evidently we need a different ontology but let me be very clear from the 
beginning about what this entails and what it does not.  It cannot entail simply 
trying to fix and patch holes in orthodox gang talking narratives because this 
not a narrative, I contend, that can be patched up and fixed.  Like any other 
failed paradigm, we must consign it to the dustbin of history.  We recognise, of 
course, that its death will no doubt be painful, extended and prolonged and, as 
George Romero’s movies remind us, even the dead have a habit of returning to 
haunt the lives of the living. To understand the informal organisation of the 
street  we  need  instead  to  begin  anew.   We  need  a  different  sociology  of 
organisations. Ultimately, this requires a different paradigm.
In what follows my aim will be to outline what such an alternative might 
look like and to do so I will draw upon the work of the philosophers Gilles 
Deleuze and Felix Guattari (Deleuze and Guattari, 1977; Deleuze and Guattari, 
1988).   What Deleuze’s philosophy provides, I will argue, is an alternative way 
of comprehending the properties of informal street organisations, and in ways 
that mark an epistemic break with orthodox gang talking traditions. This takes 
me then to Deleuze, nomadology, and the study of trees and grass.
Before  I  go  any  further,  a  brief  note  on  Deleuze.  Though  one  of  the 
towering philosophers of the twentieth century, it could be observed that his 
work has not captured the interest of many criminologists.  Indeed, even in the 
field of cultural criminology (which, one might imagine, would constitute that 
area of the discipline where his work would have most relevance), few appear 
interested in it or its possible applications .  It appears, as such, relegated to the 20
status of that obscurantist body of (continental) theory recently condemned by 
Jock Young as an unduly arcane, complex and irrelevant (Young, 2011).  Here I 
will attempt to demonstrate how wrong such an assumption would be.  In so 
 The work of Aas and McGuire are notable exceptions that prove the rule20
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doing I  will  also suggest  ways in which cultural  criminology itself  could be 
enriched through an engagement in Deleuzian thought and thinking.
To do so however requires some prior theoretical spadework. It entails, as 
a precursor, engaging in what might appear an extended digression, one well 
away from the study of informal organisations such as gangs, which, after all, is 
what we are supposed to be studying. But please bear with me and stay the 
course,  because,  like a medieval round, we will  return to where we began - 
eventually.  Before we return, though, we will need to examine the fundamental 
features of two very different kinds of society: that of the sedentary societies of 
the West and that of the nomads of the East.  It will entail studying two opposed 
models  of  social  organisation:  the  arborescent,  tree  like  systems  that  define 
western  societies  and  thinking,  and,  opposing  this,  systems  which  are 
rhizomatic and grass like, the properties of which are exemplified in nomadic 
life.  
Following  this  excursion  into  Deleuzian  thought,  I  will  develop  an 
argument  to  suggest  that  the  informal  organisations  of  the  street  are 
fundamentally  rhizomatic  and  their  organisation  needs  to  be  interpreted  as 
such.  To  grasp  their  nature  we  must  leave  behind  traditional  arborescent 
approaches to the study of street organisations (the stuff of which gang talk is 
constructed) and develop instead nomadic thought and thinking.   I will also 
argue that the problems that gang talkers typically experience in interpreting 
the world of the street stems from the fact that their ontic and epistemological 
horizons, the very lens through and by which they comprehend street realities, 
are ineluctably saturated with arborescent categories and assumptions.  
!233
The sedentary and the nomadic
For Deleuze and Guattari western societies are distinctive because they 
are sedentary and rooted by nature.  Within them populations are settled and 
parcelled out  in  what  is  predominantly  an urban civilisation defined by the 
logic  of  settlement  (forts,  villages,  towns,  cities,  nation states)  and enclosure 
(levees,  gates,  walls,  channels,  borders,  fortifications).   Citizens,  within  this 
order  are  beholden  to  regulatory  regimes  presided  over  by  a  sovereign 
territorial state and its bureaucratic apparatus (the military industrial complex). 
Within this social formation citizens live out their working lives moving in and 
between total institutions such as schools, factories, corporations and sometimes 
prisons and hospitals.  Within the sedentary society power moves from the top 
downwards  and  this  imperial  pattern  repeats  itself  in  every  institutional 
complex, including the state form itself.
In  stark  contrast  to  the  patterned,  ascribed,  predicable  logic  of  the 
sedentary order Deleuze invites us to consider the world of the nomads who 
traverse the vast grasslands of the steppes and the deserts. If within sedentary 
societies people find themselves distributed into fixed spaces which they then 
occupy, hold and defend, in the nomads we confront a society ‘without division 
into shares, in a space without borders and enclosures’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 
1988).  Unlike the rooted citizens of the sedentary society the nomad lives life in 
movement.  They occupy spaces that are then left behind as they move on to 
new  spaces  in  a  cyclical  journey  without  end.   Nothing  is  wholly  fixed  in 
nomadic life.  No foundations around which life turns except the rituals of the 
seasons and those that are established around a society in perpetual movement. 
In Deleuzian terminology if the logic of sedentary society is to territorialise life, 
that is to ascribe matter into fixed ‘striated’ space, nomads are by nature de-
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territorialised and de-territorialising.  Far from inhabiting striated space, that of 
the nomads is smooth.
Sedentary  societies  and  nomadic  orders  are  not  only  fundamentally 
different both pose real challenges to the other.  Take the other great sedentary 
society of the East, the Imperial Chinese Empire. Despite having at its disposal a 
formidable  bureaucracy,  a  great  civilisation,  and  an  army  that  greatly 
outnumbered it adversaries, it proved no match for the nomadic war machine of 
Genghis Khan and his sons and the nomads still  returned to overrun China 
even after the Great Wall had been built to keep them at bay.  In the face of the 
total liquidation of Kiev, Russia too would fall under the yoke of the Mongol 
hordes and for 300 years; while the assembled Knights of Europe, composing 
the  flower  of  the  European  warrior  aristocracy,  were  slaughtered  in  their 
thousands when they confronted the Mongol’s in Poland in the 15th century.   To 
an extent the military success of the nomads could be credited to the tactical 
brilliance and uncompromising ruthlessness of their leaders; but it  is also an 
issue of nomadic organisation itself  and the superior advantages their speed 
and  mobility  would  confer  to  them  when  they  confronted  the  ponderous, 
immobile, centralised armies of the East and West.
All  sedentary  societies  begin  when  their  nomadic  elements  are 
suppressed. When the lands are farmed and when fixed settlements develop; 
when  these,  in  turn,  become  consolidated  under  centralised  systems  of 
administration  within  territorially  delimited  borders.   If  the  trajectory  of 
sedentary societies is to forsake nomadic organisation, indeed, to aspire at its 
liquidation,  nevertheless,  nomadic  tendencies  remain  and  are  always 
experienced as a threat to sedentary society and on many levels. 
As we have observed, sedentary societies function by allocating people to 
places that have ascribed borders; they are territorialising by nature, they striate 
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space  and  people.   Nomadic  groups  violate  the  terms  of  this  order.   They 
challenge the property rights around which sedentary regimes are organised, 
and  pose  as  well  an  existential  challenge  to  their  grounding  principles  that 
demand that life be fixed, measurable and quantifiable. For centralised states in 
particular,  which  function  by  regulating  flows  of  people,  information  and 
goods,  nomadic  life  challenges their  inherent  tendency to ascribe and fix all 
matter in place. 
This  helps  explains  why  Western  societies  allocate  so  much  effort  either  at 
eliminating  nomadic  elements  or  regulating  them  by  ascribing  them  to 
particular places. Think here, for example, of the perennial problems posed to 
the state in the middle ages by the class of vagabonds who occupied the outlaw 
spaces between the cities; the ambient fears that gypsies, travellers and migrants 
continue to inspire today. Think back to the terrible solutions (the pre-modern 
genocides  as  Mike  Davis  terms  them  (Davis,  2001),  that  nomadic  tribes 
experienced in the age of  empire by the colonial  powers:  the tragedy of  the 
indigenous American tribes, the Aborigines, the Indian Tribes of the North West 
Frontier.  The fears that subcultural groups inspire among right thinking people 
today also stems in part from nomadic tendencies they possess and / or are 
ascribed.  The same holds for informal organisations such as street gangs but 
before  we  examine  this  further  we  need  to  look  more  closely  at  the  key 
metaphors Deleuze mobilises to define the distinctive properties of centralised 
sedentary systems and the nomadic elements that oppose them.  This then takes 
us  into  a  consideration of  two terms he  borrows from the  study of  botany: 
arborealism and rhizomatics
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Arborealism
The tree,  Deleuze observes,  is  a  potent  symbol  in western cosmology. 
Think here, for example, of the many images in which trees figure: ‘the tree of 
life’, the ‘tree of knowledge’, the ‘branches of government’.  Western people ‘put 
down roots’ to say they have arrived and will stay; others aspire to ‘find their 
roots’ in the sense of tracing family trees back to an ancestral point of origin; a 
fact displayed well in the popularity of programmes such as ‘Who do you think 
you are’, in which celebrities are invited to discover their ancestors.  It could 
well be that the hold that trees exercise on western thought derives from the fact 
that western societies are home to great forests and they figure heavily in our 
imaginary;  western civilisation,  in  this  sense,  has  always lived with trees  in 
ways that nomads live with the grass of the steppes or Eskimos their snow and 
ice.  But for Deleuze trees are not just part of western life, they express in their 
structure  fundamental  truths  about  the  way  in  which  western  societies  are 
organised; their structure expresses in this sense fundamental ontological truths 
about western ways of thought and thinking.  
‘It is odd’ how the tree has dominated Western reality and all of western 
thought,  from  botany  to  biology  and  anatomy  but  also  gnosiology, 
theology, ontology and all of philosophy” (Deleuze and Guattari, 1988: 
p20).  
From branch tip to root the tree,  at  least  as Deleuze conceives it,  is  a 
command structure. It grows from a seed that constitutes a founding point of 
origin. They develop with a taproot that descends vertically beneath the surface 
of  the  ground,  and  paralleling  this,  vertically  ascending,  a  trunk  that  rises 
towards the sky.  Over time radicals (the side roots) begin to develop radiating 
symmetrically  away  from the  main  taproot;  eventually  these  subdivide  into 
!237
smaller root systems which again subdivide and the process reproduces itself. 
In complete symmetry with this subterranean development,  branches radiate 
horizontally away from the central trunk.  Like the root system each branch also 
subdivides and the process repeats itself into the formation of smaller branches. 
What  is  also  unique  to  the  tree  is  that  it  constitutes  itself  as  a  predicable 
structure whose nature can be comprehended. In Deleuzian terms ‘the tree plots 
a point’.   There are common laws that defines how the structure both develops 
and reproduces itself; symmetry and predictability are integral to this process.
This ideal typical description of the tree provides both a metaphor and 
template, Deleuze suggests, for understanding key aspects of western life.  As 
we have seen, the sedentary societies of the west are precisely of the rooted 
type. They are by nature and type arborescent societies.  Like the tree, western 
peoples  invest  heavily  in  their  roots.   They  discover  and affirm their  racial 
heritage.  Here the ‘imagined community’ of the nation does not wander, they 
inhabit  homelands,  or,  like  displaced  diaspora  communities,  they  aspire  to 
reclaim them.  Western states also invest significantly in ensuring that people 
remain rooted.  To be ‘documented’ in this sense is to be a rooted citizen, just as 
to be undocumented, as many refugees are, is a potent symbol of the rootless 
outsider.
Western organisations are also inherently arborescent.  The structure of 
the state is arborescent.  So too are the political parties that constitute the polis. 
Think  here,  for  example,  about  the  branches  of  government.   So  too  is  the 
military industrial complex.  So too are the structure of corporations.  In each, 
power moves relentlessly from the top down through centralized, hierarchical, 
command  structures.   Such  organisations  comprise  sites  and  spaces  of 
domination and control.  Within them, those at the top look down upon those 
beneath them; those beneath, in turn, are expected to look up to those above 
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them.   Within  such  systems  status  accrues  to  where  you  stand  within  the 
hierarchy. These tree like structures, in turn, aspire to territorialise the lives of 
those they control; subjecting them to the logic of enclosure, subjugating them 
as they do so.   Through them flows of  information,  money,  power seep but 
always vertically; everything here is organised, everything in its right place.
Western  thought  and  science  is  also  tree  like.   The  modern  idea  of 
knowledge having an Archimedean founding point  is  a  case in  kind,  as  are 
various  attempts  to  develop  ‘trees  of  knowledge’.   Western  science  is 
paradigmatically arborescent and nowhere is this better exemplified than in the 
quest for certainty and Being expressed in western philosophy. So to are the 
natural  sciences  such  as  chemistry  and  biology.   Social  science  is  as  well 
including, we might add, criminology (but to this we will also return).
Rhizomatics
But plant systems exist which are not arborescent; and the plant life that 
they produce evolves in very different ways (and directions) to that of the tree. 
The alternative Deleuze presents us with is the rhizome. The grass that covers 
our lawns is a rhizome, ginger is a rhizome and so too are many of the invasive 
plants  we  classify  as  weeds.  Unlike  the  tree,  which  is  essentially,  a  vertical 
structure, the rhizome develops horizontally.  The term derives from the ancient 
Greek ‘rhizoma’ where it means ‘mass of roots’.  These strike away from nodes 
in horizontal stems that also produce a profusion of offshoots that penetrate to 
the  surface.   These  offshoots  follow no  predictable  direction  or  pattern  and 
constitute elaborate subterranean (and sometime service) assemblages that may 
extend over large areas. Unlike trees a rhizome may be cut into pieces and each 
piece will form a new plant (vegetative reproduction) and this is often how they 
are propagated. Like the tree, the rhizome, constitutes both a sign and a signifier 
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that can be deployed metaphorically to designate an array of human and non-
human  systems.   Read  as  a  metaphor  Deleuze  uses  the  idea  of  rhizomatic 
structures as a vehicle to describe a set of organisational processes and practices 
that stand in opposition to and depart radically from those he associates with 
arborescent structures.  Nomadic life in its entirety is rhizomatic but so too are 
many other life forms: 
…Bulbs and tubers are rhizomes, plants with roots or radicals may be 
rhizomatic in other respects altogether: the question is whether plant life 
within its specificity is not entirely rhizomatic.  Even some animals are in 
their  pack  form.   Rats  are  rhizomes.  Burrows  are  too,  in  all  of  their 
functions  of  shelter,  supply,  movement,  evasion  and  breakout.   The 
rhizome assumes very different forms, from ramified surface extension in 
all directions to concreation in bulbs and tubers.  When rats swarm over 
each other.   The rhizome includes the best  and the worst:  potato and 
couch grass, or the weed. (Deleuze and Guattari, 1988:6)
Unlike trees, rhizomes have no clearly defined symmetrical structure
‘The  rhizome  is  an  acentered,  non-hierarchical,  nonsignifying  system 
without  a  General  and  without  an  organising  memory  or  central 
automaton,  defined  solely  by  a  circulation  of  states’  (Deleuze  and 
Guattari, 1988:21).
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!Diagram 1: Rhizome
Unlike trees whose roots and branches evolve from and reach back to a 
common trunk (a classifying centre) in the rhizome each node can potentially 
connect  to  any  other.   Rhizomes  then  are  not  centred  but  de-centred  and 
distributed.  If the tree represents a command structure that is vertically aligned 
and orchestrated  from the  top  down,  the  rhizome epitomises  a  horizontally 
inclined, radically non-hierarchical system whose elements come together and 
intersect in different and unpredictable ways.  
Whereas arborescent structures function by acts of territorialisation the 
rhizome is characterised simultaneously by forces of de-territorialisation and re-
territorialisation. The metaphor Deleuze evokes is that of a map.  But this is not 
the  kind  of  map  most  of  us  are  used  to,  which  designates  clearly  and 
uncompromisingly where everything is in space.   On the contrary this is a map 
that 
‘must  be  produced,  constructed,  a  map  that  is  always  detachable, 
connectable, reversible, modifiable, and has multiple entryways and exits 
and its own lines of flight’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 1988).
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Nor is it  accurate to say that in opposition to the tree the rhizome is simply 
disorganised because that would be to misrepresent its nature.  Rhizomes are 
structured but their structure
…is  composed not  of  units  but  of  dimensions,  or  rather  directions  in 
motion. It has neither beginning nor end, but always a middle (milieu) 
from which it grows and which it overspills .  [….] When a multiplicity of 
this  kind changes dimension,  it  necessarily changes in nature as well, 
undergoes a metamorphosis. (Deleuze and Guattari, 1988:21).
Rhizomes are composed of two elements: domains  and the linkages  that 
connect  them.   These  domains  Deleuze  terms  ‘plateaus’.   The  defining 
characteristic of a plateau is that it is ‘always in the middle not at the beginning 
or  the  end’.    It  constitutes  itself  as  ‘a  continuous  self-vibrating  region  of 
intensities;  a  multiplicity’.   These  plateaus  are  in  turn  ‘connected  to  other 
multiplicities by superficial  underground stems in such a way as to form or 
extend the rhizome (Deleuze and Guattari 1988)’. A rhizome then is composed 
of  one  or  more  of  these  plateaus  and  these  ‘multiplicities’  are  themselves 
connected to others.  What connects together though may be no means be read 
as like for like because what is linked ‘are not necessarily linked to traits of the 
same nature’.   Indeed for Deleuze each connection may evoke very different 
regimes:
What is at question in the rhizome is a relation to sexuality—but also to 
the animal, the vegetal, the world, politics, the book, things natural and 
artificial—that  is  totally  different  from  the  arborescent  relation:  all 
manner of “becomings (Deleuze and Guattari, 1988).”
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And it is in this term ‘becomings’ that we find here another key distinction with 
arborescent ways of thinking.  Whereas in arboreal thought things are held to 
have necessary states of being, fixed essences that define the whole, or a state of 
being to which they gravitate, there is no such determinate destiny to rhizomic 
life.  It develops but not like a book with a beginning, middle and end, but as 
immanent  arrivals  in  a  world  where  there  is  no  predictable  pattern  or 
destination, no fixed or final state to which there is a return but simply to new 
becomings without end. 
‘It  is  a  question  of  a  model  that  is  perpetually  in  construction  or 
collapsing: and of a process that is perpetually prolonging itself, breaking 
off and starting up again’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1988). 
In attempting to delineate the two systems Deleuze is not attempting to suggest 
that we are looking at a stark binary.  Western societies might well be defined by 
their  arboreal  tendencies  but  the  composition  of  the  social  world  is 
fundamentally rhizomatic as indeed is the polity taken as a whole.  Even in the 
most rooted system, rhizomatic tendencies can be found; offshoots breakout and 
away, extending themselves in strange and unforeseen ways. And even if the 
arborescent  state  seeks  to  arrest,  expel  or  repress  rhizomatic  elements,  they 
nevertheless persist: 
‘the flow continues beneath the line, forever mutant’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 1988). 
None of this implies that arboreal features may not also form in systems that are 
rhizomatic,  or  that  rhizomatic  structures  may  begin  to  accumulate  arboreal 
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features; hierarchies may develop, despotic tendencies may evolve.  A general 
steps forward. But… and this is the point, such tendencies do not define the 
rhizome or translate it into an arboreal formation. Rhizomes cannot be grasped 
in  thought  from  within  arboreal  thought  systems  even  though,  as  Deleuze 
wryly observes: 
‘History is always written from the sedentary point of view and in the 
name of a unitary State apparatus, at least a possible one, even when the 
topic is nomads’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 1988: 23).  
Which also explains why, even when the subject of history is the nomad, 
the  nomad discovered or  narrated invariably  comes  to  appear  arboreal  (but 
more on this soon).  Why is this? Ultimately, it’s about the ontological categories 
at play in arborescent thought and the conceptual lens through which the world 
is comprehended that results from this way of seeing.  Within the sedentary 
point of view things are always seen from the top down (or from the bottom 
up); looking with arborescent eyes is always to gaze in a way that reduces the 
world  to  simple  linear  patterns  (beginnings,  middles  and  ends),  closed 
narratives, bodies with organs (functional bureaucracies, cybernetic command 
structures). 
To grasp the rhizome you have to engage instead with what  Deleuze 
terms  ‘nomadic  thought’.  You  need  to  think  like  grass?   Deleuze  has  some 
suggestions: 
Never send down roots, or plant them, however difficult it  may be to 
avoid reverting to the old procedures. “Those things which occur to me, 
occur to me not from the root up but rather only from somewhere about 
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their  middle.  Let  someone  then  attempt  to  seize  them,  let  someone 
attempt to seize a blade of grass and hold fast to it when it begins to 
grow only from the middle.” Why is this so difficult? The question is 
directly  one of  perceptual  semiotics.  It’s  not  easy to  see  things in  the 
middle, rather than looking down on them from above or up at them 
from below, or from left to right or right to left (Deleuze and Guattari, 
1988: 23)
Back to the Street
Thinking from the  middle,  that  is  precisely  what  we need to  do,  but 
before we consider how we do so, we need to return to the object of this enquiry 
and that is the world of the street and the informal organisations that populate 
it.  I  have  already  put  down  enough  signposts  such  that  the  following 
proposition can hardly come as a surprise:  Street  life  and street  organisation,  I 
contend, if not in its entirety, is predominantly of the rhizomatic form.  It is, as such, 
nomadic through and through. I will, of course, need to demonstrate why, but, 
for now, let’s consider the wider implications of this proposition before I do so.  
In arguing that the informal world of the street is rhizomatic I mean to 
claim that it possesses nomadic traits that are wholly distinct from and which 
are irreducible too that  of  the formal properties  of  formal organisations that 
constitute  and define the arboreal  state  and its  constituent  apparatus.   I  am 
claiming, in other words, that the world of formal bureaucracies and those that 
pertain to the world of the informal organisations of the street belong to two 
different modes of social organisation.  Each, I contend has a sui-generic logic, 
which means we need a different kind of sociology to interpret each.
Let me go further.  To understand the sociology of formal institutions we 
need a sociology capable of understanding the features of arboreal systems in a 
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way that reflects their own distinctive mode of organisation.  Whose categories 
express and accurately how their distinctive features can be rendered concrete 
in thought.  At the same time, however, we need to recognise that we need a 
very different sociology if we are to comprehend the world of organisations that 
are not arboreal but rhizomatic and nomadic.  To grasp the reality of informal 
organisations as concrete in thought we need in other words a nomodology.  
Given Western thought is in nature and substance shaped by arboreal 
categories and arboreal  thought more generally,  it  is  by no surprise that  the 
sociology of formal organisations is already well developed.  To find it we need 
look no further that Max Weber and his study of modern Bureaucracy (Weber, 
Gerth et al., 2009).  Unsurprisingly, perhaps, the Enlightenment underpinnings 
of this sociology of the sedentary society have also established the sociological 
foundations  around  positivistic  criminology  is  erected.   Contemporary 
academic gang talk, I would contend, simply accepts these arboreal categories 
and unthinkingly applies them to the study of street organisations and, why 
not, because for arborialists everywhere tree thinking is the only game in town. 
All of which is just fine, if only those pesky street organisations were arboreal. 
Only they are not and this is where it all goes so horribly wrong.  From this 
comes ‘gang talk’ and the ludicrous categories in which it trades: the gang as a 
bureaucracy, the gang as rational actor, the gang as corporate, the gang as Being 
and Essence. 
If the world of the street is rhizomatic then it must follow that we cannot 
or should not seek to interpret it from within this sedentary point of view.  Why 
is this? Sanity demands it.  Because, self-evidently, if the subject here is nomadic 
life, then we need a rhizomatic frame of reference to comprehend it. The trouble 
with gang talkers however is that they cannot comprehend this.  They cannot 
because they have trees growing inside their heads and this leads them to find 
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trees everywhere even when the real subject of their gaze is grass. Sedentary 
thinking unfortunately possesses them like a devil.  And this is why they do not 
see rhizomes even when they are staring at them. John Pitts, a tree thinker par 
excellence, to his credit did his best, he at least tried to comprehend the rhizome 
but failed miserably and reverted to type (Pitts 2008). But then he has always 
worshiped  at  the  church  of  latter  day  arborealism,  so  why  should  we  be 
surprised. 
But let’s be honest, such tendencies infect academia and all gang talk. But 
what  the  hell,  let’s  be  magnanimous.   I  don’t  want  to  blame anyone.   The 
Pittite’s are, after all, products of sedentary regimes.  They come from sedentary 
orders; they inhabit sedentary organisations; they think sedentary thoughts and 
behave according to type.  How can we ever be surprised when they do.  And 
this is why they see the streets from a vertical perspective and corporatise them 
ruthlessly. 
But this is also the gaze of power and this is why, in a very real sense, and 
despite their pretensions to be Progressive Thinkers and for some ‘Left Realists’, 
gang talkers are in fact consummate fantasists.  And that is why, far from being 
on the side of the good people, they invariably occupy the space of the control 
imaginary. 
So how then do we read the street rhizomatically?  There are many ways 
to approach this question.  But let’s not be too obvious here, working, as they 
say, from the top down.  Let’s begin in middle somewhere by demonstrating 
what the street is not.  A mind fuck, after all,  has to begin somewhere. That 
whatever  it  is,  the  street  cannot  be  grasped in  a  sedentary  way despite  the 
presence  of  arboreal  features  that  sometimes  appear  within  it.  I  will  then 
consider,  more  closely,  the  conceptual  categories  by  and  through  which  we 
might begin to represent gang life and gangness.  By drawing upon the work of 
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critical  ethnographers,  who  I  will  contend,  are  intuitively  nomadic  thinkers 
(whatever  else  they  think  they  are),  ways  of  comprehending  gangs  can  be 
derived  that  stand  wholly  opposed  to  and  distinct  from  the  sad  dismal 
categories of arboreal gang talk.  I conclude, by way of fun, by suggesting ways 
in which nomadic thought and thinking can and have been applied to explain 
how gangs evolve and develop.
Reading the Street as rhizome
Inherent  to  arboreal  gang talking  traditions  is  the  assumption  that  informal 
groups  like  gangs  are  organised,  where  the  organisational  form  they  aspire 
toward, mirrors that of formal organisations.  Given this, gang talkers approach 
the gang with of the assumption that you can use the descriptive categories of 
formal  organisations to  make sense of  them.  This  essentualising tendency is 
then  reflected  in  the  traits  they  subsequently  ‘discover’  in  the  gangs  they 
research.  Gangs thus have:
• Clear determinate boundaries. These distinguish the inside of the gang 
from the outside and hence allow issues like membership to be clearly 
distinguished by positivist science and not least enforcement agencies.  
• A division of labour.  In this corporate vision of the gang, members are 
allocated into distinctive offices which perform clear  functions for  the 
reproduction of the whole. 
• A vertical command structure.  In this power moves downward from the 
leader through various cadres of lieutenants to street soldiers whose lives 
the gang leaders control. 
• Bureaucratic procedures.  They engage in ‘grooming exercises’ vas part of 
their ‘recruitment strategies’. 
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• They ‘organise’ and control crime
But  as  we shall  now establish  the  properties  of  formal  organisations  cannot 
unproblematically be applied to the street world of gangs even if some gangs 
want to appropriate them. But to get to this we need to return to Weber.
For Weber modern bureaucracies, at least in their distinctively modern 
form, constitute hierarchical, centralised, command structures (Weber, Gerth et 
al.,  2009).  Within  bureaucracies  power  always  moves  from  the  top  down 
through  a  system  dominated  by  leaders  who  administer,  through  various 
subordinate  levels  beneath  them.   When  people  enter  bureaucracies  as 
employees they inhabit pre-established offices where their duties are carefully 
delineated by formal rules they are expected to abide by, where rules are made 
and applied impersonally. Positions within the organisation are obtained on the 
basis  of  technical  merit  such  as  qualifications;  and  promotion  occurs  by 
seniority.   As Bauman, observes, the modern bureaucracy is a rational problem 
solving machine (Bauman, 1989).   Whilst they often exhibit a range of perverse 
traits  (not  least  being  their  awesome  capacity  to  grow  and  reproduce 
themselves), for Weber they are nevertheless the most effective tools humanity 
has developed for realising the various ends society establishes for itself be this 
finding cures for a disease, or developing the means to destroy other humans. 
While not denying that gangs may aspire towards various bureaucratic features, 
as  we  shall  now  establish,  whatever  street  organisations  are,  they  are  not 
corporate nor can they ever be fully corporatised.  They cannot, simply because, 
as we also establish, the street world is by nature a rhizome.
While  it  is  evident  that  gangs  have  structures  and large  gangs  many 
arboreal features, it could be observed that in practice trying to create a rational 
bureaucracy out of an informal street organisation is rather difficult even if there 
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is a will to create one.  Let’s begin at the beginning.  People by and large enter 
bureaucracies that pre-exist  their employment in them.  These are located in 
dedicated premises such as a factory or a set of offices.  Cadres of administrators 
work to ensure that everything works; specialists are employed to realise the 
specific ends to which the organisation is  geared (such as making things,  or 
providing services) and these work to regimes presided over my managers who 
are specialists in management.  
Much as functionalist orientated gang talkers like to fantasise that all of 
this holds true of gangs read as criminal corporations, in reality, none of this 
holds true. Gangs it is true might well fall back on established rituals, in order to 
reproduce themselves, but their structures are always emergent and have to be 
created and maintained in a habitas largely devoid of the supportive features 
corporations simply take for granted.  More than this, they have to create their 
structures on an on-going accomplishment and in the face of  opposition not 
only posed by other gangs (many of whom will not even accept that they are a 
‘real gang’) but by enforcement agencies who conspire at their destruction. Most 
gangs do not own property; they do not own extensive offices; they are literally 
urban nomads who inhabit the street are often distributed across them which 
creates its own set of problems.  
While evidence suggests that more successful criminals are those who are 
well  networked and possess key criminal  skills  (Hallsworth and Silverstone, 
2009),  It  is  also  worth  noting  that  the  raw material  out  of  which  a  gang is 
typically formed are not disciplined adults who eek out their 9-5 jobs with the 
comfortable expectation that they will receive regular wages in remuneration. 
Gangs are populated instead by young people, many immature, some with long 
established histories of violent victimisation behind them, and that’s only for 
starters.  As Jankowski observes, they are often strung out on an unhealthy diet 
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of fast food, not to say stronger, illegal intoxicants (Jankowski, 1991).  Nor in the 
subterranean world of the street do they live a regular 9-5 existence.  In a world 
where boredom is a regular feature and where the threat of violence is never far 
away,  simply  trying  to  impose  corporate  structure  on  a  gang  let  alone 
persuading  a  group  of  ‘defiant  individuals’  to  accept  such  discipline,  rules 
against the possibility of effecting a normal corporate structure.  Given most 
gang members typically drift into gang life and drift out after little more than 2 
years  (by  which  time  most  have  had  enough)  we  are  not  looking  at 
organisations  that  can  self-reproduce  easily  anyway  –  at  least  by  formal 
corporate means. 
If a key characteristic of formal organisations is the subjugation of their 
employees  to  informal  codes  of  conduct  applied impersonally,  this  does  not 
necessarily follow in informal street organisations beholden to the codes of the 
street.   Gangs are rarely if ever fully impersonal.  They cannot be because gangs 
inhabit  a  habitas  where  personal  and  kinship  relations  matter  and  where 
clientelism  is  the  primary  method  by  and  through  which  relations  are 
organised. If we accept, as indeed we must, the fact that violence is a valued 
currency in the streets, then it also follows that a capacity to demonstrate and 
harness  violence  may  well  be  the  qualities  that  leads  some  to  positions  of 
dominance in gang structures.  All well and good, only these are not necessarily 
the right qualifications you need if rational organisation is what you are after.
Indeed, far from being cold, impersonal organisations where objectives 
are  formally  established before  resources  are  rationally  distributed to  realise 
them,  gang  structures  are  radically  informal.   In  them the  personal  matters 
which means  personalities  matter  more  than formal  positions  held by those 
employed  to  them  on  the  basis  of  technical  merit.  Within  most  gangs,  the 
organisational  goals  are  less  pre-planned  but  situationally  determined  and 
!251
driven. Within gangs, the world is not predicable but radically contingent.  And 
whereas in formal organisations business imperatives are realised through the 
application of a cold impersonal instrumental rationality, this does not hold for 
the street life of gangs where personal and business imperatives often overlap 
and blur,  sometimes with tragic outcomes.  The code of the streets to which 
most  gang  members  subscribe,  it  could  be  noted,  is  not  a  regime  that  is 
necessarily well geared to creating stable functional organisations (Anderson, 
2000).
It could be observed that this wholly self-destructive aspect of gang life 
lies  at  the  heart  of  most  fictional  accounts  of  it.   Indeed,  it  is  precisely  this 
feature of the criminal underworld that provides the dramatic tension around 
which the plot of the average gangster book or movie is organised.  Pinky, in 
Graham Greens novel Brighton Rock (Greene, 1975) aspires to take the place of a 
recently  deceased  gang  leader  but  his  emotional  instability  negates  this,  as 
indeed does the opposition he faces from far more powerful gangsters around 
him.   Alex, in Anthony Burgesses Clockwork Orange (Burgess, 1962), feels he is an 
untouchable leader in the eyes of his gang of ‘droogs’.  After all, he provides 
them with a regular diet of ultra-violence, drugs and sex.  What more do they 
need or desire?  But they are experiencing relative deprivation and its getting 
them down.   They are  unhappy at  his  bullying style,  and not  least  the low 
rewards they feel they receive relative to the huge rewards they believe they 
deserve that other gangsters around them are getting.  Eventually they topple 
their leader and Alex’s time as a successful gangster terminates in prison. 
Scorsese’s  film  Goodfellas,  (based  upon  the  1986  book  Wiseguy  by 
Nicklos Pileggi (Peileggi, 1986)) is again a wonderful parable on the inherent 
instability  and banality  of  gangster  life.   Even as  the  group of  men around 
whom it is set become more established and successful criminals, irresolvable 
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problems ensue from the endemic contradictions inscribed within the criminal 
habitas  of  which they are  a  part.   From the very beginning the hero has to 
navigate through an environment saturated with the excesses perpetrated by 
men who are systematically violent and some dangerously psychotic.  By the 
time the movie ends, its hero has developed a drug habit, he is turning state 
evidence against his erstwhile colleagues and his closest friend has tried to kill 
him. 
Many real life examples can also be cited that express how gangsters and 
their gangs become self-defeating.  The career of the Kray Twins in London’s 
East ended after Ronnie Kray walked into a pub and shot Jack (the hat) Macvitie 
dead  in  broad  daylight.   Their  inflated  sense  of  omnipotence  led  them  to 
perpetrate acts of excess that exceeded any business logic.  And so the seeds 
were  sown that  created the  preconditions  for  their  self-destruction.    In  the 
words of the old maxim, ‘those who live by the a word tend to die by it’.  And 
this would certainly fit the context of a volatile street world of cities like London 
today where business imperatives and personal ones often intersect in troubled 
and messy ways as we shall see in the next chapter.  Where strong emotions run 
riot and where young gang affiliated men kill each other and often for the most 
pointless and stupid of reasons (Hallsworth and Silverstone, 2009).  
The point I am trying to make here is that gang life is inherently unstable 
and even despite achieving a degree of formality in relation to organisation, 
instability remains integral to the grammar of street life and street organisations. 
Arboreal  features  then,  while  a  feature  of  gang worlds,  do not  define street 
organisations which are by nature inherently rhizomatic.  Simply concentrating 
on  the  organisational  features,  creating  various  typologies  distinguishing 
between groups in relation to the degree of organisation they possess, I suggest, 
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is  to  miss  the  point.   The  street  is  an  impossible  space,  a  zone  of  radical 
indeterminacy.  
To return to Deleuze, whilst gangs may aspire to territorialise, both in the 
sense  of  seizing  space  and  creating  structures,  they  confront  and  from  the 
beginning powerful forces, externally and internally, that over-determine their 
capacity to do so.  They are, I would suggest, as much, if not more, subject to 
radical processes of deterritorialisation, and this is a feature that leaves them 
better characterised as rhizomatic. Gangs, are, as such, permanently unfinished 
affairs,  always  social  relations  in  movement,  always  over-spilling,  always 
intermezzo. They never simply assemble (as paranoiac gang task imagines the 
process) they disassemble and reassemble all the time, transforming themselves 
as they do, metamorphosing as they go. 
To be Bataillian for a moment, it could be argued that in part the problem 
with  arborescent  thought  is  that  it  constitutes  gangs  in  the  same  way  that 
economists think about energy systems more generally, that is, as systems that 
consume energy which they then translate into surpluses valorised productively 
into system reproduction and growth.  This, incidentally, is how most classical 
theories of economics function; take functionalist sociology, as an example,  also 
begins  with  this  premise,  namely,  that  the  social  system  operates  in  a  self-
rectifying state of  dynamic homeostasis  (Parsons,  1999).   Drawing on Mauss 
study of potlatch, read as a socially destructive mode of exchange (Mauss, 1967), 
Bataille argues instead that social systems invariably produce surpluses that are 
not  expanded functionally  into system reproduction and growth and which, 
consequently, are squandered unproductively and often catastrophically in the 
form of deficit expenditure (Bataille, 1988). This surplus, the ’accursed share’ as 
he termed it, is never incidental to the life of the system that produces it.  More 
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to the point, the way this surplus is expended can and does define the operation 
of the system as a whole far more so, in fact than its economic base.
Informal groups like gangs I would suggest can best be understood in 
Bataille’s terms as assemblages that are rarely legible by reference to arboreal 
thought systems which want to construct them as if they were fully functional, 
homeostatic entitles.  They do not and never can be reduced back to systems 
that simply valorise surpluses into system growth.  On the contrary they exist 
and from the beginning in an economy of excess and to get to this you need to 
think of them rhizomatically, as movements which invest in forms of glorious 
and  sometimes  terrifying  and  tragic  deficit  expenditure,  much  of  which  is 
anything but instrumental or rational.  And this, it seems to me, is precisely the 
strength of Jack Katz in his observations on street life as radically anti-utilitarian 
(Katz 1988) and excessive.  But there again, Katz is himself another intuitively 
rhizomatic thinker.   
Rhizomatic organisation
Consider the terms gang talkers use to designate gangs.  They have a 
division of labour, a pyramid structure, cybernetic control systems, they engage 
in ‘recruitment’  or ‘branding’ ‘strategies’,  they ‘organise’  and ‘control’  crime. 
Isn’t it simply so arboreal.  If, however, as we have tried to argue here, the street 
simply cannot be corporate (even if it tried), it follows that we need to jettison 
the  very  terminology such gang talk  trades  in.   What  we need instead is  a 
conceptual  universe  that  better  recognises  the  distinctiveness  of  informal 
organisations and which does so without committing the other cardinal error 
(again endemic to criminology) which, in opposition to corporate excess, reads 
the streets simply as ‘disorganised’.
!255
As we saw, when we studied the nature of the rhizome, it is not that they 
lack organisation, or indeed structure, it is only that the organisational features 
they display do not follow the predicable logic of arboreal systems.  To grasp the 
world  of  the  street  as  rhizomatic  we  need  a  language  that  recognises  the 
characteristic  features  of  street  organisations  in  ways  that  respect  their  sui 
generic nature.  To an extent, such an exercise does not entail trying to invent 
such a language from nothing.  Ethnographers, true to their craft, have already 
began the process.  So let’s start with them and work sideways from there.
We  can  begin  with  Thrasher  and  his  description  of  gangs  as  a  unit  that 
spontaneously forms. What a wonderfully and refreshing rhizomatic image this 
poses to arboreal gang talking traditions who talk instead of ‘recruitment' and 
‘grooming’.  Aldridge, Medina and their colleagues also get close to rhizomatic 
thinking in  their  designation of  gang life  as  ‘messy networks’(Aldridge  and 
Medina, 2005; Aldridge, Ralphs et al.,  2011); far and away an infinitely more 
accurate designation than found for example in John Pitts arboreal fantasy of a 
‘super articulated gang’(Pitts, 2008).  Other metaphors lend themselves, as an 
alternative  to  the  tired  categories  of  corporate  gang  speaking.  Are  they  not 
instead better read as imperceptible, spectacular, spontaneous, impulsive and 
situational. And far from being characterised by firm boundaries that delineate 
where the gang inside begins and ends, as arboreal thought reads the gang, we 
find  instead  porous,  fuzzy  borders  which,  far  from  ever  being  clearly 
delineated, are always invariably vague.  
Instead  of  possessing  a  clear  corporate  structure  the  gang  read  as 
rhizome instead presents itself as fluid state that is intrinsically amorphous.  It 
never ‘develops’ it always proceeds by way of ‘flows’ from one state of intensity 
to another.  It does not congregate it swarms, it does not march, it drifts and it in 
its drifting we discern it’s essential  nature as a nomadic life form.  Arboreal 
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thinking  wants  to  confer  on  the  gang  a  fixed  immutable  essence,  the  gang 
however read from within a rhizomatic frame of reference is better understood 
as a perpetual, always deferred accomplishment. 
Rather than read gangs as a command structure shaped in the image of a 
tree,  lets  capture  them  and  their  development  instead  rhizomatically  as 
ramifications, lateral offshoots; in a sense, a glorious species of weed. And the 
metaphor  fits.   Like  invasive  weeds  that  survive  in  the  most  hostile  of 
environments, gangs also flourish in the most hostile of terrains. And even if 
they are ripped up, as weeds often are, like weeds isn’t it simply amazing how 
resilient they are; how they reproduce themselves despite all attempts to destroy 
them.   
Some might find this all a little too abstract and obtuse? Is nomadic thought and 
thinking simply an inflated language without any meaningful use-value or; as 
Roger Matthews is fond of saying, ‘policy relevance’ (Matthews, 2005).  Let me 
now  concretise  some  of  these  terms  in  order  to  show  that  they  convey 
explanatory power. 
Let’s  begin  by  taking  issue  with  the  issue  of  clear  and  determinate 
borders that arboreal gang talk likes to impose around gangs.  Think here, for 
example, of the many attempts that are made to quantify gang membership and 
produce gang typologies by putting them into neat and tidy conceptual boxes. 
An entire industry has been established around this.  Think too of those lovely 
corporate  diagrams  of  the  gang  headed  by  generals  presiding  over  various 
subordinate layers in what invariably is presented as a pyramid.  
Contrast this instead with the world of the gang as it is described by the 
new generation of gang ethnographers such as Robert Garot (Garot, 2010) and 
Timothy Lauger  (Lauger, 2012).  Here gang boundaries are never clear-cut, just 
as gang membership is never fully established or confirmed.  In fact, in their 
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narratives,  nothing in the world of the gang is ever quite where it ought to be. 
What they present  us with instead are vague and ambiguous identities  in a 
world in which the inside and outside of the gang are never clearly defined; 
where gang reputations are contested both by outsiders and by gang members; 
where ones gang identify is  sometimes elevated but also and at  other times 
disavowed.   Far  from being fully  accomplished entities  as  arboreal  thinking 
constructs them, as Lauger’s work shows, it  is social accomplishment on the 
part  of  groups  who  have  to  struggle  hard  and  in  the  face  considerable 
scepticism, to demonstrate that they are, in fact the real thing, a bone fide gang 
(Lauger, 2012). 
And it is in the desperate attempt to demonstrate and reveal their true gangness 
that we find revealed another intrinsically rhizomatic feature of gang life and 
that is the inherent propensity of gang members to myth make.  Far from being 
the calculating advocates of instrumental rationality, as functionalist models of 
gang development imply, gang members inhabit instead a lifeworld in which 
their  fictional  representations  of  themselves  carry  as  much  significance  and, 
sometimes even more, than their embodied material selves (whatever they are). 
In corporations, of course, you know who is and who is not a member. 
Employment records tell you all you need to know.  In the world of the gang, 
however,  nothing  is  as  ever  as  clearly  delineated  and  established  in 
organisations where the borders between the inside and the outside are never 
exact.
This  inherent  vagueness  is  wonderfully  conveyed  by  Hagedorn  who 
presents us with a wonderful double take on the gangs of Illinois (Hagedorn 
and Macon, 1988).  He begins with the representation of the gang as fantasised 
by its  enforcement agencies.   He then provides an alternative representation 
derived  from  his  ethnographic  engagement  with  gang  members.   The 
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enforcement image reflects all the trademarks of gang talking tree thinking.  The 
gang as a pyramid composed of various offices. In Hagedorn’s representation 
we are faced instead with an entity composed of strange amorphous shapes 
with blurred boundaries;  where the linkages between levels appear anything 
but corporate.
Figure 2.  The military model of gang organisation and Hagedorn’s alternative
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Conquergood is another intuitively nomadic thinker.  Like Hagedorn he 
also recognises that there is no clear inside and outside to gang life which flows, 
he argues, through a multiplicity of borders.  If you look closely at gangs, he 
says  ‘it becomes evident that borders are constructed on multiple and mobile 
fronts’  He  is  nothing  but  emphatic:  ‘borders  absolutely  crisscross  the  entire 
domain of gang culture’ (Conguergood, 1994: 28).  These include the border that 
separates  the  group as  a  bonded ensemble  from the  wider  community  they 
aspire to distinguish themselves from; borders between the groups and other 
gangs with whom they are in conflict; borders between gang members and their 
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families  and  the  antagonistic  border  that  separates  the  group  from  the 
enforcement  agencies  who  conspire  at  their  destruction.  The  culture  of  the 
group as such does not emanate from the top down or from a clear centre out to 
a  periphery  in  the  manner  of  arboreal  organisation.   It  develops  at  these 
defining cleavages and processes in directions that are by no means linear and 
predictable.
In arboreal  texts  we find the gang represented as a  functional  agency 
with various post holders performing an array of functional tasks.  But is it ever 
like  this  in  really?   Is  the  gang ever  a  stable  functional  entity?   Considered 
rhizomatically,  they  are  simply  multiplicities  in  movement.   Consider  for 
example  how gangs  occupy  space.   Its  hangs  about  over  here  and  does  so 
seemingly  for  long  periods  of  time  during  which  little  happens.   Then 
something does, its state changes dramatically, it might suddenly grow, it might 
disappear,  then reappears,  splits,  disassembles and then seemingly magically 
reassembles elsewhere. And so we are back to the idea of the ever changing, 
always modifiable map that Deleuze equates with the rhizome. 
Wherever they are they are never quite where they are supposed to be. 
They exist  of  course,  but  not  on this  estate  but  that  one  over  there,  always 
displaced,  always  somewhere  else.   And  this  elusive  subterranean  quality 
reflects itself into street representations no more so brilliantly realised as when 
gang members are asked to narrate their gang realities which are never quite as 
clear cut as arboreal thinking likes to imagine. This is captured beautifully by 
the Norwegian anthropologist Moshmus (Moshmus, 2005) who comments on 
the trouble he had in getting his street informants in Oslo to comment on their 
gang reality:
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I had several talks with Aki, Vat and others involved in gangs in Oslo’s 
street worlds. These talks tended to reduce the gang phenomena to be 
about someone else. It was as if we talked about someone not present. 
When I  tried to talk to my informants about their  reality their  reality 
became someone else’s,  even to them. Talking to me they did not use 
their  own language to  speak about  themselves.  They did not  use  the 
language they lived their reality in; the language they would use when 
they were living their  gang reality.  My informants were skilled in the 
language of the controllers . . . but that was a language about them. It was 
not a language their experience lived in. (Moshmus, 2005: 204)
The idea that gangs occupy and totally control life in the ghettos and 
estates where they are found plays a prominent role in arborescent gang talk. 
The truth of matter is that like invasive weeds, gang develop and take root in 
the interstitial spaces of the sedentary state and it’s hard arboreal apparatus. It is 
not so much a process of seizing territory from the formal order, this is a gang 
talking myth.  In their subterranean world the everyday world of the wider 
society passes them by,  literally.   Their  primary source of  interest  is  in  each 
other. Yes, they settle but in the gaps and fissures. And once established, despite 
every attempt to uproot them, like invasive plants they persist and reproduce 
themselves.  And even when the state aspires at their very extermination and 
removes them from their natural environment, they reproduce in the heart of 
the  hard  machine;  exploiting  as  they  do  every  crack  and  crevice  in  the 
administered order.
The  recent  history  of  American gang development  and it’s  expansion 
globally  in  the  face  of  outright  attempts  on  the  part  of  the  state  to  wholly 
exterminate it, exemplifies this, the American gang rhizome.  We can trace the 
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story from the 1980s when the post war Fordist order began to fall apart leaving 
in its wake a de-industrialised urban environment populated by a new urban 
underclass (Wacquant, 2008).  The emerging ghetto, provided, as ghettos always 
have,  a  fertile  ground where urban street  gangs could take route and thrive 
(Thrasher, 1927).  Only where traditional gangs were traditionally short lived, in 
a  post-industrial,  de-industrialising  world  no  longer  capable  of  providing 
secure  employment  for  the  new burgeoning  precariat  (Standing,  2011),  they 
started  to  persist  for  far  longer  (Hagedorn  and  Macon,  1988).   ‘Multiple 
marginality’  as  Vigil  observes  provides  a  hothouse  environment  for  gang 
development  (Vigil  1988).  Nor  was  it  simply  a  matter  of  established  gangs 
simply  continuing.   In  the  manner  of  the  rhizome  they  subdivided  and 
subdivided again, throwing off new offshoots as they evolved, creating the basis 
for new cliques that would subsequently emerge in towns and cities that had 
never previously experienced themselves as having a ‘gang problem’. 
The response on the part of the state was simply to embark on a process 
of wholesale repression (Wacquant,  2004).   Far from destroying the gang the 
American  punitive  turn  created  the  preconditions  for  the  gang  rhizome  to 
mutate again.   As a direct consequence of the mass incarceration of thousands 
of gang members, like invasive weeds, the gangs took root and flourished in the 
prison system.  Through the penal estate the gangs further extended themselves 
throwing out new offshoots as they did, again sub-dividing as they evolved.  
In addition to the ‘deadly symbiosis’ the state was forcing between the 
penitentiary and the ghetto, the US state innovated further by embarking on a 
coercive programme that  entailed the wholesale deportation of  thousands of 
gang affiliated young people back to their country of ethnic origin (including 
many  who  had  been  born  in  the  USA)  (Parenti,  1999;  Brotherton  and 
Kretsedimas, 2008). Destination states would include the Dominican Republic, 
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and South American states like Ecuador.  Did this prevent gang formation? On 
the contrary, the gang rhizome simply throws out new offshoots that then took 
root in countries where previously they did not exist.  Nowhere has this been 
more evident than in Equator, where in the wake of deportation, gangs that had 
their point of origin in the US penal gulag such as the Nieta and Almighty Latin 
Kings and Queen Nation, took root and flourished. 
Nor does the story stop here.  Women from states like Ecuador moved to 
European states like Italy and Spain in the first decade of the twentieth century, 
to take low paid work in their service sector.  Eventually their children moved to 
join these economic migrants. Facing a hostile climate of racism, criminalisation 
and marginalisation, these young people brought their gangs with them.  And 
so the Almighty Latin Kings and Queens and groups the Nieta, founded in the 
USA, began to establish themselves in European cities such as Barcelona, Milan 
and Genoa.  And once again we are back to the rhizome, with its surface and 
subterranean ramifications. A rhizome that today is further extending itself and 
in the face of outright repression, and in what can be considered to be very 
hostile  environments.  ‘The  world  of  gangs’  (Hagadorn,  2008)  it  could  be 
observed, is a world constructed by the gang rhizome.
Conclusion
While cultural criminology has accomplished much in its celebration of 
ethnographic  research  methods  and  while  the  critical  ethnographers  they 
celebrate have provided key insights to our understanding of informal street 
organisations such as gangs, this tradition has not, as yet clearly formulated the 
epistemological and ontological break their work necessarily implies with more 
orthodox gang talking traditions.  In this chapter, by drawing upon the work of 
Deleuze and Guattari  my aim has been to suggest that by reinterpreting the 
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study of informal organisations within a rhizomatic frame of reference, not only 
can the sui-generic properties of informal street worlds be captured in ways that 
better reflect their intrinsically nomadic status, such nomadic thought takes us 
decisively beyond the arboreal fixations of conventional gang talk.   
At the same time, I have also tried to show precisely why conventional 
gang talk fails.   Despite the fact  that  its  subject  is  nomadic life  it  invariably 
approaches it within an arboreal perspective.  While such an approach might be 
relevant to the study of formal arboreal organisations, this desiccated sociology 
is not relevant to the study of street worlds that are ontologically very different.  
Other  policy  prescriptions  follow  from  this  and  criminologists  and 
sociologists of the street need to bear them in mind.  Be aware of the trees that 
grow  in  our  heads,  for  once  they  grow,  all  you  will  ever  find  are  trees 
everywhere when really the object of your study is grass.  To think like grass, 
avoid then reverting to the old procedures.  So don’t study things from the top 
down, resist the general in you.  Think from the middle and proceed sideways 
from there and see the world a better way. 
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Understanding Street Collectives
Simon Hallsworth and Kim Duffy; 
Abridged from a  report for London Councils ‘Confronting London’s violent street 
world: the gang and beyond’ 2011 
Introduction
Over  the  last  decade  a  new  ‘folk  devil’  has  come  to  prominence  in  British 
society. This, the urban street gang is believed by many to be the instigator of 
the most serious violence in the UK today. The threats allegedly posed by this 
group range from public fears of young people ‘hanging around’ to stories of 
‘gang rape’,  violent  territorialism, gun and knife related violence,  the use of 
‘weapon  dogs’  and  the  importation  and  distribution  of  illegal  drugs. 
Cumulatively  the  impression  promoted  by  the  media,  politicians  and  many 
enforcement agencies, is that structured organised gangs are more prominent 
today and the offences in which they engage have become more serious.
Drawing  upon  recent  and  relevant  research  this  report  explores  the 
‘gang’ situation as it pertains to London. While the report identifies gangs and 
gang violence as a real threat, the report is nevertheless critical of the way the 
term ‘gang’ is often used and is particularly critical about attempts to conflate 
into terms like ‘the gang’ and ‘gang culture’ diverse social problems that need to 
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be addressed in their own right. Whilst confronting gangs remains an important 
issue, the report argues for an approach which locates intervention effort within 
a  wider  appreciation of  the violent  street  periphery where gangs are  found. 
Gangs are certainly part of this world but other groups and criminally involved 
individuals  inhabit  this  world  as  well.  These,  the  report  argues,  need to  be 
understood  in  their  own  right  and  as  they  intersect  together.  If  the  aim  of 
intervention  effort  is  to  prevent  such  violence  then  effort  must  address  this 
totality in a measured and proportionate way and not focus on one part of it at 
the expense of the whole.
Structure
The report begins by briefly profiling the evidential base on which this 
review is conducted; it then examines some recurrent problems in the way the 
term ‘gang’ has been popularly used and abused by examining gang myths and 
stereotypes.  A framework  for  defining  gangs  and  differentiating  these  from 
other  groups  that  have  some  involvement  in  crime  and  violence  is  then 
developed. This involves distinguishing gangs from delinquent peer groups and 
both of these groups from more organised crime groups. The following section 
examines the extent to which serious violence involving the use of weapons in 
London can be attributed to gangs. As this section shows, gangs are violent by 
nature and weapons can be used in certain contexts which the report identifies. 
As this section makes clear, other groups, including volatile individuals who are 
not  in  gangs,  are  also  responsible  for  much  of  the  violence  that  is  being 
attributed to the gang, while some problems being attributed to the gang turn 
out, on inspection, not to be gang related. 
The  second  section  draws  the  implications  of  this  analysis  together 
arguing  for  an  approach  to  serious  violence  which  looks  beyond  the  gang. 
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Rather than privilege a particular group as the object of intervention, the report 
argues instead that intervention effort needs to be directed at the spaces where 
gangs and other groups are located; this constitutes the volatile periphery of a 
violent  street  world.  A  framework  for  understanding  this  world  is  then 
developed. 
The report concludes by examining the principles that should inform the 
intervention effort directed to address the violence of the street periphery and 
profiles a range of interventions that can be mobilised to confront the different 
risks and dangers peer groups and gangs types of group pose. 
Methodology
This  report  brings  together  relevant  and  current  research  that  has  been 
conducted into gangs and other criminal groups in London over the course of 
the last decade. Substantively, the report draws upon four sources of data. First, 
this report reflects on findings of primary research that the author, along with 
colleagues from the Centre for Social and Evaluation Research, have conducted 
into issues connected with gangs and other  criminal  groups .  Secondly,  this 21
report makes reference to relevant research that has been conducted into the 
contemporary gang situation in the United Kingdom. Thirdly, this report draws 
 This  includes  research  conducted  for  the  Metropolitan  Police  Service,  the 21
European Union,  the Home Office,  Youth Justice Board and various London 
boroughs, including Hackney, Brent, Ealing and Enfield. The evidential base for 
this  research has  involved extensive  interviews with gang affiliated and no- 
gang  affiliated  young  people  with  older  ‘gangsters’  and  with  a  range  of 
practitioners  who  have  some  involvement  with  or  expertise  in  relation  to 
criminal groups and weapon use.
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upon a wide body of literature relating to gangs, including a range of academic 
articles  and  books.  Fourthly,  this  report  utilises  findings  from  interviews 
conducted for the purposes of this project with a range of professionals and 
practitioners working with young people in London.
Gang Myths and Stereotypes
To understand fully the ‘gangland’ situation in London it is necessary to 
be able to distinguish fact from fiction and evidence from assumptions. This is 
not always easy in a society where many stereotypes about gangs enjoy wide 
circulation and where the language used to describe them often dispenses with 
proportion in favour of an inflated rhetoric. One way to accomplish this task is 
to consider some of the problems that follow from deploying the term ‘gang’ in 
ways that lack rigour but which are widely used. Another will be to consider 
some of the stereotypes that have evolved around the gang. 
Let us begin with bad definitions.  The most popular but least  helpful 
way of understanding the term ‘gang’ is as a blanket label applied to define any 
group that is felt to cause trouble to somebody. This is the way in which the 
media typically operate and this mode of classifying gangs is also widespread 
among  the  public  at  large.  The  term ‘gang,’  applied  this  way,  constitutes  a 
universal  shorthand  to  denote  a  troublesome  group.  While  popular,  this 
approach  is  neither  satisfactory  nor  useful.  Street  organisations  vary 
significantly  and mobilising the  blanket  label  ‘gang’  to  encapsulate  them all 
submerges important differences that need to be recognised. A group of eleven 
year old lads ‘hanging around’, for example, is very different from an armed, 
territorially affiliated group of eighteen year olds looking for trouble; and this 
differs in turn from a group of adult criminals planning a heist. Calling all these 
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groups ‘gangs’ is not helpful and works against producing a definition fit for 
purpose. 
If we consider further the mythology that surrounds the gang then this 
often  derives  less  from  the  dangers  posed  by  the  gang  and  more  from 
stereotypical  images  that  people  hold  which  are  then  projected  upon  them. 
Though a perennial problem of inner urban life, the gang today is imagined as 
essentially  new  and  this  is  accompanied  by  the  perception  that  gangs  are 
proliferating.  This view is  often accompanied by the notion that  the gang is 
moving from a state of disorganisation to one of progressive organisation. It 
may, for example, be claiming new territory which its members then coercively 
control or be expanding its membership base by ‘grooming’ or ‘recruiting’ new 
members who are then brutally exploited. Rather than understand the gang for 
what it often is, a disorganised street group, many impose upon the gang an 
organisational  form  and  command  structure  few  ‘gangs’  in  fact  possess.  In 
effect, the gang and the street world it inhabits becomes corporatised: invested, 
that  is,  with  a  complex  division  of  labour  and  a  command  structure  that 
resembles that of a corporation or an army . While gangs often have a diverse 22
membership,  they  are  typically  identified  in  the  public  mind  with  minority 
ethnic groups. 
While gangs certainly exist, it is often the case that their actuality and 
prevalence is exaggerated and in many cases the perceived presence of a gang 
occurs because people elect to define a group as such. As we found in the course 
of  conducting  interviews  with  young  people2  (many  of  whom  had  been 
 This tendency is not new, the same occurred in relation to the American Mafia 22
which was fantasised as  a  mirror  image of  the American corporation in  the 
1960s. See Cressey (Cressey, 1969). 
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classified as ‘gang affiliated’ by practitioners) most did not define themselves as 
gang members. It  is also worth noting that the language practitioners use to 
describe what gangs are and what they do (they ‘groom’ and ‘recruit’, they have 
members with names like ‘wanabees’) reflects the language of control, not the 
gangland realities in which these young people live out their day-to-day lives. 
The point here is that the language used by practitioners to represent gang life 
and the way it is experienced by those who live ‘gang’ lives are sometimes two 
very different things. 
The lesson to derive from this section is that if we want to talk about 
gangs we need to do so appropriately and accurately. In practice this means not 
falling into the pitfalls of ‘gang talk’ outlined above4. It means knowing how to 
distinguish stereotypes and myths from an often very different, street reality. It 
means maintaining a sense of proportion in a context where this is not evident 
and recognising that effective policy must be evidence-based.
Defining Gangs and Other Street Organisations
The  extensive  American  gang  research  literature  shows  that  gangs  possess 
many different features . They are typically durable; they may have a leader 23
and some division of labour within them. They often have a name by which 
they know themselves and by which they are known by others. Many lay claim 
to  a  territory  which  they  attempt  to  control.  Their  members  may  adopt 
particular  stylistic  features that  distinguish them from other groups,  such as 
wearing colours. Gang members may develop a subculture which has its own 
language and which is defined by the performance of specific rituals. Finally, the 
 See Hagedorn J. and Macon P. (1988); Klein M. W. (1995); Decker S.H. and Van 23
Winkle B. (1996); Huff C.R. (1996).
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life of the group may also involve engaging in violence and crime of various 
descriptions. 
This begs the question as to which of these factors constitute the basic 
building block out of which we might want to construct a definition of the gang 
as it is found in the London context. The answer to this question is that we need 
to highlight core factors. Given the fact that the gang is not the only type of 
group in London that is responsible for committing crime and violence, it is not 
enough to profile  the gang alone.  This  also needs to  be accompanied by an 
analysis of other street and criminally inclined groups as well. In what follows, 
three kinds of collective which have some engagement in crime and violence are 
identified . These can be termed respectively the ‘peer group’, the ‘gang’ and 24
the ‘organised crime group’. Each borough is likely to have variants of each of 
these groups, though the most violent and dangerous will typically be found in 
the poorer boroughs. 
The Delinquent Peer Group
The delinquent peer group is composed of friends and associates who are known 
to  each  other  because  they  share  the  same space  (school  or  neighbourhood) 
along with a common history and biography (they have grown up together and 
have shared the same experiences).  Delinquency and criminal activity is  not 
integral to the identity or practice of the peer group or its members but can 
occur in given contexts in some peer groups, specifically in public spaces where 
they are most visible. 
 This definitional framework was originally developed for the Metropolitan 24
Police Service. See Hallsworth S. and Young T. (2005).
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The  peer  group is  the  most  pervasive  form of  social  group found in 
European  societies.  Peer  groups  exist  among all  socio-economic  groups  and 
both young people and old, male and female, will find themselves members of 
one or  more  of  them.  Most  peer  groups have no involvement  in  crime and 
violence  and  people  do  not  belong  to  them  for  this  purpose.  Through 
involvement in peer groups people live out their lives as social beings. In them 
they find comradeship,  they pass  the time of  day,  seek mutual  support  and 
avoid feeling isolated and alone.  For  the most  part  people  do not  join such 
groups, they spontaneously form.
While  generally  benevolent,  some  peer  groups  (particularly  those 
populated  by  young  people)  may  find  themselves  engaged  in  anti-social 
behaviour  and sometimes violence.  In  the  British  situation this  may involve 
binge drinking, fighting, smoking, and low level drug use. Street robbery is also 
predominantly perpetrated by such groups and this is most likely to occur in 
poor inner city areas. Some groups may also become involved in fights with 
others and, because many also wear a ‘street uniform’ and have a pronounced 
public visibility, they regularly induce fear into adults who often imagine they 
are gangs. These are not gangs however nor should they be labelled as such 
because crime and violence is not integral to group identity as it is in the case of 
a gang. Members of peer groups may drift intermittently into some anti-social 
behaviour and crime but most of those who do will also drift out of it as they 
complete their transition from childhood to adulthood. While most peer group 
engagement with anti-social behaviour is trivial and episodic, peer groups can 
be volatile and such behaviour can escalate to that which is risky and harmful. It 
is when this occurs on an ongoing basis that the peer group can become a gang.
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The Gang 
The gang can be  defined as a  relatively durable,  predominantly street-based 
group  of  people  who  see  themselves  (and  are  recognised  by  others)  as  a 
discernible group for whom crime and violence is intrinsic to the identity and 
practice of the group. 
The minimal characteristic features of the gang are that it has: a) a name; 
b)  a  propensity  to  inflict  violence  and engage  in  crime and c)  violence  and 
delinquency  perform  a  functional  role  in  promoting  group  identity  and 
solidarity. While the presence of an organisational structure, a defined leader, 
group rituals and a definable territory claimed by the groups as its own are also 
characteristic  features  of  some  gangs,  these  are  supplementary  features  not 
essential defining characteristics of all gangs. Whilst the organisation, ethos and 
structure of the gang differ from that of peer groups, the gang is a derivative 
and mutation of it.
Though there are examples of  girl  gangs in the USA such groups are 
relatively  rare  and  gangs  are  predominantly  male  dominated  groups  with 
which women are associated. In the UK there are very few female gangs though 
female peer groups are often being mistaken for them. The age range for gang 
membership lies between early teens and the early twenties. Ethnically, the gang 
is likely to reflect the ethnic demographic of the estates where it is found; in this 
sense  it  is  not  confined  to  one  particular  ethnic  group.  In  London,  where 
minority  ethnic  groups  are  over-represented  in  many  of  London’s  poorest 
boroughs, the gang structure typically reflects this demographic.
As John Pitts observes, it is in areas subject to concentrated disadvantage 
that  gangs  are  typically  found .  These  are  areas  where  long term structural 25
 See Pitts J. (2008).25
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unemployment is high as are other indices of deprivation like poor housing, 
rates of poverty and benefit claimants. While most young people from deprived 
backgrounds do not join gangs and aspire to enter the formal labour market by 
obtaining qualifications, not all succeed. For those who are not bequeathed good 
opportunities in life engaging in the illegal economy may provide an alternative 
means by which socially desirable goods can be obtained. Gangs also  provide 
spaces where structurally powerless men may accumulate a reputation and by 
so doing achieve status in a social world where they otherwise find little. 
According to the few UK surveys that have been undertaken to establish 
gang prevalence within the population,  the number of people who meet the 
academic  criteria  for  being defined as  a  gang member  is  relatively  low and 
usually comprises between 3-6% of the sample group. These kinds of survey are 
often conducted on high risk groups in high crime areas and tend to overstate 
the degree of membership in the wider population . 26
Like the peer group, gang members come together because they typically 
share  a  common  history  and  biography  and  because  they  live  in  the  same 
neighbourhood  or  estate.  Some  people  may  ‘join’  a  gang,  but  most  will 
spontaneously form in the same manner as a peer group. Like the peer group 
the  gang  also  acts  as  a  space  where  excitement  may  be  generated  and  the 
mundane  boredom  of  everyday  life  temporarily  transcended.  Like  the  peer 
group the  gang offers  its  members  the  security  of  belonging,  a  place  where 
friendships  are  established  and  where  reputations  can  be  made  and  tested. 
 See Bennet T. and Holloway K. (2004). ‘Gang Membership, drugs and crime in 26
the UK’.  British Journal of Criminology 44(3):  305-323;  Sharpe P.  et  al  (2006). 
‘Delinquent  Youth  Groups  and  Offending  Behavior:  Findings  from  the  2004 
Offending Crime and Justice Survey’. Home Office.
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Indeed,  for  most  of  its  existence,  the  gang  functions  like  -  and  is 
indistinguishable from - street-based peer groups who ‘hang around’.
Where the peer group and the gang are distinguished from one another is 
in  the  role  and status  that  crime and particularly  violence  plays  within  the 
group.  Whereas  in  the  peer  groups  violence  is  something  that  sometimes 
happens, in the case of gangs a propensity for violence is intrinsic to the group 
and its identity. This could be because the men within the group are themselves 
violent; it is also the case that the group actively search out opportunities to be 
violent. 
While the American stereotype of the gang points towards a group with 
many members, a complex division of labour and a command structure located 
in a central hierarchy populated by leaders and lieutenants, this model does not 
apply in the case of London or indeed the UK as a whole. This does not mean to 
say that the members of some gangs do not allocate themselves different roles . 27
However, rather than understanding organisational structure by reference to the 
 An important note here on street language. The people who inhabit the street 27
worlds of London often have a vocabulary that they use to define its occupants. 
They may refer to ‘tiny’s’ (meaning very young children), ‘youngers’ (teens), 
and  elders  (adults).  They  may  also  use  expressions  like  your  ‘endz’  (your 
territory),  the  ‘man dem’  (your  friends);  ‘crew’  or  ‘brethren’  (the  group you 
hang around with). They may also talk of ‘faces’ (known criminals). None of 
this is surprising or sinister unless gang obsessed individuals take hold of these 
terms  and  from  them  construct  the  fantasy  of  a  criminal  gang  where 
designations like ‘tiny’s’, ‘youngers’ and ‘elders’ are now brought together as 
part of a corporate street structure, while the term ‘man dem’ is reconstructed to 
mean ‘gang’.
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division  of  labour  a  gang  may  claim,  it  is  more  accurate  to  understand  its 
organisation  as  characterised  by  relations  of  domination  and  competition 
between  members.  In  this  sense  the  gang  typically  exhibits  more  pack-like 
behaviours  than  those  found  in  formal  bureaucracies.  Dominant  figures  are 
dominant,  for  example,  not  because  they  have  more  qualifications  or  have 
obtained an elevated position through interview,  they are  dominant  because 
they are more ruthless and ‘hard’ than less dominant members. Status within 
the group however only exists for as long as it  can be defended from status 
challenges. As such reputation and honour can never be presumed but have to 
be continuously demonstrated and reaffirmed. This makes most gangs highly 
volatile and unstable entities. The lesson to take from this is that it is rarely the 
coherence  of  the  group  that  makes  it  dangerous;  it  is  rather  precisely  its 
volatility and the volatility of its members that lead to lethal outcomes such as 
stabbings  and  shootings.  Social  disorganisation  as  opposed  to  corporate 
organisation defines the way most London gangs are organised . 28
 There is currently an ongoing debate between researchers on how organised 28
contemporary gangs in the UK are. For researchers like John Pitts the gang in 
London today can take the form of a highly corporate structure that imposes 
total  control  over  social  life  in  the  estates  where  it  is  based.  This  position 
however has attracted considerable criticism both on the basis that this attempt 
to corporatise the streets reflect gang talking myths rather than realities; and 
because  other  researchers  such as  Hallsworth  and Silverstone,  Aldridge and 
Medina have found little empirical proof of such structures. Their work stresses 
instead the fluid, volatile and ‘messy’ nature of street life and organisation. See 
Aldridge J. and Medina J. (2007); Pitts J. (2008); Hallsworth S. and Silverstone D. 
(2009); Hallsworth S. (2010).
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Gang life for most gang members is a very insular and parochial space where 
small  insults  and  disagreements  over  status  and  respect  can  assume  a 
significance and command a response literally inconceivable to those who are 
not part of this often institutionally disconnected world. The volatility of the 
gang  is  compounded  by  the  fact  that  a  number  of  gang  affiliated  men  are 
psychologically  unstable.  Many have long and complex histories  of  violence 
and violent victimisation and a significant number derive from chaotic family 
backgrounds . 29
Finally, life is volatile because street life is itself often chaotic in the sense that 
things  suddenly  happen  that  involve  violence  or  which  demand  a  violent 
response.  It  could be,  for example,  that a gang member is found by another 
gang away from his territory and is beaten up. In the name of collective honour 
one gang may retaliate against another or proxies for it  in what can quickly 
become a vendetta.  It  could simply be that  someone looked at  someone the 
‘wrong way’ and such disrespect had to be addressed violently in the name of 
street  justice.  ‘Beef’,  to  use  the  colloquial  street  term  for  conflict,  can  be 
provoked  for  many  perceived  and  actual  slights.  Unfortunately,  among  the 
more volatile gangs in London, weapons are also used. 
 In a Home Office study into gang and gun crime conducted by Hales, Lewis 29
and Silverstone they found that of their sample of 80 people, “40 had previously 
been threatened with guns, 29 shot at and eight had been shot; 28 had been 
stabbed, 17 injured with other weapons, 34 had been robbed and three had been 
kidnapped.  Additionally,  26  reported  friends  or  family  members  shot  and 
injured and another  26  reported friends  or  family  shot  dead”.  See  Hales  G. 
Lewis C. and Silverstone D. ( 2006).
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The Organised Crime Group 
The  organised  crime  group  is  composed  of  men  for  whom  involvement  in 
criminal behaviour is intrinsic to their identity and practice and for whom such 
involvement is their purpose and justification. These are not boys nor would 
they typically define themselves as a street-based gang. These are professionals 
who ‘do the business’ where the business of crime is an occupation. 
In  economic  terms,  it  is  organised  crime  groups  that  exercise 
disproportionate control over the illegal means and forces of crime production. 
These are populated by professional criminals who typically occupy the core of 
the criminal underworld while the gang, along with volatile peer groups and 
various individuals, comprise the periphery.
Many of the organised crime groups in London are family based criminal 
firms and it is familial association that provides the bedrock of trust and loyalty 
between  members .  Ethnicity  may  also  provide  another  axis  around  which 30
membership  may  be  based.  Other  criminals  who  are  not  family  may  be 
affiliated to these groups directly or through networks, but these are often close 
friends with whom family members grow up, or people who have mastered 
particular criminal skills and can be trusted. It could be noted that the family 
unit is the oldest and most traditional form of organised crime group. It persists 
because blood relations remain the strongest unit out of which trust is formed 
and trust is a crucial currency in illegal contexts. 
The  family  firm  is  not  the  only  form  of  organised  crime  group. 
Professional criminals may work together specialising in a particular criminal 
enterprise like commercial burglary. Membership in this sense occurs because 
 See Decker S.H. and Van Winkle B. (1996)..30
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these men have grown up together (sometimes being part of the same gang in 
their earlier life), or alternatively they have met through their involvement in 
various criminal networks, including prison. Many possess key criminal skills; 
they  may  have  an  established  reputation  for  being  good  at  their  job;  and 
importantly, they also have a reputation for being trustworthy . 31
In the face of globalisation the family based ‘firm’ has not declined; it is 
more  the  case  that  iconic  criminal  families  and  other  criminal  groups  are 
increasingly  meshed  into  flexible,  criminal  networks  and  it  is  through  such 
distributed  networks  that  criminal  enterprise  in  the  global  context  is 
conducted . These networks may be international in scope and are integrated 32
through the use of communication technology. As Potter (1994) argues, these are 
‘flexible adaptive networks that readily expand and contract to deal with the 
uncertainties of the criminal enterprise’ . While popular mythology still likes to 33
imagine organised crime to resemble a corporation (think here of the Godfather 
 Findings from research by Hales and Silverstone (2005),  Hales et  al  (2006), 31
Hallsworth and Young (2006)  and Young et  al  (2007).  See Hallsworth S.  and 
Silverstone D. (2009). ‘.
 For a discussion on the nature of organised crime networks see Edwards A. 32
and Gill P. (2003); and Lea J. (2002). It could be noted that in studies of organised 
crime (rarely referenced by gang ‘experts’) the idea that this was perpetrated by 
a ‘Mr Big’ who heads a corporate criminal gang was discredited long ago. It 
could also be noted that while large organised criminal groups exist, they are 
typically found in weak states and crisis states. These typically include major 
drug producing countries.
 See Potter G. (1994).33
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movies)  this  is  not  how  serious  crime  is  organised  in  the  global  ‘network 
society’ . 34
Many of the professional criminals who operate through such networks 
are likely to have access to firearms but they will not routinely carry them. On 
occasions they will use them to settle conflicts which have a business motive 
and sometimes (but rarely) they will use them to settle personal disputes. To 
this extent they are also beholden to the ‘codes of the street’. As professional 
criminals they typically operate in ways that remove them from the street retail 
sector  of  the  drug  marketplace  which  is  also  the  most  violent;  this  they 
delegate / subcontract to more youthful peer groups, individual dealers and 
gangs  in  the  street  periphery .  In  their  work  orientation  they  operate  as 35
businessmen and operate in accord with the imperatives of capitalist business 
which is to make a profit. Because the businesses in which they trade are illegal, 
such transactions are not formally regulated by the rule of law (let alone formal 
business  ethics).  Violence,  by  default,  becomes  the  de  facto  regulating  force 
within  the  underworld  in  which  they  operate.  This  means  that  while 
professional  criminals  may  be  more  careful  than  gangs  members  about  the 
violence in which they engage, violence is still a currency in which they trade. 
Professional criminals engage in a range of criminal behaviours. This can 
include  providing  illegal  services  such  as  prostitution  or  protection,  selling 
legitimate goods acquired illegally, trading in illegal goods such as drugs, or 
engaging in acquisitive crimes such as fraud, armed robbery or kidnapping. The 
supply  and  trade  in  illegal  drugs  is  the  principal  mainstay  of  the  illegal 
 For a discussion of the network society see Castells M. (1996)34
 For a discussion of the life world of professional criminals see Hallsworth S. 35
and Silverstone D. (2009). 
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economy in which most organised crime groups operate in London, as is also 
the case internationally.
Profiling Groups in Relation to Risk
The threats posed by each group described above vary. On one hand, organised 
crime groups are likely to be populated by men who engage in the most serious 
of crimes and who, if caught, will receive the most severe sentences. But because 
these men are likely to maintain a low street profile they are unlikely to provoke 
much public disorder.  Gangs and delinquent peer groups on the other hand 
have  a  much  more  pronounced  street  presence  and  are  likely  to  engage  in 
activities that induce far more public anxiety. This occurs even if the crimes they 
commit are less serious.
Key features of street organisations
Peer Group Gang Organised Crime Group
Membership Mixed or single sex groups. Predominantly male. Predominantly male.
Age Any  age,  most  volatile 
predominantly  aged 
between 14 and 19.
Teens  through  to  early 
adulthood.
Men  aged  from  19 
onwards.
Participation 
in crime
Predominantly  low  level 
ASB,  some involvement  in 
street robbery.
Street  robbery,  some 
participation  in  the  retail 
street  end  of  the  illegal 
drug economy.
Mid  to  high  level  drug 
import  and  distribution, 
also trade in illegal services 
such as protection.
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Participation 
in violence
Predominantly  episodic 
and  low  involvement  in 
violence. 
Violence  is  integral  to  the 
life  of  the  group.  Can 
express itself in gang wars 
and  violent  territorialism, 
in defence of drug markets, 
in  attempts  to  rob  other 
drug  dealers,  in  leisure 
venues,  in  the  context  of 
street  level  justice  as  a 
response  to  honour  slights 
and acts of disrespect. 
Violence is rarely regulated 
by  street  codes  and 
conventions.  In  the  street 
world business imperatives 
and  more  personal 
motivations  blur  and 
merge. 
Violence  is  typically 
regulated  by  norms  that 
delimit  unnecessary 
violence. 
Violence  is  mobilised 
instrumentally in pursuit of 
criminal  goals  (armed 
robbery), as defence against 
attack  and  as  a  mode  of 
regulating a business where 
normal rule of law does not 
apply.
Weapons use Some  may  carry  knives, 
predominantly for defence.
This  group  will  carry  and 
use  weapons.  While  most 
likely  to  use  knives  they 
will  occasionally  have 
access  to  reactivated  guns 
although it is unlikely that 
gang  members  will  know 
how to use these nor have 
knowledge of their origin. 
Organised  criminals  will 
often  be  armed  with  guns 
and will know how to use 
them though many will not 
routinely carry them. They 
will  typically  subcontract 
violence  to  individual 
career  criminals  and/or 
gang members.
Structure Friendship groups. Fluid,  chaotic,  messy  and 
volatile  friendship  groups, 
limited (if  any) division of 
labour,  rarely  if  ever  any 
corporate structure.
May  operate  through 
family  ‘firms’  or  a  group 
that  specialises  in  a 
particular crime. These will 
be  locked  into  global 
networks. 
Key features of street organisations
Peer Group Gang Organised Crime Group
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From the Gang to the Violent Street Periphery
As the section above concludes, to focus on the gang alone and see this as 
the only group that requires an intervention would be to make a mistake. It 
would also be a mistake to condense all the problems of urban violence into a 
problem of gangs. As we have seen gangs are not the only group that engages in 
violence, nor is the problem of weaponised violence a problem of groups alone 
as many other violent  and volatile  individuals  are also involved.  The policy 
implications of this are profound because these findings challenge the current 
focus which is to lay the blame for serious and weaponised violence in London 
at the door of the gang.
Despite the fact that the problem of urban violence extends beyond the 
gang, intervention policy runs a real risk of being reduced to an issue of gang 
suppression programmes. While gang suppression is certainly justified it could 
be  observed  that  such  intervention  alone  will  not  prevent  interpersonal 
violence; it will not prevent drug distribution; it will not prevent young women 
being  sexually  exploited;  nor  will  it  address  the  problems  posed  by  ‘status 
dogs’. 
Rather than focus on a particular group and see this as the solution to the 
problem of violence, it would be far more sensible to focus instead upon the 
spaces where gangs and other violent groups and individuals are to be found - 
the violent street world where they intersect. In what follows we consider the 
structure of this street  world to identify its  constituent features.  One way to 
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understand this violent world is to conceive it as possessing a constitutive core 
and an outlying periphery . 36
Profiling the Core
The core will typically be populated by older men ‘who do the business’ 
of  crime  and  who  operate  either  as  individual  professional  criminals  or  as 
members of more organised crime groups. Entry to the core would appear to be 
dependent on a number of factors: the ability to demonstrate entrepreneurial 
flair and ability, the ability to be well connected to local and national criminal 
networks, a capacity to be violent and ruthless but also to control the exercise of 
violence appear essential characteristics. Most who operate within the core have 
grown up as part of the periphery but have grown out of it. Instead of drifting 
out of crime and into law abiding behaviour (as most do) they have become 
‘differentially associated’33 into the criminal underworld, accumulating criminal 
contacts and criminals skills along the way.. 
Profiling the Periphery
The periphery is populated by younger, more volatile young men (and 
occasionally women) along with various individuals (such as lone drug dealers) 
who have some involvement in crime and the criminal economy. It is within the 
periphery that we will tend to find gangs and delinquent peer groups. Here we 
find  volatile,  fluid,  messy,  amorphous  and  chaotic  networks,  rather  than 
organised,  corporate  entities.  Here  violence  is  less  predictable  and  more 
 One of the problems attendant on those who like to imagine the gang as a 36
complex corporate structure is that they make no distinction between the core 
and the periphery. In this model the core controls the periphery.
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impulsive and situational.  People in the periphery are also more likely to be 
more psychologically unstable and immature than those found in the core and 
are subject,  as such, to low levels of social and self-control.  In the periphery 
business  imperatives  and  personal  motives  often  blur  together  with  fatal 
consequences. 
!
Relations Between the Core and Periphery
Different forms of relationships exist between the core and the periphery. This 
relationship  can  veer  along  a  continuum  from  mutual  support  and  help  to 
ruthless exploitation. 
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Mutual support 
While by no means under the explicit direction of professional criminals 
or organised crime groups it is evident that there are often close ties that bind 
groups in the periphery to the groups that  occupy the core (to which many 
younger people may be related). Younger siblings of established gang members 
may form youthful equivalents of the groups populated by their brothers, while 
older gang members may subcontract out lower level, street based work to them 
or, on occasion, set them up to conduct illicit business.
Instrumental relationships 
Relations  between  the  core  and  periphery  can  also  be  of  a  more 
instrumental kind. This is particularly the case in the drug retail sector where 
individual drug dealers will purchase illegal drugs from a higher level dealer in 
the  core  for  street  level  distribution.  Here  the  relationship,  usually  between 
people who have grown up together or live in the same area, is of a strictly 
business kind where drugs are exchanged for money. The real risks and dangers 
associated  with  the  violence  that  often  accompanies  this  sector  are  thereby 
negated as younger people take the risks involved. 
Exploitative relationships 
Relations can be of a more violent and exploitative kind. Where people 
are known and trusted, deals are typically honoured on the basis that you ‘don’t 
jack your peeps’ (you do not rob from your own). Relations can however be far 
more coercive and some young people (whom Pitts calls ‘reluctant gangsters’33) 
may be forced into doing particular jobs for older gang members who might 
also  prey  on  young,  vulnerable  women.  Those  who  betray  the  older  and 
established criminals (for example, by running up a significant drug debt) may 
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be violently assaulted or kidnapped. The same can happen to people who have 
their drugs confiscated by the police. 
To summarise the implications of this for practitioners:
• it is not enough to focus solely on the gang as violence and weapon use cannot be 
addressed through gang suppression alone;
• the focus needs to be located on the violent street world where gangs and other 
violent groups and individuals intersect which has two spheres: 
– an  inner  core  populated  by  professional  criminals  and  organised  crime 
groups locked into national and international networks; and 
– a volatile street periphery populated by gangs and delinquent peer groups 
along with other individuals;
• intervention efforts as such must address the street periphery as a totality - not 
focus  attention  on  one  part  of  it  (the  gang)  at  the  expense  of  the  whole 
(individuals, peer groups and gangs). 
General Principles of Intervention
If the problem of the street cannot be seen solely as a problem of gangs 
then a comprehensive and holistic intervention strategy needs to address the 
risks posed by all troublesome groups within the volatile street periphery, not 
just the gang. Applying a one-size-fits-all model as an intervention strategy will 
not work. 
For  the  most  part  confronting  organisations  which  have  some 
involvement  in  crime  will  not  require  importing  gang  ‘solutions’  created  in 
other  societies  which  are  very  different  from  the  UK.  Overall,  the  aim  of 
interventions must be to strengthen existing provision within each borough, not 
create  new  tiers  of  intervention  which  then  become  expensive,  self-serving 
industries.
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Given that the violence of the street periphery is not a problem of gang 
members  alone interventions should target  the criminal  behaviour of  all  the 
individuals and groups within the periphery. This should involve using existing 
criminal ordinances and being cautious about erroneously treating offences as 
‘gang’ issues when the relevant evidence does not merit such an assumption. To 
put this another way, care should be taken not to make the mistake of conceding 
to the gang an importance and significance it often does not possess. 
Identifying What Works
Care  should  be  taken  to  discover  what  interventions,  or  features  of 
interventions,  do  and do  not  work.  Projects,  as  such,  need to  be  rigorously 
evaluated to  demonstrate  that  they are  successful  and effective  in  achieving 
their  targets.  There cannot be evidence free zones particularly in the context 
where policy should be evidence led.  Finally,  as  individual  communities  are 
unique, what appears overall to be similar problems between them may stem 
from different causes or, because of the make-up of the community, require a 
different response. What works in one area may not work, or indeed may be 
counter-productive, in another area. Therefore, importing models and projects 
successful  in  other  areas  (including  American  models)  to  London  may  be 
inappropriate  and  outcomes  unlikely  to  be  replicated.  Targets  pertaining  to 
what works should be meaningful and care should be taken that activity is not 
masquerading  as  performance.  The  value  of  programmes  is  not  necessarily 
locked  in  explicit  outcomes  but  works  on  many  levels  in  different  ways. 
Strategies and protocols  should be flexible to allow agencies and services to 
develop organically in response to the needs of the young people they work 
with.
!288
Locating Effort and Allocating Services 
Interventions directed at peer groups that are not systematically criminal 
need  to  emphasise  proactive  and  informal  interventions  over  the  use  of 
repressive sanctions. The kind of work conducted by youth workers, conflict 
mediators,  arbitrators  and  community  workers  would  all  fall  within  this 
category as they presuppose some kind of conversation and negotiation with 
groups  and  their  members.  Conversely,  for  those  who  are  more  criminally 
inclined such as gangs and organised crime groups, the situation would reverse 
and  favour  official  law  enforcement  over  non-repressive  interventions.  The 
rationale for this is simple. As organised crime groups comprise career criminals 
who cause high levels of social harm, evade detection and are committed to 
their vocation of crime, informal interventions are unlikely to be successful. Peer 
groups  however  are  composed  of  law-abiding  individuals  and  low-level 
offenders  and  treating  them  as  competent  career  criminals  is  likely  to 
criminalise those to whom the label ought not to be deployed.
In what follows an overview of the intervention strategies for confronting 
different  groups  is  outlined.  Given  that  the  audience  for  this  report  is 
practitioners who will have a remit to work with gangs and volatile peer groups 
(rather than organised and professional criminals) the interventions described 
apply specifically to these groups. 
Locating Effort
Group type Nature of risk Mode of intervention Service type
Organised crime groups High Enforcement Targeted and specialist
Gangs Medium / high Enforcement / integrative Generic and targeted
Volatile peer groups Low Non  repressive  and 
integrative
Generic
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The hierarchy of the threat posed by each group can be conceptualised in 
different ways dependent on the purpose of classification, as demonstrated in 
the pyramid of risk below. It is useful to note that while peer groups and gangs 
(often indistinguishable from one another) pose the highest risk to public order 
given their  street  visibility,  in terms of  social  harm it  is  the organised crime 
groups which pose the greater  threat  given the seriousness  of  the  crimes in 
which they are involved. 
!
This  bears  relevance  to  designing  interventions  strategies  and  programmes 
which, in order to be fit for purpose, should be developed with awareness for 
the following:
• Where risk is high interventions should be tailored to address particular 
problems posed by different groups. For example, if the high risk pertains 
to fear of crime, more needs to be done on the level of social integration 
and building community  relations,  whereas  if  the  high risk  pertains  to 
serious offending a tailored law-enforcement strategy is more appropriate;
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• where risk is low interventions should be general and generic, with care 
taken not to unnecessarily marginalise nor criminalise low-risk groups;
• interventions are required at each level both to inhibit delinquency and 
upward migration to more serious levels of criminality and violence; 
• interventions targeted at  particular groups,  rather than social  problems, 
can  have  negative  unintended consequences,  such as  glamorising  gang 
membership or illegal dog ownership;
• addressing the problems posed by one group in isolation is unlikely to 
have a significant impact on crime reduction; and 
• interventions aimed at peer groups and gangs will not appreciably reduce 
the serious and serial offences which cause the most harm to society.
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Street Representations and Street Realities
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Gangland Britain? Realities, Fantasies and 
Industry 
Every age produces a ‘public enemy’ and such ‘enemies’ have a habit of 
changing.  In  2002,  public  enemy  number  one  in  the  UK  was  the  ‘street 
robber’ (Hallsworth, 2005). Such ‘folk devils’ had, of course, always existed but, 
in 2002, they re-emerged with a vengeance. As in the 1970s, the ‘street robber’ 
became the source of considerable anxiety and sensational media coverage (Hall 
et  al,  1977).  Fast  forward  eight  years  and  haven’t  things  changed?  Nobody 
today  is  preoccupied  with  ‘muggers’  and  ‘street  crime’  is  barely  mentioned 
(despite the fact that there is still a fair bit of it around). If anxiety pertaining to 
‘muggers’  once  abounded,  this  has  seemingly  now  been  replaced  by  a 
burgeoning fear of youth ‘gangs’. Indeed, according to the ‘Gangland Britain’ 
thesis, youth ‘gangs’ are on the move everywhere. Moreover, it is claimed that 
such ‘gangs’ are armed, organised, predatory and lethal.
What are we to make of this re-focussing? According to John Pitts (2008; 
this volume), we are looking at a society where ‘street life’ has changed - and is 
changing  –  dramatically;  a  society  where,  until  recently,  few  if  any  ‘gangs’ 
existed, to a society where ‘gangs’ are mushrooming apace. Pitts (2008) is both 
unequivocal  and  bold  in  his  convictions.  We  are,  he  asserts,  witnessing  the 
‘changing face of youth crime’ and many state agencies appear to agree. The UK 
government,  for example, has identified the ‘gang’ as a primary target of its 
‘action plan’ to tackle violent crime (Home Office, 2008). It identifies the ‘gang’ 
as a serious threat to public order and, accordingly, it has established designated 
‘task  forces’  (to  address  the  threats  that  ‘gangs’  supposedly  pose)  and 
introduced ‘tough’ legislation (to suppress them).  Government ministries are 
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not acting alone. Indeed, every major agency within the criminal justice system 
– including the Metropolitan Police, the Youth Justice Board (YJB), the National 
Offender  Management  Service  (NOMS)  and  the  Association  of  Chief  Police 
Officers  (ACPO)  -  has  either  commissioned  research  on  ‘gangs’  or  has 
commissioned  research  to  find  out  what  to  do  about  them.  Many  similar 
agencies  have established various committees  to  deliberate  over  ‘gangs’  and 
many  others  have  created   specialist  positions  with  a  dedicated  ‘anti-gang’ 
remit. At the local level Crime and Disorder Reduction Partnerships (CDRPs) 
have replicated such responses. Many CDRPs have identified the ‘gang’ as a 
primary  ‘public  enemy’  and  have  sought,  and  been  granted,  government 
funding/public money to help them tackle ‘gang’ activity in their respective 
areas. Accordingly, a growing ‘industry’ has emerged, populated by a multitude 
of organisations and consultants offering ‘expert’ opinion, guidance and advice, 
together with ‘tailor made’ programmes in ‘gang’ suppression. 
In  the  face  of  such  ‘industry’  it  is  ostensibly  difficult  to  question  the 
‘gangland  Britain’  thesis.  Surely,  all  we  need  to  know  is  that  ‘gangs’  have 
arrived and we need to ‘get real’ about this problematic phenomenon. Or do 
we? This chapter poses a ‘heretical’ counter-thesis by arguing that whilst social 
entities commonly termed ‘gangs’ (notwithstanding the problems of definition) 
certainly  exist  (as  they  always  have  done  –  see  Davies  and  Pearson,  this 
volume),  there is  less evidence to suggest  either that  ‘street  violence’  can be 
reduced to a concern with ‘gangs’ or, that ‘gangs’ are the principal drivers of 
violent street crime. Indeed, the problem of the street is not primarily derivative 
of  organised  armed  groups;  rather  social  disorganisation  better  explains  the 
violence that  is  increasingly being attributed to ‘gangs’.  A central  contention 
here is  that  the problem of the ‘gang’ is  not the ‘gang’ itself,  but the media 
driven ‘moral panic’ and ‘gang control industry’ that surrounds it. The major 
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problem, therefore, lies less in suppressing ‘gangs’ and more in addressing the 
‘industry’ that has emerged to ‘tackle’ them. 
The ‘gangland Britain’ thesis revisited 
The ‘evidence’ apparently underpinning the ‘gangland Britain’ thesis has 
been critically reviewed and found to be lacking (Hallsworth and Young, 2008). 
Given  that  the  UK  has  no  established  record  of  conducting  qualitative  and 
quantitative ‘gang’ research (unlike the US) there is no readily available data to 
verify,  or not,  whether the presence of ‘gangs’ has increased or decreased in 
recent years. What the limited number of existing surveys indicate is that the 
level  of  ‘gang’  membership  is  relatively  low among the  population  at  large 
(ranging between 2 per cent and 7 per cent dependent upon the definition of 
‘gang’  used).  Furthermore,  such  surveys  typically  focus  upon  the  ‘usual 
suspects’  (young  people  in  deprived  areas  and/or  young  offenders),  which 
almost certainly produces skewed results that artificially inflate and overstate 
the actual level of ‘gang’ membership (see, for example, Bennet and Holloway, 
2004; Sharp et al, 2006).
On closer inspection, much of the violence attributed to ‘gangs’ appears 
not to be specifically ‘gang’ related. Even if ‘gang’ members commit offences, it 
is  often  not  evident  that  the  offence  in  question  is  motivated  by  ‘gang’ 
membership  in  and  of  itself.  It  is  precisely  because  a  significant  volume of 
violent crime is  routinely being defined as ‘gang’ related -  coupled with the 
tendency on the part of the media to apply the term permissively and arbitrarily 
to classify all and every group that occasions harm to others as a ‘gang’ - that 
has, at least in part, served to establish and consolidate the ‘gang’ as a new ‘folk 
devil’.
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Drawing on grounded research with young people in areas supposedly 
awash with ‘gang’ activity, it is certainly possible to identify some young people 
who  might  reasonably  be  classified  as  ‘gang  affiliated’,  but  many  others 
typically labelled ‘gang members’ simply do not recognise and/or conceptualise 
the peer groups with whom they associate as ‘gangs’ (Hallsworth and Young, 
2008). Indeed, far from the streets being overrun by ‘gangs’, the most pervasive 
street  collectives  appeared  to  comprise  volatile  peer  groups  randomly  and 
erroneously labelled as ‘gangs’ by control agencies. If, in order to legitimately be 
classified as a ‘gang’, a group has to have some integral relation to crime and 
violence,  then  the  overwhelming  majority  of  young  people  involved  in  the 
research simply failed to qualify (Hallsworth and Young, 2008). 
Interviews conducted with practitioners across a range of different UK 
cities  have  revealed  that  few believe  that  the  problematic  issues  posed  and 
experienced by young people are,  in fact,  derivative of  ‘gangs’  (Young et  al, 
2007). Interestingly, many practitioners have minimal informed knowledge with 
regard to ‘gangs’. That noted, the experience of many practitioners leads them 
to  conclude  that  the  principal  problems  of  the  street  are  more  accurately 
understood in terms of young peoples’ often chaotic and deeply distressed lives, 
coupled  with  endemic  deprivation  and  structural  marginalisation.  Few 
practitioners  appeared  to  perceive  the  ‘gang’  to  be  a  new  or  escalating 
phenomenon and, in an intriguing test of the proposition that young women 
were  increasingly  involved  in  ‘gangs’  (part  of  the  current  control  fantasy), 
members of youth offending teams were invited to identify girl ‘gang’ members. 
The exercise failed to generate anything like a substantive sample of ‘shemale 
gangsters’ and, of those so identified, most were more akin to young women 
who had experienced deeply troubled and traumatic lives than to the ‘gang’ 
girls of the of the populist imaginary (Young et al, 2007; see also Batchelor and 
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Young this volume). Whilst it could be argued that this research focused upon 
areas  without  the  same  degree  of  ‘gang’  organisation  as  those  studied  by 
protagonists of the ‘gangland Britain’ thesis (particularly Pitts, 2008), a better 
way  of  understanding  the  core  discrepancies  between  the  respective  sets  of 
research findings might more readily be understood in terms of the problematic 
assumptions that ‘gang talkers’ routinely make in conducting their inquiries. 
The first thing to note is  that the fundamental claims that Pitts (2008) 
makes about ‘gangland Britain’ derive from field research conducted in London. 
Quite how it is possible to generalise from such findings and argue that they 
reveal  the  ‘changing  face  of  youth  crime’  is  open  to  question.  Equally,  the 
evidential basis upon which Pitts builds his case is also questionable. Indeed, 
the  argument  is  principally  rooted  in  the  testimony  of  practitioners 
(interestingly  referred  to  as  ‘informants’  thus  invoking  policing  discourse) 
whose narratives Pitts appears to accept at face value. Whilst it is, of course, 
possible  to  garner  good  evidence  by  talking  with  front-line  practitioners 
working  with  young  people  at  street  level,  it  is  equally  important  to 
acknowledge that the epistemological implications of such testimony need to be 
critically interrogated in ways that seem to be overlooked in Pitts’  work.  As 
others  have  found  in  the  course  of  conducting  research  into  ‘gangs’, 
practitioners, are inclined to project a level and degree of organisation onto the 
street  that  best  reflects  the  kind  of  organisations  to  which  they  belong 
(Hallsworth  and  Young,  2008).  In  this  sense  practitioners  tend  to  see  (and 
perhaps want to see) structures, hierarchical divisions of labour and organised 
entities that they can map and which chime with familiar agency discourses. In 
other words, they do ‘gang talk’ in a manner of ‘tree thinking’ and this arboreal 
way of seeing and interpreting the world leads them to misrepresent what are 
often fluid, amorphous and even rhizomatic street realities. 
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Young  people  often  replicate  the  same  conceptual  errors.  As  the 
Norwegian  anthropologist  Moshmus  (2005)  observed,  they  do  not  live  their 
‘gang’  realities  in  the way that  they are  typically  invited (by researchers)  to 
narrate  them.  Often,  young people  themselves  revert  to  what  we might  call 
‘gang talk’  which,  in  reality,  is  the  de  facto  language of  control  agents.  The 
problem with Pitts (2008) and most other ‘gang talkers’ in this respect, is that 
they  fail  to  adequately  address  complex  (and  perhaps  inconvenient) 
epistemological issues. Maybe they cannot, because they are ‘tree thinkers’ who 
(even despite themselves) ultimately inhabit the space of the control imaginary - 
constructing a fantasy of the contemporary street as a world dominated not only 
by ‘gangs’, but ‘super gangs’, that control all aspects of social life in the areas in 
which they operate. It makes for a good story but perhaps that is all. 
Whilst  Pitts  (2008)  is  right  to  assert  that  street  life  is  not  totally 
disorganised  and  that,  in  response  to  globalisation,  new  forms  of  criminal 
organisation have appeared, he may well be wrong in supposing that organised 
‘gangs’ define the adaptation and he is certainly mistaken in looking to Castells 
(1996) to support such a claim. Indeed, Castell’s is the consummate theorist of 
the network society and it is precisely through complex distributed networks – 
rather than the territorial  ‘gangs’ that Pitts appears to situate at  the heart of 
things - that organised crime evolves. Similarly, the ‘reluctant gangster’ thesis 
that  Pitts  develops  -  holding  that  young  people  are  coerced  into  becoming 
members  of  ‘gangs’  –  is  also  questionable.  There  is  little  disputing  that 
relationships  between  organised  criminals  and  their  ‘on  road’  brethren  are 
frequently coercive and exploitative, but the relations between the organised core 
and the  more  disorganised  periphery  of  the  street  world  is  characterised by  a 
multifaceted complex. Such relationships can veer between support and help - 
provided to and from people who are kith and kin - to more calculated and 
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instrumental  business  contracts  between  buyers  and  sellers  in  the  drug 
economy. 
If  contemporary youth ‘gangs’  amount to the ‘changing face of  youth 
crime’,  then what are we to make of a British history replete with stories of 
estates populated by young men and sometimes older and more professional 
criminals (see Davies and Pearson, this volume)? Estates where, getting a good 
kicking if you were in the wrong place at the wrong time, is a longstanding risk 
many young men (in particular) have experienced whilst growing up in urban 
settings.  And  how  are  we  to  conceptualise  the  longstanding  traditions  of 
collective  violence  that  have  always  been  a  feature  of  street  life  in  the  UK 
(Patrick,  1973;  Bean,  1981)?  Indeed,  the  ‘changing  face’  claim  implies  the 
negation of history and invokes the amnesia that Pearson charted many years 
ago in his seminal study of ‘hooligans’ and ‘respectable fears’ (Pearson, 1983; 
this volume). 
A wider source of critique that might be levelled at ‘gang talkers’ begins 
with the a priori assumption that the problem of the street is one of ‘gangs’. In 
other words, whilst ‘gangs’ are certainly part of a complex – and sometimes 
deeply problematic - street tapestry, by focusing on ‘gangs’ alone, by reifying 
the ‘gang’  and constructing it  as  a  kind of  fetish,  the ‘gang talkers’  actually 
appear to lose sight of the wider ecology of the street itself which, arguably, 
ought to be the real focus of any attempt to understand violent street worlds. 
But Pitts (2008) and other fellow travellers are not the only arborialists in the 
expanding ‘gang’  research community.  Indeed,  many others  advance  similar 
claims. The figure below, for example, invokes another fantasy of the street, this 
time  taken  from  a  publication  produced  by  Jonathon  Toy  (2008),  a  leading 
practitioner in the ‘War Against Gangs’ in London. 
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Figure 1: Fantasies of the street (1): ‘Business typical organisational gang structure’ 
!
Source: Toy (2008: 31) 
Similarly,  one  might  consider  the  totally  ‘evidence  free’  New  Labour 
‘action plan’ to confront violence (Home Office, 2008). The document - without 
any evidence to support such a contentious claim - identifies the ‘gang’ as a 
major  driver  of  lethal  violence.  Despite  utter  disregard  for  any  notion  of 
‘evidence driven policy’, the ‘action plan’ makes the case for ‘gang’ suppression 
as a solution to violent crime and a whole new paradigm of risk management is 
touted as the solution. 
Rethinking violent street worlds 
If  the  violence  that  occasions  public  concern  cannot  legitimately  be 
attributed to organised ‘gangs’, how are we to make sense both of the violence 
itself  and  the  anxiety  and  outrage  that  it  tends  to  induce?  Why  do  certain 
constituencies of young people (normally boys and young men) routinely carry 
knives (and sometimes guns) and use them against each other, sometimes with 
fatal consequences? This question has recently been addressed by drawing upon 
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a range of different research projects (Hallsworth and Silverstone, 2009). Rather 
than begin (as is the tendency of ‘gang talkers’) with an apparent presumption 
that  the  answer  is  to  be  found  by  looking  for  ‘gangs’,  it  is  arguably  more 
profitable to listen instead to what many young people – and, indeed, convicted 
adult criminals - have to say about the violent street worlds they inhabit(ed). 
Whilst such testimonies certainly feature ‘gangs’, few tend to conceptualise the 
‘gang’ in quite the same ways that control agents are inclined to do. In other 
words, ‘gangs’ might – in certain circumstances – form an integral part of street 
reality but they do not fully envelop or totalise that reality. Rather than impose a 
particular construction of the ‘gang’ (typical of control agents) upon complex 
street realities - what Katz and Jackson-Jacobs (2004) have appropriately termed 
‘the criminologists gang’ – it is necessary instead to attempt to understand what 
such testimonies tell us about multi- dimensional street worlds and the violence 
that might characterise them (Hallsworth and Silverstone, 2009). This requires 
making a  heuristic  distinction between the  lifeworld of  more  organised and 
professional criminals - the organised core of the street world where men ‘do the 
business’ and crime is a vocation - and what might better be understood as the 
more disorganised periphery of ‘on road’ activity. 
Professional criminals are ‘successful’ because they are well networked, 
they manifest a pragmatic orientation to their work (typically mid-level drug 
dealing and armed robbery) and they are able to mobilise entrepreneurial flair 
in their chosen lines of activity. They tend to work with others, mostly those 
who they have grown up with or who they meet in places such as prison. Often 
(but  not  always)  the groups they are  part  of  have specified names or,  more 
likely, are known by others (including control agents) by ascribed names and 
identities. Such men can certainly apply and/or mobilise violence and many are 
trained and skilled in using guns (unlike their ‘on-road’ brethren), but they are 
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also acutely aware of how ‘bad for business’ (and dangerous for themselves) 
using weapons can be.
Firearms are accordingly used sparingly and preferably in an organised 
and calculated manner. This does not mean that such men – the criminal core - 
are not violent but, arguably, they are not as problematic as others who operate 
‘on road’, at the margins or periphery. Indeed, this latter group occupy a hyper 
volatile world where violence is omnipresent and can, and does, explode for 
relatively  mundane  reasons.  Moreover,  once  unleashed,  violence  tends  to 
escalate  randomly  and  rapidly.  Life  ‘on  road’  is  often  populated  by 
unpredictable  young  men  from  chaotic  backgrounds  whose  psychological 
instability is often compounded by long histories of violent victimisation. Such 
young men certainly face threats from territorial groups but that is only part of a 
more complex picture.
Many struggle to make a living at  the retail  end of crack-cocaine and 
heroin  markets;  a  trading  place  which  is  also  incredibly  violent.  Indeed,  as 
research from the USA and the UK attests (Jacobs, 1999 and 2000; Lupton et al, 
2002; Wilson et al, 2002), this is probably the most violent arena in the criminal 
underworld.  Violence  is,  as  such,  a  competence  that  has  to  be  learnt  and 
mastered in a world where street survival is  literally the name of the game. 
While ‘gang talkers’ imagine that the problem of violence emanates from the 
presence of organised ‘gangs’ (the core), the reality implies that it is the social 
disorganisation of the street periphery and the self-destructive ways of ‘on road’ 
life that prevail within it, that is the principal problem. 
Violence may be ritualised and, as such, regulated by normative street 
codes  (at  least  in  part)  or,  alternatively,  it  may be  anomic,  unregulated  and 
normless where the absence not the presence of a clear social structure (which 
many ‘gangs’ provide) creates the preconditions for violence to occur. For this 
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reason it  is difficult to equate life ‘on road’ with ‘subculture’ in recognisable 
sociological terms (Hall et al, 1976). Rather, ‘on road’ might be conceptualised as 
a way of life predicated precisely on the social demolition of its inhabitants. In a 
social world where capitalism is destructively reproducing itself from above, ‘on 
road’ is  seen to represent one of  its  concomitant effects,  the destructive self-
reproduction from below:
Here a small number of socially marginalised men have come to respond 
to their  predicament destructively in what becomes,  at  times,  close to 
what Thomas Hobbes described as ‘a state of nature’, what he termed a 
‘war of all  against all’.  Life ‘on road’,  is  not a world where the social 
contract has much salience or purchase. This is the zone of the outlaw. 
This  is  a  zone  where  deeply  internalised  anger  and  rage  among 
depoliticised and deeply alienated young men finds violent expression. 
The  tragedy here  is  that  the  rage  and anger  they  feel  is  not  directed 
outwards and towards the world that  marginalises them. Instead it  is 
directed inward and against each other. Guns have become a part of this 
logic  of  self-destruction  as  young men pointlessly  die  at  each  other’s 
hands (Hallsworth and Silverstone, 2009: 373). 
A moral panic? 
If the violence of the street is not reducible to a question of ‘gangs’, how 
has the problem of the street come to be constructed as a problem of ‘gangs’? Or 
to rephrase the question, how and why has the ‘gangland Britain’ thesis become 
dominant  to  a  point  where  it  is  seemingly  taken  to  provide  the  accepted 
hegemonic interpretation of violent street worlds? One way of understanding 
this phenomenon is to invoke the familiar sociological concept of ‘moral panic’ 
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and to situate the emergence of the ‘gang’ as ‘public enemy’ as the latest in a 
long line of ‘folk devils’. In this way, the rise of the ‘gang’ might be interpreted 
as a classic case of deviancy amplification. 
In ‘Moral Panics and the Media’ Critcher (2003) – following Cohen (1972; 
2002) and Hall et al (1977) – presents a processual model by way of explaining 
the stages through which moral panics evolve and develop: 
Emergence.  This  is  the  process,  according  to  Cohen  (1972:9),  whereby  a 
‘condition, episode, person or group of persons emerges to become defined as a 
threat to societal values and interests’. 
The media inventory. Here the threat is articulated specifically through the mass 
media.  An  ‘enemy’  is  identified  and  presented  through  processes  of 
exaggeration, distortion, prediction and symbolization (Cohen, 2002: 16-34). 
Moral  entrepreneurs.  ‘Various  groups  and  organisations  then  take  it  upon 
themselves  to  pronounce  upon  the  nature  of  the  problem’,  and  identify 
appropriate responses. For Cohen (2002: 1) the ‘moral barricades are manned by 
editors, politicians, bishops and other right-thinking people’.  
Experts.  Socially  accredited  experts  then  pronounce  their  diagnoses  and 
solutions.  
Coping  and  resolution.  Experts  and  moral  entrepreneurs  translate  ideas  into 
practice. Control initiatives are exploited and if - as is often the case – they are 
found lacking they are expanded. Fade away. Moral panics rarely last long. The 
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moral panic ends when the condition disappears, submerges or deteriorates.  
The rise of the ‘gang’ within public consciousness appears to ‘fit’ with the 
moral panic model. Up to 2002 there was limited media interest in ‘gangs’. The 
focus of media reporting was, as stated, fixed upon the spectre of the ‘mugger’. 
This radically changed in tandem with widespread media reporting of a series 
of violent episodes that came to be defined as ‘gang’ related. It began in 2000 
with the death of 10-year-old Damilola Taylor in South London , but it was the 37
apparently  random  murder  of  two  girls  in  Birmingham,  in  2003  ,  that 38
cemented  the  arrival  of  the  ‘gang’.  With  a  small  but  steady  stream of  fatal 
shootings, often involving young Black males, the ‘evidential basis’ of a society 
facing new and alarming threats  -  posed by armed ‘gangs’  -  evolved.  Street 
crime  effectively  disappeared  as  a  news  story  as  the  ‘gang’  steadily  and 
incrementally came to replace the ‘mugger’ as the new public enemy.  
There is little doubt that the media reporting surrounding the ‘gang’ had 
all the hallmarks of ‘exaggeration’, ‘distortion’, ‘prediction’ and ‘symbolization’ 
that Cohen (2002: 16-34) terms the ‘media inventory’. Cases of violence reported 
as ‘gang related’ were, on closer inspection, not ‘gang’ related at all (including, 
interestingly, the death of Damilola Taylor whose murder provoked the original 
‘discovery’  of  the  ‘gang’  but  who  was  actually  killed  by  two  brothers 
(Hallsworth and Young 2008). 
 In November 2000, Damilola Taylor, a 10-year-old schoolboy, was killed on a 37
council estate in Peckham, South London, after being stabbed in the leg. Two 
brothers aged 12 and 13 were subsequently convicted of his manslaughter.  
 Charlene Ellis aged 18 and Latisha Shakespeare aged 17 both died outside a 38
New Year’s party in 2003 in Aston, Birmingham, after being hit by a hail  of 
bullets dispensed from an automatic weapon in a ‘drive-by’ shooting.
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Despite  this,  having  ‘discovered’  ‘gangs’  the  media  has  since 
applied  the  term permissively  to  include  seemingly  all  and  every  group  of 
(working class) young people with any street presence. It is not only the media 
who  apply  the  term  ‘gang’  indiscriminately,  however.  Ofsted  (school) 
inspectors,  not  normally  recognised  for  their  criminological  expertise,  have 
nonetheless identified a burgeoning ‘gang culture’  in British schools (Ofsted, 
2005).  Not only have ‘gangs’ arrived, according to such accounts, they have 
been ascribed organisational capacities that they cannot possibly possess, as was 
the case with the sensational reporting of a group of ‘Muslim Boys’ in London. 
This  ‘gang’,  it  was  claimed  by  the  Independent  newspaper,  had  Al  Qaeda 
connections and their stock in trade was (allegedly) forcibly converting their 
‘victims’  to  Islam (Malik,  2005).  Add to  this  a  rash of  ill-thought  out  ‘gang’ 
documentaries - most of which have relied upon treating exceptional cases as 
the norm, asking leading questions and often treating unsubstantiated (not to 
say often absurd) testimony as gospel truth - so the ‘gangland Britain’ thesis 
assuredly came to establish itself as ‘the changing face of youth crime’ (Pitts, 
2008). 
To sensational media reporting must be added the contribution of a range 
of  other  dubious  moral  entrepreneurs  within  the  burgeoning  ‘gang  control 
industry’.  For  example,  Lee  Jasper  -  the  then  Mayor  of  London’s  principal 
adviser on ‘race’, youth and crime – proclaimed, in the Independent article on the 
‘Muslim  Boys’  that  they  represented  nothing  less  than  the  ‘single  greatest 
criminal threat’ he had ever witnessed (Malik, 2005). And even more absurdly, 
when  the  Mayor  of  London,  Boris  Johnson,  subsequently  held  a  press 
conference -  to publicise his anti-gang and anti-violence credentials -  he was 
flanked by  the  actor  Ross  Kemp whose  ‘expertise’  on  ‘gangs’  (and thus  his 
credibility to pronounce ‘solutions’) amounted to no more than being cast as a 
!306
gangster  in  a  popular  soap  opera  (‘EastEnders’)  and,  on  the  back  of  that, 
fronting a ‘documentary’ series on ‘gangs’. The Mayor’s ‘informed prognosis’, 
for what it is worth: ‘gang’ members had bad role models and needed better 
ones (the military) (Crerar, 2008). 
The  emerging  ‘gang  control  industry’  –  the  presence  of  which  has, 
paradoxically, fuelled moral panic - is nothing but eclectic. To help develop its 
anti-gang  strategy,  for  example,  the  Home  Office  commissioned  private 
consultants. Similarly, at a seminar convened at 10 Downing Street - co-chaired 
by the Prime Minister and the Home Secretary - a representative of the Wave 
Trust (a proselytising organisation steeped in biologically reductionist theories 
of crime) argued, in part, that the problem of ‘gangs’ arose from the fact that the 
average ‘gang’ member had an atrophied brain by the age of three (Wave Trust, 
2007). In a subsequent conference on ‘gangs’ - attended by the Mayor of London 
- an image of an atrophied brain appeared as part of a PowerPoint presentation 
provided by the Wave Trust  (by now apparently accorded the status of gang 
experts). Truth to tell it looked like a walnut (see figure 2)  . 39
Figure 2 Fantasies of the street (2): The brain of a ‘gang member’? 
 This image was subsequently used by a senior Metropolitan Police Officer to 39
illustrate the ‘reality’ of British ‘gangs’ at an international conference convened 
in Rome by the European Council in 2007. Sections of the audience were, to say 
the  least,  somewhat  incredulous.  On being asked where  the  neglected brain 
originated from,  the  officer  had to  concede that  it  belonged to  a  3  year  old 
Romanian Orphan, subject to extreme neglect and abuse. 
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!The  head  of  the  British  Race  Equalities  Council  at  the  time,  Trevor 
Phillips,  also  attended  the  Downing  Street  seminar.  He  was  subsequently 
quoted  by  the  Guardian  as  a  leading  player  in  the  development  of  the 
government’s  anti-gang  strategy  (Muir,  2007)  (although  quite  where  his 
supposed  ‘expertise’  on  ‘gangs’  came  from  is  unknown).  Phillips’  ‘expert’ 
solution  was  similar  (and  as  idiotic)  as  Ross  Kemp’s:  gang  members  need 
military role models don’t they?
Perhaps most problematic of all, academics have also played a significant 
role in helping cement the dystopian vision of a society plagued by ‘gangs’. 
Notwithstanding the more nuanced attempts to understand ‘gangs’ - that have 
cast considerable doubt on any notion of an organised counter force confronting 
the ‘good society’ (Aldridge and Medina- Ariza, 2005; Alexander,  2008) -  the 
problem  is  that  more  accurate,  but  less  sensational  terms,  like  ‘messy 
networks’ (Aldridge et al, this volume) rarely appeal in quite the same way as 
sensationalised constructions of ‘gangs’ and, as such, are easily ignored by the 
media and political elites with an interest in having their fantasies of the street 
confirmed rather than challenged. An associated problem with academic ‘gang 
talkers’ actively searching for ‘gangs’ and deploying surveys to help them ‘find’ 
them, is that such fixed determination is almost certainly going to yield ‘results’. 
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More  than  that,  given  the  fluidity  and  elasticity  of  ‘gang’  definitions,  the 
‘researcher’ can find as many or as few ‘gangs’ as their methodological variables 
- to measure ‘gang’ prevalence - allow. While the interventions of identifiable 
academic ‘experts’ into this policy arena might be expected to dispel some of the 
more grotesque media distortions, it has paradoxically acted to reinforce moral 
panic and escalate processes of deviance amplification further. 
Politicians  comprise  an  additional  constituency  to  have  found 
considerable mileage in the ‘gang’. New Labour ministers, for example, have 
been quick to seize and pronounce on the ‘gangland menace’. Tony Blair, when 
Prime Minister, was quick-off-the-mark in pledging a crackdown on ‘gangs’ and 
actively promoting the implementation of anti-gang legislation. Similarly, Iain 
Duncan Smith, representing the new face of ‘compassionate conservatism’ (sic), 
produced a report on ‘gangs’ entitled Dying to Belong that presents yet another 
vision of  the ‘gangland Britain’  thesis,  offered this  time as confirmation that 
Britain is indeed ‘broken’ (Centre for Social Justice, 2009). 
At  the  practitioner  end,  a  range of  personnel  have emerged from the 
woodwork in recent years, seemingly reinventing and presenting themselves as 
self-professed ‘gang’ experts and serving to front a disturbing proliferation of 
anti-gang policy and practice initiatives. As an example, at a conference run by 
the National Probation Service in 2008 (‘Steps 4 Change:  Addressing Serious 
Violence’), one practitioner presented a paper on the rise of girl ‘gangs’ flanked 
by two ‘gang girls’ whose voices were never heard (as the male practitioner did 
the talking for them).  According to this ‘expert’,  girl  ‘gang’ members are far 
more  dangerous  than people  imagine.  Scarily  the  conference  delegates  were 
busy  noting  down  this  nonsense  as  if  it  was  the  gospel  truth.  The  ‘expert’ 
concluded his presentation by drawing the audience’s attention to the dedicated 
programme  his  organisation  now  provides  to  tackle  the  ‘disturbing’  rise  of 
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‘gang girls’. As he noted (without irony), he had identified an ‘important’ gap in 
the market! 
What moral panic and the work of the media – alongside an army of 
other ‘right thinking people’ (Cohen, 2002: 1) who should know better – have 
managed to cement, and quite successfully, is the fundamental notion that the 
UK is facing an unprecedented threat from organised criminal (youth) ‘gangs’. 
The underpinning control fantasy provides that such ‘gangs’ are on the rise, 
they are large and organised, they are more dangerous than they used to be and 
they have to be stopped. All of this is said to necessitate the delegation of more 
and wider  powers to  the control  apparatus.  Perhaps inevitably,  without  any 
meaningful ‘gang’ intervention programme of its own, the UK government has 
looked for guidance to the USA, where the ‘gang control industry’ has tangibly 
failed but where such failure has not prevented its widespread implementation 
closer to home. 
The industrial logic of ‘gang’ production 
Moral panics tend by nature to be relatively intense but short in duration. 
Eventually  they  fade  away  as  ‘solutions’  are  developed  by  control  agencies 
and/or  the  media  lose  interest  and,  in  time,  normally  turn  attention  to  an 
alternative ‘folk devil’. While the ‘discovery’ of the ‘gang’ certainly fits with the 
developmental  cycle  of  moral  panic  discussed  by  Cohen  (1972;  2002)  and 
Critcher (2003), its demise is less certain in the short term. Indeed, it is more 
likely that violent street life - engendered by multiple forms of marginality in 
polarised cities - will continue to feed the ‘gangland Britain’ thesis. 
It is not only ‘gangland killings’ that sustain such fantasy. Rather the term 
‘gang’ is now so nebulous, fluid and elastic that it is randomly applied to just 
about any group of young people ‘hanging around’. The fundamental idea that 
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society is  facing an organised counterforce –  as  distinct  from a disorganised 
mess - ensures that the focus of attention remains on the ‘gang’ rather than the 
social and economic conditions that tend to produce violent street worlds. In 
this sense the ‘gang’ provides us with what Christie (2001) terms a ‘suitable 
enemy’, upon which an insecure society can vent its rage and indignation. 
The continued rediscovery of the ‘gang’ also meshes well with the needs 
of the emerging post welfare security state that requires a tangible object on 
which to focus. Conceptualising the street as an amorphous messy reality is too 
complex,  fuzzy  and uncomfortable  for  most  control  agents.  It  unsettles  and 
challenges their explanatory universe that is typically constructed in arboreal 
terms. If the street world can be reduced down to readily defined ‘office’ and 
neatly organised divisions of labour – ‘lieutenants’,  ‘soldiers’,  ‘aspirants’  and 
‘wannabees’, for example – to particular group identities allocated ‘risk’ scores 
and,  ultimately,  to  coercive  control,  it  lends  itself  to  convenience  whereby 
multiple, intersecting and extraordinarily complex phenomena are simplistically 
encapsulated by the problem of the ‘gang’. The term ‘gang’ might also remain 
popular  because  of  its  intrinsic  growth  potential.  As  noted,  it  is  an  elastic 
construct  that  can  be  mutated,  blurred  and  hybridised  at  will.  The  term  is 
pregnant with possibility. New ‘gang’ typologies are readily created – including 
‘girl gangs’ - and blended with other reifications such as ‘knife crime’ and ‘gun 
crime’. 
Following Christie’s lead (2000)it could also be noted that there is also an 
industrial logic to the reproduction of the ‘gang menace’. Until recently the UK 
had no established ‘gang’ experts and certainly little by way of a developed 
‘gang  control’  apparatus.  But  this  has  all  changed  and  there  is  now  a 
burgeoning industry that, on one hand, claims to suppress the ‘gang’ whilst on 
the  other  hand  paradoxically  feeds  from  it  and,  accordingly,  has  a  vested 
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interest in discovering and maintaining precisely that which it ostensibly aims 
to expunge. Ultimately, a stage has been reached where too many people have 
too great a vested interest in the ‘gang’ to surrender the gangland fantasy.
At the general level, ‘gang talk’ operates like a lubricant oiling the control 
apparatus in ways that allows its constituent cogs to turn and mesh together. 
‘Gang talk’, in this sense, animates the system. It provides a clear and common 
focus around which the control apparatus – and its various vested interests – 
works. Take, for example, the research community who have had a field day: 
discovering  ‘gangs’,  defining  ‘gangs’,  producing  ‘gang’  typologies  and,  not 
least, proffering views and informing ‘action plans’ pertaining to what needs to 
be done. This is now big business. Whereas, until recently, few academics were 
researching  this  issue,  ‘gang’  research  has  now  mushroomed.  The  political 
community is equally, if not more implicated. ‘Gang talk’ provides politicians 
with the ammunition they need in order to demonstrate governing competence 
within the emerging security state. 
Where, until recently, there were few ‘gang’ experts and few ‘gang’ suppression 
programmes,  these  are  now  proliferating  like  weeds.  One  of  the  core 
beneficiaries is the practitioner community that has found common purpose in 
‘gang’ suppression. By becoming ‘gang’ experts and – in some cases - chairing 
various  anti  ‘gang’  committees  and  task  forces,  many  practitioners  career 
prospects  have  prospered.  Others,  particularly  in  the  private  sector,  have 
created ‘anti-gang programmes’ attracting generous funding from central and 
local government. John Pitts (2008) refers to ‘reluctant gangsters’ but there is 
also a constituency of reluctant practitioners who have found that unless they 
also do ‘gang talk’, they are unlikely to receive the necessary resources needed 
to  sustain  services  for  the  troubled  young  people  with  whom  they  work. 
Indeed, as an indication of such absurdity youth workers have been known to 
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attempt to have their young people identified as ‘gang’ members precisely so 
they can access services and support that would otherwise not be available. 
What is to be done? 
From the perspective of the control imaginary the solution is clear. A new 
‘public enemy’ has emerged and it must be suppressed. Inspired by the USA, 
‘solutions’ are now being borrowed and are currently being rolled out across the 
UK.  Many  problems  of  the  street  certainly  derive  from  the  behaviours  and 
actions of violent men operating within the volatile world that is the retail end 
of  the illegal  drug economy. This  is  a  world where violence is  produced by 
messy,  amorphous  and  profoundly  disorganised  processes  as  distinct  from 
organised and regimented divisions of labour. But because many ‘gang talkers’ 
occupy the  space  of  the  control  imaginary  this  is  not  the  street  reality  they 
typically want to see. It’s simply not convenient: it collides with and unsettles 
not  only  their  explanatory  universe  but  also,  in  many  cases,  their  vested 
interests in the industry that is keeping ‘gang’ mythology alive. 
Real solutions cannot be found from within the control imaginary and 
others  must  be  sought  out.  If  the  problem  of  the  street  is  its  social 
disorganisation then, in part, a solution lies in creating a more organised street 
world. The way forward is not to confront this volatile reality by suppressing 
the ‘gang’, but by radicalising and politicising the often deeply alienated and 
marginalised  young  people  who  live  amongst  it.  Far  from  looking  at  the 
emerging ‘gang’ suppression industry as the solution to the problem of street 
violence; it must itself be conceptualised as part of the problem. To build a better 
society,  therefore,  it  is  ultimately  necessary  to  eliminate  the  ‘gang’  control 
industry. 
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Deciphering Gang Talk
We  are  back  in  England  yet  again,  it’s  August  2011  and  London  is 
burning.  The police  have managed to shoot  dead yet  another Black male in 
dubious circumstances and across the city thousands of people have taken to 
the streets. The resulting disorder unfolds for a further four days as the riots 
reach out beyond London to take hold in cities across the country. It would be 
the  worst  outbreak  of  urban  disorder  England  had  witnessed  in  decades. 
Someone or something had to be blamed and it was not going to be the police. 
Within three days of the riots the Prime Minister, David Cameron, convened a 
press conference and identified ‘gangs’ as the criminal masterminds responsible 
for organising the riots, and ‘gang culture’ the background cause. Put together, 
these were responsible for what he went on to identify as a ‘major criminal 
disease that has infected streets and estates across our country’. 
At  the  heart  of  all  the  violence  sits  the  issue  of  the  street  gangs. 
Territorial, hierarchical and incredibly violent, they are mostly composed 
of  young  boys,  mainly  from  dysfunctional  homes.  They  earn  money 
through crime, particularly drugs and are bound together by an imposed 
loyalty to an authoritarian gang leader. (Cameron 2011)
Let’s  go back in  time now to  2007 where  Hurricane Katrina,  obeying 
every prediction that  had been made about  such an event,  swept  into  New 
Orleans, breaching its levees, burying the city beneath an avalanche of water. If 
this  was a  tragedy for  the city  it  was an even greater  tragedy for  the city’s 
poorest  Black  community  whose  neighbourhoods  were  devastated  by  the 
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resulting floods that would also go on to claim many lives. Only this would be a 
tragedy with a difference because within 24 hours of the levees being breached, 
the  worst  humanitarian  crisis  the  United  States  had  experienced  in  recent 
decades became discursively reconstructed instead into a crisis of law and order. 
Instead of recognising the Black population as victims cruelly abandoned by a 
federal government seemingly impervious to their plight, a dominant theme in 
the  reporting  of  Katrina  was  of  Black  looters,  armed  Black  gangs  on  the 
rampage and Black rapists. And the power of this ‘gang talk’ was so powerful 
that when the authorities eventually returned to the abandoned city; it returned 
more as an invasion force than a rescue effort. 
Two very different events, but each unified by the fact that, in both cases, 
versions of ‘gang talk’ were mobilised to make sense of them. Not only did gang 
talk  establish  the  definitional  narrative,  as  we  have  seen,  reality  was  then 
(re)ordered around it: in the case of New Orleans, troops were sent in to reclaim 
the drowned city from its gangs, while, in the immediate aftermath of the riots 
not  caused by  gangs,  the  British  government  developed a  gang-suppression 
policy as its response
These two cases are graphic but by no means unusual examples of events 
where ‘gang talk’ has come to provide the interpretative grid by and through 
which divergent social problems are rendered legible, even when the events in 
question are by no means solely or even remotely gang-related. In the US the 
gang has been equated with the terrorist  threat,  the illegal  drugs trade,  and 
global  crime  more  generally.  In  the  UK,  media  hysteria  has  seen  the  gang 
blamed for everything (as we have seen) from outbreaks of dangerous dogs, to 
the mass rape and sexual abuse of women, to most shootings and, not least, the 
organisation of the illegal drugs trade. 
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The sensational and often hysterical coverage the gang has received has 
by  no  means  remained  absent  from  the  radar  of  critical  scholars.  Dwight 
Conquergood  was  one  of  the  first  commentators  to  draw  attention  to  the 
criminalising rhetoric at play in the way gangs were being represented and the 
criminalising functions such a discourse performed.
In the public sphere, the label gang is a thickly layered representational 
screen onto which powerful and contradictory images are projected. The 
term  gang  powerfully  cathects  and  conjures  middle  class  fears  and 
anxieties about social disorder, disintegration and chaos, that are made 
palpable  in  these  demonised  figures  of  inscrutable,  unproductive, 
predatory,  pathological  alien  Others  lurking  in  urban  shadows  and 
margins, outside the community of decent people. (Conquergood 1991: 4)
In his own reflection on the way the gang was represented,  not least, 
within the academy of American gang researchers, Jack Katz also observed the 
disjunction between the way the gang was being narrated in official discourse 
and a street reality that was very different (Katz and Jackson 1997). The ‘gang’, 
he argued, appeared less a descriptive term identifying groups out there in the 
street,  but  appeared  instead  as  a  ‘transcendental  evil’  into  which  wholly 
disparate social problems could be unproblematically folded. In the UK, Claire 
Alexander has also pursued a similar theme. The term ‘gang’, she observes, is 
one heavily saturated with a cultural and not least racial baggage from which it 
is difficult to disentangle (Alexander 2008).
Given the seductive appeal of gang talk and the sheer variety of social 
problems it is  now deployed to explain, a case could be made for exploring its 
nature further, and this will constitute the focus of this chapter: its aim, to build 
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upon and develop the insights of Conquergood, Katz and Alexander by seeking 
to  decipher  the  enigmatic  discourse,  gang  talk.  To  explore  this  ‘garrulous 
discourse’  the  chapter  addresses  two  questions:  ‘What  are  the  defining 
characteristics  of  gang  talk’?  and  ‘Why  is  this  discourse  so  seductive’?  It 
concludes by looking at some of its unintended consequences.
Gang  talk,  I  will  argue,  constitutes  a  free-floating  discourse  that  can 
operate wholly independently of  gang realities  as  these unfold in any street 
context. In constitution, it can be considered a conspiracy discourse produced by 
those who do not live gang realities but have a vested interest in gang lives and 
gang  worlds.  Gang  talk  is  thus  a  discourse  that  reflects  what,  following 
Lefebvre, I propose to term representations of the street not street representations as 
gang members produce them. 
Gang  talk  is  a  discourse  that  possesses  a  determinate  structure.  It 
constitutes,  as  such,  what  Wittgenstein  would  designate  a  ‘language  game’ 
replete  with  its  own  vocabulary  and  rules  of  composition;  rules  that  gang-
talkers intuitively iterate and reiterate in the gang talk they produce. Gang talk 
is organised around several common self-reinforcing tropes about gangs and 
how they are imagined to develop; these can be narrated and recognised by 
gang-talkers without any of them ever having to have met a gang member or a 
gang in their  lives.  Gang talk,  then,  can reveal  the ‘truth’  of  ‘gangs’  wholly 
independently of any empirical confirming evidence. 
Gang talk is seductive precisely because of the performative role it plays 
and by reference to the primal and powerful archetypes it harnesses. This is not 
a discourse that lends itself to disconfirmation because, as we shall establish, 
gang talk operates through iteration and confirmation. It is seductive precisely 
because it is performative. It is popular because the archetypes it trades in are 
timeless and because it provides a seemingly plausible narrative about the way 
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things are. At the same time it is also a discourse of power and must also be 
understood in terms of the ideological role it plays in stabilising a post-welfare 
neoliberal security state and its constituent social relations.
Defining Gang Talk
By ‘gang talk’ I mean to designate a discourse about gangs that has wide 
currency. It is a discourse that works to make meaningful the world of gangs 
both to those who produce this discourse and to others who are receptors of it. 
By and large, the producers of gang talk (hereafter ‘gang-talkers’) are those with 
a vested interest in gangs (of some sort) but who are not of the world of gangs 
they talk about. They may be journalists looking for a good story about them, 
enforcement agencies that want to suppress them, practitioners on the hunt for 
gang suppression money, the public who are scared of them, academics wanting 
to study them, or policy-makers who have been given the mission of developing 
anti-gang strategies.  
These are people who, by and large, do not belong to the street world of 
gangs they want to talk about and who, consequently, have a distance from this 
world.  They  produce,  as  such,  and  to  evoke  the  language  of  Lefebvre, 
representations  of  the  street  not  street  representations  as  those  who  live  gang 
realities produce them (Lefebvre 1991). This disjunction is important but often 
lost on gang-talkers who imagine their world and the world of gang members is, 
in some sense, cognate. It is not. Gang-talkers, therefore, occupy a very different 
discursive space from those who live gang realities. Those who live gang realities 
at the same time live their gang realities in very different terms than the gang 
talk  that  gang-talkers  produce  about  them.  Gang  talk  as  such  constitutes  a 
discourse of power because gang-talkers are primary definers of deviance and 
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their interpretations predominate over street representations which are silenced 
or, alternatively, translated into versions of gang talk.
Just as it is important to distinguish representations of the street from street 
representations so it is important to distinguish the order of representations from 
the world of street practices (see Figure 3.1). This is a material reality populated 
by social relations within and between groups (gangs and others), relations that 
are in perpetual movement. This order is not directly legible either to those who 
live gang realities or to gang-talkers who want to comprehend the street world 
where  gangs  dwell.  Gang talk  does  not  capture  this  reality  because  what  it 
typically trades in are idealistic representations of the street. While gang-talkers 
might  well  respond  that  they  in  fact  trade  in  street  representations  having 
spoken to gang members, their epistemological illiteracy blinds them to the fact 
that  when  asked  to  narrate  their  gang  realities  (‘Tell  me  about  your  gang 
please’) what they tend to get back is more gang talk. 
! Figure 3.1 Ontologising the 
street
Street Practices
Street 
Representations
Representations 
of the Street
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Rather than engage with gang talk as a discourse that is mistaken about 
its object (they are wrong about the gang for this or that reason), or see it as the 
product of a moral panic that exhibits moral panic features (over-reaction to an 
event, sensational coverage, the pathologising of an enemy (Cohen 1972; Goode 
and Ben-Yehuda 1994)), I would suggest that more can be gained by examining 
gang talk as an imaginary discourse that best exhibits the desire production of 
its producers. Gang talk, at least as I intend to approach it, can thus best be read 
and  studied  as  a  collective  control  fantasy  that  reveals  the  predilections, 
anxieties and desires of its producers more than the truth of the street it aspires 
to represent. 
Reading Gang Talk as a Language Game
If we consider the literary genre of fantasy-writing, evoked in novels and 
cinema such as The Lord of the Rings trilogy, then what we find distinctive about 
it is that the worlds in which the novels are set are not just fictional but literally 
fantastic  (Butler  2009).  These  are  imaginary  worlds  often  populated  by 
imaginary  beings  set  in  parallel  worlds  or  worlds  set  in  some remote  time. 
These are magical places populated by magical beings, but at the same time 
they also possess recognisably human attributes which are what make them 
familiar to us. 
Gang talk, I would suggest, is not unlike the fantasy genre insofar as it 
does  not  capture  the  reality  of  gang  practices,  but  rather  a  fantasised 
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representation  of  them.  These  are  found  materialised  in  various  journalistic 
accounts, press releases, academic articles, reports and statements about gangs. 
Gang talk, like fantasy fiction, is an imaginary construction which reflects gangs 
less as they are, and more how they are imagined to be; where what is imagined 
represents the phantasmagorical desires of gang-talkers. This is why, as we shall 
see, the gang, as gang talk constructs it, has a sensational appearance that has 
little to do with a material reality that is often more mundane. As we shall also 
observe, gang talk is also populated by similar tropes to those reproduced in 
fantasy fiction, particularly in its evocation of a world reduced in Manichaean 
terms to Evil subterranean multitudes that are on the rise and which must be 
vanquished by those of the Good.
To study gang talk then we need methodologically to treat it as a self-
enclosed, self-referential discourse that has a distinctive structure we need to 
interpret.  To  study  this  we  need  to  look  at  how the  gang  is  imagined  and 
positioned within this discourse. The first point to note is that gang talk is a 
conspiracy discourse; one that coalesces around a perspective on gangs where 
they are presumed to be a potent threat and one that is growing. Gang talk, 
then, is an unending paranoiac rumination about the evil gangs represent and 
pose in the process of their mutant development. Within this discourse, as we 
shall  observe,  seemingly  innocuous  events  and  activities  assume  the  most 
sinister  dimensions.  In  this  world  gangs  do  not  spontaneously  form,  they 
‘recruit’  and  ‘groom’  instead;  they  do  not  communicate,  they  engage  in 
‘branding exercises’.  In David Garland’s terms, to study gang talk is thus to 
engage with what he terms ‘the criminology of the other’ because it is as ‘Other’ 
that the gang is imagined (Garland 1996). The question I now want to pose here 
is what precisely is it that is ‘Other’ about them?
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To address  this,  it  pays  to  think  of  gang talk  as  a  language  game in 
Wittgenstein’s (1953) sense; that is, as a primitive language defined by common 
terms and bound by common rules that define the permissible moves that any 
player (gang-talker)  can make in the gang talk they produce.  As a language 
game, gang talk is composed of a series of mutually self-reinforcing tropes. Each 
reflects  a  particular  ‘truth’  about  the  gang  and  the  alleged  pattern  of  its 
development. There are, I will suggest, six that require consideration (though 
that  said,  there  may well  be  many more).  These  may be  studied under  the 
following headings: 
Novelty: They were not here but now they are and we have never 
seen their like before. 
Proliferation: They were few but now they are many. Now they are 
multitude.
Corporatisation: Until recently they were disorganised but now they are 
organised and organising as we speak.
Weaponisation: Their violence was once manageable but as they organise 
they appropriate and possess ever more terrifying 
‘weapons of choice’.
Penetration: They may emerge in particular areas but over time they 
expand to penetrate and colonise new settings (they are out 
to get us!!!).
Monstrousness: Gang members may look like ‘normal’ people but they are 
essentially different. ‘Here be monsters …’
For the most part the evidence I adduce to explore and substantiate these 
elements of gang talk is derived from the UK experience. As a case study the UK 
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is relevant because it has been undergoing a moral panic about gangs for some 
years now. As with other moral panics, the gang has found itself at the centre of 
moral outrage from a state that has now delegated an array of alarming coercive 
powers to enforcement agencies; many taken ‘off the shelf’ from the US. The 
media  continue  to  report  the  gang  in  sensational  terms  while  enforcement 
agencies,  in  what  has  becoming a  burgeoning new anti-gang industry,  have 
produced an ongoing blizzard of gang-talking reports about them. 
In what  follows I  will  draw,  albeit  selectively,  on a  range of  different 
gang-talking texts.  Most,  it  could be observed, present themselves as serious 
documents composed by serious commentators seeking to reveal the Terrible 
Truth about gangs; a number even claim that the ‘truth’ revealed is based on 
empirical research and constitutes a ‘realist’ analysis of the gang phenomenon. 
Here, without exception or apology, I treat them as fantasy constructions. 
Novelty
British history is rich with groups that might well be said to constitute 
what we today call ‘gangs’. In the Middle Ages they were known as ‘canting 
crews’;  in  the  seventeenth  century  the  notorious  highwayman  Dick  Turpin 
belonged  to  what  was  known  as  the  Essex  Gang  (Hallsworth  2005;  Harris 
1971)). In his novel Brighton Rock, Graham Greene narrates the tragic history of 
would-be gang member Pinky, set in Brighton during the period between the 
First  and  Second  World  Wars  (Greene  1975);  while  in  the  novel  Clockwork 
Orange,  written in the 1960s, Anthony Burgess paints a dystopian vision of a 
British future overrun by gangs (Burgess 1962).  Gangs, in other words,  have 
always been around and the public have always been fascinated by the lives of 
gangsters. 
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Despite being a perennial feature of street life in many neighbourhoods 
(as  we saw in Chapter  2)  gang talk constitutes  the gang as  an entirely new 
phenomenon, the like of which has never been seen before. As Geoffrey Pearson 
observes, in imagining the gang as eternally new, the public is caught up in a 
form of historical amnesia about a past characterised as invariably benign and 
peaceful  (from  which  gangs  are  absent)  which  is  then  set  against  a  bleak 
dystopian  present  (Pearson  1983,  2011)  now  apparently  overrun  by  gangs. 
Captivated  by  the  shock  of  the  new;  the  idea  that  they  have  discovered 
something  the  like  of  which  has  never  been  witnessed  before,  gang-talkers 
produce a fantasy of the present characterised by an immense rupture with the 
past.  Evidence  of  the  hold  this  way  of  thinking  exercises  is  nowhere  more 
clearly exemplified than in the widely held claim that gangs in the UK today 
represent nothing less than what Pitts terms ‘the new face of youth crime’ (Pitts 
2008).
That similar refrains about youth groups exist back through the twentieth 
century (and beyond) becomes, unfortunately, lost in this exercise in negation.
Proliferation
It is not just that the gang is here where until recently it was not, gang 
talk also coalesces around the idea that the gangs are now proliferating; where 
they were once few, now apparently they are multiplying and are now many. 
And, of course, it is getting worse all the time. This narrative is often bound up 
with  a  representation of  gangs  and gang culture  imagined as  some form of 
infectious  disease  or  virus  that  gestates  in  one  group  before  migrating  to 
another, which then becomes ‘infected’ by this mutant ‘criminal disease’. This 
refrain became popular in the aftermath of the riots of 2011, not least after the 
appearance  of  celebrity  historian  David  Starkey  on  a  primetime  news 
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programme,  who argued that  a  gang culture  that  had gestated in  the  Black 
community had now reached out  to infect  the culture of  the white  working 
class. 
Most  gangs  are  populated  by  young  men  and  most  gang  offending, 
according to the available evidence, is male (Klein 2001). None of this, however, 
has  prevented  various  journalists  from  recurrently  discovering  girl  gangs 
populated by hyper-violent ‘she-male’ gangsters who, we are asked to believe, 
have  become  as  dangerous  or  even  more  so  than  their  male  counterparts. 
Though, as Tara Young’s (2009, 2011) and Susan Batchelor’s (2009) careful and 
detailed demolitions of the ‘she-male gangster thesis’ attest, the evidential basis 
for such claims is weak, headlines nevertheless proliferate: ‘Mob Violence: The 
Rise of Girl Gangs’ (Lee 2008), or ‘The Feral Sex: The Terrifying Rise of Violent 
Girl Gangs’ (Bracchi 2008). 
Nor  is  it  only  young  women  you  have  succumbed  to  the  gang  infection. 
According to other reports,  gang members are getting much, much younger. 
Hail the rise of the ‘tinies’ as they are known, young gangbangers aged no older 
than  three,  armed  and  dangerous  and  on  a  street  near  you  (Clements  and 
Roberts 2007).
Corporatisation
Not  only  are  the  gangs  multiplying,  the  gang  today  is  evolving  and 
organising in ever more lethal directions. The narrative runs something like this: 
‘Once upon a time the groups were disorganised and posed a relatively small 
threat we could deal with; but now they are organising as we speak, and now 
pose terrible threats to us all.’ At its most developed this (hysterical) aspect of 
gang  talk  works  by  conceding  to  the  gang-bureaucratic  attributes  that  best 
describe the structure of  corporations and armies.  In this  projection,  a  street 
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reality which is most often composed (as we shall subsequently see) of loose, 
amorphous, fluid and, in a Deleuzian sense, rhizomatic networks (Hallsworth 
and Silverstone  2009)  becomes  reconstructed in  terms that  best  describe  the 
organisations that gang-talkers typically inhabit.  And so the gang is ascribed 
with elaborate divisions of labour and a complex vertical, hierarchical structure. 
This attempt to corporatise the street by projecting upon it attributes that 
best  define  formal  social  institutions  is  by  no  means  new.  To  return  to  the 
Middle  Ages  the  Canting  Crew  was  imagined  in  organisational  terms  that 
corresponded to that of the medieval guild. Entry to the Company of Thieves 
required a solemn oath while the Canting order was imagined to possess twelve 
subdivisions (the Canting Orders) presided over by the ‘Dimbler Dambler’, the 
Prince of  Thieves  (Harris  1971).  Moving forward to  the 1960s  and the same 
process could be observed in the US, nowhere more brilliantly worked through 
than  in  Cressey’s  evocation  of  the  Mafia  as  a  shadow  corporation  (Cressey 
1969).  This  fantasy  of  organised  crime  as  a  criminal  corporation  involved 
conceding to it a pyramidal structure presided over by the Godfather, supported 
by a company lawyer (the ‘Consigliere’), run by various middle managers (the 
Lieutenants) who control the street ‘soldiers’. The same process can also be seen 
at  work in the UK today,  in accounts of  gangs that  rework street  terms like 
‘elders’ (older gangsters),  ‘youngers’ (younger men),  ‘tinies’  (young children) 
and ‘wannabes’ (would-be gangsters) and transforming this into a full-blown 
bureaucratic gang structure (see Pitts 2008).
The attempt to corporatise the gang also reflects a key trait about gang 
talk more generally. Again, to revert to the language of Deleuze, gang talk is 
constructed from within an arborescent (tree-thinking) perspective and this is 
nowhere reflected more than in the pronounced tendency to approach the gang 
in the same way sociologists traditionally studied bureaucracies and to deploy a 
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managerial language to describe their features (Deleuze and Guattari 1988). In 
the  words  of  Jonathon Toy,  for  example,  a  practitioner  musing on the  gang 
situation in London, ‘organisational gangs’, as he terms them,
are well structured, profit led businesses. They are led by entrepreneurial, 
dynamic  individuals,  capable  of  creating  high  levels  of  loyalty  with 
dividends being paid to the board of directors as a reward for success. 
They  have  a  strong  recruitment  policy,  akin  to  headhunting,  and  are 
willing to fire people who do not perform or who go against the ethos of 
the business. (Toy 2008)
He goes on to identify the organisational features of this new criminal gang in a 
diagram that is resolutely corporatist in inspiration (Figure 3.2). 
!
Figure 3.2 Gang talking fantasy: The corporate model of the gang
Source: Toy (2008: 31).
Weaponisation
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As the attraction of gangs is bound up ineluctably with the violence that 
gang members do, it is unsurprising that a key focus of gang talk condenses 
around the weapons gang members allegedly carry. To a degree, this aspect of 
gang  talk  is  also  bound  up  with  the  idea  that  as  the  gang  becomes  more 
organised, gang members are more likely to carry weapons, while the weapons 
they carry become ever more lethal.  
In the UK, the gang-talking narrative that surrounded the contemporary 
(re)discovery  of  the  gang  exhibited  precisely  this  narrative.  Gangs,  it  was 
alleged, were no longer fighting each other with fists; they were now carrying 
knives and were increasingly arming themselves with guns to sort  out  their 
‘gang wars’. If that was not enough, the gang was also beginning to innovate by 
using  what  the  media  and  other  right-thinking  people  like  to  term  ‘new 
weapons of choice’. 
As  we  saw  in  Chapter  1,  they  have  quite  a  lot  of  these,  including 
dangerous dogs such as pit bulls which have now become ‘a weapon of choice 
for  gang members,  drug dealers  and street  corner  thugs’  (BBC News 2009); 
while  according to  ROTA,  ‘Rape has  become a  weapon of  choice,  and used 
against sisters, girlfriends and on occasion mothers, as it is the only weapon that 
cannot be detected during a stop and search’ (Firmin 2010).
The idea of the gang imagined as an armed, insurgent unit perhaps also 
explains why they were so quickly identified and blamed for the urban disorder 
in the UK in 2011. After all, they have been blamed for every other inner-urban 
problem in recent years, so why not riots? This also helps to explain why they 
can be identified with the capacity not only to cause riots but also to destroy 
community life entirely; a sentiment expressed clearly by government minister 
Iain Duncan Smith, a self-styled expert on gangs, in his reflections on the causes 
of social breakdown: 
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Gangs have created no-go areas and made impossible the very things 
that  could  help  deprived  neighbourhoods  to  rejuvenate,  such  as 
community action and business development. Gangs are both a product 
of social breakdown and a driver of it. (Duncan Smith 2011)
Penetration
Fears about the ‘new weapons of  choice’  are compounded by various 
fears  and  anxieties  about  the  gangs’  capacity  to  extend  themselves  through 
space. They begin as always in the inner-city estates where they emerge, but, 
over time, they reach out to colonise other settings which they dominate and 
control. This fantasy is expressed variously in the idea that super-gangs have 
developed which now exercise total control over social life in the estates where 
they  are  found  (see  Pitts  2008),  to  fears  and  anxieties  over  what  are  often 
referred  to  by  gang-talkers  as  the  ‘recruitment  strategies’  of  gangs,  and  in 
particular the corrupting role they play in ‘grooming’ vulnerable people and 
enticing them into a life of vice and crime. 
Gang members often groom girls at school and encourage/coerce them 
to  recruit  other  girls  through  school/social  networks.  There  is  also 
anecdotal evidence that younger girls (some as young as 10 or 12) are 
increasingly being targeted, and these girls are often much less able to 
resist the gang culture or manipulation by males in the group. The girls 
often do not identify their attackers as gang members and tend to think 
of them as boyfriends. They may also be connected through family or 
other networks. Girls are often groomed using drugs and alcohol, which 
act as disinhibitors and also create dependency. Girls may also be used as 
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mules to transport drugs,  which frequently involves trafficking within 
the UK. (London Serious Youth Violence Board, 2009)
Nor  are  gangs  today  geographically  bound to  the  estates  which  they 
apparently control. In such narratives the gang is imagined as a mutant force 
that  invades  new  territories  in  order  to  feed  upon  ever  new  categories  of 
victims. They have, apparently, invaded the prison system. Apparently radical 
fundamentalist Islam gangs are not only rampant in the penal system, they are 
forcibly converting young men to Islam within them (Beckford 2012). 
If this isn’t bad enough, it gets worse. The gangs apparently are also seeking to 
target  posh  girls-only  schools  in  leafy  suburbia,  at  least  according  to  the 
findings of the self-defined ‘watershed’ ROTA report: 
Girls who carry firearms and drugs for their boyfriends often live in areas 
that are not perceived to have a ‘gang-problem’, may attend grammar or 
private all-girls schools , will rarely be under any form of surveillance or 
be known to any specialist services such as children’s or youth offending 
services have their own bank account where their boyfriend can store his 
money. (Firmin 2010)
Note  what  is  being  evoked  here:  the  world  of  childhood  innocence 
corrupted; a world where decent girls who attend privileged schools in ‘good’ 
areas, are targeted by evil gang members from the ghetto who force them to 
carry their weapons and hide their criminal goods. That the report was based, as 
we have seen, predominantly upon opinion, much of it garnered from people 
who had no gang affiliation, where the term ‘gang’ was never defined, escaped 
notice.  As for the claim that gangs were targeting grammar school girls,  the 
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report (in common with most gang talk) produces no evidence at all in support 
of  the sensational  claim being made that  everyone else  then unquestionably 
accepts.
Monsters
If we consider the way in which gang members are described in gang-
talking narratives, what comes across is a vision of a population who are not 
only systematically dehumanised but rendered absolutely Other. In this guise 
they appear as violent psychotic outsiders, driven by depravity to crime; wholly 
devoid of recognisably human attributes. 
If we consider further what it is that is monstrous about the gang then 
one of its most evident features is that its members are almost always imagined 
to  belong  to  or  come  from  a  minority  ethnic  group.  The  legacy  of  deeply 
inscribed racism, it could be observed, invariably reflects itself in gang-talking 
narratives not least  when produced by white middle-class gang-talkers.  And 
this explains why, in the UK, the gangs are invariably Black or Asian. This also 
explains why group offending is never found in predominantly white middle-
class suburbs, though fears of wealthy areas being penetrated by gangs forms a 
potent  trope within  gang talk,  as  the  idea  of  the  gangs  targeting privileged 
schools  reminds  us.  Like  the  undead  in  Buffy  the  Vampire  Slayer;  the  gang 
member  is  conceived  as  someone  who  is  essentially  different  from  the 
indigenous  (white)  population.  And  like  the  undead  in  Buffy,  this  is  a 
population that cannot be reasoned with but only coercively controlled.
Monstrousness is also bound up with the idea prominent in gang-talking 
discourses that the gang member is essentially different from ‘normal’ members 
of society. They may be born different or, once subject to the fatal embrace of the 
gangs or that wonderfully nebulous term ‘gang culture’ (having been ‘groomed’ 
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or ‘recruited’),  they become different.  Here are the signs and symptoms that 
define those who have been subject to such a process of conversion, at least as 
fantasised by the authors of a report into serious youth violence in the UK – a 
report  which,  to  define  a  typical  and  recurring  feature  in  the  gang-talking 
literature, adduces absolutely no evidence at all to support its claims: 
Gang identifiers:
• Child withdrawn from family;
• Sudden  loss  of  interest  in  school.  Decline  in  attendance  or  academic 
achievement  (although  it  should  be  noted  that  some  gang  members  will 
maintain a good attendance record to avoid coming to notice);
• Being emotionally ‘switched off’, but also containing frustration rage;
• Started to use new or unknown slang words;
• Holds unexplained money or possessions;
• Stays  out  unusually  late  without  reason,  or  breaking  parental  rules 
consistently;
• Sudden change in appearance –  dressing in a  particular  style  or  ‘uniform’ 
similar  to  that  of  other  young people  they hang around with,  including a 
particular colour;
• Dropped out of positive activities;
• New nickname;
• Unexplained  physical  injuries,  and/or  refusal  to  see  /receive  medical 
treatment for injuries;
• Graffiti style ‘tags’ on possessions, school books, walls;
• Constantly talking about another young person who seems to have a lot of 
influence over them;
• Broken off with old friends and hangs around with one group of people;
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• Associating with known or suspected gang members, closeness to siblings or 
adults in the family who are gang members;
• Started adopting certain codes of group behaviour, e.g. ways of talking and 
hand signs;
• Expressing aggressive or intimidating views towards other groups of young 
people, some of whom may have been friends in the past;
• Scared when entering certain areas; and
• Concerned  by  the  presence  of  unknown  youths  in  their  neighbourhoods. 
(London Serious Youth Violence Board 2009)
In reading the above, continuities can be established between the way the 
gang  member  is  being  identified  today  and  older  myths  and  stereotypes 
reproduced about dope fiends in the 1940s and 1950s; everyday stories about 
how decent, well-behaved kids from respectable families became demented and 
depraved addicts having been forced to take the evil ‘weed’ by a drug dealer. As 
with the dope fiend, we find signs of dropping out of the good society as a 
marker  of  gang  belonging  (‘broken  off  with  old  friends’,  ‘dropping  out  of 
positive activities’),  as we do signs of  entry to a new monstrous gang order 
(adopting certain codes, a new nickname, and so on).
Monstrousness  is  also  evident  in  the  eternal  fascination  gang-talker’s 
exhibit  towards  what  are  often  imaged  as  the  evil  induction  rituals  gang 
members  indulge  in.  Initiation  ceremonies  often  garner  considerable  and 
salacious  interest.  And  several  circulate,  though  evidence  attesting  to  their 
reality is often difficult to find, as research into this issue attests (Decker and 
Van Winkle 1996). For some gangs, apparently, rape is used as a rite of passage, 
while other gangsters, it is claimed, apparently require would be wannabes to 
randomly shoot or stab a stranger as a price for belonging. 
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Taking the idea of the gang member as abnormal monster to its logical 
conclusion, images of an atrophied brain were presented by members of the 
Wave  Trust,  a  proselytising  organisation  steeped  in  biologically  reductionist 
theories of crime, at practitioner conferences and seminars about gangs in the 
UK, with the implication that this is what the brain of a gang member looks like. 
The brain in question was that of a seriously neglected three-year-old Romanian 
orphan. 
The Seduction of Gang Talk
None of this disputes the fact  that gangs exist  and can be dangerous, 
however we elect to define this vague and elusive term. There are gang realities 
and we need to comprehend them. Moreover, gang lives fit certain aspects of the 
ascribed archetypes which help to confirm the gang talk that gang-talkers do. 
Guns and knives are not discursive constructions, not least when used by gang 
members to shoot each other. Gangs, as such, are not, as Aldridge and Medina 
(2010) observe, spectres or chimeras of the control imaginary. That said, when 
gang-talkers attempt to engage with the reality of the gang, it is not the reality of 
gang practices that they engage with, what is produced instead is an imaginary 
set of representations about gangs that take the archetypical forms described 
above, and it is these that take precedence when gangs are being evoked by the 
wider gang-talking fraternity. 
In  such  representations  any  sense  of  proportion  is  invariably  evicted. 
Rare instances become indicative of the norm; the exception defines the rule. 
Complex, messy lives in this process are reconstructed into evil caricatures; a 
pornography of violence prevails in which only the most extreme representation 
is  allowed  and  heard.  In  this  highly  essentualised  construction  complexity 
simply has no place. All  gang members are ubiquitously alike and each and 
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every one embodies every pathology the gang-talking fraternity identifies. In 
the evocation of the gang as the harbinger of all evil the gang literally becomes 
what David Brotherton terms ‘everyman’s other’.
The  archetypes  around  which  gang  talk  is  assembled  are  deeply 
ingrained in the social imaginary. They are not, as such, new; all that gang talk 
does  is  reassemble  them.  The  image  of  the  gang,  in  this  sense,  parallels 
archetypes about fearsome outsiders everywhere. Historically, elements of these 
can  most  certainly  be  found in  the  folk  literature  and  fairy  tales;  they  also 
provide the stable of much fantasy literature that also hinges on the arrival into 
the good society of dark subterranean forces that mean it harm. In our insecure 
age,  primordial  fears  about the Other continue to enjoy wide dissemination. 
Fears about the terror threat represent yet another manifestation. So too does 
gang  talk,  which  also  articulates  long-established  perennial  fears  about 
outsiders everywhere.
Gang talk, it could be noted, is never a neutral discourse, but one bound 
up  with  a  racial  subtext  from  which  it  cannot  be  disentangled.  This  helps 
explain, not least, why gangs have been so sensationally rediscovered in British 
society. The fact that they were associated from the beginning with Black youth, 
an already criminalised population, has a lot to do with it. For Conguergood, 
gang  talk  is  itself  bound  up  with  what,  following  Said,  he  identifies  as 
‘orientalism’ (Said 1978); only in this case the ‘other’ being evoked is no longer 
the  exotic  colonial  subject  abroad,  it  denotes  instead  the  ‘new  postcolonial 
natives of the urban jungle’. 
The inner city and suburbs are polarised sites within a new economically 
articulated  geography  of  power  and  domination  that  remaps  the 
colonialist axis between capital and colony. The ‘inner city’, like Joseph 
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Conrad’s Congo, is spatially imagined as a journey into a dark interior, 
the penetration of a cavity, an orifice, an absence a moral decent into an 
urban heart of darkness’. (Conquergood 1991: 5)
In  gang  talk  then  we  find a  world  reduced  to  a  fundamental  binary 
between the healthy ‘included’ (white) middle-class society and, confronting it, 
(Black)  feral  gangs  that  threaten  to  overwhelm it  (unless  beaten  back).  In  a 
recent paper McGuire explores further what it is about the Other than constructs 
it as such (McGuire 2011). To arrive at this, he argues that we need he argues a 
science of abnormality, a teratology; in effect, a science of monsters. Gang talk, I 
suggest, is one of society’s most potent teratology’s, a treatise on the imagined 
deformed and deforming nightmare that white society imagines is taking root 
within the inner city ‘heart of darkness’. 
Why are these teratology’s continuously resurrected in the space of our 
contemporary and consumed so  avidly?  The answer  to  this  is  that  they are 
performative; they provide an interpretative grid through and by which murky, 
difficult chunks of reality may be readily comprehended. They offer a ready-to-
hand vocabulary that puts messy reality into context and place. Not least, gang 
talk provides a  vocabulary about gangs that  everyone can quickly recognise 
even if  the producers of  gang talk have never met gang members or gangs. 
Gang talk also chimes well with the arborescent horizons of control agents. By 
corporatising the gangs and locating them into their various offices, so a reality 
is constructed (as opposed to discovered) that they believe they can manage and 
control.
In a postmodern, hyper-real culture, where the signified and the signifier 
have long departed company (Jameson 1984; Harvey 1989), gang talk is ready-
made for narrating the ‘reality’ of a world which, in Richard Rorty’s terms, is 
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already ‘well lost’ (Rorty 1972). In the ‘society of the spectacle’ (Debord 1994), 
gang talk establishes the reality of the gang but as simulacra; as an identical 
copy of a reality that never existed (Baudrillard 1981). 
But there is  also an ideological  function to gang talk that needs to be 
acknowledged.  In  the  post-  welfare,  neoliberal  state  where  penal-fare  as 
opposed to welfare increasingly defines the way in which poverty is managed 
(Waquant 2009); gang talk helps establish the terms in and by which the global 
precariat, the losers in the neoliberal, winner-takes-all society, are now defined. 
Together with underclass thinking more generally, it reconstructs the lives of the 
urban  poor  as  feral  outsiders;  as  a  population  to  whom  pain  dispensation 
appears necessary and, not least, just. It constructs them in Nils Christie’s terms 
as a suitable enemy at the same time as it establishes the included society as a 
suitable victim.  In Conquergood’s terminology, gang talk as such ‘functions as 
discursive apparatus for controlling and containing difference,  managing the 
problem of diversity’ (Conquergood 1991: 7).
In part, this ideological function is realised precisely through the visceral 
emotions that gang talk evokes. Gang talk is not a neutral discourse or one that 
operates only at the level of explaining What the Gangs are Doing Now.  What 
gang talk does is simultaneously appeal to deeply-inscribed fears, phobias and 
anxieties the good society has about its monstrous outside that are ignited in its 
very evocation of it; fears grounded on primordial ontological insecurities about 
dark strangers violating, penetrating and invading the body of society that gang 
talk mobilises, harnesses and then translates into fear, indignation and rage. In 
so doing, gang talk establishes the emotive register then comes to define the 
control  response.  Fears  easily  translated through media  amplification spirals 
into  the  demand  for  coercive  action  against  enemies  reduced  to  terms  of 
absolute, essentualised, difference. 
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Collective fantasies are not merely fictions that can be discarded if they 
have been falsified. People cling to them with faith. In this, they behave rather 
like scientists attached to paradigms that have been falsified but who refuse to 
accept the failure of their science (Kuhn 1962). And so it is with gang talk, the 
Philistogen  theory  of  the  street.  It  produces  a  self-referential  reality  that 
everyone  readily  comprehends  and  into  which  everything  gangs  do  or  are 
imagined  to  do  can  be  condensed  and  folded:  knives,  dangerous  dogs, 
shootings, muggings, riots, the drugs trade, social breakdown, and so on. Given 
this, what gang-talkers want to find is not evidence that challenges the gang talk 
that  constitutes  the  orthodoxy  of  their  conspiracy  discourse,  so  much  as  a 
further iteration of the archetypes and thus a confirmation of the orthodoxy. 
Let me take this argument further. Academics who undertake respectable 
gang research, whose findings either challenge the orthodoxies of gang talk or 
which fail  to  deliver  the  sensational  truth  about  the  gangs  which gang talk 
demands and trades in, are those most likely to be ignored. This has certainly 
been the situation in the UK, and I  suspect  the US as well.  If,  however,  the 
researcher appeals directly to the archetypes embedded in gang talk (novelty, 
proliferation, corporatization, weaponisation, and so on) then the findings will 
almost invariably be celebrated and widely reported – and funding is likely to 
follow. 
And when we come to study policy formation in respect to gangs, the 
same logic applies. Gang suppression is less a rational proportionate response to 
a threat whose nature is carefully identified in a world dominated by ‘evidence 
driven  policy’;  it  conversely  takes  the  form of  a  set  of  knee-jerk  responses, 
where overwhelming force is used to address the problem of the gang, when the 
only evidence being marshalled is that typically produced through gang talk 
and its constitutive archetypes.  And this also helps explain the often wildly 
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disproportionate  responses  that  gangs  attract.  ‘Wars’  declared  against  an 
imagined evil, rather than a proportionate response to social problems posed by 
unruly groups among multiply disadvantaged populations. 
Unforeseen Consequences
But gang talk can also produce unforeseen consequences in its othering. 
To understand this, however, we must return to the insights of Labelling theory 
as this was articulated in the work of Becker and Goffman many years ago. As 
Becker argued, labels are potent, they exist not only as vehicles through and by 
which deviant groups become classified as deviant by those with the power to 
label them as such; they determine both how agents of social control respond to 
and  perceive  the  rule-breakers;  they  also  shape  the  way  rule-breakers 
subsequently  perceive  themselves,  often  in  the  manner  of  a  self-fulfilling 
prophesy (Becker 1964).  Gang talk in this  sense is  a  potent  way of  labelling 
groups; it defines what they are, it establishes the magnitude of their difference; 
and the appalling nature of their crimes. It establishes them as a public enemy 
and legitimates their coercive treatment. Living with the burden of stigma is 
difficult,  insofar  as  it  often  forces  those  stigmatised  to  acquire  the  deviant 
personality they have been ascribed (Goffman 1963). 
The  gang  talk  that  saturates  the  US  is  illustrative  of  this  process.  By 
classifying entire generations of ghetto youth as a public enemy, and treating 
them as if they are, so the preconditions have been created where the ghetto 
responds by coming to accept the demonic labels used to classify them. These 
are then thrown back in the face of the excluding society. ‘We will become the 
nightmare you imagine us as’ arises as a predictable response. This, not least, 
was a fact recognised by organic intellectuals within the hip hop movement. 
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One exemplar would be the group Pubic Enemy; Tupac Shakur’s ‘Thug Life’ 
and Outlaw Immortalz also play on this refrain.
And the same process it seems to me is also at work in the UK today. In a 
world where gang talk saturates public and political discourse, groups of young 
people in poor areas are not only being labelled as gangs, they are also being 
treated as if they are. Many reject the demonic labels they find imposed upon 
them; but as Cohen’s work on the Mod phenomenon and Jock Young’s early 
work on ‘drug takers’ many years ago demonstrated, some may well come to 
assume the persona of  the folk devil  into which they are being interpolated 
(Cohen  1972).  And  this  leads  me  logically  to  the  final  irony:  the  unintended 
consequence of gang talk is that it constitutes the Other it designates. The deviant, as 
always, is less discovered but produced.
Conclusion
Trying to have a reasoned debate on gangs in any society is difficult. The 
object of enquiry does not lend itself to easy definition as the academic gang-
literature attests. And the task of studying worlds that are themselves closed to 
and often hostile towards outsiders is inherently difficult. But attempting to get 
to the reality of the gang is also be-devilled by gang talk of the kind I have tried 
to identify here. The ‘truths’ in which it trades are not those of the gang realities 
it  claims to  narrate  but  partakes  instead of  the phantasmagorical  elements  I 
have tried to describe here.  A paranoid hyper-real,  conspiracy discourse that 
proceeds  wholly  separately  from  the  street  world  it  claims  to  represent.  A 
collective fantasy that has its own rules of constitution and combination, as we 
have seen, and which, like most fantasies, does not lend itself to falsification. 
While it might appear that this populist discourse belongs to the world of the 
mass media,  the foolish and the ignorant,  this  I  fear is  to underestimate the 
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seductive allure of  this  discourse that  also continues to infest  and infect  the 
academy. The question I want to pose, but leave unanswered here, is, how far 
can the pitfalls of gang talk possibly be avoided? Indeed, can they?
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Tilting at Windmills: In Pursuit of Gang Truths 
in a British City
In this paper we present the findings of a small empirical research project 
conducted in Birmingham, a large Metropolitan City in the UK in 2013.  The 
project was commissioned by the local police and was initiated with the aim of 
helping establish the nature, prevalence and structure of urban street gangs in a 
research site defined by the police and governmental agencies at the time as 
‘gang  afflicted’.  As  a  small  snapshot  study  the  research  findings  have  clear 
limitations  in  relation  to  generalisation.  That  said,  they  do  throw  up  some 
interesting  findings  that  bear  in  on  current  debates  within  and  outside  of 
academia on the urban street gang phenomena. 
The  research  in  question  was  commissioned  with  the  aim  of  helping 
provide the commissioners with a reality check on the urban gang situation in 
the UK during a period when many sensational claims were being made about 
gangs both within and outside of the academy. Claims to the effect that gangs 
were the new face of  youth crime;  that  contemporary gangs were large and 
hierarchical; that gangs were a serious developing threat in English cities; and 
that gangs were responsible for a range of social evils including orchestrating 
riots and taking over the penal estate.  Claims we will  simply badge up into 
what we propose to call the contemporary gang talking inventory.
As we shall see, when we went in pursuit of these ‘gang truths’ in an area 
defined by the authorities as ‘gang afflicted’, the gang and group realities we 
found,  bore  little  relationship  to  the  sensational  claims  embodied  in  this 
inventory. Nor, as we will argue in conclusion, did the very real problems of 
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violence in the area we studied, lend itself to a policy response shaped around 
gang suppression then mediated as a magic bullet by the government. 
Prior to profiling our research, however, it pays to briefly consider the 
status of gang research as this has developed since the urban street gang was 
sensationally (re)discovered in Europe in the opening decade of the twenty first 
century. It also pays, to consider more broadly the sensational social reaction the 
discovery of the urban street gang has provoked as these frame the social and 
political  context in which this research was conducted. If  the findings of the 
research  must  be  considered  tentative,  they  nevertheless  support  some 
contemporary  approaches  to  the  study  of  urban  street  gangs,  while  also 
challenging other approaches and not least policy.
The contours of contemporary European gang research
Until  the  21st  century  the  urban  street  gang  was  considered 
predominantly  a  uniquely  American  problem  not  a  European  one.  Having 
failed to discover USA style gangs in the UK in the 1960s, criminologists in the 
UK predominantly ignored urban street gangs and studied youth subculture 
instead (Hebdidge, 1979). Looking across at Europe more generally, the same 
story can be told. Groups across Europe may engage in crime and violence but 
this was not interpreted through the urban street gang lens. 
This began to change in the opening decade of the 21st century when 
concerns about street gangs began to appear in the popular media who then 
began to report their activities in a sensational manner. In the UK the arrival of 
the gang was directly linked to a series of fatalities specifically involving young 
Black males. Many appeared gang related, and, though a number of others were 
not  (on  closer  inspection)  it  was  through  the  gang  lens  that  they  were 
interpreted (Hallsworth & Young, 2008). Looking more widely across Europe, 
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the gang was not traditionally conceived as a European Problem. This began to 
change in the twenty first century and for varied reasons. Offering empirical 
confirmation of the ‘gangs have now arrived’, kind, the arrival into European 
cities such as Milan and Barcelona of urban street gangs such as the Almighty 
Latin King and Queen Nation and Neta, suggested an all American problem 
now appeared have migrated across the Atlantic  to become a European one 
(Feixa et al., 2008). Reports about the activities of groups that appeared to have 
clear gang connections in societies as diverse as Norway, The Netherlands and 
Germany  also  confirmed  the  picture  (see  Klein  et  al.  2001,  2006;  Decker  & 
Weerman, 2005). Given that young people in inner city estates across Europe 
were  now  readily  embracing  the  uniform  of  the  American  ghetto  warriors, 
gangs appeared to many an altogether new and sinister phenomenon.
Academic  attempts  to  interpret  what  was  happening  across  Europe 
began to spiral in rather different and often starkly opposing directions. As the 
findings presented here both support some of the interpretations that have been 
made,  while  challenging others,  it  pays to identify the contours of  the gang 
debate as it has developed over the last decade.
In  an  attempt  to  bring  to  Europe  lessons  learnt  from  America  the 
Eurogang Research network was established under the leadership of a team of 
professional academic, administrative gang researchers led my Malcolm Klein. 
Pursuing a predominantly positivistic, numbers driven research agenda, Klein 
and  Maxon  argued  that  gangs  existed  in  Europe  and  used  the  results  of 
quantitative  surveys  to  demonstrate  that  they  met  the  definitional  criteria 
necessary  to  be  defined  as  gangs,  where  their  definition  stressed  systemic 
involvement in crime. Klein and Maxon went further. It was not that the gang 
was a new phenomenon, it  had always existed,  only European scholars had 
long been in denial about it. This they termed the Eurogang paradox (Klein et 
!344
al.,  2001).  If  the  gang  was  not  new,  nor  did  it  resemble,  they  argued,  the 
stereotype of  the  American Street  gang imagined as  large  and defined by a 
corporate structure. They stressed instead the more informal aspects of the gang 
and used a typology developed in USA to profile its variations.
Promoting what he claimed was a left realist approach to the study of the 
urban street gang UK academic John Pitts (Pitts, 2007, 2008), went much further. 
Using  findings  from  empirical  research  conducted  in  London,  he  and  his 
associates (see Harding, 2014 Toy, 2008) contended that urban street gangs were 
both large and corporate, and represented nothing less than the ‘new face of 
youth crime’. In common with Klein and the Eurogang, the gang as he defined it 
was  essentially  a  criminal  unit  and,  as  such,  something  that  needed  to  be 
suppressed in the name of law and order. 
Offering a more cultural criminological,  not to say critical perspective, 
our  work  (see  Hallsworth  &  Young,  2008;  Hallsworth,  2013)  challenged  the 
emerging  orthodoxies  of  the  ‘gang  talk’  that  Pitts,  along  with  an  emerging 
industry of ‘gang talkers’ were promoting: the gang as corporate entity, the gang 
as the new face of crime, the gang as the latter day harbinger of urban mayhem 
responsible  for  everything  from  gun  crime  to  organising  riots.  Our  critique 
challenged  the  epistemological,  ontological  and  methodological  assumptions 
that had come to frame the gang debate.
While not denying that groups that met whatever definitional terms to 
qualify as gangs existed, we argued that most groups that engaged in the crimes 
blamed on gangs did not. Rather than wrap up group offending into a gang 
typology as the Eurogang researchers sought to do, we argued that the gang 
was one of a number of possible grouping which included peer groups and 
more organised crime groups that were not gangs and should not be defined as 
such (Hallsworth &Young,  2005;  Hallsworth & Duffy,  2011).  We argued that 
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when subject to empirical scrutiny, many of the problems blamed on gangs had 
causes that simply were not gang related. While gangs could and did use guns, 
gun crime was not confined to gangs. Most gun crime as Silverstone and myself 
argued, could best be explained by looking instead at the volatile make shift 
lives of the denizens of a violent street culture known by its own inhabitants as 
‘on road’ (Hallsworth & Silverstone, 2009). Far then from making the gang the 
principle object of a governmental crackdown, our work, echoing the American 
traditions  of  Elijah  Anderson  (Anderson,  2000)  and  Phillip  Bourgois  (1995), 
emphasised the need to foreground a highly violent and volatile street culture 
that  had taken root  in many British Cities,  as  opposed to reducing complex 
street  realities  to  a  problem  of  gangs.  Drawing  upon  the  lessons  of  critical 
criminology our work also focused upon understanding the social reaction the 
gang was producing. We have consistently emphasised problematic labelling, 
and  not  least  the  racial  and  criminalising  assumptions  that  underlay  public 
gang talk. 
This  focus  would  also  be  reproduced  in  the  work  of  Aldridge  and 
Medina et al whose ESRC funded research in gang city also discovered groups 
that less resembled formal bureaucracies but what they termed informal messy 
networks (Aldridge et al., 2011). Gang labels, they also emphasised, were being 
permissively applied by control agents and to the detriment of those to whom 
they had been successfully applied. 
This paints in broad brushwork terms the contours of the contemporary 
debates around the urban street gang at least as it has unfolded in the European 
context. More recent work on urban street gangs in a sense sides implicitly or 
explicitly  with  various  elements  of  the  positions  outlined above.  Harding’s 40
 For an overview of the positions in the current debate see the papers assembled in Goldson 40
(2011). 
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recent  work (Harding,  2014),  for  example,  echoes Pitts  position which holds 
gangs to a new escalating phenomenon. As with Pitts, the gangs he claims to 
have discovered appear to equate directly with the American Stereotype: large, 
hierarchical  and with  a  complex  division  of  labour.  Working  within  a  more 
street  sensitive,  ethnographic  tradition  the  recent  work  of  Alister  Frazier 
(Frazier,  2015)  and  Joanne  Moore  (Moore,  2015)  in  Glasgow  paint  a  very 
different position, one more akin to the work of Aldridge, Medina, Hallsworth 
and Young. Glaswegian gangs inter-generationally reproduce themselves; they 
are at heart informal friendship groups that take root within multiply deprived 
working class estates,  members typically have a pronounced street  presence. 
Though  a  capacity  for  violence  is  certainly  a  competence  members  have  to 
demonstrate, these ethnography's also highlight other less criminalising aspects 
of gang life, such as the search for excitement. Both ethnography's also explore 
the inter-generational  reproduction of  the gang and frame its  formation and 
reproduction  within  a  cogent  analysis  of  the  post-industrial  city.  As  with 
American ethnographers like Brotheron, and Hagerdorn, the gang in this body 
of ethnographic work is far more than a criminal entity and in these works we 
find the life of the ‘other’ humanised in ways it is not in the more administrative 
criminological traditions.
If this summarises, albeit with considerable brevity, the internal history of 
developing gang research in  the  European context,  looking externally  at  the 
wider social reaction that the discovery of the gang has provoked, then it is fair 
to say that in relation to the way the gang has been constructed in the mass 
media  and  by  various  ‘right  thinking  people’  (to  use  Cohen’s  formulation 
(Cohen, 1972)) the gang appears as little more than a demonic other. And it is 
this way of framing it that has quite literally dominated the policy and media 
debates  in  the  UK.  If  we now consider  this,  the  contemporary gang talking 
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inventory, the urban street gang has quite literally being blamed for just about 
every  manifestation  of  urban  violence  (Hallsworth,  2013).  Gangs  were  now 
being placed at the heart of the drugs trade, blamed for the rise in weaponised 
violence, and among other things, the systematic sexual exploitation of women 
(Firmin, 2010) in what appeared close to what Cohen would define as a moral 
panic (Cohen, 1972). Following the English riots of 2011, the urban street gang 
was singled out as criminal mastermind orchestrating the disorder, and gang 
suppression was meted out as the policy response (even though evidence began 
to emerge (and quite quickly) that the role of the gang in urban street violence 
had been heavily overstated). Summarising the government line minister Ian 
Duncan Smith identified the urban street gang not only as a symptom of social 
breakdown in the UK but a net driver of it (cited in Wintour, 2011). 
The research project
The  project  we  will  now  discuss  was  commissioned  by  the  West 
Midlands Police  and ACPO in the wake of  the English riots  of  2011.  It  was 
commissioned in the wake of an international conference on gangs convened by 
the government, and the creation of what would become the government’s key 
social response to the riots, the Ending Gang and Youth Violence Taskforce (HM 
Government, 2011). This would be funded to the tune of £15 million and was 
supported by the employment of 100 ‘gang experts’. Groups of these were to be 
dispatched  to  various  ‘gang  afflicted  areas’  to  support  the  development  of 
effective gang suppression policy and practice.
It  should  be  pointed  out  that  the  research  we were  commissioned to 
undertake  was  not  connected  with  or  funded  by  this  gang  suppression 
programme  but  by  the  local  constabulary  as  an  independent  project.  Our 
commissioners, in effect, wanted a reality check on urban street gangs. In the 
!348
context of a society where they were, as we have seen, being blamed for urban 
violence  and  community  breakdown,  our  commissioners  wanted  to  know 
whether the gang problem was as serious as the gang talking inventory would 
suggest.
In order to meet the terms of the research brief, rather than go looking for 
gang truths  in  an area  of  Birmingham where  the  knowledge base  on urban 
street gangs was limited, we asked to study the gang problem in an area that 
had an established reputation for gang related activity and which was already 
labelled by the police and government as ‘gang afflicted’; in other words we 
went  looking  for  the  truth  about  urban  street  gangs  in  an  area  where 
confirmation of their violent excesses could be most be readily confirmed. That 
is,  if  they  existed.  The  target  areas  in  which  research  was  conducted  were 
Handsworth, Lozells and Aston.
Research sites
Before we make some more broad and personal observations about the 
socio-economic conditions of these areas, it is worth noting that the sensational 
attention that the gang has come to command in British society was not least 
confirmed  by  what  was  manifestly  a  gang  related  incident  in  Handsworth 
which saw two women murdered in  a  drive  by shooting.  This  was directly 
connected  to  conflict  between  two  established  local  urban  street  gangs,  the 
Burger Bar Boys and The Johnson crew. These were populated by local young 
Black men drawn from a wider Afro Caribbean Community resident in the area. 
It could be noted that Handsworth’s reputation for urban violence has a longer 
history.  In the 1970s,  it  had an established reputation for street  crime and it 
would be a violent street  robbery in the area that would provoke the moral 
panic that formed the focus of Hall et al.’s seminal text ‘Policing the Crisis’ (Hall 
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et al., 1978). The first wave of ‘Black riots’ that swept across England in the early 
1980s also saw Handsworth quite literally go up in flames. In an area where 
police and community relations were strained, the research sites we selected 
were perfectly matched to the research brief we had been given. 
Leaving aside the status of these areas as ‘gang afflicted’, these are multi 
ethnic areas that have for decades been home to generations of minority ethnic 
populations both from Africa and the Caribbean and from India and Pakistan. 
Though  these  areas  are  vibrant  and  culturally  rich,  they  are  also  areas 41
characterised by high levels of deprivation and poverty. Many young people 
growing up in these areas, including those with gang affiliations, would have 
faced and directly experienced as a consequence the symptoms that generations 
of academics have associated with deprivation and poverty: overcrowded and 
sometimes substandard housing; higher than average rates of crime; high levels 
of  welfare,  high  levels  of  unemployment  and  underemployment  in  a 
predominantly low wage economy. The research was also conducted against a 
background of recession and in the context of a state that had embarked on a 
programme of sustained cuts to welfare and welfare services.
Methodology
Mindful  of  the fact  that  different  constituencies  might  well  have very 
different conceptions about the nature and extent of the gang situation in the 
areas  we  studied,  we  elected  to  deploy  different  researchers  to  interview 
members  of  the  key  constituencies  whom  it  appeared  reasonable  to  expect, 
 During the 1970s Handsworth was home to one of the UK’s most successful Reggae bands 41
Steel Pulse. Their album ‘Handsworth Revolution’ is also arguably one of the greatest reggae 
albums that came out of the UK. A searing critique of an unjust society and a call for urban and 
cultural insurrection. 
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might  have an informed understanding of  the  gang situation in  the  area.  A 
dedicated researcher was thus dispatched to interview front line officers in the 
areas studied, along with intelligence officers and members of the local gang 
suppression  unit.  Another  researcher  was  tasked  with  interviewing  local 
community  stakeholders  who  worked  closely  with  young  people.  Given 
concerns  had  been  raised  about  the  presence  of  gangs  in  the  penal  estate 
another researcher interviewed staff in the local prison. 
Finally  we employed a  youth worker  resident  in  the research sites  to 
conduct a series of interviews with young men at a local youth club located in 
Handsworth. The young men interviewed were selected by the youth worker 
on the basis that they had a pronounced street presence, were affiliated in some 
way to local youth groups (which may or may not be gangs), and who, as we 
shall  see,  had  some involvement  with  violence.  The  young  men  were  aged 
between 16 and 20 and in terms of ethnicity were predominantly Black. While 
this is admittedly a narrow demographic and by no means representative of all 
ethnicities in the areas studied, it was nevertheless among the young Black male 
population in Birmingham that urban street gangs came to prominence, Given 
we were looking for gang truths were they might most reasonably be expected 
to be found, studying this constituency appeared justified. 
Each researcher conducted their  research independently of  each other. 
Only when the final report was written did the field researchers see the results 
of each other endeavours. The reason we pursued this tactic was because we 
wanted to see if the gang realities each constituency saw converged around a 
common  gang  reality,  or  a  series  of  different  ones.  We  return  to  this  issue 
subsequently. 
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The questions we asked were shaped by our research aims: How far did 
the gang reality in the area correspond to the sensational claims mediated both 
by academics and practitioners nationally. We thus asked questions about:
• The perceived seriousness of the gang situation in the area
• The number of gangs resident in the area
• Group  organisation  and  structure.  Were  ‘gangs’  large,  territorial  and 
hierarchical,  did  they  have  initiation  rites  and  did  they  forcibly  recruit 
members as many were arguing
• Group engagement in crime and violence
• The nature of territorialism
• The relation of gang members to their communities. 
Though this snap shot research might not deliver the depth of research 
an ethnography by its nature reveals, it would, we felt, address the question of 
seeing how far gang realities in the area equated with the gang inventory then 
driving gang suppression forward.
Participants
Young  men  we  interviewed  were  aged  between16-19  years.  Six 
participants identified as Black Afro Caribbean, one White UK, two mixed race – 
White UK and Black Afro Caribbean, and one mixed race – south Asian and 
Black Afro Caribbean. Two elder ex-gang members were also interviewed about 
their experiences, both were Black Afro Caribbean. Both were in their thirties. 
Fourteen  community  stakeholders  were  interviewed  who  had  direct 
experience of working with young people in the pilot areas. Six men and four 
women  consented  to  interview  whose  age  ranged  between  20-40  years. 
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Participants  stated  they  had  worked  with  youth  from  1-10  years  (mean  5.1 
years) in areas that covered a city wide location. Job roles that they occupied 
were described as youth worker, mentor, Director of organisations that worked 
with  disaffected  youth,  Director  of  community  interest  organisation,  faith 
organisation worker, or social entrepreneur. All stated they had obtained their 
knowledge from direct work with youth in the Birmingham city area, four also 
stated they knew gang members through friends/family or had lived in areas 
populated by gangs in the past or present day. 
Officers and staff from WMP also contributed directly with this study as 
participants, specifically personnel from the Gang Task Force, Pan-Birmingham 
Gang Team, Safer Neighbourhood Team, the Multi-agency Gang Unit (MAGU) 
an integrated offender management team that work with gang nominals, Force 
Intelligence  and  the  Birmingham  Community  Safety  Partnership.  Interviews 
normally  lasted  approximately  1  hour  and  where  possible,  a  stakeholder 
questionnaire was also completed for direct comparison with responses from 
the  complementary  stands  of  the  research.  Participants  of  this  strand of  the 
research ranged in rank from Detective Inspector,  Sergeant,  Constable,  PCSO 
and  civilian  staff,  all  sharing  a  knowledge  of  USGs  and  the  areas  being 
reviewed. 
Interviews lasted approximately one hour on average. The responses of 
young people were audio recorded, while the responses of other participants 
were noted in detailed written format. Content analysis is used to analyse the 
collated  data  and  the  integrity  of  the  research  was  checked  by  asking  the 
participants retrospectively if our analysis of the data constituted an accurate 
reflection of their experiences. 
!353
A plenitude of gangs?
In  the  context  of  a  society  in  which  the  urban  street  gang  has  been 
allegedly discovered as the ‘new face of youth crime’ it made sense to begin our 
investigation  of  gang  land  realities  by  enquiring  just  how  serious  the  gang 
problem was perceived to be in this ‘gang afflicted’ area and try and establish 
how many gangs there were. What became clear as we assembled the different 
research  strands  was  that  each  constituency  we  interviewed  did  not  see  a 
common gang reality; different constituencies saw the same reality but often in 
very different ways. 
The police constituted the constituency most likely to argue that the gang 
situation was serious. They were also most likely to identify violence in the area 
as  gang  related.  But  even  this  constituency  was  by  no  means  homogenous. 
Intelligence officers identified far fewer gangs than front line officers and some 
officers were quite sceptical about the seriousness of the gang situation. When 
we explored this discrepancy further it emerged that the term ‘gang’ as it was 
intuitively applied by front line officers, constituted a term that could embrace 
most groups they worked with in the course of their day to day work roles. In 
order for  intelligence officers to have a group formally identified as a  gang, 
however,  it  had to  meet  the  criteria  for  gang membership  as  this  had been 
formally identified by the Home Office. Given that a number of the front line 
officers  worked within  dedicated gang suppression  units,  the  fact  that  their 
work  reality  meant  engaging  with  groups  identified  as  gangs  ,  also  helps 
explain why for them the gang problem was recognised as serious.
The other constituencies we spoke to did not see the gang situation in the 
area as quite as serious as the front line officers. According to one Home Office 
accredited  ‘gang  expert’  we  contacted  (employed  by  the  government  in  the 
!354
wake of riots), there was ‘no gang problem’ in Birmingham that deserved study 
‒ we were, he made clear, wasting money). While the community stakeholders 
we interviewed acknowledged that gangs posed problems in the area, they were 
also adamant that the problem was not quite as serious as was often made out. 
They acknowledged that the area faced real problems, not least connected to 
violence, drug use, and violent territorialism, but they did not define all of this 
through the gang lens. They also drew attention to other social problems in their 
area such as youth unemployment and ethnic tension
As part of an initial ice breaker, the young people we interviewed were 
asked to list three things about the area they lived in which they liked and three 
they  disliked.  One  reason  for  asking  these  questions  was  to  establish  how 
readily the gang situation registered in their minds as a serious issue, without 
us actively prompting them into reflecting about it. Good things about the area 
included ‘good food’ and ‘good people’. Gangs were mentioned as an issue by 
three of those interviewed but it was not the only bad thing they registered. 
Crime and violence and the use of weapons were also cited by most as serious 
issues  they  confronted,  as  were  the  activities  of  people  referred  to  as 
‘stupid’ (ergo dangerous). 
In the case of the interviews conducted in Birmingham Prison with staff who 
worked with offenders it was by no means evident that gangs were considered a 
serious issue at all (at least in the prison) though some interviewers did raise a 
number of concerns about the way some groups were being labelled as gangs. 
The young men who entered the prison, we were told, tended to leave their 
gang and territorial affiliations at the door. The prison staff also took care to 
ensure that wings within the prison was not segregated on postcode / gang 
lines.
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A few gang names recurred from the testimonies we received with older gangs 
such as the Burger Bar Boys and Johnsons receiving considerable attention, A 
range of other more recent gangs were named including the B515,  the Slash 
Crew, the Sodamite Soldiers, the Raiders, Cash Money Crew, GSA, Bang Bang, 
Shot and Neel, Mob Squad and B21. However we were unable to find wider 
confirmation that all these groups actually existed. 
As noted above, the target areas came to prominence as ‘gang afflicted’ as 
a consequence of the activities of two resident gangs, the Burger Bar Boys and 
the Johnsons. For some of the police officers we interviewed these groups were 
apparently  still  in  existence  and were  said  to  have  migrated  into  organised 
crime  and  were  actively  recruiting  from  ‘feeder  gangs’.  According  to  an  ex 
Burger Bar Boy, interviewed as part of the project, the gang he had been part of 
no longer existed. Members had, he argued, either been imprisoned, grown out 
of  the  gang or  had left  the  area.  An ex-gang member  once  affiliated  to  the 
Johnsons was also sceptical of the claim that the group he once belonged to was 
active.  Nevertheless  during  our  research  we  heard  from  our  community 
stakeholders that some young people from the area were claiming ‘Burger Bar’ 
and ‘Johnson’ affiliations. One provisional conclusion that can be derived from 
this is that getting to gang truths is often difficult because gang mythology often 
gets  in  the  way  in  a  world  where  gang  knowledge  is  fragmented  and 
incomplete. At the end of this exercise we had to tell our commissioners that we 
had  no  clear  comprehension  as  to  how  many  gangs  operated  in  the  area. 
Different  constituencies  simply  saw the  same reality  but  in  a  very  different 
way.42
 That said the police did compute numbers in ways that other constituencies didn’t. Some front 42
line officers identified 30 whilst the intelligence community 8. 
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The young people we interviewed didn’t help clarify the situation either 
as  we  had  considerable  difficulty  getting  them  to  identify  gangs  and  their 
respective  territories  with  any  success.  They  did  not  want  to  implicate 
themselves or their friends, nor did they want to be seen helping the police. As 
we  had  a  prior  agreement  that  we  would  not  incriminate  any  group  or 
individual in the course of our research, we were not going to push them on this 
issue. If they did not want to implicate particular groups they did however tell 
us a lot about the groups to which they belonged and the things these groups 
did. As we shall see, while these groups to which they belonged engage in many 
of the activities blamed on gangs, serious questions could be raised over the 
extent to which group offending in the target areas could be reduced to question 
of  urban  street  gangs  and  whether  the  groups  to  which  these  young  men 
belonged could legitimately be defined as gangs.
Group characteristics
In the wake of the English riots of 2011 Prime Minister David Cameron 
identified what he saw as the defining characteristics of the urban street gangs 
he held responsible. 
At  the  heart  of  all  the  violence  sits  the  issue  of  the  street  gangs. 
Territorial, hierarchical and incredibly violent, they are mostly composed 
of  young  boys,  mainly  from  dysfunctional  homes.  They  earn  money 
through crime, particularly drugs and are bound together by an imposed 
loyalty to an authoritarian gang leader (Cameron, 2010)
A position reinforced in the work of a range of British academics who like 
Pitts  (2008)  and Harding (2014)  appear  to  have discovered gangs with clear 
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corporate structures; in effect, gangs that reflect the stereotypical structure of the 
American  Street  gang.  In  a  word  where  many  policy  makers  were  also 
identifying corporate style gangs (see Toy, 2008), it made sense as part of our 
enquiry into gang realities to explore group structures as these were perceived 
by our research subjects.
A number of police officers interviewed for this project described gangs 
in terms that did equate with established American gang stereotypes. They saw 
groups that had, as such, clear offices such as generals, lieutenants, soldiers, and 
runners. But not all police officers saw gangs this way. Some saw the groups as 
less formal structures but more informal and often chaotic. When pushed as to 
the  source  of  their  information  most  officers  acknowledged  that  this  was 
derived from work they had read. When we spoke to the young people about 
their group belongings, a rather different picture of group life began to appear.
When confronted with a list of things gangs had been widely accused of 
doing, such as organise drug dealing, rape women, deal drugs in schools and 
‘mug’ old people, young people by and large did not contest what was being 
presented to them as a stereotypical model of urban street gangs, some of whose 
offences they were prepared to accept as descriptive of gang activity (though, all 
but one questioned the gang as rapist characterisation). However, when they 
were asked to describe the kind of groups they belonged to, not only were they 
clear that their groups had no clear hierarchy and structure, they painted a very 
different picture of group life to that presented in police accounts and mediated 
in the work of academics such as Pitts, Harding and Toy. The groups they were 
part of were invariably friendship groups populated by people they knew and 
who in many cases they were related to. They had grown up together, lived in 
the same area, shared a common ethnic heritage and attended the same schools: 
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‘we live in the same street’, or ‘he’s my cousin’ were emblematic of the kind of 
responses we received.
Though the idea that gangs reproduce themselves through ‘recruitment’ 
has received much attention (see Pitts, 2008), this was not considered an issue 
for community participants, young people or for the elder ex-gang members all 
of  whom  were  highly  sceptical  about  such  claims.  The  young  people 
interviewed were also clear  that  their  groups did not  have initiation rituals, 
though as one interviewee asserted, there was a sense in which the people they 
‘rolled’ with were expected to ‘support your back’, that is defend the group in 
the  face  of  status  challenges  by  others.  No  one  we  interviewed  spoke  of 
‘wanabees’, nor when asked ‘did their group take orders from ‘elders’’ did we 
find any that did. No one interviewed for this project saw group membership as 
in any way coerced or coercive and ‘reluctant gangsters’ as Pitts terms them 
(2008) we found none. Indeed, as one young man interviewed for the project 
noted,  the  very  idea  appeared absurd to  him on the  basis  that  it  would be 
impossible to trust  such recruits  given you could not trust  them to ‘support 
your back’ in a time of trouble. The young people we interviewed were also 
adamant that they did not have leaders or a formal division of labour where 
people  in  the  group  held  ranks.  Nor  importantly  did  the  young  men  we 
interviewed define themselves as gang members, though a few were very clear 
in their testimonies that this was how they were being classified by enforcement 
agencies.
Our interpretation of their street reality and group belonging was that 
they did not meet the criteria used by the government to define urban street 
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gangs.  These were better described as ‘volatile peer groups’. Nor were they 43
corporate. They reflected in ways that echo the work of Aldridge and Medina, 
far more fluid, amorphous and informal groups. While it might be argued that 
we were talking to the wrong people it could be observed here that the research 
site and the young people who occupied it were immersed in the violent side of 
street  life.  Interestingly  no  one  outside  of  the  police  we  interviewed  made 
mention of the activities of more organized corporate style gangs in the area. It 
seems reasonable to us to suggest that had they existed we would have been 
notified about them.
Though  research  in  cities  like  London,  have  identified  gangs  with 
membership running into hundreds (see Pitts,2007a, 2007b), this was not how 
they were perceived by the people we interviewed for this project. The general 
consensus  of  those  we  interviewed  being  that  the  groups  to  which  they 
belonged contained between 8 and 20 members.  One elder ex-gang member 
interviewed  was  adamant  that  large  numbers  of  people  made  any  gang 
unmanageable and unable to function effectively. In his own words ‘size’, he 
claimed ‘killed gangs’.
The  overall  consensus  among  officers  and  community  stakeholders 
interviewed  was  that  the  gang  /  group  situation  in  the  target  areas  was 
overwhelmingly a problem posed by young men to each other, where the men 
in question were seen to be overwhelmingly Black. The ethnic dimension to the 
gang situation however was not explained in terms that saw the situation as a 
 The official government definition of gangs reads: ‘A relatively durable, predominantly street-43
based group of young people who: 1. see themselves (and are seen by others) as a discernible 
group; 2. engage in criminal activity and violence;. 3. lay claim over territory (not necessarily 
geographical but can include an illegal economy territory); 4. have some form of identifying 
structural feature; and 5. are in conflict with other, similar, gangs.’
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‘Black’  issue.  It  was  more  the  case  that  the  gangs  /  groups  of  areas  like 
Handsworth reflected the ethnic demography of the estates where they were 
based. In East Birmingham gangs were considered predominantly a problem of 
Asian men. 
In a world where girl  gangs had also been identified as a developing 
issue and abject of intervention (see Bracchi, 2008), we also asked our research 
subjects whether girl gangs were an issue locally. Though a number of police 
officers and some community stakeholders saw the relationships between gang 
members and girls as problematic and in need of further investigation, no one 
mentioned girl gangs or raised them as a problem in the area. For the young 
men we interviewed there groups were exclusively male affairs, girls appeared 
to  belong  to  a  different  world  separate  and  away  from  the  group  and  its 
activities. This finding held for every young man interviewed.
Territorialism 
In  the  context  of  a  society  who were  routinely  equating (as  Cameron 
indeed  had)  gangs  with  territory  and  which  saw  ‘postcode  wars’  between 
territorially  affiliated gangs as  a  net  driver  of  urban violence,  we asked our 
interviewees a series of questions about the role of territorialism in the area and 
its connection to violence. All the people interviewed for this project identified 
territorialism as an issue and a serious one. Whether the issue could be reduced 
to a gang issue however we will question. 
As we saw in the section above, the groups we appeared to be dealing 
with here did not fit the criteria that would formally allow them to be classified 
as gangs, that said there was no doubt from the testimony of the young men we 
interviewed that they lived incredibly territorial lives. A finding that not least 
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equates  with wider  gang research and not  least  the  work of  Aldridge et  al. 
(2011).
All individuals we spoke to were aligned to and identified with the area, 
street or estate where they lived. All young people, in turn, were identified with 
that area by other people. The turf in question could be a road, a tower block or 
a  post  code.  In  the  words  of  the  young  men,  these  constituted  what  the 
identified as their ‘ends’ (or ‘endz’). It appeared from their testimony and from 
some of our community stakeholders that while you might be identified with a 
particular street or estate, you were also part of and identified with the wider 
locality in which you lived such as Handsworth. 
When asked whether they ‘claimed’ their territory or just had a territory 
they hung around in most young men tended to the latter view. Though clearly 
identified by their area of origin by other groups, there were mixed reactions 
when asked how far they would defend their endz. If a group of outsiders from 
a different endz entered, then it appeared reasonable to ask them to declare their 
intentions,  but  as  one  young  man  remarked,  it  depends  on  their  attitude. 
Violence did not appear a forgone conclusion. When asked how far they would 
fight to defend turf, the response was less about defending territory and more 
about defending the group if it was threatened – and its members were expected 
to do this. In the worlds of one young man: ‘I aint going to die for no postcode’.
Outside of  their  endz however lay zones of  danger and everyone we 
interviewed highlighted the very real  risks and dangers young men faced if 
they left the security of their home ground and entered that of others. As one 
young man argued ‘if you’re not from ednz, people don’t like you’. One youth 
worker  explained  how  even  the  task  of  visiting  a  youth  offending  team  in 
Handsworth posed real risks for young people who had to visit it if they came 
outside  the  area.  This  was  also  confirmed  in  conversations  with  Youth 
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Offending Team Staff in the area. What these interviewees also identified was 
how  new  technologies  such  as  mobile  phones  facilitated  mobilising  groups 
rapidly in the event of a perceived excursion into someone else’s territory by an 
outsider. 
It was also clear from talking to community stakeholders that a state of 
often  longstanding  and  intra  generational  conflict  existed  between  different 
groups  and  between  different  areas  more  generally.  These  myths  of 
longstanding  conflict  appeared  culturally  reproduced  with  younger  groups 
picking  up  longstanding  traditions  of  conflict  (‘beef’)  with  other  groups  in 
different postcodes area.  In fact  it  was this  intergenerational  reproduction of 
conflict  through collective  memory,  coupled  with  a  stark  inability  to  let  the 
legacy go, that ensured the violence continued. How to end vendettas whose 
origins are lost in the mist of time remains a serious community safety issue. 
What we found in Birmingham appeared to parallel closely the wider forms of 
violent  territorialism  also  found  in  the  work  of  Aldridge  et  al.  (2011)  and 
recently by Fraser (2015) in his study of Glasgow gangs. 
Social media platforms and underground radio were also used by groups 
to proclaim their territorial affiliation (and gang affiliation) often through the 
medium of  rap and grime music.  These  social  platforms were  also  used by 
groups/ gangs to celebrate successful excursions they had made into another’s 
territory.  Often  these  provocative  displays  took  the  form  of  a  direct  status 
challenge where one group celebrates its alleged dominance over another. 
If so far we have found little evidence that would confirm many claims 
made about urban street gangs, at least as inscribed in the contemporary gang 
talking inventory, in the case of territorialism we certainly did find confirming 
evidence. The young people we interviewed were clearly territorial and violent 
territorialism  was  clearly  an  issue  for  them.  However  before  this  might  be 
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interpreted  as  posing  stark  confirmation  of  a  gang  land  reality,  it  bears  to 
consider the question of territorialism as something rather wider than simply 
something gangs do. From our interviews what came across was the fact that all 
young  people  were  territorially  affiliated.  In  the  words  of  one  young  man 
‘everyone has endz’, not just gang members. While it might well be the case that 
groups of territorially based young men with violence on their minds might 
well take territorial defence more seriously than those who were not. Leaving 
ones  endz  however  was  a  riskly  business  for  many  young  people,  not  just 
territorially affiliated street fighting groups we were dealing with.
Violence and offending behaviour
The fears that urban gangs command today is ineluctably bound up with 
the perception that they are at heart criminal entities and this is the key aspect of 
gang life identified in the gang definition that has been used to identify them. In 
what follows we examine the dimensions of group involvement in crime and 
violence.
From the  testimonies  of  police  officers,  as  we  have  seen,  gangs  were 
implicated in a range of illegal acts. These ranged from interpersonal violence, 
public disorder such as that involving ‘hanging around’,  intimidating others, 
street robbery, territorial conflict, to street level involvement in the retail sector 
of the illegal drugs trade where they engaged either in selling drugs, ‘running’ 
them for elder more established dealers or robbing other dealers. There was also 
a broad consensus that gang members routinely carried and used weapons such 
as knives or guns with knives appearing to be the weapon most likely to be 
carried. 
The relationship of gangs to more established criminals and organised 
crime  groups  was  also  raised  as  a  key  issue,  though  detailed  intelligence 
!364
supporting this allegation not often supplied. In the words of one elder ex-gang 
member, his involvement in more serious crime occurred from his late teens and 
involved engaging in an array of scams to make money including fraud, raiding 
clubs and bars with his gang to engagement to selling fake jewellery. His entry 
into more organised crime and away from street based fighting occurred, he 
stated, when more organised criminals began to arrive on the scene where these 
were relatives. These included a cousin who had been deported from the USA 
for  weapon  related  offences  and  Jamaican  relatives  heavily  involved  in 
wholesale drug retail. These relations both led to an increase in the serious of 
the  offending  he  was  engaged  with  and  the  level  of  weaponisation  that 
accompanied it
Though front line officers were clear that gangs played a significant role 
in the commission of crime and engaging in a range of violent acts it could be 
noted that police figures on violent street crime do not record much of it as gang 
related. Indeed only a small  percentage of it  is  and this disjunction between 
claims and statistical record bears thinking about. It could be that incidents that 
are gang related are not being recorded. It could also be the case that producing 
clear definitions governing what is gang related and what is not needs to be 
developed. We found no evidence that they were. It  could also be observed, 
however,  that  most  of  the  crimes  blamed  on  gangs  also  appeared  to  be 
perpetrated by people who were not in gangs and who on arrest were not found 
to  have  known  gang  affiliations,  which,  when  pressed,  the  police 
acknowledged. In this category fell a range of violent events from stabbings to 
street robbery and involvement in the drug trade. This issue, if correct, raises 
questions  as  to  how  appropriate  the  current  focus  on  gangs  are  as  the  net 
drivers of serious youth violence.
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What did come through from the interviews with the young men we 
spoke to however was a clear sense that group life was violent where the most 
dangers were posed by young men to each other in what remained a violent 
street world, where in the words of one young man, people could get shot or 
stabbed for a range of ‘stupid’ reasons. What also came across was that violence 
could be both expressive and instrumental. That is, it could arise spontaneously 
in the context of a personal disagreement or be planned and perpetrated in the 
commission of a criminal act. It also appears to be the case that in the street 
world that the young men we studied existed, violence could suddenly flair up 
in  a  world  where  business  imperatives  for  mobilising  violence  and  more 
personal  ones  intersected  messily  with  each  other.  The  motives  for  using 
violence thus varied as did the contexts where violence was deployed.
Though criminal endeavour appeared to be part of the lifeworld of the 
groups  studied  in  the  target  areas,  it  was  violence  that  appeared  the  most 
problematic aspect of their day to day lives of young men we spoke to. What 
made the violence in which they were implicated often serious and sometimes 
lethal was that weapons could and were being used. These included knives and 
guns, but clubs were also mentioned as an issue. 
Interpersonal  violence  appeared  to  be  a  potent  risk  that  any  group 
potentially faced once they left the relative security of their endz. It could erupt, 
moreover, out of nowhere and what might appear to most for very insignificant 
reasons. For example, as one young man described, one group of men left their 
area for a club in Erdington one evening. It was getting late and the weather wet 
and rainy and a number left. About 15 remained. They walked round a corner to 
find themselves facing a larger group of older men (elders) and these carried 
knives and staves. Violence ensued. Two young men had just left college and 
entered a chip shop to get some lunch. Two other young men from elsewhere 
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were  there  and an altercation broke  out  outside  the  shop.  Two men started 
fighting another one reached for a knife. The narrator’s hand was cut in this 
incident. A group of four men were enjoying a stroll through the city centre. 
Another group passed them but looked at them ‘the wrong way’. They entered 
a shop and the group followed. A fight subsequently ensued. 
The seriousness of the violence here was attested by the fact that not only 
had every one of the young people we interviewed experienced violence of this 
sort, but everyone knew friends and acquaintances that had been stabbed and 
shot.  In  their  world  this  was  an  everyday  hazard.  Serious  violence  was  a 
normalised aspect of their lifeworld
Conclusions
As we saw in the introduction among the many sensational claims made 
about gangs are that they are large and corporate in structure,  exercise total 
control over the estates where they are based, forcibly recruit members, and are 
armed  with  various  weapons  of  choice.  The  research  we  conducted  in 
Birmingham  was  designed  as  a  reality  check  on  this,  the  hard  side  of  the 
contemporary  gang  talking  inventory.  As  would  have  become clear  there  is 
considerable  disjunction  between  the  sensational  claims  made  about  gangs 
within  this  inventory  and a  street  reality  we discovered that  appeared very 
different.  Let  us  summarise  our  findings  before  considering  some  policy 
implications
Though mindful  of  what  the  enforcement  agencies  were  telling  us,  it 
appeared to  us  that  the  groups  we were  dealing  with  in  the  area  were  not 
corporate or hierarchical. They were best characterised as volatile informal peer 
groups,  not  urban street  gangs.  To this  extent  our typology of  street  groups 
worked (see Hallsworth & Young, 2005). Nor, as we have observed, did these 
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groups do the kind of gang like things that have been attributed to the urban 
street gang. They did not have forcible recruitment strategies, they did not have 
initiation  ceremonies  and  nor  did  they  have  formal  ranks  or  leaders.  The 
research findings then tended to chime rather more with the gang sceptic side of 
the academic gang debate rather than with the work of those who like Harding, 
Pitts  and  Toy  discover  corporate  gang  Leviathans.  It  also  most  definitely 
challenged the government orthodoxy represented by the work of the Centre for 
Social  Justice,  the  key government  authority  on the  subject  of  gangs.  Going 
further we would suggest in a world where debating the meaning of the world 
gang has commanded considerable attention, the grandfather of gang research 
Frederick Thrasher definition of the term ‘a group that forms spontaneously but 
is  integrated through conflict’  captured succinctly  what  we found (Thrasher, 
1927).
The young men in the groups we studied however were territorial and 
violent territorialism was clearly a serious issue in their lives. Though this is 
most certainly the case, the extent to which territorialism was a gang issue alone 
is open to question. As Kintrea et al. (2008) work on the role of territorialism in 
young  people’s  lives  found,  many  young  people  are  territorial.  The  young 
people we spoke to were not territorial because they were in gangs, they were 
simply reproducing in their conduct a cultural trait that has a long history and 
is  widely  distributed (see  also  Hallsworth,  2013 for  a  historical  take  on this 
trend).  To put  this  a  different  way,  violent  territorialism is  not  a  product  of 
urban street gangs and their gangness, it is an inescapable part of street culture 
in  a  world  where  every  occupant  will  identify  with  their  territory  and  be 
identified in turn with the territory they come from by outsiders. The young 
men we spoke to  all  identified the  risks  and dangers  associated with  being 
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where others do not want you. The contexts for violence could not, as we have 
seen, simply be laid at the door of the urban street gang.
The discovery of the urban street gang has been driven by wider fears of 
its  role in driving violence in general  and weaponised violence in particular 
forward. As I hope we would have made clear in this paper, the young men we 
interviewed  lived  violent  lives.  Indeed,  going  further,  violence  was  a 
disturbingly  normalized  part  of  their  everyday  reality,  and  weapons  were 
clearly present in this reality and were often used. However prior to jumping to 
the conclusion that  it  was the gang that  was responsible for this,  we would 
argue  instead  that  framing  the  problem  of  violence  in  this  way  is  both 
irresponsibly reductive and misses a broader picture we need to recognize is we 
are to understand the very real violence that exists in the areas we studied. As 
we saw when we studied the violence the young men we interviewed were 
involved in, it was difficult to blame all of it on their group belongings. Badging 
it up as ‘gang related’ in this sense was not helpful. The violence that found 
them might have nothing to do with their gang belonging and many people not 
in gangs appeared to be doing the violent things being blamed on gangs
In a  nutshell,  the  problem of  serious  violence  we have explored here 
could not be reduced to gangs alone. The problem here is that by constituting 
the gang as the sole object of analysis,  by in effect,  reifying the gang, so the 
wider violent ecology of the street and its determining role in shaping violence 
is lost in a gaze that simply reduces difference and complexity to a mono causal 
obsession about groups called gangs. Which again suggests that to get to the 
truth of the violence it pays as Hallsworth (2013) argues to ‘look beyond the 
gang’  and  study  the  wider  street  ecology  in  which  the  kind  of  groups  we 
describe here operate. 
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Which takes us logically to the policy implications of our research which 
was,  as  we have observed,  conducted in  a  context  where  gangs were  being 
blamed  for  all  and  every  manifestation  of  urban  violence,  and  where  gang 
suppression was touted as the logical policy response. If,  as we have argued 
here,  the  problem  of  violence  manifestly  evident  in  areas  like  Handsworth 
cannot be reduced to a problem of large corporate gangs conceptualised as a 
potent  developing  threat,  then  this  must  surely  raise  questions  about  the 
appropriateness  of  making gang suppression the  panacea  to  a  violent  street 
reality that bears little relation to the gang talk mobilised to describe it. As Don 
Quixote discovered long ago, tilting at windmills is not a good thing.
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